Introduction
This article employs settler colonialism theory to examine the evolution of Zionism as a colonial movement within and beyond historical Palestine, with a focus on Indigenous Diplomatic Resistance (IDR) from 1882 to 1914. It revisits the historical context that shaped Indigenous diplomatic responses during this period by offering a critical analysis of this resistance and draws on various theories of Michel Foucault to support that analysis.
To frame this analysis, the article establishes a theoretical foundation based on settler colonialism theory. This involves an examination of Patrick Wolfe’s and other scholars’ contributions, which help differentiate settler colonialism from other forms. Wolfe’s works (2006) are central due to their comprehensive treatment of the structural aspects of settler colonialism, providing a foundational understanding for this paper. A review of relevant literature includes seminal works by Wolfe, Lorenzo Veracini (2011), and Rachel Busbridge (2018). This review also incorporates critical perspectives from J. Kēhaulani Kauanui (2016) and Jean M. O’Brien (2017) to address theoretical limitations related to Indigenous perspectives and resistance strategies. Theoretical mapping helps situate the Palestinian context in relation to broader settler-colonial dynamics and offers insights into how colonial narratives are constructed and maintained, a concept that aligns with Foucault’s discussion on the historical production of knowledge (Foucault 1972: 7–9).
The study introduces the concept of “diplomatic resistance” as a new framework. It is developed using existing literature on diplomatic strategies of resistance movements from international relations, history, and political science, including works by Max Paul Friedman (2010), Robert Kendall Brigham (1999), and Harish Mehta (2009).
Diplomatic resistance, rather than being merely a way of negotiating with settler-colonial powers, reflects a strategic engagement with power dynamics. Drawing on Foucault’s idea that power is not simply imposed but constantly reshaped through interactions and discourses (Foucault 1990: 92–94), diplomacy becomes a relational form of resistance. It embodies both a challenge to and a negotiation within the structures of power, aligning with Foucault’s concept of power as a fluid and reciprocal process.
By re-examining Indigenous Palestinian diplomatic resistance through the lens of settler colonialism, this study contributes to the fields of settler-colonial and Palestinian studies. This work draws from Foucault’s concept of resistance not as opposition alone, but as embedded in the very structures of power. Specifically, Palestinians’ engagement with the Ottoman Empire’s imperial system can be seen through Foucault’s lens of disciplinary power and surveillance, as it demonstrates how power structures operate to regulate and control resistance (Foucault 1991: 204–206).
A significant aspect of this study is its integration of Indigenous perspectives. This addresses the limitations of current theories and provides an understanding of Indigenous resistance. Furthermore, the study proposes an extension of the settler colonialism theory by incorporating diplomatic resistance as an analytical component. This will enhance the theoretical understanding of Indigenous resistance and offer new insights into the dynamics between Indigenous peoples and settler-colonial powers. This study’s use of diplomacy as resistance builds on Foucault’s notion that resistance is not just a counter-action but part of the productive forces that challenge power structures, as seen in the Palestinian case (Foucault 1990: 92–94).
This framework is applied to the Palestinian struggle because of the history of resistance against settler-colonial powers. This case provides empirical grounding for theoretical insights and demonstrates how diplomatic resistance functions in a settler-colonial context. Foucault’s ideas about how power and knowledge intersect help us understand the historical narratives produced during this period and how these narratives framed Indigenous resistance (Foucault 1972: 7–9).
Whilst scholars like Ilan Pappé, Rashid Khalidi, and Abdul-Wahab Kayyali have significantly contributed to understanding the broader context of Palestinian resistance, there remains a gap in the literature in terms of conceptualizing the diplomatic strategies employed by Palestinians against settler colonialism.
The gap underscores the need for further exploration of diplomatic resistance, acknowledging its potential as a key component of Palestinian strategies from 1882 to 1914. Investigating this aspect would increase understanding of the political efforts of Palestinians and Palestinian responses to the Zionist settler-colonial project. Such a study would enrich current scholarship by shedding light on important dimensions of Palestinian resistance.
It is important to shed new light on the emergence of IDR to the Zionist settler-colonial project in Palestine because of this gap. This article re-examines methods and avenues of political and diplomatic resistance employed by Palestinians, including petitions to the Ottoman Government, engaging in negotiations, forming commissions, and lobbying to halt Zionist immigration and land purchases. These actions reflect strategic engagement with the political and social structures of the time, as discussed in Foucault’s work on resistance (Foucault 1990: 92–94).
Re-examining (Palestinian) IDR through the lens of settler colonialism contributes to settler-colonial and Palestinian studies and this article emphasizes the significance of diplomatic resistance as an essential yet neglected form of resistance. Foucault’s ideas on power and resistance are crucial in this context, as they help explain how the interplay of power relations shapes the effectiveness of resistance movements (Foucault 1991: 204–206).
It is important to acknowledge Lori Allen’s critique of Palestinian diplomacy, even though the focus is after 1914. Allen’s A History of False Hope (2021) highlights the challenges Palestinian diplomats faced, including structural power imbalances and internal tensions, during the British Mandate period. Her analysis of investigative commissions as mechanisms of colonial control underscores the ways these commissions created an illusion of justice whilst perpetuating oppression. Foucault’s notion of how institutions construct truth through power is relevant here, as these commissions functioned to maintain colonial hierarchies whilst presenting themselves as neutral entities (Foucault 1972: 7–9). Whilst Allen critiques later diplomatic efforts, this study examines an earlier phase under Ottoman rule, when Palestinians approached diplomacy with cautious optimism. It explores how this period set the stage for the later disillusionment Allen describes.
This study investigates pre-mandate Palestine by analyzing how Palestinians under Ottoman rule initially approached diplomatic mechanisms with optimism. Unlike the British investigative commissions critiqued by Allen, which were explicitly colonial in their design and implementation, the Ottoman system represented a different form of imperial governance. Palestinian petitions and appeals were directed to an empire to which they ostensibly belonged, reflecting a belief in the possibility of redress within a shared political framework. However, these early diplomatic efforts were constrained by similar structural power imbalances, including class-based leadership, Ottoman priorities that conflicted with local Palestinian needs, and the imperial administration’s limited capacity to address settler-colonial pressures. Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between power and social structures helps explain how even these early diplomatic efforts were influenced by broader imperial forces (Foucault 1991: 204–206).
