Introduction
The irrational fear and hostility towards Muslims in European cities first started to be felt after 9/11 and was materialized following the attacks on European soil in Madrid (2004), London (2007) and Paris (2013-2015). Rooted in the archetypes of European colonialism (Kundnani 2014), this fear was fed by a type of media coverage, political discourse, and law enforcement policies that essentialize Islam (Meer and Modood 2009), deny the complexity of Muslim communities and dehumanize individuals by cataloging Muslims as “permanent suspects” (Birt 2008) and “permanent outsiders” (Abbas 2019). The rise of far-right populism and ascent to power of anti-Islam political parties, as has recently occurred in the Netherlands, has made the situation worse (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; McGhee 2008; Fekete 2009). In recent years, Muslim communities across Europe have reported an increase in hostilities toward them, which has clearly been aggravated since the start of the war in Gaza. Islamic institutions receive letters containing death threats and attacks have been perpetuated on mosques in Germany, England, France and Norway. In the streets, citizens endure various forms of mistreatment on a daily basis. 3 An overt Islamophobia that is combined with a more every day and covert one, such as when a qualified woman is not hired at a company because of her religion or when a man is not rented a flat because he has Arab features. 4
While this negative and hostile environment has generated a proactive attitude among Muslim activists (O’Toole et al. 2016; Brown 2006; Lewicki and O’Toole 2017; Joly 2016), little research has been done on the activism combatting Islamophobia. This kind of racism is usually studied by analyzing academic (Hajjat and Mohammed 2013; Amir-Moazami 2016), political and media content (Roy 2009; 2013; Mandaville 2009), or by studying everyday Islamophobia through surveys and case studies (Zapata-Barrero and Diez Nicolás, 2012; Jacobsen 2011; Poli and Fabbiano 2012; Alexandrer 2017; Abbas and Siddique 2012).
This research, however, focuses on the anti-racism solutions and the ways Muslims have intervened in three cities: Madrid, Paris, and London. It aims to show the various grammars of action taken by these local and urban networks through an analysis of the social capital they employ and a description of their allies and adversaries. The originality of this article lies in its power to bring together issues of comparative Muslim activism with those about new social movements and social capital theory. Putman’s theory of social capital, and his concepts of super bonding and super bridging social capital in particular, will help achieve two goals: a) to critically evaluate the difficulties and barriers hindering the fight against anti-Islam sentiment and b) identify specific logics of action and alliances that are successfully putting pressure on public institutions to modify the legal and political framework, in such a way as to truly prevent hatred towards European Muslim communities. This article argues that the most effective actions against Islamophobia are those carried out by organizations who deploy both bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital creates connections within groups and reinforces the primary solidarity that keeps Muslim movements alive, while bridging capital strengthens ties outside the group and adds diversity to the movement. In the absence of this latter type of social capital, anti-Islamophobic actions would be less successful.
Social Capital and Anti-Islamophobia Activism in Three European Cities
For Putnam, social capital is a resource that enriches the civic community. He believed trust, the norms of reciprocity and civic engagement tend to be cumulative and lead to healthier political communities, which in turn boosts economic growth. Putnam stated there were two types of social capital, depending on the density and kinds of relationships produced: social capital that builds bonds within groups and social capital that builds bridges outside the group. The former tends to strengthen specific identities and boost homogeneity within groups. This kind of social capital is very useful for building internal reciprocity and creating solidarity. It is used to strengthen the “narrowest me,” is a super glue, and helps in “getting ahead.” The latter is a kind of social capital that builds bridges, looks outward to primary groups, and tends to integrate people from different social classes, ethnic and religious origins, to build broader reciprocity. It is useful for building social movements and reaching wider goals. It is a super lubricant and helps achieve success (Putman 1993).
The decisive question here would be: is the social capital being used by urban Muslim civil society more bridging or bonding in nature?
According to the latest research, ethnic minority activism is changing and tends to use new patterns of identity-based engagement (gender, ethnicity, culture, and above all, religion). Religious identities emerge alongside ethnic identities as a basis for mobilization and in response to racialized representations and exclusions. What is characteristic of the new activists is the tendency to prefer “direct involvement in horizontal, informal networks or movements, or ad hoc involvement with particular initiatives, rather than membership in formal, centrally organized political organizations” (O’Toole and Gale 2009; Joly and Wadia 2017) Muslim activists are reinforcing their primary identity and reshaping their religious and cultural identity to engage politically and civically (Modood 2006). These studies confirm the new theories of social movements that indicate that activists are changing and now express themselves “in more personalized, ad hoc and ‘DIY’ activism” (Wieviorka 2005), bringing their personal identities into the fore by using information-communication technologies at glocal level (MacDonald 2006) while also being increasingly skeptical of traditional organizations (political parties, trade unions, and associations) (Touraine 2015).
