Persistent internal conflicts in Syria have created many challenges and obstacles in front of community components to build social cohesion in their regions. Several clashes and conflicts have occurred among the community components particularly among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in the northwest of Syria region for several reasons. Those clashes and conflicts have negatively impacted the social cohesion fabric and destroyed genuine and fair co-existence among community components, consequently, rifts have been increased among conflicted parties. Every segment within the community has formed its own viewpoint regarding other sections, influenced by a multitude of factors and the specific circumstances of the region. The northwest Syria (NWS) region is navigating through a complex and challenging phase, with numerous external elements adversely affecting the accomplishment of social cohesion. Therefore, it’s essential to thoroughly explore the perceptions of each community component, deriving parameters that can facilitate the realization of social cohesion in the northwest of Syria and ensure a fair and genuine living experience for all its inhabitants.
The primary research question is formulated to ascertain the feasibility of establishing social cohesion in northwest Syria at both the micro and mezzo societal levels and to identify the challenges that impede its realization. The central query is articulated as: Is it feasible to foster social cohesion at the micro and mezzo societal tiers within conflict-ridden areas, aiming for a dignified existence? The research posits that challenges obstructing social cohesion in northwest Syria, with a specific focus on the A’zaz case, can be effectively addressed and surmounted by the local community. Given the present state of social cohesion in northwest Syria, there exists a potential to institute and fortify this cohesion across all community segments, thereby fostering a life characterized by fairness, equality, and integrity. Building upon this premise, it is hypothesized that harmonious co-existence between IDPs and the host communities (HC) is not only conceivable but also attainable. A pivotal component of this discourse is the damaged social contract among the Syrian populace, a consequence of the protracted political strife. Thus, this study aspires to offer tangible, field-derived insights on how to rejuvenate this social contract, bridging divides and fostering unity.
Over 5.6 million Syrians have fled their country in search of safety due to the ongoing crisis (UN, 2018). Approximately 3.7 million of these refugees chose Turkey as their sanctuary for various reasons (Syrian Dialogue Center, 2022). Since 2012, Turkey has adopted an open-door policy to welcome Syrians escaping the war. However, as the conflict worsened and new players like ISIS and PKK entered the fray, refugee waves surged dramatically (Syrian Dialogue Center, 2022). Thus, the refugee situation exerted significant pressure on Turkey, which accommodated over 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and northwest Syria emerged as a potential threat to the Turkish government. Therefore, devising a sustainable solution in the region is crucial to facilitate a safe and dignified return for Syrian refugees while also safeguarding their human rights and addressing the root of their concerns permanently.
Displacement patterns in A’zaz district post-2011
After 2011, the northwest region of Syria, specifically the A’zaz district, experienced significant changes. The regime forces pulled back from most of the area, holding onto a few military sites and certain villages, like the Minnigh Military Airport and the Shia-populated villages of Nobbul and Azahraa (Anadolu Agency, 2012). Because some areas were liberated from regime control, the Syrian opposition forces took them over. These areas not only became bases for military operations but also offered a somewhat safe living space for supporters and their families. A’zaz City became crucial for the opposition forces since maintaining an open supplementary military corridor there was vital for delivering support and carrying out military operations against the Syrian regime (CNN Arabic, 2016). This dynamic made the A’zaz region attractive for IDPs or evacuated Syrians from various governorates, offering them a chance to reside in the northwest, particularly in A’zaz City. Furthermore, the region served as a base for Syrians who shared similar political stances, ideas, or opinions about the regime, whether they were military personnel or civilians.
In a pivotal moment in the Syrian crisis, the Russian parliament approved Bashar Al Assad’s written request for assistance against “Islamic terrorists” on 30 September 2015, marking a substantial shift in the conflict. This action signified the introduction of external military forces to the conflict, with the Russian army entering the war to support the regime against the opposition (BBC, 2015). The Russian air force promptly initiated its mission in Syria to back the Assad regime. Operations began in the eastern part of Aleppo City, which was not under regime control and was held by the Free Syrian Army. Following intense military operations, an evacuation of more than 150,000 Syrians from Aleppo City took place. Of these displaced individuals, 75% relocated to Idleb City, while 25% chose the northern rural area of Aleppo, seeking a haven (Maan Tallaa, IDPs, and refugees in Syria).
Turkey and Russia signed a Memorandum of Understanding, known as the Sochi Agreement, aiming to create a buffer zone in Idlib (Reuters, 2018). Despite this agreement, the Syrian regime, with support from Russian forces, breached the ceasefire. They initiated a military plan to regain control of rural Damascus, aiming to secure the capital city. Rigorous military operations ensued, resulting in the evacuation of over 80,000 Syrians from the rural Damascus area to the northwest of Aleppo. Of these evacuees, 59% moved to Idleb, 6% to the north of Hama, and 25% to the north of Aleppo. The Sochi Agreement inadvertently influenced the relocation of Syrians from the south to the northwest of Syria, comprising various ethnic and sectarian backgrounds. Additionally, the evacuated Free Syrian Army groups, such as Jaish Al Islam, already harbored significant tension and conflict with the Hieat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) group, with clashes having occurred between them in rural Damascus. The relocation of these groups to northwest Syria opened a new chapter of internal conflict and clashes with HTS (Sputnik Agency, 2018).
On 19 April 2018 the Free Syrian Army groups in Al Qalamoun City, situated in the rural region of Damascus, agreed with the regime and Russia. This agreement had a profound impact on about 5,000 Syrians, prompting their evacuation from their original locations to the northwest of Syria. Essentially, these individuals were presented with two options: either stay under regime control in their original place or evacuate to the northwest of Syria. They opted for evacuation, choosing not to remain under the regime’s control or mercy (Enab Baladi, 2018). The Syrian regime and Russia pursued their military initiatives in the urban and rural areas of Damascus to consolidate control over the surrounding regions. The government and Russian forces expanded their dominion south of Damascus city, adhering to a systematic plan to seize control of the area. Approximately 9,000 IDPs were forced to evacuate to northwest Syria due to these operations. Simultaneously, over 35,000 IDPs from the northwest rural region of Homs also relocated to northwest Syria (Aljazeera Studies, 2020). Moreover, between 15 and 31 July 2018, over 100,000 Syrians evacuated from the Daraa governorate and Qunaitera region, sought refuge in northwest Syria (Aljazeera Studies, 2020). From November to December 2019, intense military operations by the Syrian regime and Russia prompted the displacement of approximately 1.5 million individuals from Idleb, the northern parts of Hamah, and western rural Aleppo. These displaced people found temporary solace in the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch regions, moving northwest within Syria to escape the conflict. An updated agreement was signed by Erdogan and Putin in Sochi, aiming to mitigate the escalating tension in Idleb (Reuters Agency, 2020).
Community components formation in A’zaz District
Following a succession of evacuations into northwest Syria, the A’zaz district witnessed the formation of a new demographic map, introducing new actors and factors into the political and societal landscapes. The inflow of displaced Syrians brought diverse experiences, needs, and perspectives, shaping a unique community dynamic within the district. Based on data from the local council in A’zaz as of January 2023, the A’zaz district’s population landscape reveals that only one-third are original residents or belong to the host community. The remaining two-thirds consist of IDPs evacuated from various governorates, including Aleppo and other regions. Notably, the displaced individuals from Aleppo make up about 30% of the total, a figure that matches the host community’s size in the A’zaz district, excluding the IDPs from other areas.
A significant observation from this data is the concentration of evacuations. The majority of those evacuated arrived in the A’zaz district within a short span of three years, from 2016 to 2018. Such a sudden and substantial influx posed considerable challenges to the region’s social fabric, as the unanticipated and unplanned nature of these displacements threatened the existing social cohesion in the host community. Moreover, typically, a high population density can strain a community’s resources and infrastructure. This is a common concern even in well-established regions. However, in conflict-affected areas, the situation is even more precarious. These areas already grapple with scarce resources and fragile infrastructures. When such communities have to accommodate a surge of IDPs, it further amplifies the stress on these resources and facilities. Consequently, there is a growing and urgent need for economic development, increased resources, and enhanced infrastructure facilities in these regions.
As the conflict was militarized, it transformed into an armed struggle involving diverse factions. The northwest of Syria is home to 4 million people, and intriguingly, more than half of this number consists of IDPs, as reported by UNHCR in March 2021. Such a massive influx of IDPs presents a formidable security challenge to the prevailing governing structures. This concern is amplified by the fact that many of these IDPs are armed and there’s a conspicuous absence of consensus or unity among the various groups. The subsequent charts detail the number of casualties recorded between 2019 and 2020.
Figures 1 and 2 show a comparison between 2019 and 2020 in number of victims between armed group members and civilians.