Allen’s conclusions diverge from this article’s focus by presenting a more critical assessment of Indigenous diplomacy, particularly under British rule, where she identifies diplomatic efforts as complicit in maintaining colonial structures. She demonstrates how British commissions constructed narratives that reinforced imperial control whilst presenting themselves as neutral arbiters of justice. Furthermore, Allen critiques the ways in which Palestinian actors navigated these commissions, arguing that the reliance on such mechanisms often diluted grassroots resistance and entrenched hierarchies within Palestinian society. Whilst this paper acknowledges Allen’s critiques, it suggests that the earlier period under Ottoman rule represents a phase of cautious experimentation with diplomatic channels, before the full disillusionment Allen describes took hold.
Foucault’s insights into the production of knowledge and the functioning of institutions as power mechanisms provide a useful framework for understanding how these diplomatic engagements shaped Palestinian resistance (Foucault 1990: 92–94).
The study explores questions related to the impact of Zionist policies on Palestinian society and the responses of Palestinians. It also examines how these developments contributed to the emergence of diplomatic resistance. Integrating theoretical insights with historical evidence advances the discourse on Palestinian history and settler colonialism. Foucault’s framework on power relations helps to clarify how different forms of resistance, including diplomatic efforts, are part of broader systems of colonial power (Foucault 1991: 204–206).
The first section of the article reviews settler colonialism theory, explaining its significance and exploring its weaknesses, particularly in relation to Indigenous voices. The second section introduces IDR within the settler-colonial framework and examines its application to Palestine. The final section reconstructs diplomatic strategies of Indigenous resistance in Palestine from 1882 to 1914 and revisits historical circumstances and forms of resistance.
Settler Colonialism
Settler colonialism is particularly premised on the liquidation and erasure of natives and their cultures whilst replacing them with settlers. The logic of settler colonialism depends on the elimination of natives. It is achieved through genocide, repression, ethnic cleansing, and assimilation. Patrick Wolfe states that since settler colonialism “destroys to replace”, it is “inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal” (Wolf 2006: 4).
Wolfe says that settler colonialism is not merely classified as one of the forms of genocide and that there are many examples of genocide without a connection to settler colonialism. He emphasizes that “elimination refers to more than the summary liquidation of Indigenous peoples, though it includes that” (Wolfe 2006: 4).
Settler colonialism can be described as systemic and not as a historical event that happened in the past and has now ceased. It is an ongoing structure that erases the lives of natives and, via land invasion tactics, erases Indigenous knowledge, heritage, and civilization. Foucault’s concept of biopower is central here, as it explains how modern power operates not only through repression but also by managing populations, often by controlling knowledge, norms, and systems of governance (Foucault 1990: 140). The colonial logic of elimination relies heavily on this form of power, as it frames Indigenous lives as obstacles to be governed or erased for the benefit of settlers.
As Foucault argued in The Archaeology of Knowledge, power establishes regimes of truth, defining what is “normal” and whose knowledge is legitimate. Settler-colonial systems impose epistemic dominance, systematically marginalizing Indigenous knowledge systems whilst legitimizing settler narratives (Foucault 1972: 131). This epistemic violence complements the physical violence of settler colonialism, creating a dual mechanism of erasure.
Invaders eliminate and uproot the natives systematically from their lands as a precondition to replace the natives with new settlers and build a new colonial society. Patrick Wolfe states that settler colonizers “come to stay”, asserting that “invasion is a structure, not an event” (Wolfe 2006). In this framework, it is worth considering that there are some differences between classic colonialism and settler colonialism in terms of their objectives and strategies.
Rachel Busbridge points out that classic colonialism focuses on a logic of exploitation, whereas settler colonialism is premised on a logic of elimination (Busbridge 2018). Similarly, Lorenzo Veracini argues that:
Colonisers in classic colonialism use a logic of commodification to demand that Indigenous peoples “work for them”, whilst settler colonizers use a logic of evacuation to demand that Indigenous peoples “go away”, clearing the land for agriculture and resource extraction by imported labourers. (Veracini 2011: 1)
Thus, Wolfe and Veracini contribute to distinguishing settler colonialism as an object of academic study distinct from classic colonialism (Cox 2017).
The imposition of settler colonialism as an analytical framework reflects Foucault’s insights into the discursive formation of colonial systems (Foucault 1972: 193). Settler colonialism enforces legitimacy by creating a discourse that renders Indigenous peoples as inferior or “other”, systematically erasing their voices and histories. Foucault’s lectures in Society Must Be Defended elaborate on how sovereign power and biopower intersect, particularly through the concept of racism as a mechanism of power. In settler-colonial contexts, these mechanisms are deployed to justify the elimination of Indigenous peoples, whether through violence, assimilation, or exclusion (Foucault 2003).
Settler colonialism as an analytical framework has conceptual impacts in terms of explaining the logic of the elimination of Indigenous people throughout history, so it can be regarded as an important paradigm for comprehending conflicts in places such as Palestine, Kenya, and Argentina. Furthermore, it is useful in analyzing the legacies of the colonial empires that engaged extensively in the foundation of Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, and South Africa (Barker and Battell-Lowman 2015).
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to settler colonialism theory as a significant analytical framework for explaining the strategies of colonial powers in terms of the logic behind the elimination of natives. However, there is still some controversy surrounding the theory, as it fails to consider the voices of Indigenous people.
The theory neglects their struggle, sovereignty, knowledge, culture, traditions, perspectives, and historical resistance against colonial powers. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui investigates how settler colonialism as an analytic paradigm is insufficient, arguing that it must be contextualized in relation to indigeneity (Kēhaulani Kauanui 2016).
Likewise, Jean M. O’Brien emphasizes that the voices of Indigenous people were dropped from the paradigm, and no methods for analyzing the history of Indigenous peoples’ resistance were offered (O’Brien 2017). Pappé criticizes the theory despite how it enables scholars to depict Zionism as a settler colonialist movement, as “it ignores the perspective of Indigenous people in Palestine” (Pappé 2015: 59).
Despite the dispute surrounding the theory’s insufficiency, the possibilities of addressing the weaknesses can be valuable for improving and extending settler colonialism theory through integrating the political, cultural, and social issues of Indigenous peoples within it. This contributes to the re-raising of Indigenous voices. Robert Warrior attempts to regain an understanding of settler colonialism within the context of the Indigenous framework. His argument puts the analytical paradigm on a historical and political track to overcoming obstacles that prevent Indigenous voices from being heard. Hence, Warrior’s contribution curbs the re-telling of the narratives of settlers and contributes to raising the voices of the Indigenous people (Kēhaulani Kauanui 2016).
