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James M. Buchanan : A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy
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Editor(s):
Richard E. Wagner
Publication date
(Print):
2018
Publisher:
Springer International Publishing
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There is no author summary for this book yet. Authors can add summaries to their books on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.
Related collections
World Review of Political Economy
Author and book information
Book
ISBN (Print):
978-3-030-03079-7
ISBN (Electronic):
978-3-030-03080-3
Publication date (Print):
2018
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3
SO-VID:
56b36c87-e158-4d8e-bcab-2acb55623312
License:
http://www.springer.com/tdm
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Book chapters
pp. 1
Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why Is He Significant?
pp. 13
What Should Economists Do Now?
pp. 39
Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan
pp. 65
James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist
pp. 85
James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program
pp. 109
Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-Based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy
pp. 133
The Conflict Between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods
pp. 147
Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments
pp. 169
The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments
pp. 187
Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a Mostly Private Good
pp. 205
Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand
pp. 235
The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons
pp. 263
Contraception Without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraceptive Insurance Mandates
pp. 291
Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity
pp. 315
Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality
pp. 337
Constitutional, Political and Behavioral Feasibility
pp. 359
Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution
pp. 383
Blockchains as Constitutional Orders
pp. 399
The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie
pp. 425
Beneficent Bullshit
pp. 441
Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy
pp. 467
Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the Work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom
pp. 487
On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion
pp. 511
Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire
pp. 539
James M. Buchanan: Political Economist, Consistent Individualist
pp. 577
A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project
pp. 603
Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled
pp. 627
Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice
pp. 649
Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar
pp. 671
Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions
pp. 693
James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals
pp. 713
From Highway to Clubs: Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods
pp. 741
In Defense of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism
pp. 769
Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus
pp. 807
The Constitution of Markets
pp. 839
The Extent of the Market and Ethics
pp. 853
When Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government
pp. 883
Rules Versus Discretion in Criminal Sentencing
pp. 903
Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist
pp. 921
From Models to Experiments; James Buchanan and Charles Plott
pp. 941
Rules Versus Authorities: Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy
pp. 965
The Quest for Fiscal Rules
pp. 991
The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt
pp. 1009
Can There Be Such a Thing as Legitimate Public Debt in Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared
pp. 1031
Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements
pp. 1053
Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program
pp. 1079
Paretian Fiscal Sociology
pp. 1105
Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and Beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice
pp. 1131
The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic
pp. 1155
Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on His Wall Despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics
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