According to data from the Omran for Studies Center in October 2017, the societal rifts spanned ideological, sectoral, and ethnic dimensions. The northwest region of Syria, with a population of 4 million, hosts over 50% of IDPs, as per the UNHCR’s March 2021 report. This large IDP contingent poses notable security challenges, especially given that many of them are armed and there is no unified stance among the groups. In a comparative analysis of incidents between the latter half of 2019 and the first half of 2020, it was observed that incident rates escalated in 2020. Civil entities bore the brunt of these attacks in 75 incidents. Armed groups encountered 70 such incidents, and the Turkish military was targeted in three cases. Additionally, 14 incidents were categorized as unidentified sources (Qouman, 2021).
Notably, in October 2022, HTS launched a significant assault on the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Afrin and A’zaz, aiming to wrest control of these strategic cities from the SNA (Netjes, 2022). By the 14th of that month, a ceasefire agreement was brokered between HTS and the Third Corps of the SNA. This accord granted the Third Corps the right to re-establish its base in Afrin while promoting a shared governance structure in Northwest Syria, covering Aleppo and Idleb (Netjes, 2022). Further, internal discord plagued the SNA with internal skirmishes and confrontations with tribes in A’zaz and Al-Bab (Aman Alasi, 2023). For many in the region, the persistent infighting dashed hopes of establishing a unified governing body outside the regime’s purview (Tallaa, 2017). Another prevailing security issue is the rampant proliferation of weapons among residents and IDPs. Such widespread weapon accessibility has resulted in multiple attacks on civilians, including women and children (Khateeb, 2018). A decentralized approach to security portfolio management has exacerbated the security situation. A surge in public attacks, notably car bombings in crowded areas, has demonstrated the fragility of governance in the region (Tallaa, 2017). A poignant reminder of this was the truck bombing in a bustling A’zaz market in January 2017, resulting in 48 fatalities and injuring over 100 (BBC Agency, 2017). This attack underscored the region’s vulnerability and the persistent threat from adversaries.
Security structure
The first institutional security formation era faded in northwest Syria for several reasons: the intensity of military operations by the Syrian regime and the re-take lands under its control, which did not allow the governing bodies to take a breath and build their institutions. Most of the formed local councils desired to be away from the security portfolio and leave it for the armed groups in each village or city to manage this file; the reason behind this decision is that the security management needs funds, skilled and trained staff and that the local council has not (Tallaa, 2017). The table below presents the initial security institution structure (Table 1).
Security institution’s functions
| Institution | Role |
|---|---|
| Free Police | Overseeing daily social activities and ensuring order in public spaces such as roads, streets, and markets. They also implement decisions and orders made by local councils and courts. |
| Law Institutions | judging disputes and legal matters using both Islamic and Syrian legal principles. |
| Armed Groups | Established post-2012, these groups primarily fought against the regime and its allies. |
| Radical Armed Groups | Consisting of foreign fighters who arrived in Syria from various countries, these groups generally uphold radical or extremist ideologies. |
| Local Councils | Catering to the civil needs of the residents who elected them. This is evidenced through various departments within the councils such as the social affairs department, services department, legal department, and media department. Their formation was primarily to administer areas freshly liberated from regime control. |
Source: Author’s research.
The initial security and governance framework faced challenges, necessitating an overhaul for several reasons. This was to ensure it remained adaptable to the evolving complexities of the crisis and to align with the concerns and demands of the international community. Recognizing these needs, a revamped security structure emerged in the northwest of Syria, specifically within the Aleppo governorate (excluding the Idlib governorate). This structure comprises the following divisions:
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Prime Minister: The National Alliance of Revolutionary Forces and the Syrian Opposition are entrusted with electing the Prime Minister for the Syrian Interim Government (SIG).
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Defense Ministry: Operating under the Prime Minister’s oversight, the defense minister holds the primary responsibility of overseeing the security dimension in the northwest of Syria.
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The restructured security framework was anticipated by local residents to effectively address issues like assassinations, bombings, and other security-related incidents.).
The revamped structure has introduced noticeable improvements in the security situation. Despite these enhancements, the local populace retains the hope for an end to external aggressions from the Government of Syria and its allies, as well as to put a stop to internal conflicts among the SNA factions.
Weakness points in the security portfolio
The security landscape in the region under the SNA is fraught with several challenges and vulnerabilities. Foremost among these challenges is the varying ideological and operational backgrounds of the armed groups present in the area. While some, like Ahrar Al-Sham, veer toward more extremist viewpoints, others occupy a moderate stance. This ideological divergence, compounded by competitive instincts and resource allocations, poses significant threats to social cohesion. Another glaring concern is the palpable inexperience among security personnel.
The situation led to the formation of various armed groups, often spearheaded by individuals with little to no security background. This hasty incorporation of novices into pivotal security roles underlines an urgent need for a more professional and seasoned approach. Additionally, financial hurdles further hamper the development of a sound security infrastructure. With inadequate funds and logistical backing, the sector struggles to lure seasoned professionals, who, in the face of economic challenges, are inclined to seek greener pastures. This environment of “ad-hocism” permeates the region’s strategic outlook. Governance structures in northwest Syria, constrained by myriad challenges, are often seen scrambling to address immediate concerns, sidelining the necessity for a coherent long-term strategy. This short-sightedness is further accentuated by a decentralized approach to security management. With each armed group maintaining its security framework, there’s a conspicuous absence of a unified strategy, leading to fragmentation and inconsistency, a concern highlighted by the Omran Center in January 2017. This prevailing insecurity and uncertainty have resonated deeply with the Syrian populace. Reports from sources like Aljazeera Center (March 2020) suggest a growing sentiment among Syrians that finding a solution to the ongoing crisis is becoming an increasingly intricate puzzle. Such instability not only impedes essential service delivery but also magnifies societal rifts, fuels migration, and aggravates the divide among community members, as pointed out by Maan in April 2020.
Following the failure of the initial attempt to establish police and security institutions in northwest Syria, attributed partly to the escalating militarization of the conflict with the Damascus government, a pressing demand emerged to construct a renewed framework for these institutions (Tallaa, 2017). The initial architecture comprised revolutionary police, local justice courts, and armed groups’ security offices. However, the revamped model was streamlined into two entities: the free civil police and the military police. These institutions were distinct in their affiliations. The military police fell under the purview of the defense ministry, whereas the free civil police was established by professional officers who had defected from regime institutions to northwest Syria. These defectors subsequently set up the free civil police, an autonomous entity with its board and chairperson, tasked with delineating the institution’s strategy. The board resolved to maintain the free civil police’s independence, primarily because the SIG institutions were predominantly based outside Syria, lacking a tangible presence within the region (Enab Baladi Agency, 2016). In July 2016, seeking to bolster the presence and authority of SIG institutions in the area, the Prime Minister of the SIG, Mr. Jawad Abou Hatab, proposed managing these institutions directly from within Syria. This involved relocating all high-ranking officials and ministers to be based in northwest Syria (Enab Baladi Agency, 2016). This move was positively received by the Free Civil Police board, prompting collaborative efforts with the SIG.
Funding for the free civil police, since its inception in 2014, came from a consortium of countries, namely the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and the US. The funds were channeled through the Adam Smith company. This external financial support emboldened the free civil police to maintain their autonomy, resisting integration with other governmental or quasi-governmental factions of the Syrian opposition (Rozana Radio, 2018). However, when British media outlets reported that a portion of the funding might have inadvertently supported radical armed factions in northwest Syria, the UK government promptly ceased its backing. This decision acted as a domino effect, leading all other supporting nations to suspend their assistance to the free civil police by September 2018 (Rozana Radio, 2018). Subsequent to this collective withdrawal, the original structure of the free civil police dissolved. A reformed version, affiliated with the SIG, emerged, amalgamating both former members and new recruits from the SNA.
Amidst the escalating conflict between the Syrian regime and free army groups, the civilian population found themselves trapped in dire circumstances, struggling to access basic necessities like food, water, and shelter. Recognizing the profound humanitarian crisis unfolding, the United Nations Security Council took an unprecedented step by passing Resolution 2139 on 22 February 2014. This resolution permitted the delivery of humanitarian assistance to regions beyond the control of the Damascus government without requiring its explicit permission, marking a significant departure from traditional protocols (UN Security Council Resolution, 22 February 2014). Endowed with this mandate, both UN agencies and numerous NGOs set forth to extend vital humanitarian support, essential services, and emergency relief to these affected regions. This influx of assistance had a profound and positive impact, not only addressing immediate needs but also helping to insulate civilians from the harshest effects of the conflict. Fueled by Resolution 2139, a plethora of NGOs and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) emerged, initiating a wide range of humanitarian projects aimed at sustaining and empowering local communities. These organizations not only provided immediate relief but also embarked on programs to fortify community resilience, helping locals to better navigate the challenges posed by the ongoing conflict. A few of the organizations that have made significant contributions to the region include the Stabilization Support Committee, World Vision, UNOCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, Human Care Syria, and dozens of humanitarian actors.