Marcelo Svirsky also offers a framework that considers the expansion of settler colonialism theory. He argues that resistance is part of a structure, not an event. Indigenous struggles should be explained as part of structural resistance against settler colonialism. He suggests incorporating resistance into the paradigm as part of the structure (Svirsky 2017: 12).
Despite the contribution of scholars whose work improves the efficiency of settler colonialism theory, inadequate attention has been given to the diplomacy of the resistance movements of Indigenous people. There are strategic, objective, and principal aspects to this diplomacy. However, it is yet to be systematically conceptualized. This gap in the literature still exists, despite the vital history of the Indigenous struggle at the international level and their achievements such as:
International Year of the World’s Indigenous People (1993).
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (1994).
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).
World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (2014).
These accomplishments can be regarded as the culmination of Indigenous struggles at the international level (United Nations 2020).
Acknowledging this deficiency of settler-colonial theory, this article proposes a new approach by highlighting the role that diplomacy can play in Indigenous resistance. By developing a conceptual framework for the notion of “IDR” within the settler-colonial context, this article explores the positive role diplomacy can play when applied in the Indigenous resistance context. Settlers have been able to rely on the doctrine surrounding the notion of “domestic dependent” nations, which makes IDR in the international arena a crucial site of struggle.
Diplomatic Resistance
The notion of diplomatic resistance is utilized in international relations and peace and conflict studies but is referred to by different names in different contexts. Max Paul Friedman utilized it in his article “Latin American Diplomatic Resistance to United States Intervention in Guatemala in 1954” (Friedman 2010). Robert Kendall Brigham also addressed what he called “guerrilla diplomacy” in “Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War” (Brigham 1999: 181). Harish Mehta has analyzed the “People’s Diplomacy” as one of the international methods of resistance and demonstrates its use by the Diplomatic Front of North Vietnam during its war against the United States (1965–1972) (Mehta 2009).
The literature on diplomacy for resistance movements provides some lessons that can be taken from the liberation movement’s experiences. The work in this field may contribute to achieving some of the goals of this research such as conceptualizing Indigenous diplomatic strategies. Whilst scholars have focused on analyzing and explaining the international struggle of liberation movements, investigations can contribute by conceptualizing a specific kind of diplomacy used by the resistance movements of Indigenous peoples against colonial powers. This has not been conceptualized based on settler colonialism theory, nor is it included in the theories of diplomacy. This is in spite of the fact that these movements around the world have become a major force shaping contemporary political conflicts, especially in terms of achieving political resolution through diplomacy (Dudouet 2009).
In a Foucauldian framework, diplomatic resistance (IDR) can be understood as a form of counter-conduct, a tactic of resistance against the colonial governance structures that shape Indigenous peoples’ lives. Foucault describes counter-conduct as the forms of resistance that emerge from within the very structures that attempt to govern and regulate (Foucault 2007: 165).
In the case of Indigenous resistance, IDR is not merely reactive, but a strategy that works within the global systems of power, particularly the international diplomatic institutions, to challenge colonialism’s continuing dominance over Indigenous peoples. By engaging in diplomatic resistance, Indigenous movements are not only contesting the external violence and oppression imposed by settler-colonial powers but also the global knowledge systems that legitimize these colonial power structures.
Whilst there is no standard definition of the term IDR, this paper will use this term to refer to methods of international struggle such as negotiations, alliance building, lobbying governments or parliaments, fundraising, and dealing with international diplomatic intervention. Historically, Indigenous diplomatic practice can be perceived as “resistance” because it usually develops as a response to colonial or imperial initiatives and projects. However, this kind of resistance is not simply a form of nonviolent opposition to an oppressive project. IDR can be described as the variety of avenues of international diplomacy used by an Indigenous society against colonial powers. It can be defined as a political-diplomatic strategy combining diplomacy with pressure, resistance, and advocacy methods.
Foucault’s insights into biopolitics and sovereignty are relevant here: In Society Must Be Defended (2003 [1976]), Foucault explains how modern forms of power work through the regulation and management of populations, utilizing mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (Foucault 2003: 242–246). Indigenous diplomacy thus operates within and against these biopolitical mechanisms, leveraging international systems of legitimacy to challenge settler-colonial domination.
By framing resistance through diplomacy, Indigenous groups seek to disrupt the colonial “truths” and the sovereign power established by colonial regimes, aiming to reassert their sovereignty within global political and legal structures. Diplomacy in the context of Indigenous resistance is not an avenue of cooperation with colonial powers nor an alternative method of resistance. It can be classified as one of the tactics that resistance movements use in their struggle to accomplish liberty and independence from the domination of settler-colonial powers.
From Foucault’s perspective, resistance is not just about opposing external power but about redefining the terms of governance and identity. Foucault’s ideas on power highlight that resistance is embedded within power relations, meaning that IDR is not simply the opposite of settler colonialism, but part of a larger struggle to reshape the power dynamics at work (Foucault 1978: 95–96).
Diplomatic resistance can be seen as a practice that challenges the legitimacy of settler-colonial governance by asserting Indigenous autonomy and sovereignty within international forums. In this way, resistance becomes a transformative act that engages with and disrupts the global system of settler-colonial power, reshaping the terms of Indigenous identity and nationhood on the international stage.
This was clarified with the passing of the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 3246 of 29 November 1974, reaffirming “the legitimacy of the peoples’ struggle for liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means, including armed struggle” (Sigler 2004). Thus, diplomatic resistance can be regarded as one of the strategies of resistance movements in their struggle against settler-colonial powers. It has been shaped as part of the collective effort organized by a people (or nation) to maintain or regain freedoms, assets, and historical standing and is developed in a given territory.
According to Foucault, such resistance is not simply opposition to the status quo but part of a broader function of power that continually redefines the boundaries between the governed and the governing. In this case, IDR repositions Indigenous peoples in the global political sphere, asserting that their sovereignty and self-determination are legitimate and that settler-colonial rule is fundamentally unjust (Foucault 1982: 220).
