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      Punishment in International Society : Norms, Justice, and Punitive Practices 

      Why Sanctioning?

      edited-book
      Oxford University PressNew York

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          Abstract

          The mainstream international relations scholarship on sanctions overwhelmingly concludes that if the success of sanctions is measured by the change of the target’s behavior, then sanctions do not work. But if sanctions “do not work,” why are they increasingly popular? This chapter seeks to answer this question with the help of interdisciplinary scholarship on punishment, with the goal of connecting the political science insights on sanctions with broader scholarship on punishment. The practice of sanctioning countries reflects three contributions of the punitive lens on international politics: It shows which norms are at the core of international order (and deserve to be protected by the punitive responses), it demonstrates structures of power and authority (and the right to sanctions), and it shows where the potential for cooperation is in international politics.

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          Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work

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            On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia

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              Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion

              Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
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                Author and book information

                Book Chapter
                February 27 2024
                : 118-140
                10.1093/oso/9780197693483.003.0006
                d252d1b0-0839-4157-b004-759f6b738aaa
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