Research methods
This study employs a qualitative research approach, leveraging in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and public surveys to distill insights. Primary data sourced from community leaders, local council staff, members of the SIG, civil society representatives, military personnel, and professional unions form the study’s backbone. These participants, representing both the indigenous population and IDPs, embody the grassroots of this nascent community. Complementing this is secondary data from civil society organizations, offering an enriched perspective. The overarching goal is to draft a roadmap for bolstering social cohesion, transforming communities into robust, resilient entities capable of withstanding adversities. This plan delineates the milestones and strategies for fostering unity, curbing inter-community conflicts, and bridging societal divisions.
The complexities surrounding the establishment of social cohesion in conflict-stricken areas, especially in northwest Syria, are immense. Ensuring fair, honest, and inclusive living conditions and promoting co-existence amid such challenges necessitates an exhaustive understanding. Given that A’zaz has a total population of approximately 500,000, this research adopts a tri-tiered data collection strategy:
Key Informative Interviews (KIIs): This involves intensive interviews with 25 prominent individuals. These individuals are earmarked based on their deep insights, experiences, and contributions to the region.
Focused Group Discussions (FGDs): Three separate discussions are conducted, each encompassing distinct demographics, summing up to 30 participants. These discussions aim to harness collective insights, narratives, and experiences, painting a broader picture of the on-ground realities.
Online Public Survey: Targeting between 500–700 respondents, this expansive online survey aims to capture the sentiments, opinions, and perspectives of the broader population, ensuring statistical significance and a holistic view.
Criteria for Participant Selection: Participant selection is methodical and grounded in criteria that ensure a well-rounded and inclusive representation:
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Ensure the diversity of representation like male, female, IDPs, and HC.
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The participants must be part of civil society organizations.
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The participants must be from a public institution.
Ensuring diversity in participants’ backgrounds as a validation step to ensure that all collected information that has been collected from different perspectives.
The following tables include detailed information about the participants in the data collection (Table 2).
Participants in the interviews
| Date | Code | Category | Position | Background | Inter-Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16-April-2023 | AS-1 | CSO member | Coordinator | IDP | 41 minutes |
| 26-April-2023 | AM-2 | SIG | Economy | IDP | 40 minutes |
| 06-May-2023 | AR-3 | Aleppo council | Head | IDP | 40 minutes |
| 6-May-2023 | AH-4 | Politician | Head | HC | 50 minutes |
| 18-April-2023 | AM-5 | SY Plus | CEO | IDP | 40 minutes |
| 2-May-2023 | AH-6 | Military | General | IDP | 30 minutes |
| 2-May-2023 | AA-7 | Geneva call | Trainer | IDP | 90 minutes |
| 18-April-2023 | AN-8 | CSO | CEO | HC | 30 minutes |
| 18-April-2023 | WO-9 | Media | Journalist | IDP | 50 minutes |
| 10-May-2023 | ALH-10 | 2020 Idea | CEO | IDP | 30 minutes |
| 25-April-2023 | AO-11 | NGO | Office Manager | HC | 31 minutes |
| 6-May-2023 | BN-12 | Legal | General manager | IDP | 35 minutes |
| 10-May-2023 | BZ-13 | CSO | CEO | IDP | 25 minutes |
| 18-April-2023 | IB-14 | Legal | Lawyer | IDP | 60 minutes |
| 3-May-2023 | JA-15 | Legal | President | IDP | 37 minutes |
| 6-May-2023 | MB-16 | UN | Coordinator | IDP | 20 minutes |
| 18-April-2023 | GN-17 | Media | Coordinator | IDP | 20 minutes |
| 18-April-2023 | MM-18 | Media | CEO | IDP | 38 minutes |
| 10-April-2023 | MKH-19 | Military | Head of Office | IDP | 55 minutes |
| 16-April-2023 | MM-20 | Legal | Lawyer | IDP | 50 minutes |
| 19-April-2023 | MY-21 | University | Student | IDP | 75 minutes |
| 6-May-2023 | SD-22 | CSO | CEO | IDP | 28 minutes |
| 19-April-2023 | WD-23 | LC | Head of | IDP | 39 minutes |
| 25-April-2023 | ZH-24 | Legal | Lawyer | IDP | 32 minutes |
| 26-April-2023 | MHJ-25 | NGO | Officer | IDP | 35 minutes |
Source: Author’s research.
During 9–11 May 2023, three focus groups were conducted in the A’zaz district, to benefit from interactive discussions of activists, civil society members and stakeholders; 30 participants shared and exchanged their thoughts, ideas, and voices about social cohesion challenges in the region. In Table 3 there is coded information about participants in the sessions:
List of participants in the FGDs
| Date | Code | Position | Category | Background |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9-May-2023 | 01-AH | Office Manager | CSO | IDP |
| 9-May-2023 | 02-HA | Office Manager | NGO | IDP |
| 9-May-2023 | 03-HO | Field Coordinator | NGO | HC |
| 9-May-2023 | 04-AS | School Manager | Education | IDP |
| 9-May-2023 | 05-ST | Project Manager | NGO | Circassian |
| 9-May-2023 | 06-RZ | Specialist | NGO | HC |
| 9-May-2023 | 07-MSH | Office Manager | University | HC |
| 9-May-2023 | 08-AM | Minister | SIG | IDP |
| 9-May-2023 | 09-WA | Journalist | Media | IDP |
| 9-May-2023 | 10-RT | Office Manager | NGO | IDP |
| 10-May-2023 | 11-WO | Media officer | NGO | HC |
| 10-May-2023 | 12-NH | CEO | CSO | IDP |
| 10-May-2023 | 13-AA | Project officer | INGO | HC |
| 10-May-2023 | 14-YH | MEAL officer | CSO | HC |
| 10-May-2023 | 15-AO | Office Manager | LC | HC |
| 10-May-2023 | 16-FA | Trainer | Media agency | HC |
| 10-May-2023 | 17-HS | Negotiator | GB | IDP |
| 10-May-2023 | 18-EA | Coordinator | CSO | IDP |
| 10-May-2023 | 19-DS | Team Leader | CSO | HC |
| 10-May-2023 | 20-AR | CEO | CSO | IDP |
| 11-May-2023 | 21-HB | Project Manager | CSO | HC |
| 11-May-2023 | 22-AAW | Office Manager | NGO | HC |
| 11-May-2023 | 23-WA | Center Manager | CSO | HC |
| 11-May-2023 | 24-MH | Head of Council | Education | IDP |
| 11-May-2023 | 25-SH | Member | Association | HC |
| 11-May-2023 | 26-ABN | Head | Association | HC |
| 11-May-2023 | 27-SK | Manager | CSO | IDP |
| 11-May-2023 | 28-AKTH | Officer | CSO | IDP |
| 11-May-2023 | 29-NR | Office Manager | Alliance | IDP |
| 11-May-2023 | 30-RKH | Social Worker | NGO | HC |
Source: Author’s research.
In the data-gathering phase, a public survey was carried out, containing 77 questions. The Kobo tool application was employed for the survey due to its widespread accessibility, enabling individuals in the target area to easily participate using their mobile devices. The survey was made available on 16 April 2023, and concluded on 23 April 2023, garnering feedback from 516 respondents. Details about participants’ gender can be found in the Figure 3 below:
Most respondents in the public survey are female with 74%, and just 26% are male.
In Figure 4, we can see the education level of the respondents in the published survey:
Figure 4 shows us that 41% of respondents in the survey are educated people at university level, while 16% of respondents came from primary school education level, then, 15% came from secondary school, 8% from a higher level of education like master’s degree and just 1% from PhD.
The current population of A’zaz
In A’zaz, there are about 500,000 residents, Figure 5 indicates the percentage of respondents in the survey based on their status, about 47% of IDPs and 53% are from HC.
It means that the percentage of participants from displaced and host communities was close to half and half.
The IDPs hail from various Syrian governorates, with a significant portion, approximately 44% of the total IDPs, originating from Aleppo City. This migration occurred after multiple evacuations and displacements from Aleppo to northwest Syria. In contrast, about 14% of the IDPs are from the Damascus governorate, roughly 13% from Homs, and the remaining 29% from diverse locations such as Deir-Ez-Zor, Al-Raqqah, and Daraa governorates. When surveyed about their places of origin, the respondents indicated as follows in Figure 6:
Figure 6 shows that most IDPs in the A’zaz district came from Aleppo: about 44% from Aleppo and 14% from Damascus, while 13% from Homs. Finally, 29% came from different Syrian governorates. The population figures point out the number of people or residents in the region and it indicates the hierarchy and the community components in the A’zaz district.