IDR, as understood in this context, aligns with Foucault’s idea that resistance is immanent to power and necessary to the functioning of power relations (Foucault 1982: 229). Whilst settler colonialism seeks to impose a singular narrative of dominance and control, IDR works within and against these structures, creating new possibilities for Indigenous people to engage politically, reclaim their land, culture, and identity, and reclaim the means of governance over their own futures. In this sense, IDR becomes a powerful tool not only for challenging the settler-colonial state but for redefining the very terms of the colonial encounter on the world stage.
Contextualizing Settler Colonialism and Diplomatic Resistance in Palestine
The Dynamics of The Zionist Colonial Movement
From its inception, the Zionist Colonial Movement realized the importance of international support for its colonial project in Palestine. Zionists engaged in diplomatic efforts to build alliances with the major colonial powers of the time. Theodor Herzl, a leading founder of the modern Zionist movement, presented his idea to establish a basis for a future Jewish state in Palestine to Germany, Britain, Russia, France, Belgium, and Portugal. In attempting to convince the Europeans, he offered mutual colonial interests linking Zionism with Europe in the establishment of a Jewish political entity in Palestine. The Zionist movement sought to connect its colonial interests with those of other countries to support its colonial project in Palestine (Al-Hakam 1973).
This strategic alignment resonates with Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, where power functions through networks of influence, alliances, and the shaping of conduct (Foucault 1991: 93). Herzl’s diplomatic strategies exemplify the exercise of power not just through direct domination but by aligning with existing colonial structures to secure legitimacy and control. Herzl said, “We should there form a portion of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. We should as a neutral state remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence” (Herzl 1976: 30).
This was one of the most important tactics of the Zionist movement in the diplomatic sphere. For instance, Herzl said:
We should there form a portion of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. We should as a neutral state remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence. (Herzl 1976: 30)
Herzl’s statement reflects a colonial mindset that aligns with Michel Foucault’s theories of power, biopolitics, and the production of “truth”. Herzl frames the Zionist state as an “outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism”, employing a discourse of inclusion and exclusion that, as Foucault elaborates in Society Must Be Defended (2003), operates to regulate life and populations. This dichotomy legitimizes the Zionist colonial project by portraying Europe as the pinnacle of civilization whilst characterizing Asia—and by extension, Palestine—as a space requiring transformation.
Furthermore, Herzl’s reliance on European powers to guarantee the Zionist state’s existence reflects Foucault’s notion of sovereignty as the “power to make live and let die”. In this context, European colonial powers acted as arbiters of legitimacy, deciding who would thrive and who would be marginalized or eliminated. This dependence on European sovereignty underscores how Zionism positioned itself within broader structures of colonial dominance, solidifying its political survival through alignment with imperial powers.
Additionally, Herzl’s vision of the Zionist state as a “portion of Europe” reflects Foucault’s insights into the territorialization of power. This aligns with Foucault’s argument that modern power is inherently spatial, governing through territorial control and the reordering of populations. Herzl’s framing of the Jewish state as an extension of Europe reinforced the Zionist movement’s legitimacy within colonial paradigms, whilst simultaneously constructing Indigenous Palestinians as outside the norms of inclusion and civilization.
The Zionist movement preceded the Palestinians at the international level, mainly as it emerged in Europe and started its activities there. As Ann Mosely Lesch states:
In Palestine, the Zionist Organization was much more effective in gaining external support for the Jewish community than was the Arab leadership. The Arabs appealed to the League of Nations and to British public opinion, but they could not sustain these efforts or win meaningful support. (Mosely Lesch 1979: 20–21)
Between 1882 and 1914, the colonial encounter between Zionist immigrant settlers and Indigenous Palestinians disrupted the existing equilibrium of Palestinian life, marking a tipping point that ultimately led to the establishment of a new socio-political system in the region. This transformation aligns with Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics, where colonial power exerts control over life, managing populations to serve its objectives (Foucault 2003: 242). The imposition of settler society exemplifies a shift in governance and identity, moving Palestinians from being stewards of their land to objects of a colonial project.
The Filastin newspaper in 1913 poignantly described the shared life of Indigenous people in Palestine before the transformation caused by the Zionist Colonial Movement:
The Jews were living as Ottoman brothers loved by all the Ottoman races. Living in the same quarters, their children are going to the same schools. The Zionists put an end to all that and prevented any intermingling with the Indigenous population. They boycotted the Arabic language and the Arab merchants and declared their intention of taking over the country from its inhabitants. (cited in Pappé 2015: 59)
The Zionist movement, utilizing the Jewish immigrant settlers and the capital invested in them, did not merge with the native society but sought to replace it. Foucault’s concept of sovereignty—the power to “make live and let die”—provides a lens to understand this process. Zionist strategies, such as the eviction of Palestinian peasants, underscore the biopolitical aim to transform the land and population to serve the colonial agenda (Foucault 2003: 241).
Arthur Ruppin, the foremost land expert in the Jewish Agency, explained the Zionist colonial strategy:
Land is the most necessary thing for our establishing roots in Palestine. Since there are hardly any more arable unsettled lands in Palestine, we are bound in each case of the purchase of land and its settlement to remove the peasants who cultivated the land so far, both owners of the land and tenants. (cited in Mandel 1976: 20)
This colonial Zionist practice in Palestine embodies settler colonialism theory, particularly its emphasis on the elimination of native populations to establish settler hegemony. The intersection of settler colonialism and Foucault’s frameworks highlights how resistance emerges not merely as opposition but as a redefinition of governance and sovereignty, contesting the biopolitical management of life and land.
Origins of “IDR” in Palestine: Historical Circumstances and Context
In these circumstances, it is important to understand the origins of IDR in Palestine against colonial Zionist policies by contextualizing it within historical factors that contributed to its emergence, notably, how the resistance of Indigenous peasants (fellaheen) played a significant role and had considerable political and international implications during this period. They resisted the new Zionist colonies as a reaction to land confiscation by Zionist settlers.
Rashid Khalidi argues that the peasants (fellaheen) struggled hard against the new Zionist settlers who purchased Palestinian lands and replaced Arab wage labourers and peasants with Jewish workers (Khalidi 1997: 69). The first recorded Palestinian reaction against Jewish immigration came in 1886 when Palestinian fellaheen resisted the Jewish settlers in Al-Khdirah and Petah Tiqva (Mandel 1976: 20). As a result, these circumstances highlighted the threat posed by the Zionist colonial project in Palestine. These pivotal historical events had substantial political and diplomatic consequences.