Among academics there is no shared definition of the term Islamophobia. Some of them define it as a reaction to the fear of the unknown (Kepel 2015; Lagrange 2010) and others (Kundnani 2014, 2007; Lentin and Titley 2012; Sayyid and Vakil 2010; Halliday 1999; Frost 2008) argue for a more complex definition, showing the intertwining nature of class and race, and the role of neoliberal policies on its perpetuation. The latter sometimes prefer using “anti-Muslim hate,” saying that Islamophobia is not based on fear, but rather on hate speech and stigmatization. They also ask that all individuals from Muslim cultural contexts be included, regardless of their degree of religious practice. Non-religious individuals are also targeted and stigmatized, which forces the fight against Islamophobia to be more inclusive (Malik 2005; Halliday 1999; Eseverri-Mayer and Khir-Allah 2022). Among the activists and leaders of Muslim organizations participating in this research, a variety of discourse has been found regarding the term Islamophobia. Some believe it should not be used at all, the thinking being that Muslims are not subjected to systemic discrimination in Europe; others believe the term is insufficient because it fails to reflect the crudeness of the hate that comes with this kind of discrimination; and lastly, others believe it is accurate because it reflects the contempt and fear toward Islam. Despite being controversial, it has been decided that the term shall be used in this article for two reasons: 1) the participants use it constantly in their own language and 2) it is a widely used concept in socio-political debate and the media in all three countries. This research, however, seeks to understand Islamophobia in this broad and complex sense, as a phenomenon that arises out of 9/11 and the start of the war on terror, in addition to being rooted in colonial history and Westernism, which has allowed a racism-based, systemic process of stigmatization to develop toward everything Muslim (Kundnani 2014). Furthermore, at present, jihadist violence has been used by certain ideologies to stir up and revive this historical racism, re-packaging it with fear and projecting continuous suspicion toward people coming from Arabic and Muslim backgrounds (Birt 2008).
Some background on how the English, French, and Spanish Muslim communities evolved is crucial to understanding the approach of this article. In all three cities, the mobilization of European Muslim civil society has been key to raising awareness of anti-Muslim racism. London has been one such pioneering city. Muslim immigration from the “New Commonwealth” (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India) led to the first urban riots in 1981, exposing racist crime and abuse by the police and authorities in certain neighborhoods. In the 1970s, the Asian Youth Movement (The AYM) was born, forging alliances (bridging social capital) with Afro-Caribbean immigration and white workers’ associations to demonstrate that a new multi-ethnic and secular identity can unite against racist propaganda. These movements coincided with other global movements, such as Rock Against Racism (RAR), a political and cultural movement against racism, and the growing support for the far-right National Front. Activists organized national carnivals and tours, as well as local gigs and clubs throughout the country. Just like the AYM, the RAR involved black and white fans and activists who advocated for building bridges among racial communities in order to prevent new generations from being influenced by racist speech (Tranmer 2018).
Around the same time, in 1976, one of the first anti-discrimination laws in Europe was passed—The Race Relations Act—and a new British Muslim Society came about to represent British Islam (Joly 2012; Rex 1982). Identity ceased to be transversal and instead became an ethnic and religious identity, organized locally through community leaders and umbrella organizations (the Muslim Council of Britain and Muslim Association of Britain), created in the heat of the Salman Rushdie Affair (Joly 2012). The young people who demonstrated against the Satanic Verses in Bradford, Bolton, Birmingham, and London were branded Islamist and violent but, at the same time, they demonstrated the complexity of a new generation of Young British Muslims, capable of uniting, of asking to be acknowledged, of feeling religious on a freer and more individual level, of demanding rights such as the right to religious education in schools (Joly 2016).