“A’zaz stands out as a region with better social cohesion in northwest Syria in comparison to other districts, and this can be attributed to multiple factors” (AH-10). “The strength of social cohesion in the region becomes evident during times of adversity or threat, but it seems to diminish in other situations” (AM-2). Drawing from the collected data, approximately 47% of the survey respondents expressed that A’zaz possesses a moderate level of social cohesion. Nevertheless, there remains significant room for enhancement, especially in fostering relationships among all community members. The subsequent Figure 7 provides a comprehensive view of the current state of social cohesion:
People’s contentment with social cohesion in A’zaz is mixed and largely hinges on the intentions and actions of local authorities and armed factions. These entities have the power to significantly influence the process of bolstering social cohesion by emphasizing unifying factors and diminishing divisive elements in the community.
From the conducted FGDs, participants highlighted several areas of weakness in social cohesion. A notable concern was the underrepresentation of IDPs within Local Councils and other governmental entities. This underrepresentation fosters feelings of disparity, amplifying divisions between the IDPs and the HC.
Moreover, the lack of consistent law enforcement for all community members means that IDPs often feel compelled to assert their rights forcefully, further perpetuating a sense of neglect and unfairness. Additionally, there’s an evident void in policies regarding equitable resource distribution between HCs and IDPs. This absence fosters an environment where perceived injustices thrive and disrupts the harmony between different community factions. The nonexistence of a well-defined resource-sharing framework hinders the implementation of developmental and early recovery projects. Such initiatives could potentially enhance employment opportunities, thereby alleviating numerous challenges.
Regrettably, there’s a prevalent tendency toward regional favoritism, overshadowing the spirit of inclusive citizenship. Discrimination based on city, tribe, or clan affiliation is rampant, with people favoring those from their backgrounds over others. “There exist Civil Society Organizations that predominantly cater to a specific group, making it difficult for members from other communities to gain access” (AS-1).
When survey respondents were questioned about encountering challenges related to social cohesion within the host community, roughly 49% confirmed facing issues, while 51% reported no such challenges. The subsequent Figure 8 elucidates these percentages.
Conversely, a significant 68% of survey participants expressed a need for enhancing social cohesion in A’zaz, suggesting there’s substantial room for improvement. On the contrary, 23% believe that the current state of social cohesion is satisfactory and requires no alterations. This sentiment is echoed by one of the respondents, who remarked, “Social cohesion in A’zaz is superior when compared to other districts in the northwest Syrian region” (ALH-10). A smaller segment, making up 9%, feels that while there is a need for some changes, they should be minor, attributing this to an already satisfactory level of social cohesion present in the district. The subsequent Figure 9 provides a detailed breakdown of these percentages.
As a result, from Figure 9, most people in the A’zaz city are seeing that there should be a change in the region on social cohesion level.
The role of law and justice institutions
Official justice institutions in the A’zaz district are divided as illustrated in Table 4.
Functions of courts in A’zaz
| Institution | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Ordinary Courts | It belongs to the Ministry of Justice within the (SIG) |
| Military Courts | It is under the administration of the Ministry of Defense belongs to the (SIG) |
| Police Courts | Civilian police belong to the Ministry of Interior of the (SIG) and apply the execution of law and the decisions of the courts |
| Military Police under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense of (SIG) | |
| Prisons |
Source: It comes from the author’s research.
In the northwest region of Syria, the formal legal institutions mirror the approach of the government in terms of court structure and the legal materials employed to resolve disputes between parties. One respondent opined, “The foundation of the justice institutions is adequate” (BN-12), whereas another noted, “The challenge doesn’t lie within the legal institutions themselves, but rather in the lack of initiative to implement them” (AO-11).
From a theoretical perspective, the rule of law and the realization of justice stand as foundational pillars for achieving social cohesion. These elements not only ensure the rights and fundamental freedoms of every community member but also foster trust among different community factions, making them indispensable for the successful attainment of social cohesion. However, while the official justice institutions may have a clear hierarchical structure, they grapple with myriad challenges that hinder the enhancement of social cohesion. Participants during data collection sessions highlighted multiple impediments in the path of law enforcement. Primarily, the ineffectiveness of the courts stands out; their rulings often go unenforced, revealing an apparent disconnect between justice and executive entities.
Following a survey that sought to uncover the underlying reasons for the diminished role of justice institutions, responses varied. Figure 10 shows a significant 47% of respondents attributed the issue to the local authorities’ lack of willingness to strengthen law enforcement. In contrast, 28% believed that the limited expertise of staff in legal institutions was the crux of the matter; 20% of respondents identified interference by armed factions as the primary obstacle; while a smaller 5% cited various other reasons, including concerns about the independence of these justice bodies.
Armed groups, operating from a position of strength, often sidestep formal judicial processes, believing they can assert their rights directly through the use of force, rendering the courts redundant in their view. As illustrated in the subsequent chart, 39% of such entities typically avoid court proceedings altogether. Meanwhile, Figure 11 indicates a slightly lower percentage at 34% opt to utilize the courts but only when they anticipate a favorable verdict for their claims.
As summarized in Figure 11, most residents in the region objected to going to the courts to obtain their rights, the percentage about 39%, while 34% saw that going to court is partial and related to winning the cases or not.
When participants of the survey were questioned about the reasons armed groups typically avoid the courts, their responses were as follows in Figure 12:
From the collected data, Figure 12, is evident that 54% believe the primary reason armed groups avoid the courts is due to their reliance on raw power, 30% felt it’s a deliberate choice to remain outside the legal system, and 15% avoid courts to evade potential blame or charges. Furthermore, the financial limitations faced by the judicial system, particularly the insufficient compensation for judges and legal staff, have raised concerns about their commitment and independence. One participant noted, “The prevalence of bribes among legal staff weakens the enforcement of the law” (MB-16). Discussions in the focus groups emphasized the importance of increasing financial support for court personnel by the SIG.
Moreover, the inconsistency in laws and judicial processes across different cities has been highlighted, underscoring the necessity for standardization (GN-17).
In the absence of a concerted effort by local authorities to strengthen the rule of law in northwest Syria, the ongoing state of chaos, rising discrimination, and the proliferation of social injustice are inevitable. This weakening of judicial institutions also has a cascading effect, compromising the efficacy of the civilian police force. Consequently, numerous confrontations between the civilian police and armed groups have eroded public trust in the police, negatively influencing perceptions about their capabilities. This has, in turn, weakened the enforcement of the law and reduced the chances of establishing social cohesion in the region.
Reflecting these challenges, the survey results show in Figure 13 that a majority, 56%, of respondents would refrain from approaching a police station to lodge a complaint, whereas 44% stated they would.
Of the 44% in Figure 14 who reported approaching the police station with a complaint, almost half (49%) confirmed that their issue was resolved satisfactorily. On the other hand, 38% stated that their problems remained unresolved. A smaller segment, 12%, felt that their concerns were addressed but only to a partial extent. This data highlights the varying degrees of effectiveness and efficiency within the policing and justice system in the region.
In the presented data, Figure 15 indicates that 47% of the respondents believe that there’s a lack of genuine intent in the region to uniformly implement the rule of law across all community groups. Following this, 28% emphasized the need for more qualified and seasoned professionals in legal institutions.
A concerning absence of systems and policies for accountability, such as those against corruption, bribery, and nepotism within justice institutions, has been observed. The lack of performance evaluations for staff members, coupled with the dearth of measures to hold individuals accountable, has rendered consequences for misconduct virtually non-existent.
This absence of accountability has inadvertently paved the way for an increase in criminal activities among the populace. A prevailing sentiment seems to be that individuals can commit crimes and eventually evade any retribution or punishment. Such circumstances directly undermine the principles of social cohesion. The resulting disputes and a deep-seated sense of discrimination among the citizens only serve to perpetuate discord and disparity in the community. Ultimately, social cohesion and harmony become the primary casualties in such an environment.
“To ensure a robust legal system, it’s crucial to place the right individuals in positions of decision-making”, (WD-23). Additionally, ZH-24 emphasized the importance of setting up new courts within A’zaz to prevent the inconvenience of traveling to “Alra’ee City” for certain legal matters. In parallel, there’s a growing call to enhance the role of non-official justice mechanisms in the region, as voiced by 02-HA. Currently, the area boasts various non-formal justice institutions that encompass mukhtars, tribal leaders, faith leaders, and community figureheads. It’s imperative to streamline and synchronize their roles, ensuring they contribute constructively to achieving social cohesion.
Actors impacting social cohesion in the region
The analysis highlights the presence of various actors, entities, and institutions pivotal in fostering social cohesion within A’zaz. As emphasized by MB-16, “Every individual, especially the educated, has a duty towards ensuring social cohesion”.
The research has identified and grouped these actors based on their distinct roles and identities.