Palestinian intellectuals, politicians, and journalists were alarmed by the threat of Zionism. Figures such as Ruhi al-Khalidi, Najib Nassar, and Issa El-Isa (among others) were crucial in highlighting the dangers posed by Zionism and its settler-colonial project in Palestine. Their concerted efforts were directed towards exposing the true objectives and dangers associated with Zionism. They intensified efforts to raise awareness about the colonial project’s threats in Palestine by establishing newspapers and publishing articles, manuscripts, and books to engage with various segments of Palestinian and Arab society. Newspapers in Palestine constituted one of the most effective means of raising awareness among Palestinians and Arabs regarding the perils associated with the Zionist movement and its colonial objectives in Palestine (Tamari 2008: 22).
These newspapers offered insightful perspectives on the Zionist colonial project, highlighting Indigenous viewpoints and proposing strategies for resistance. Arab newspapers closely monitored the Zionist movement’s developments in Europe and its activities within Palestine. Newspapers in Palestine, such as Al Karmel and Filastin, criticized the Zionist movement and its political goals. Al Karmel is regarded as the first Palestinian newspaper to highlight the dangerous objectives of the Zionist movement in Palestine (Neal 1995: 23). Najib Nassar, founder and editor of Al Karmel, warned Palestinians about the dangers posed by the growing strength of the Zionist movement in Palestine. He urged them to thwart its plans and colonial activities. Nassar also published a book on Zionism, in which he outlined the objectives of the Zionist movement (Ayyad 1999: 23). He analyzed the methods employed by the Zionists to achieve their goals and criticized Ottoman policy for failing to protect Palestinian lands from Zionist acquisition (Mandel 1976: 127).
It is interesting to note that Palestinians analyzed and portrayed Zionism as a settler-colonial movement. Their descriptions of Zionism correspond to the settler-colonial paradigm articulated by scholars 100 years later. As Ilan Pappé emphasizes on the eve of the First World War, the Filastin newspaper portrayed the Zionist movement as a settler-colonial movement, like scholars and academics who have analyzed it as such more than a century later (Pappé 2015: 3). As well, Al Karmel raised questions about the danger of Zionism such as “should we allow the Zionists to revive their nationalism at the expense of our nationalism? Have we agreed upon selling them our land piece by piece until they expel us from our land in groups and on an individual basis?” (Ayyad 1999: 51). Palestinian intellectuals concluded that not only did Zionists want to occupy Palestine, but also replace the Indigenous Palestinian people (rather than integrate with them) and create a new colonial society in Palestine. They portrayed Zionism as a settler-colonial movement. Their analysis can be viewed as integral to settler-colonial theory. So, it seems reasonable to assume that the positions of the newspapers and the intellectuals in Palestine reflected their consciousness regarding the settler-colonial project of the Zionist movement in Palestine.
Palestinian diplomatic resistance strategies at the international level, led by prominent Palestinian leaders, extensively relied on lobbying the Ottoman Government to take effective measures to halt Jewish colonial immigration and land purchases by Zionists. The Palestinian strategy of lobbying the Ottoman Government was logical since the Ottoman Government had control over Palestine at that time. In this respect, Mandel confirms that the Ottoman Government had the ability to intensify some effective measures to stop Zionists from migrating to Palestine and purchasing lands, especially if it held administrative and judicial authority (Mandel 1976: 224).
In addition, the Palestinians believed that the Ottoman Government was disposed towards stopping the Zionist movement from attaining their political objectives in Palestine. This was evident when Theodor Herzl (in June of 1896) failed to convince the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, Abdul Hamid II, to buy Palestine or to found an autonomous state or entity for the Jews there. The sultan rejected the proposal of Theodor Herzl, telling him, “I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people” (Neal 1995). Of course, the Zionist movement was not only dangerous for Palestine but also for the Ottoman Empire. This is due to it creating an additional nationalist problem in the empire (Ayyad 1999: 3). The Ottoman Government was also worried about the influx of Jews seeking to stay in Palestine and did not approve of the increasing numbers of Zionist immigrants settling from 1882 onwards. The Ottoman Government was afraid of another national problem erupting within the Ottoman Empire such as the Balkan rebellions. Importantly, the Ottoman Government did not want to expand the influence of the Great Powers in the Empire by allowing an influx of their subjects, especially if they sought to settle in a sensitive place like Palestine with its Holy Places (Mandel 1976: 224).
Sending Petitions to the Ottoman Government
Sending petitions to the Ottoman Government was a key method of diplomatic resistance. Recognizing the threats posed by the Zionist settler-colonial project, Palestinians submitted numerous petitions and telegrams to express their opposition to increased Jewish immigration and Zionist land purchases. Whilst reviewing all petitions is impossible, it is important to highlight the most significant. For example, in 1891, key figures from Jerusalem submitted a petition to the Ottoman rulers, urging them to halt the growing wave of Jewish immigration and prevent the sale of Palestinian land to Zionist settlers. These petitions were crucial in mobilizing both local and international resistance to the Zionist agenda (Laqueur 1972: 120).
Similarly, in 1901, Arab officials in Jerusalem gathered signatures for a petition opposing Zionist immigrants and land acquisitions (Mandel 1976: 224).
In May 1910, the local populations of Nazareth and Haifa sent telegrams to the Ottoman Government rejecting Zionist land purchases. Although these efforts had limited success, they did convey Palestinian resistance to the Zionist colonial project. Despite challenges, Palestinians made progress in lobbying the Ottoman Government. As a result, Ottoman edicts were adjusted to reduce land purchases by Jews in Jerusalem (Mosely Lesch 1979).
Additionally, a commission was established in Jerusalem in 1897 to scrutinize land sales to Jews, effectively halting such transactions for several years. This commission was led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammed Tahir al-Husayni (Beška 2007: 22–25).
It is significant to note that sending letters and petitions arose from the Indigenous people’s concern about the severe consequences of the Zionist colonial project in Palestine. This concern is evident during some contact between Palestinian and Zionist leaders, as demonstrated by Yusuf Dia Pasha al-Khalidi, a member of one of the leading Palestinian families in Jerusalem known for his support of religious tolerance and progressive political ideas. Yusuf Dia Pasha al-Khalidi sent a telegram to Herzl indirectly through Zadoc Kahn, the Chief Rabbi of France, urging Herzl to prevent bloodshed. In his telegram, he stated, “In the name of God, let Palestine be left in peace” (Schneer 2010: 50–55).