Despite the recent increase in Islamophobic attacks, 5 the British Muslim community has become aware of its power as a constituency and its potential for convening power through broad outreach online at universities, neighborhoods, and mosques, with women being key to boosting capacity for action (Eseverri-Mayer 2019). Some examples of this are the demonstrations against the war in Iraq in 2003, the mobilization against the occupation and bombings in Palestine, and engagement during Corbyn’s 2019 election campaign. O’Toole et al. (2016) showed that Muslim civil society holds the capacity to harness resources offered by administrations and create “potential spaces for change” (166) by redirecting, for example, the anti-terrorist PREVENT Plan towards new local priorities, by denouncing police abuse, fostering community cohesion, security, and interfaith dialogue (including with non-violent fundamentalists and Salafists to help young people turn away from radicalism) (Lowndes and Thorp 2010). One concrete example is the “No Place for Hate” project created in 2012 in the borough of Tower Hamlets, where any extremist propaganda was rejected, and cohesion enhanced in the face of far-right threats (Joly 2016; Saeed 2016). Legally in the UK today, the Race Relations Act, the Sex Discrimination Act, and the Disability Discrimination Act have been unified into one—the Equality Act of 2010. People can report cases of different types of discrimination directly (to the person or organization responsible for the discrimination), with the support of a mediator (non-governmental organizations being the most common option), or they can take the legal route directly.
The two events leading to the birth of a new Muslim civil society in Paris were the Stasi Commission, which approved the law prohibiting religious symbols in schools (Law 2004/228 of 15 March) (Mameri-Chaambi 2012b), and the urban riots of 2005 following the death of two teenagers in a banlieue north of Paris. For the first time, it was French citizens who grew up in the outskirts of the city who had the strength to carry out various initiatives via associations, mosques, and religious groups and negotiate their support for certain candidates in exchange for commitments on various Islamic or anti-racism causes. In 2012, over 400 candidates of immigrant background and Muslim descent ran for office on independent lists or through the new Muslim political party (Kepel 2015). These candidates belong to the third generation of Maghreb and sub-Saharan origins, organized independently from the umbrella organizations—the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF). These Islamic institutions were created by the first generation of Maghreb migrants and focused their efforts on establishing the first mosques in France (Mameri-Chaambi 2012a). The second generations (born between 1977 and 1990), began speaking out against police abuse and racism through the Beur movement (Dubet 1987) (the first anti-racist movement in France) and started demanding new religious rights, such as the use of the hijab at school (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau 2001). While this generation fundamentally advocated for an anti-racism struggle, they also started demanding recognition of their cultural and religious diversity. In France, however, it was not until the 1990s that the political elites started talking about discrimination (Bataille 1997; Wieviorka 1992. In 2000, the first telephone hotline for victims was set up and the instruments and regulations needed to effectively apply the old anti-racism law (from 1972) were created: the Haute Autorité pour la lutte des discriminations et l’égalité des changes (HALDE, today transformed into the Défenseur des Droits) was founded. The HALDE is an independent institution in charge of identifying discriminatory practices and providing counsel to victims in legal proceedings through evidence gathered by investigating the discriminatory act. However, many associations dedicated to fighting Islamophobia criticize the ineffectiveness of this Haute Authorité and believe that without their everyday work, Muslims would be completely unprotected in France (CCIF 2020).
It was not until the urban riots in 2005 that the third generation (born between 1990 and 2010) began denouncing the growing Islamophobia and creating new religious and secular initiatives for uniting Muslim communities in Paris in the fight against it. The last important event they organized was the first march in Paris against Islamophobia in 2019, which congregated over 13,000 people. This generation seeks to highlight their religious practice (Islam) as a clear sign of discrimination in France, naming for the first time in the public debate the concept of Islamophobia. However, even though Islamophobia is gaining visibility—through such widely publicized situations as the burkini affair in August 2019, and the violent attack on imams and women wearing hijabs, and the degradation of mosques 6 —some in the political class, and even some civil society organizations, refuse to use this concept, appealing to universalism and accusing Muslim organizations and a part of the Left of creating factions within the anti-racism struggle, and fomenting separatism and communitarianism in France. Even in the academic world, the concept of Islamophobia is difficult to use because researchers may be accused of belonging to a group—called the Islamo leftist (“islamo gauchist”)—who supposedly support Islamists (Joly 2023). 7
The law against Islamist Separatism passed by Emmanuel Macron in early 2020 has been criticized for being disciplinary and causing the creation of a “suspect community” (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; McGhee 2008), even going so far as to ban associations that had been fighting anti-Muslim racism in France for ten years, such as the Collectif contre l’Islamofobie en France. Imams are also mobilizing against the government’s desire to create “halal imams” and lead new movements where different groups of civil society converge, such as the LES Musulmans@.