Semi-governmental institutions
Several semi-structured bodies in A’zaz have the potential to positively influence social cohesion, particularly those with semi-governmental attributes. They serve as the official establishments focused on safeguarding the rights and lives of the populace, aiming to ensure safety for all residents. These entities are formally linked to the Ministry of Interior within the SIG. Their core mandate revolves around upholding the rule of law, addressing instances of violations, settling disputes, and directing culprits to the appropriate judicial authorities.
Additionally, the local councils, which fall under the purview of the Ministry of Local Administration in the SIG, have the capacity to significantly boost social cohesion. They extend vital services to every segment of society, be it the native residents or the displaced populace. These councils can spearhead comprehensive social cohesion efforts through active collaboration with a variety of institutions, spanning areas like the SNA, education, health, and the economic sectors. Furthermore, the local councils can bolster the functionality of official justice mechanisms in the region, promoting synergy between the decisions of the councils and the established justice institutions.
Institutions and bodies of civil society
Post the onset of the Syrian crisis, with the diminishing influence of the government, the civil society sector began to flourish. This resulted in a notable expansion in the scope of CSOs. Consequently, a plethora of CSOs, volunteer groups, grassroots initiatives, advocacy coalitions, associations, and NGOs emerged in the northwest of Syria. These institutions have since become intrinsic to the societal landscape, actively shaping its dynamics.
Free Aleppo Lawyers Association
The Free Aleppo Lawyers Association stands as an autonomous entity, established by opposing judges and lawyers. Distinctively, it is not tied to any political or governmental framework and is established and financially sustained by the lawyers themselves. Given its nature, the association holds significant potential in fostering social cohesion in the A’zaz region. The local inhabitants harbor a deep trust in the association, stemming from its transparent and democratic electoral processes. This trust is further enhanced by the diverse representation within the association, where various backgrounds find a voice. Serving as a bridge between the general populace and legal entities such as courts and police, the association remains closely connected to the people.
Civil society organizations in the region
Civil society organizations operate with vigor in the region. Numerous entities, teams, and civic groups are actively rolling out humanitarian aid initiatives and civilian projects. These undertakings play a pivotal role in heightening community consciousness, reshaping certain entrenched customs, and laying down the foundational stones for genuine social cohesion. Such initiatives promote unity among various societal elements, potentially bridging divisions and fortifying the bonds that unify the community.
Furthermore, NGOs channel international funds into the region, ensuring a steady influx of foreign currency. These projects, in turn, generate revenue for marginalized community segments, acting as a buffer against societal challenges and problems.
During the FGDs, when participants were quizzed on the role of CSOs and NGOs in fostering social cohesion, Figure 16 indicates that 47% believed CSOs played a supportive role. This belief is anchored in the financial prowess of these CSOs in catering to the fundamental needs of the populace and integrating knowledgeable and proficient individuals in the social cohesion process. Conversely, 33% opined that CSOs negatively impact social cohesion. Their rationale hinged on the perceived regional biases of CSOs in their project locations, staff hiring practices, and the transient nature of their projects. The prevailing sentiment among this group was that the region would benefit more from long-term projects to bolster its capacities and yield desired outcomes.
Syrian Tribal Council
A significant portion of the A’zaz region’s residents is affiliated with tribes and clans. “Regrettably, many of the active tribal and clan members possess limited formal education, with some even lacking literacy”, noted MHJ-25. However, their profound commitment to tribal customs, traditions, and regulations, combined with their fierce loyalty, implies they often heed the calls of their leaders unconditionally.
The tribal elders and dignitaries, who also serve as political leaders, play a pivotal role in mediating disputes and conflicts among tribe members and outsiders. “Recently, a consolidated council representing various tribes and clans was formed, with its headquarters situated in the A’zaz district. This council has made notable strides in fostering social cohesion, especially in mediating issues between displaced and local communities”, observed 03-HO.
The council offers a semblance of spiritual leadership to all inhabitants, irrespective of their origins. Additionally, the fact that many tribal members are armed implies they hold considerable sway in escalating or defusing tensions among armed factions. “It’s essential to recognize that these tribes and clans abide by a traditional verbal law rooted in ancient Arabic values, which can momentarily bridge legal vacuums in the region until a comprehensive regional law is enacted”, mentioned 04-AS.
Individual community leaders
Within the A’zaz district, numerous individuals wield considerable social influence. This group includes notables, mukhtars, religious figures, media personalities, and certain intellectuals. “These community stalwarts often enjoy the trust of both the grassroots community and local governance structures”, stated AA-07. Their existing positive involvement in community dispute resolution and problem-solving is commendable. As highlighted by the collected data, participants acknowledged the potential of these community leaders in promoting a culture of tolerance, mediating regional and community-level disputes, fostering a collective sense of purpose among diverse community sections, and playing a significant role in realizing social cohesion.
Security and economy in NWS
Security and economy affect societal situations negatively or positively.
In the survey conducted, Figure 17 indicates that 48% of participants believed that the realization of social cohesion is influenced by security and economic situations. Meanwhile, 27% felt that there was only a partial connection between the two, and 24% felt there was no connection at all.
AM-02 stated, “In the absence of security, injustice prevails”. Elaborating on the importance of security and economy in fostering social cohesion, 09-WA from FGD1 expressed, “These two are fundamental pillars for any society, but they’re even more crucial in the A’zaz district. The region’s ongoing conflict with the government has deeply impacted both the security and economy”.
22-AAW from FGD3 added, “The interplay between security and economy can either foster harmony or spark conflicts within communities. It can even escalate conflicts among armed factions”. Similarly, 23-WA from FGD3 highlighted the economic aspect, noting, “The dearth of job opportunities and diminished incomes can propel individuals towards negative behaviors”.
AO-011 shed light on the economic challenges, remarking, “The rapid devaluation of the local currency against the US Dollar – a staggering 400% in a short span – has severely undermined the purchasing power of families”. Emphasizing the need for economic stability, MY-21 said, “A’zaz district needs stringent economic regulations. There should be zero tolerance for any activities detrimental to the economy, given its paramount importance nowadays”.
Security remains a concern for the A’zaz city, plagued by attacks from Vehicles Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED). This not only jeopardizes the residents’ safety but also hinders investment opportunities, compelling potential investors to seek more stable regions for business endeavors.
BN-012 concluded, “Every community member has a role to play in bolstering the security and economy of NWS. There’s a pressing need for awareness campaigns led by local authorities, aiming to enlighten people on the significance of these twin pillars and their role in societal stability”.
The precarious security situation in the region has directly impacted its economic policies. As 28-AKTH noted, “Without a sense of safety and security, the environment isn’t conducive for growth or for undertaking economic activities like investment, trade, launching factories, setting up companies, and initiating private or small-scale projects”.
Furthermore, ensuring job opportunities can act as a deterrent against security threats. 29-NR believes that “Employment opportunities can prevent the youth or those without jobs from gravitating toward extremist factions or participating in acts of terrorism”. The economic challenges also touch upon education, as 30-RKH observed, “Given the economic strain, parents often prioritize having their children contribute to household income rather than sending them to schools”.
The diminished sense of security in the A’zaz region has fostered a climate of disorder among its inhabitants and has led to a proliferation of arms. This unchecked spread of weapons has hampered efforts toward achieving social cohesion, igniting disputes, skirmishes, and tensions among various community groups. 24-MH emphasized, “Addressing and resolving the economic challenges is pivotal, as it’s nearly impossible to curb criminal activities and provide a sense of security without stabilizing the economic framework of the region”.
Societal challenges
The data reveals a myriad of societal challenges that impede the achievement of social cohesion in the region. These challenges intensify societal fragmentation and widen the existing rifts between different community components one of the most pronounced issues is administrative disunity.
The absence of a cohesive administrative structure thwarts centralized decision-making, causing fragmentation and inefficiency, as noted by 19-DS. This lack of unity hampers the effective enforcement of laws and organized operations of the civil society sector, as emphasized in FGD2. Another concern is the overreach of the SNA into civil matters, exemplified by instances where they bypass the rule of law, suggesting the urgency of demarcating boundaries between the military and civilian realms, as highlighted by AN-08.
This situation is further complicated by the weak formal regional justice and policing institutions that falter in protecting the human rights and freedoms of the residents, a point brought forward by 10-RT.
The security landscape is marred with incidents like kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, and assassinations, which erode the social fabric, as underscored by MB-16. Simultaneously, economic challenges loom large, with mounting unemployment, poverty, and crime rates, particularly affecting the IDPs in camps, a sentiment echoed by BN-12.
This dire state of affairs is exacerbated by the reluctance of the populace to partake in activities that could uplift civil society, primarily due to concerns about safety, as highlighted by 01-AH. Another layer of complexity is added by the intermittent conflicts between armed groups, which intensify societal divisions, a concern reiterated by MB-16. A significant societal challenge also arises from the unwavering loyalty to tribes and clans, often sidelining the ethical stance of their actions, as pointed out by 11-WO. The glaring absence of developmental initiatives that cater to capacity-building for the populace, especially the youth, signifies the pressing need to infuse programs instilling essential life skills, as mentioned by 10-RT. Concurrently, deeply ingrained customs, particularly those detrimental to women and girls, aggravate societal woes, with sources like 06-RZ and JA-15 expressing concern over the same.