This illustrates that the Indigenous people of Palestine have long utilized diplomatic methods to pursue peace, justice, security, and the preservation of their existence.
Negotiation
The negotiation process can be regarded as one of the oldest methods of Palestinian diplomatic resistance. Palestinians have participated in negotiations with the Zionist movement’s leaders for many decades in order to achieve their national goals and demands. For example, there was contact between many Arab groups in Palestine and Zionist representatives between 1913 and 1914, occurring in order to achieve an Arab–Zionist entente. The question is, to what extent did Palestinians achieve progress towards acceptable solutions via negotiation with the Zionist movement? In order to answer this, it is worth looking at the negotiations between Muslims and Jews in Palestine at this time. On 25 November 1914, a congress between Muslims and Jews in Palestine was convened at the seminary for Jewish teachers in Jerusalem. They argue that the congress tied Muslims and Jews together with “respect”. However, this congress failed to achieve important progress (Svirsky and Ben-Arie 2017: 47).
In this context, Neil Caplan’s Futile Diplomacy: Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913–1931 (1983) explains the reasons for the failure of diplomatic efforts. He concludes that by 1914 popular feeling in Palestine was too hostile to the Jews, which prevented such an entente from succeeding (Caplan 2016 [1983]: 24).
Caplan seems to be influenced by Zionist propaganda in explaining the conflict in Palestine as a religious conflict. He ignored the facts regarding the separatist and racist mentality of the Zionist movement and its strategy, which aimed to build an isolated economy independent of the natives of Palestine. They wanted to create their own Zionist organizations and to change the national identity of Palestine into a Jewish region. They refused to integrate with Palestinians. An insightful analysis of Zionist policy can be drawn from the remarks of Yaakov Zerubavel, the editor of Ha’ahdut, which served as the ideological organ for David Ben-Gurion’s political party, Poale Zion (Svirsky and Ben-Arie 2017: 48). In addressing the issue of “Hebrew labour”, Zerubavel argued:
The question of Hebrew labour, in which we have invested significant effort, must be separated from the issue of the relationship between the Yishuv [Jews residing in Israel] and the Arabs. The former is primarily an internal matter, reflecting how we shape our own life, while the latter pertains to external relations and defines our interaction with the broader world. (Svirsky and Ben-Arie 2017: 48)
The term “Hebrew labour” refers to the Zionist movement’s policy of prioritizing Jewish workers in the workforce, particularly in agriculture and industry, as part of efforts to build a self-sustaining Jewish economy in Palestine. This policy led to the systematic exclusion of Palestinian peasants (fellaheen) from their traditional land-based livelihoods. The removal of Palestinians from agricultural work, as well as the acquisition of land by Zionist institutions, resulted in significant economic and social displacement for the Palestinian population.
This policy of exclusion was not merely an isolated economic measure, but rather part of a broader Zionist strategy to reshape the demographic and economic landscape of Palestine. According to Mandel (1976: 224), the introduction of Hebrew labour was intended to create a Jewish-only workforce that would replace Palestinian workers, undermining their ability to support themselves or maintain ownership of their lands. Khalidi (1997: 67–70) also discusses how this economic exclusion contributed to the growing political resistance from the Palestinian leadership, particularly as the impact of the policy became more widespread. Additionally, Finkelstein (2001: 85) and Schulze (2000: 215) highlight that these practices were often accompanied by the strategic purchase of land from “absentee” landowners, which further marginalized the local peasant population.
By recognizing the implications of Hebrew labour policies, we see that the Zionist movement’s economic initiatives were closely linked to its territorial and demographic ambitions. This not only deprived Palestinians of economic opportunities but also played a crucial role in the broader context of land dispossession and displacement that became central to the Palestinian experience in the early 20th century.
The Diplomatic Efforts of Palestinian Representatives in the Ottoman Parliament
Lobbying was one of the most significant diplomatic resistance methods in the Palestinian strategy. Palestinians adopted this form of diplomacy during their resistance at a diplomatic level for a long time. Palestinian representatives in the Ottoman parliament, including figures like Ruhi al-Khalidi, Hafiz As-Sa‘ad Ahmad, and Said al-Husayni, consistently raised concerns about the dangers of Zionist land acquisitions and Jewish immigration. During debates in March and May of 1911, these deputies called for stronger measures to prevent the further purchase of Palestinian lands by Zionist organizations. They specifically pointed to large-scale land deals, such as those in Marj Ibn Amir, which threatened the economic stability of local Arab farmers (Porath 1974: 11–13).
Despite the efforts of Palestinian representatives, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) did not care about this issue (Mandel 1976: 115–116).
In addition, the Arab deputies raised the Zionist issue at a time when the Chamber was not concerned with this question. According to the Constantinople press, in general the deputies were listened to, but not seriously. At its closure on 16 May, only about 50 of the 288 deputies remained in the Chamber (Mandel 1976: 115–116).
In contrast, Neal (1995: 19) emphasized that two of the Palestinian representatives of the Ottoman parliament were known for their enthusiastic speeches against Zionist immigration on other occasions. Moreover, Said al-Husayni, a deputy from Jerusalem, was an expert on Zionist objectives and activities in Palestine and was fluent in Hebrew. Albert Antebi said the feeling of anti-Zionism among the Palestinian peasants increased as a result of the power of the speeches of the Palestinian representatives in the Ottoman parliament, especially Ruhi Khalidi and Shukri al-Asali (Neal 1995: 19).
Given the above, the literature on Palestine illustrates that Palestinian diplomatic resistance is a strategy that has been adopted by Palestinians for a long time at a diplomatic level. Thus, it can be said that Palestinians utilized various diplomatic efforts such as petitions, negotiations, newspapers, forming commissions, lobbying by Arab parliamentary representatives in the Ottoman parliament. A variety of diplomatic efforts were utilized in order to attain their goals of stopping the purchase of Palestinian lands and ending Zionist immigration to Palestine during this era.