Muslim immigration in Madrid is more recent than it is in Paris and London, but the impact of Islam’s historical heritage—Al-Andalus was the center of Muslim civilization for nearly eight centuries—is crucial to understanding the origin of Islamophobia and the relationship between Muslims and the Spanish State (Astor 2014). In 1980, a new “Organic Law of Religious Liberty” (LOLR) recognized the cooperation of religious communities that have become “deeply rooted” (notorio arraigo) in Spanish society. Islam was recognized in 1989 as one of the essences of Spanish cultural heritage. Despite these positive steps, some researchers have stated that Islamophobia in Spain is present in the unconscious due to this heritage (Martín-Muñoz 2015).
In 1981, the first generation of Muslims began representing themselves through the Islamic Commission, which built a relationship of convenience with the State (Eseverri-Mayer 2021). However, the second generation quickly showed its discontent with this umbrella organization and tried staking out new spaces of participation both in and outside the mosques. Far from being an obstacle to civic and political engagement, Islam became a vehicle for participation and struggle in the public arena (Tellez and Madonia 2018; Eseverri-Mayer 2021; Aparicio et al. 2019; Guia 2014). As some ethnographic studies have shown, Muslim youth and Muslim women first started appearing in the public sphere after the March 11 attacks (2004), and then after the attacks on Las Rambas in Barcelona (2017), to fight against prejudice and show Spanish society the true meaning of Islam (Eseverri-Mayer 2021; Eseverri-Mayer and Khir-Allah 2022; Téllez 2008). New courses of action have been taken by individuals and collectives, both online and in real life (such as community leaders in disadvantaged neighborhoods, and influencers active on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram), who stand up for their faith and spirituality from a personal point of view while demonstrating independence and freedom of action (Eseverri-Mayer 2019; Téllez 2008; 2011; Lems 2021; Madonia 2018).
However, despite the passing of successive anti-discrimination laws and plans (Law 62/2003, Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, Operational Program to Combat Discrimination 2007-2010, the Law for Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination in 2011) (Cea D’Ancona 2018), Spain is one of the countries where young Muslims are least aware of organizations that offer help and advice to victims of discrimination (only 6 percent of the sample know of an anti-racism or anti-Islamophobia organization) (European Unión Agency 2010). This might be related to the fact that Spanish society only has a new emerging generation of Spanish Muslims who have not yet created organizations capable of denouncing this kind of discriminatory treatment, as has been done in London and Paris (Eseverri-Mayer 2022).
International literature is rife with material on the struggle for religious rights (Rosenberger and Sauer 2012; Bano and Kalmbach 2011; Hafez 2020), women’s rights (Lewicki and O’Toole 2016), and anti-war mobilizations (Joly and Wadia 2017; Wadia 2015). However, it is limited regarding how urban Muslim civil societies use their social capital and what kind of social capital predominates when developing their grammars of actions. The qualitative data presented here shows actions ranging from advocating secularism to influencing the vote of Muslims and showing unity in the streets, including some who cling to the need for reparations for colonial domination and others fighting from a feminist stance. New forms of action emerge that help to understand how Muslims defend themselves and try to carve out a place in the West by reinforcing internal cohesion (bonding social capital) or by expanding their links and alliances outside the primary group (bridging social capital). Inclusive coexistence in the future will largely depend on the type of struggle they engage in.
Materials and Methods
The methodology focuses on qualitative methods and combines a specific participant observation, biographical interviews, and focus groups carried out between 2017 and 2020. Specific participant observation conducted at a variety of events—such as Muslim festivities, rituals, conferences, charity events, demonstrations, political campaigns, local meetings between different associations and political representatives, as well as cultural, sportive, and artistic activities—has allowed the researcher to identify the most active organizations fighting against Islamophobia in the three cities of Paris, Madrid, and London. This specific and strategic ethnographic work made it possible to contact prominent leaders and members such as representative leaders of Islamic institutions and federations of mosques, activists from local and civic associations, youth and women leaders, and members of humanitarian organizations.
Seventy-five biographical interviews—24 in Paris, 18 in London, and 25 in Madrid—have been carried out with people who were taking part in the fight against Islamophobia through campaigns, demonstrations, political actions, conferences, awareness-raising activities, communication or victim support activities. In addition, one focus group, with a selective sample of these 75 interviewees, was carried out in each city between 2020 and 2021. The aim was to get accurate descriptions of the interviewee’s life trajectories and their experience as leaders and members of Muslim associations, to uncover the patterns of social relations (the type of social capital) they developed, putting the emphasis on a comparison between cities and types of Muslim organizations (Bertaux 1980). Approaching specific-field and singular communities requires the application of a comprehensive (qualitative) approach that makes it possible to grasp the meaning and significance that actors give to their actions and their repertoires of action (Denzin and Lincoln 1998).