Differences in traditions between IDPs and host communities further fuel conflicts, a sentiment captured by AM-2. The stranglehold over resources by certain merchants, coupled with increasing rental rates by host communities, further widens the rift between IDPs and HCs, as mentioned by ALH-10. Lastly, the resistance to democratic norms by some local authorities, who seemingly harbor illusions of unending power, epitomizes the challenges faced in the region, a perspective offered by AH-4.
Learning from global instances
The present dynamics in northwest Syria are relatively recent, having emerged due to the internal conflict that began in 2011. This means that Syrians primarily need to address their challenges independently, especially given their mistrust toward the government.
In the survey, Figure 18 indicates that participants expressed diverse views on the best approach to address the Syrian conflict. Nearly half, or 45%, of the respondents see merit in looking to solutions from other global conflict scenarios as potential avenues for resolution in Syria. A significant 29% advocate for a blended approach, emphasizing that while external solutions might offer insights, it is crucial to adapt them in line with the Syrian context and cultural nuances. On the other hand, a quarter of the participants, accounting for 25%, voice skepticism about the efficacy of replicating any external strategies, attributing their reservations to the distinct nature of the Syrian conflict. Interestingly, a small fraction, 1% of the respondents, shed light on a local conflict resolution initiative in Maarit Nouman city, as mentioned by AA-7, suggesting that such grassroots efforts could serve as notable examples to guide future endeavors.
Conversely, while there are distinct differences in global conflicts such as those in Rwanda, Lebanon, and Iraq, they still bear similarities to the Syrian situation. Solutions from these contexts might serve as a template. However, it’s essential to account for Syrian cultural nuances and tailor any approach to suit the specific needs and dynamics of the region AH-4.
In Figure 19, approximately 40% of survey respondents felt that the conflict in Lebanon mirrors the situation in Syria, suggesting the possibility of adapting its resolution measures. Meanwhile, 28% looked toward the solutions implemented in Iraq, around 24% cited Rwanda, and a smaller fraction, 8%, brought up other cases like Singapore, South Africa, and Germany.
The Syrian population is grappling with unprecedented challenges, necessitating innovative strategies to foster community rebuilding through a renewed social contract (AH-6).
The A’zaz local council’s data reveals that the number of IDPs closely matches the local host community. Generally, the economic conditions of the host community surpass those of the IDPs. A crucial reason for this disparity is that many IDPs, having been displaced multiple times, couldn’t transport their assets. Any proposed solution must account for these disparities (07-MSH).
While several global conflicts might resemble Syria’s, transplanting those resolutions onto the Syrian context without adjustments is deemed implausible by some, like AK-1. In the regional sphere, Iraq achieved consensus among its diverse communities, agreeing on a power-sharing government that spans ethnicities, sects, and religions, underpinned by international accords. The situation in Lebanon, marked by sectarian warfare, saw international intervention that culminated in the Taif Agreement in Saudi Arabia. Although these resolutions have their fragilities, they, at least, concluded the civil unrest.
The Rwandan conflict, from a global perspective, bears some similarities to Syria’s, but differences in international community involvement render it non-analogous. The significant distinction between Syria and other cited instances is the international community’s unified stance in other conflicts. In contrast, the Syrian crisis witnesses divisions, alliances, and even military interventions by nations backing various factions within Syria (22-AAW).
Survey feedback also highlighted certain non-negotiables, key themes, or issues that must be addressed in any forthcoming resolution endeavors.
In Figure 20, 42% of survey participants emphasized the need for any resolution to respect and incorporate Syrian cultural nuances. Given Syria’s rich tapestry of religions, sects, ethnicities, and doctrines all coexisting within its borders, it’s imperative that all these groups are involved in the resolution process and that their concerns are addressed. Meanwhile, 35% of respondents highlighted the necessity to acknowledge the aspirations of the 2011 revolution. The Syrian populace initially rallied for freedom and dignity, and any potential solution must recognize their sacrifices. Given that the country has mourned over a million lives and seen twice as many injured in its quest for change, reverting to pre-2011 conditions is not viable. These immense sacrifices should guide any negotiation or reconciliation talks. Additionally, 20% of those surveyed voiced religious reservations. In essence, the Syrian situation is distinctive, and careful evaluation and consultation are pivotal to devising a holistic resolution.
Parameters of social cohesion achievement
Given the complexity of the Syrian crisis, dubbed as one of the gravest of the century, defining the parameters for social cohesion in the A’zaz district is inevitably challenging. Through extensive data collection, this thesis outlines key attributes and benchmarks required for fostering social cohesion and promoting justice, transparency, and harmony across all sections of the community.
“There is an imperative need for establishing a sturdy governance structure with inclusive representation. A broader or public assembly, encompassing both IDPs and HC from all strata, is pivotal” (AM-2). The subsequent chart delineates the predominant challenges faced in bridging the gap between IDPs and HC.
Figure 21 reveals that resource allocation stands as the primary challenge in the region, with 35% of respondents highlighting resource-sharing, particularly economic resources, as their top concern. Concurrently, 31% feel that social divisions remain a key issue, suggesting enduring differences within the community. Additionally, 19% indicate security concerns, stemming from the fact many were forced to vacate their homes due to security threats. These concerns not only hinder long-term stability but also lead people to adopt unfavorable behaviors as protective measures. On another note, 15% believe that the dearth of employment opportunities spurs tension between IDPs and HC.
Building on that, nearly half (47%) of the surveyed participants recognize the existence of certain degrees of social cohesion within the region. Nonetheless, there’s an expressed need to amend or eradicate certain detrimental behaviors to fully realize social cohesion.
It’s emphasized, “A collective consensus among all community elements is crucial to enhance social cohesion and nurture a mutual spirit of collaboration” (AH-4).
Furthermore, the subsequent Figure 22 outlines the residency duration for IDPs within the A’zaz district. Specifically, 43% have lived there for 3–5 years, 28% for under three years, 22% between 6–9 years, and roughly 7% have called it home for over a decade.
Based on data collection, the respondents mentioned that there are several steps to reach social cohesion in the A’zaz district.
Participants in the data collection process concurred that the realization of social cohesion requires a prolonged effort. “The embodiment of social cohesion necessitates the widespread adoption of the principle of justice among all community sectors”, IB-14 emphasizing the urgency to shift residents’ perceptions and rectify negative stereotypes about others. “There exists a shared foundational understanding among all community groups in the NWS. They collectively aspire to close the chapter on the era of turmoil and pave the way for growth and progress”, MB-16 highlights.
In Figure 23, roughly 40% of the surveyed individuals believe that achieving full social cohesion among all community segments in the region will take between 3–5 years. Conversely, 13% think the process will extend beyond a decade, while 24% anticipate a 6–9-year timeframe.
Inquiring about the foundational step toward fostering social cohesion, the thesis in Figure 24 revealed that a significant 56% felt the primary focus should be on enhancing the economic conditions of residents in northwest Syria. Close behind, about 40% asserted that a shift in cultural perspectives is crucial for cultivating a just, transparent, and harmonious environment for all community members.
One respondent stressed the importance of proactive efforts, saying, “It’s vital to host numerous workshops and bring in community figureheads to instill a change in societal attitudes and encourage a culture of mutual acceptance” (AO-11).
Economic well-being forms the crux of any community’s livelihood. As one respondent noted, “There’s a pressing need to ramp up development initiatives in the area, with an emphasis on job creation, particularly for the youth. They are, after all, the agents of transformation” (27-SK).
“Education is a primary concern for parents and caregivers in the region, impacting almost every household” (AO-11). “The education system is comprehensive, so every aspect of it needs attention. Vocational training should be made available for adults and young people, beginning at the secondary school level” (29-NR). Given the toll the crisis has taken, particularly on children, adults, and the youth, “there’s a pressing need to invest in human resources within the educational sector. The region has a wealth of educated and skilled individuals who are well-equipped to drive the transformation” (MM-18).
The survey in Figure 25 reveals that 40% of respondents consider the education sector crucial for implementing social cohesion. Meanwhile, 37% believe that reform should begin with the legal institutions. Furthermore, 18% emphasize the importance of the security situation over other factors. A minority, 5%, reiterated the significance of the economic sector.
“It’s imperative to distinguish between civil society and the military. Armed groups should not interfere in the lives of civilians. Their primary responsibility should be safeguarding borders”, states (MM-20).