The Palestinian diplomatic resistance and the restrictions of the Ottoman Government were supposed to prevent Jewish immigration and establish colonial settlements. Nevertheless, the Jewish population of Palestine rose from about 24,000 in 1882 to ~85,000 in 1914, by which point more than 40 colonial settlements had been built (Mandel 1976: 255). According to Granott’s table, lands purchased in Palestine between 1878 and 1914 can be summarized as the following: “245,581 dunums (English acre) purchased between 1878 and 1914 (59 percent of the total of 418,100 dunums acquired by Jews in Palestine by World War I)”. Granott also analyzed the land purchases in that period, which he classified into four groups based on their previous owners as follows: 25 per cent from large absentee landlords, 25 per cent from large resident landlords, 37.5 per cent from “various sources” (such as the Ottoman Government, large foreign companies, and churches) and 12.5 per cent from the fellahin (Khalidi 1997: 112).
Al-Khalidi argues the size of the land purchased in Palestine including, “the other lands in the Marj Ibn ‘Amir (such as al-Fula), sold to the Zionists before 1914 by the Sursuq, A’yan, and Tueni families” amounts to 313,000 dunums. In other words, this size of the land was equal to around 22 per cent of all the land purchased by Zionists in Palestine until 1948 (Khalidi 1997: 112–113).
Despite the lack of accurate numbers about the inhabitants of Palestine before World War I, Justin McCarthy estimates the figure of the population was around 720,000 based on formal Ottoman records. According to Zionist studies, the figure of the Jewish population in Palestine was about 85,000 before 1914. Furthermore, McCarthy projected that the figure of the Jewish population was about 60,000 based on Western statistics. Al-Khalidi confirmed that
for the more than 400,000 dunums (English acre) sold before 1914, most of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine were living in the significant cities which have religious positions such as Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias. Approximately 10,000–12,000 of Jewish populations were living in the forty Zionist agricultural colonies that had been founded since 1878. (Khalidi 1997: 96)
On 28 August 1912, the Filastin newspaper warned its readers that Zionist immigrants possessed 30 colonial settlements in Palestine (Kayyali 1978).
These figures demonstrate that Palestinians could not attain their aims in that period. This raises one of the main questions of this paper about the factors that prevented the Palestinians from succeeding, despite the restrictions of the Ottoman Government.
One of the main reasons for this failure lies in the Zionist methods of circumventing the Ottoman restrictions. This was because they could purchase land in the name of Ottoman Jews, who long established in Palestine, or in the names of Arabs, and even as consuls or consular agents (Mandel 1976: 210–225).
Often, those Zionists were anonymous among the people, and it was not easy to find them when their visas expired. Even if they were found, they would complain to their embassies and in those circumstances, they were granted consular protection. Hence, they were protected from expulsion by the Ottoman Government (Neal 1995: 14).
Neal also argues that the careless position of the CUP was not only because of the failure of Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament. He argues that the main reason for the collusion of this union was with some Zionist organizations that supported the CUP in solving its financial problems. In return, this Committee (CUP) started a new policy of cancelling all the restrictions on Jewish immigration. Therefore, CUP allowed Zionists the right to buy lands in Palestine. In addition, they closed three anti-Zionist papers, such as Al Karmel, and Filastin in 1913 (Neal 1995: 24). One of the main weaknesses of the Palestinian strategy at the diplomatic level was the gap between the leadership and their audiences, which contributed to the elitist nature of Palestinian leadership during this period. This disconnect had significant implications for the Palestinian national movement and its diplomatic strategy. The Palestinian leadership engaged in diplomacy without fully supporting its efforts, often relying on tactics that applied pressure and nonviolent actions (Ayyad 1999). These methods primarily manifested in organized protests and strikes. As Abdelaziz Ayyad discusses in his book Arab Nationalism and the Palestinians (1850–1939) (1999), this leadership gap hindered the effectiveness of their broader political and diplomatic initiatives.
In it, he analyzes the nature of the leadership in that period, specifically the Palestinian leaders. Descended from the A’yan families (notable social class), they focused on political and diplomatic activism in order to preserve their political status and positions. They did not establish effective political, economic, and social organizations which would cooperate to support their diplomatic efforts. The Palestinian national movement in the early 20th century can thus be described as incoherent, lacking intellectual cohesiveness and unity (Ayyad 1999: 38). Within this discussion, it is also interesting to mention the phenomenon of bribery which was widespread in the Ottoman Empire. For example, the permits for Zionist entry to Palestine could be bought from Ottoman officials. It is worth noting that most of the Zionist immigrants were supported by wealthy Jewish leaders in Europe like Baron Edmond de Rothchild of Paris. As Segev has noted:
Baron Rothschild, along with other rich Zionists, got around Ottoman immigration rules by offering bribes or incentives to Ottoman officials. This money helped secure entry permits for Jewish settlers, even during a time of strict immigration restrictions. (Segev 2000: 37)
In summary, Palestinian diplomatic resistance has been a longstanding strategy. Palestinians employed a range of diplomatic efforts. Palestinian diplomatic resistance refers to the strategic efforts and policies employed by the Palestinian national movement to counteract the influence and encroachment of Zionist settler colonialism from 1882 to 1914. This resistance is situated within a broader framework of settler colonialism, characterized by the attempts of Zionist immigrants and their supporters to establish the foundations of a Jewish colonial state in Palestine, displacing and marginalizing the Indigenous Palestinian population. The concept encompasses a range of diplomatic and political actions undertaken by Palestinian leaders and their allies to halt the purchase of Palestinian lands, prevent Jewish immigration, and challenge the international recognition and support for the Zionist project. This resistance emerged as a response to the multifaceted settler-colonial threat, which included not only the physical displacement of Palestinians but also the undermining of their socio-cultural integration and political sovereignty. This article analyzed some important avenues and methods of IDR that Palestinians used during their struggle. It also has examined the extent to which they succeeded in achieving the objectives of the Palestinian struggle at the diplomatic level in terms of stopping the purchase of Palestinian lands and ending Jewish immigration to Palestine during this era.
Study Implication
This article not only advances theoretical insights into settler colonialism but also provides a historical analysis of Palestinian diplomatic resistance. By bridging these areas, it offers valuable perspectives on the dynamics between settler-colonial powers and Indigenous peoples, enhancing our understanding of the multifaceted nature of resistance and contributing meaningfully to contemporary discussions on colonialism and Indigenous rights.
Expanding the understanding of Palestinian diplomatic resistance through the settler colonialism paradigm provides new insights into the study of diplomatic resistance in the Middle East. This analysis reveals that contrary to portrayals of Palestinians as solely militant actors, they have historically utilized diplomatic tools, albeit with limited success.
Foucault’s concept of power and resistance highlights the potential of Palestinian diplomatic resistance to operate as a counter-discourse within a broader settler-colonial power structure. According to Foucault (1980: 95), power is not only repressive but also productive, shaping the ways in which colonial states like Israel maintain dominance through control over narratives and systems of knowledge. The framing of Palestinian resistance as militant and disorganized serves as a Foucauldian example of discourse as a tool of power. This resistance, however, operates as a “counter-power”, challenging these narratives through protests, strikes, and diplomatic strategies aimed at asserting Indigenous rights and decolonization.
Analyzing Palestinian diplomatic resistance through the settler colonialism lens can offer support for raising Indigenous voices in Palestine. It also challenges the historical narrative promoted by Zionism. Early Zionist leaders used a binary conflict framework to counter accusations of settler colonialism and gain support from non-Zionist Jews and other allies, which concealed the realities of settler-colonial deprivation and Palestinian experiences (Jong 2017: 365). This is consistent with Foucault’s analysis of how power constructs “truth” and shapes what is accepted as legitimate knowledge (Foucault 1980: 131).
Deepening our understanding of IDR enriches our comprehension of the Palestinian struggle and highlights the ongoing relevance of such strategies in contemporary contexts. By acknowledging the historical context and the challenges faced, we can better appreciate the complexities of the Palestinian fight for liberation and the critical role of diplomatic efforts within it. Foucault’s theory of power relations as inherently dynamic reminds us that resistance can emerge at any point within a structure of domination, underscoring the resilience of Palestinian diplomatic efforts despite systemic oppression (Foucault 1982: 781).
Furthermore, acknowledging the historical context of Palestinian diplomatic resistance enriches the current discourse on international solidarity and activism. It calls for renewed support and strategic rethinking in the 21st century, where international solidarity with the Palestinian cause is increasingly critical. By integrating insights from this historical analysis, future resistance efforts can build on past experiences to forge stronger, more effective strategies for achieving liberation and justice.
Foucault’s notion of “counter-conduct” also applies here, as it describes resistance strategies that oppose dominant modes of governance (Foucault 2007: 201). Palestinian diplomatic resistance exemplifies such counter-conduct by challenging the settler-colonial system’s political and legal frameworks. This perspective aligns with the UN General Assembly’s position condemning governments that do not recognize the right to self-determination and independence for peoples under colonial and foreign domination, including the Palestinian people (Sigler 2004).
The integration of Foucault’s theories adds depth by linking power dynamics, resistance, and discourse to the historical and strategic context of Palestinian diplomatic efforts.
Conclusion
This article examined the intersection of settler colonialism and IDR, focusing on Palestine from 1882 to 1914. By integrating settler colonialism theory with the concept of “diplomatic resistance”, it provided a nuanced perspective on how Palestinians navigated and contested the emerging Zionist movement during this crucial period.
The analysis affirmed that the roots of the Palestinian struggle extended beyond the Balfour Declaration of 1917, tracing back to the early waves of Jewish immigration and Zionist activism. The period between 1882 and 1914 was pivotal, as it laid the groundwork for sustained Palestinian resistance against colonial encroachment. The concept of diplomatic resistance, as applied in this context, highlighted the strategic ways in which Palestinians engaged with international diplomacy to counteract Zionist and colonial pressures. This approach demonstrated that diplomatic efforts were not merely supplementary but central to the broader resistance strategy, providing a fresh lens through which to understand Palestinian agency and resilience.
The integration of settler colonialism theory with diplomatic resistance emphasized the distinctive nature of Palestinian resistance. Unlike classic colonialism, which focused on economic exploitation, settler colonialism was aimed at the elimination and replacement of Indigenous populations. This paradigm was crucial for understanding the specific challenges faced by Palestinians and the ways in which they adapted their resistance strategies to a complex and evolving colonial landscape.
This study contributed to the broader academic discourse by addressing the limitations of settler colonialism theory. It argued for the inclusion of diplomatic resistance within the theoretical framework, thus enhancing our understanding of Indigenous resistance in settler-colonial contexts. By foregrounding the diplomatic dimensions of resistance, this paper offered a more comprehensive view of how Indigenous groups, such as the Palestinians, engaged in international arenas to assert their rights and challenge colonial dominance.
Building on Michel Foucault’s theories of power and resistance, this study recognized the importance of discursive practices in shaping resistance movements. Foucault’s notion of power as relational and omnipresent illuminates how Palestinian intellectuals and leaders contested Zionist narratives and colonial frameworks through media and diplomacy. These discursive interventions were not merely reactive but sought to reshape the terms of engagement, reflecting Foucault’s insights into the productive capacity of resistance to generate alternative knowledge and strategies.
Lori Allen’s concept of “false hope” (2021) adds further depth to this analysis by addressing the complexities of diplomatic engagement under colonial systems. Allen’s exploration of the promises and limitations of diplomacy in Palestinian resistance resonates with this study’s findings. The concept of “false hope” highlights the tensions inherent in relying on international recognition and mediation whilst grappling with the structural inequalities of settler colonialism. This duality enriches the understanding of diplomatic resistance, offering a critical lens through which to view both the achievements and constraints of Palestinian efforts during this formative period.
The exploration of Palestinian diplomatic resistance during this period underscored the importance of recognizing and analyzing the diverse methods of resistance employed by Indigenous peoples. It also suggested that further research into diplomatic resistance could provide valuable insights into contemporary struggles against settler colonialism and other forms of oppression.
The study not only deepened our historical understanding of the Palestinian struggle but also enriched the theoretical frameworks used to analyze Indigenous resistance. As scholars continue to grapple with the legacies of settler colonialism and its impact on Indigenous peoples globally, incorporating diplomatic resistance into analytical tools is essential for advancing justice and acknowledging the resilience and agency of those who resisted colonial oppression.
This integration of Foucauldian discourse theory and Lori Allen’s “false hope” (2021) with settler colonialism theory demonstrates the transformative potential of interdisciplinary approaches. By uniting historical, theoretical, and contemporary perspectives, this study provides a multidimensional understanding of Palestinian resistance, emphasizing the enduring relevance of intellectual and diplomatic strategies in the broader context of anti-colonial struggles.