The survey results suggest a significant inclination toward strengthening the rule of law as a foundation for social cohesion. In Figure 26, a majority of the respondents believe that the starting point for enforcing the rule of law should come from the ministry of law of SIG. This sentiment is backed up by the belief that there’s a pressing need to enhance the capacity of law enforcement personnel through training and awareness programs. The statement, “Increasing law institution staff’s capacity and supporting universities or generating new staff” from AA-7 underscores this sentiment.
The third prevailing opinion highlights the necessity for revisiting and updating existing legal frameworks. This stems from a perceived breakdown in the social fabric of the region due to ongoing clashes and conflicts. As JA-15 points out, these disturbances have disrupted the established social contract between the diverse community components. To remedy this, there’s an expressed need to bring the region’s inhabitants together under a renewed, more inclusive social contract that respects and upholds the rights of every individual.
Furthermore, there’s an emphasis on nurturing the idea of active citizenship. The current observation, as highlighted by AA-7, suggests that community components are primarily operating in their self-interest rather than prioritizing the collective good. Hence, instilling the value of active citizenship and ensuring that everyone works for the greater communal benefit becomes essential.
Lastly, the role of advocacy campaigns emerges as crucial in reinforcing the importance of adherence to laws and regulations. Such campaigns can serve dual purposes – not only can they help in the widespread dissemination of legal standards but can also play a part in eradicating discriminatory practices. As IB-14 suggests, the ultimate aim should be the uniform enforcement of laws, ensuring equality and justice for all community components.
For effective implementation of social cohesion in the region, decisions must be initiated by local authorities. This is because they hold the necessary influence and resources to instigate change. By leveraging their innate understanding of the community, they can initiate and spread these strategies throughout the community.
Figure 27 indicates that nearly half (47%) of those surveyed believe that some level of social cohesion is present within the community, and an additional 21% fully believe in its existence. Combined, this suggests that around 68% of respondents would potentially back efforts aimed at bolstering social cohesion. However, it’s noteworthy that 32% feel that the community lacks social cohesion entirely. Given these findings, a subsequent question was posed to respondents, inquiring about the institutions or entities best positioned to spearhead the initiative toward achieving social cohesion.
Figure 28 indicates that 40% of survey participants believe that community leaders are best positioned to initiate the social cohesion process, given their influence and decision-making capacity. On the other hand, 27% feel that the educated members of the community should helm this effort, emphasizing that the change must stem from the community’s decision-makers, and isn’t necessarily tied to a formal directive by any particular institution. It’s a holistic shift within the community, and the community itself holds the power to make that call. Similarly, 27% are of the opinion that the social cohesion process should follow a top-down approach, with local authorities and key decision-makers taking the lead. Conversely, a smaller segment, 6%, advocates for a bottom-up strategy, arguing that since it involves altering cultural norms, mindsets, and principles, the initiative should encompass and be driven by all sectors of the community.
Challenges on the road to social cohesion
In A’zaz City, societal challenges persist that hinder the achievement of social cohesion. “The community remains deeply entrenched in certain traditions and customs that act as barriers. For instance, prioritizing tribal allegiance over civic loyalty obstructs the path to social cohesion”, expressed (AM-2).
There’s a pressing need to address and evolve these traditions to pave the way for greater unity. “Moreover, the continued displacement destabilizes the community fabric, weakening social cohesion, which in turn jeopardizes sustainable solutions”, stated JA-15. Trust issues between the local authorities and community members also persist, as “local authorities haven’t yet gained full legitimacy in the eyes of the community”, mentioned by WD-23. To build mutual understanding and dispel misconceptions, AN-8 emphasized the importance of “establishing open communication channels between IDPs and HC”. A significant concern is the prevailing environment, which is “not conducive to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This climate of insecurity stifles civil society and makes individuals or groups apprehensive about their safety”, voiced 22-AAW.
Given that the A’zaz district’s population is a blend of HC and IDPs in almost equal proportions, it’s imperative to cultivate a fresh communal culture. This new culture should emphasize mutual acceptance among all societal factions.
A subsequent diagram provides insights into the prevailing relationship dynamics between HC and IDPs. Approximately 35% of participants perceive the treatment as acceptable, contrasting with 32% who find it unsatisfactory. Thus, there’s a pressing need to reshape perceptions and foster mutual respect. Only a mere 7% regard the treatment as positive. Evidently, efforts must be intensified to bolster social acceptance across all sections of the community.
The region grapples with deep-rooted issues of regionalism, where appointments often hinge on loyalties, relationships, and corrupt practices. “There’s a pressing need to place the right individuals in appropriate roles based on their competencies”, AS-1 highlighted, asserting that choosing qualified individuals is integral to fostering trust between the community and local authorities. Figure 29 reveals distinct sentiments among participants. A significant 44% believe that fostering social acceptance across all community sectors is crucial. Meanwhile, 34% underscore the importance of bolstering the sense of citizenship, asserting that rights and responsibilities should pivot around civic identity rather than extraneous factors.
In the economic sphere, Figure 30 indicates that 17% stress the urgency of enhancing the financial landscape, while a smaller portion of 5% point out the necessity for political representation. “To ensure effective oversight, there’s a call for the formation of a committee comprising representatives from all community segments to monitor and evaluate the strides made in social cohesion”, suggested AA-7.
“Women play a pivotal role in our community. As such, it’s essential to reshape prevailing perceptions about them and broaden their involvement in the region. Establishing a women’s forum could be instrumental in addressing their concerns and amplifying their contributions to the community”, emphasized 02-HA. Meanwhile, another perspective highlighted the importance of capacity-building for members of the SNA: “They must undergo awareness sessions aimed at emphasizing human rights, fundamental freedoms, and allegiance to the nation over individuals”, 09-WA pointed out. Further, the significance of community leaders in this cohesion journey is evident, as 07-MSH stated, “Creating a structured program for these leaders, focusing on governance, strategic planning, and group collaboration, is paramount since they spearhead the social cohesion initiative”.
The governing entities in the region are relatively nascent, lacking extensive experience in effectively administrating the local populace. Many of these governance bodies have assumed power without a formal electoral process. Consequently, there’s an imperative need to enlighten them via educational programs.
Figure 31 sheds light on the local community’s appetite for capacity-building. A significant 64% of participants expressed the importance of engaging the community in dialogue promoting co-existence. Conversely, 26% deemed awareness initiatives redundant, while a moderate 10% believed in a selective approach to such programs.
Out of the 25 participants interviewed in the KII, a mere four believed there wasn’t a necessity for external support in capacity-building. They advocated for the local governance body to spearhead the change process, collaborating with community stakeholders such as CSOs, academics, skilled professionals and tribal leaders. However, the majority felt the need for external collaboration to leverage their expertise.
“There’s an undeniable requirement for collaboration with the international community. Their experience in conflict resolution and community reconstruction post-conflict is invaluable. Moreover, we face significant financial constraints in our region, making it imperative to maintain ties with international entities”, voiced 05-ST.
Yet, trust issues seem to plague collaborations between non-governmental organizations NGOs and local players. “The prevailing lack of trust is rooted in the absence of transparency and the perceived resilience of local bodies. As a result, many NGOs hesitate to collaborate with these local entities, fearing a breach of their organizational principles”, highlights 25-SH.
Tribes and clans contribution
Tribes and clans play a prominent role in the region, particularly among displaced community members. “Their influence on social cohesion can be both beneficial and detrimental”, observes 12-NH. The effectiveness of these tribal and clan networks largely relies on the awareness and education of their members (13-AA).
These tribal affiliations, deeply rooted in history, carry with them shared values such as justice, respect for the elderly, fairness, and assistance for the vulnerable. Members are often tightly knit under the leadership of the tribe, respecting, and following decisions made by the tribal chief. “Such unanimous adherence to tribal decisions makes it easier to implement social cohesion initiatives within these smaller, more cohesive units rather than a broader group”, notes AH-4. However, while these affiliations offer many advantages, certain challenges need addressing:
There’s a pressing need to improve education levels, particularly among women and girls within these tribes and clans (15-AO).
Blind allegiance to tribal affiliations often supersedes justice, a detrimental practice that must change (WD-23).
Many tribe members traditionally engage in livestock farming. Introducing them to other skillsets will diversify their income sources and enhance job opportunities (AM-5).
There’s also a need to reform certain outdated tribal customs, such as practices of revenge, denying inheritance rights to women, and a lack of emphasis on citizenship and the rule of law. Awareness campaigns targeting these issues are crucial (AH-4).
To effect genuine change within these tribes, it’s pivotal to empower their leaders. “Tribal chiefs, being the primary decision-makers, should be targeted with specialized capacity-building programs”, suggests AA-7. Training these leaders in conflict management, mediation, social cohesion, human rights, and fundamental freedoms can be instrumental. As BZ-13 opines, they already perform such roles in their communities, so advanced training can further amplify their positive impact. Furthermore, integrating tribal leaders into educational advocacy campaigns can aid in addressing issues such as child education and early marriages for girls (AO-11). Their deep understanding of the tribal psyche positions them as invaluable assets in fostering social cohesion (WO-9). The presence of tribal and clan leaders is indispensable. “Being pillars of stability within communities, they play a vital role in resolving issues and should be involved in all community-building endeavors”, affirms SD-22.
The role of the SIG in social cohesion
The Syrian Interim Government, recognized as the region’s paramount executive authority, operates under the National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, garnering international legitimacy to act on behalf of its people. The SIG encompasses various ministries and hierarchical bodies responsible for sectors such as Justice, Defense, Education, Health, Economy, and Agriculture. The SIG is noted for its diverse representation, including IDPs, HC, Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, ensuring a broad spectrum of voices and perspectives are included (MY-21). To reinforce the SIG’s regional role and contribute to long-term social cohesion, stakeholders highlight the necessity of establishing a robust internal administration within each ministry, emphasizing coordination, and minimizing bureaucratic hurdles (03-HO).
The Justice Ministry and it’s affiliated institutions, such as the military judiciary, are highlighted as crucial in managing relations between conflicting armed groups, thereby safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms. This necessitates building trust between formal justice institutions and the public, as well as implementing accountability mechanisms to facilitate community feedback (AS-1).
In terms of civil society engagement, there is a call for organizing the sector through a dedicated ministry or directorate. This body would guide CSOs in their efforts, lead recovery and development projects, and ensure that humanitarian relief efforts are efficiently executed without redundancy, targeting the most vulnerable populations (13-AA).
Particular attention is drawn to the IDP community, underscoring the need for specific policies and regulations to address their challenges and integrate them with the host community. This approach aims to promote social cohesion and inclusion (17-HS).
Economically, the SIG is identified as a pivotal entity in developing economic plans and investment policies, driving early recovery, reducing unemployment, and ensuring equal employment opportunities for all community members (AS-1). Furthermore, the SIG is tasked with creating a secure environment for the media, protecting journalists, and upholding their rights.
Enhancing community participation in decision-making and supporting local council elections are also deemed crucial. Ultimately, the SIG holds the responsibility of leading the region toward democracy and social cohesion (22-AAW).
The role of SCOs in social cohesion
Civil society organizations function as crucial indicators of a community’s health and resilience, acting as the societal lungs. Their existence and active participation are essential in every community, serving multiple roles including third-party monitors of administrative and local authority performance. CSOs have the capability to exert pressure and advocate for change in response to issues or abuses perpetrated by local authorities. CSOs play a significant role in development and early recovery sectors, contributing to the overall progress and stabilization of communities. The chart below would likely illustrate the community’s perceptions of the role CSOs play in implementing and fostering social cohesion.
In Figure 32, approximately 47% of respondents view CSOs as positive contributors to social cohesion, highlighting their financial and human resources as significant supports. On the contrary, 33% perceive CSOs negatively, citing their potential to create rifts and challenges within community groups, particularly through discriminatory employment practices and biased project location selections. The remaining 20% see the role of CSOs as partially positive, acknowledging their financial contributions to the region and their general support of the community.
The commentary provided by various individuals underscores the multifaceted nature of CSOs’ impact on communities. One respondent (01-AH) emphasized the importance of spreading awareness about social cohesion, respect for others’ rights, and acceptance of diverse opinions to create a harmonious and accepting community. Another individual (21-HB) highlighted the role of CSOs in supporting and organizing initiatives, especially those related to women’s support groups, while advocating for the integration of human rights principles.
Attention to IDPs is also deemed crucial, with an emphasis on enhancing their social and political participation and ensuring fair representation in decision-making processes (18-EA). The establishment of laws against discrimination and racism is also suggested.
The relationship between CSOs and the SNA is highlighted as vital, emphasizing the need for educational initiatives within military and police institutions to foster a respect for law and understanding of their roles (AA-7).
Furthermore, the capacity-building of community leaders in peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and governance is deemed necessary, alongside the creation of advocacy channels to enhance communication between leaders and community members (WO-9). Ensuring the safety and security of media personnel and activists is also considered crucial (MHJ-25).
The contributions of CSOs are viewed as essential in revitalizing communities and rebuilding social cohesion in the region. Their diverse roles, ranging from financial support to capacity-building and advocacy, highlight their integral position within the community fabric.
International community role
The involvement of the international community in regional development during conflict periods is a nuanced and sensitive topic. A subset of respondents from Key Informant Interviews (4 out of 25) argued that the region possesses enough experienced and skilled individuals to independently achieve social cohesion, suggesting a lack of necessity for international involvement. To gain further insight into the community’s perception of the international community’s role in social cohesion, a survey was conducted.
The results showed a division in opinion: 49% of respondents viewed the international community’s role as beneficial to building social cohesion, highlighting its positive impact. On the other hand, 34% believed that the international community contributes negatively, associating it with the emergence of disputes and tensions in the region.
In Figure 33, the remaining 18% saw the international community’s impact as partially positive, recognizing its contribution in terms of financial and consultancy support. These varied responses underscore the complexity of international engagement in conflict-affected regions, emphasizing the importance of prioritizing local needs and perspectives in such collaborations.
Building on the previous inquiry regarding the role of the international community in fostering social cohesion, the thesis presented a follow-up question to gauge public opinion on the necessity of international support. The ensuing data, illustrated in the chart below, reveals a majority of 60% of respondents acknowledge a need for international community support. In contrast, 27% of respondents expressed a belief that there is no requirement for any form of support or contribution from the international community, highlighting a desire for complete self-reliance.
A smaller segment of the population in Figure 34, 13%, occupied a middle ground, recognizing a partial need for international support but emphasizing the importance of maintaining the region’s independence. This distribution of opinions reflects the varied perspectives within the community, illustrating the delicate balance between seeking external assistance and preserving regional autonomy.
WO-9 highlights the region’s need for support from the international community in establishing a robust governance structure. This support could materialize through consultancy services, drawing on global precedents in governance, and the provision of financial grants to aid in the development process. On the other hand, MM-20 underscores the significance of international recognition as a form of support. Such recognition could facilitate the accreditation of educational institutions in the region and empower local authorities to issue official documents like passports.
Furthermore, a notable proportion of respondents, specifically six out of 25 in the KII, emphasized the necessity for financial assistance from the international community. They posited that such support is crucial for rejuvenating the region’s economic landscape, addressing pressing concerns, and ultimately improving the living conditions of the residents. This collective input sheds light on the diverse ways in which international engagement could contribute positively to the region’s development and governance.
Mitigation of internal clashes among armed groups
The Syrian Interim Government has taken significant steps toward consolidating various armed factions in the region under a single entity, the SNA. The SNA operates under the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense of the SIG. Despite these efforts, the region has witnessed ongoing clashes among different SNA factions, the military police, and local tribes and families, exacerbating social divisions and undermining efforts to build social cohesion.
The majority of respondents, 63%, emphasized the importance of consolidating the armed groups into a strong, unified entity, highlighting that accountability and adherence to the law within the SNA ranks are crucial for maintaining order and stability. Meanwhile, in Figure 35, 20% of the participants believed that relocating military bases and checkpoints out of urban areas could help reduce interactions between armed groups and minimize conflicts. Additionally, 16% of respondents suggested that shifting the loyalty of armed group members from their immediate leaders to the nation itself could be an effective strategy to mitigate clashes and foster a sense of national unity.
These responses collectively underline the community’s desire for a more cohesive and disciplined military structure, emphasizing the need for both structural changes and shifts in individual loyalties to achieve lasting peace and social cohesion in the region.
The SNA faces significant challenges related to the lack of awareness among its members regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, as highlighted by AA-7 which estimates that 70% of SNA members are not well-versed in these critical concepts. This is compounded by issues of illiteracy within the ranks, preventing members from making informed and logical decisions when following orders from their leaders.
One of the prevalent issues contributing to clashes and instability is the bearing of weapons by SNA members inside cities and communities. AM-2 emphasizes the urgency of legalizing and regulating this practice, advocating for strict laws to curb the chaotic and dangerous phenomenon of unchecked weapon bearing. He notes that numerous clashes have occurred as a direct result of this lack of regulation and control. WO-9 sheds light on another critical issue within the SNA, pointing out the prevalence of regional loyalties that supersede allegiance to the SNA itself. This regionalization within the armed forces leads to fragmented loyalties and undermines the unity and effectiveness of the SNA.
To address these challenges, it is imperative to conduct comprehensive awareness-raising sessions and capacity-building programs for all SNA members. These initiatives should focus on instilling a strong understanding of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the importance of national loyalty. By doing so, the SNA can work toward establishing a more disciplined, informed, and cohesive military force, ultimately contributing to stability and social cohesion in the region.