Due to ideological differences and potential conflicts, the names of associations have been anonymized (Table 1). Few public leaders or policymakers consented to going on the record. Accessing the Muslim community and leaders in particular is not easy, especially in London and Paris where Muslim leaders distrust researchers because of the tense political atmosphere. In the autumn of 2017 and the spring and summer of 2018, specific observations took place at activities and events in all three cities. At the university and in some neighborhoods in London and Paris in particular, leaders and members of different organizations were wary of this research, thinking that it might be linked with strategies for preventing extremism with the intent of monitoring and denouncing activists. The researcher’s continued presence and commitment at events important to the participants gradually earned their trust and made it possible to contact important figures in anti-Islamophobia activism in London and Paris. In addition, prior ethnographical research developed by the project PI (Eseverri-Mayer 2012; 2015; 2017; 2021), with young Muslims in deprived areas in Madrid, Paris, and London facilitated entry into the field and trust-building. In Madrid, it was easier to gain participants’ commitment to the research though the observations facilitated this task. Some biographical interviews were carried out during the participant observation and others between the autumn of 2018 and the autumn of 2019. The focus groups were conducted in early 2020. The interviews allowed key figures in the Muslim civil society to be discovered by way of the snowball technique, and the focus groups were carried out with seven participants, at least one from each type of structure (see Table 1), where the following topics were addressed in chronological order: motivations for civic and political engagement, issues associated with racism and Islamophobia in each context, allies, and opponents from each leader’s point of view, and possible solutions.
In the end, the sample was composed of 39 women and 36 men. Thirty-three of them were under 35 years old. All except 15 held a university degree (some were homemakers, two retired and the rest studying). They work in a variety of professions, e.g., doctors, lawyers, public servants, educators, professors, journalists, actors, and artists (18 work in an Islamic setting, a mosque, Muslim media, or Muslim business). Almost all participants self-identify as practicing Muslims. They also state feeling both Muslim and either French, Spanish, or English. Also, 26 participants state being feminists, liberal and progressive, and in favor of reforming Islam; 23 participants declare themselves to be rigorist and against any reformulation of Islam; 48 declare themselves as moderates, yet not keen on reformulations of the holy texts; and 15 declare themselves as reformists. Lastly, while 23 participants defined themselves as “political activists,” the rest feel more comfortable framing their action within a more social, civic, and spiritual field. Of the sample, 42 were representative leaders and the rest were members, or ex-members, of different organizations.
The comparative method is most suited to understanding phenomena affecting similar communities in terms of identity, religion, and culture that settle in different countries (Durkheim 1894; Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Castañeda 2012). Once the fieldwork was finished, the researcher carried out intensive analysis and continuous comparison based on Grounded Theory (see Glaser 1992), using Atlas-ti software. A code tree served as a guide, addressing three fundamental themes: 1) the personal biography of the activist and the type of political and religious ideology the participants developed over the course of his or her engagement; 2) the relationship of the organization with its environment (creating codes associated with allies and opponents to observe the type of social capital they used); and 3) the concrete actions carried out by the organization (setting codes regarding the repertoires, barriers and/or facilitators of these actions, in addition to codes addressing the impact or effectiveness of these actions). Initially, an open coding was used, which made it possible to gradually regroup the different codes and create properties and analytical categories through constantly comparing the data. The typology of associations for each city could then be created according to the different repertoires of actions presented in this article (see tables 2-4, below). This article does not claim inductive validity by suggesting that the 75 leaders and activists represent the broad experience of Muslims civil society in Madrid, Paris, and London. Nonetheless, the participant observation, biographical interviews, and focus groups developed have allowed the qualitative data to be triangulated (Denzin and Lincoln 1998) and help when it comes to examining the kind of social capital each selected organization develops outside and inside the primary group. In addition, this research has an interesting application in that, by comparing the actions that have been most effective in tackling Islamophobia, interesting solutions to this problem can be envisaged. Effective actions are defined as those having a social or political impact. This impact can be of different natures, bringing about a change in legislation, launching public actions against racism and Islamophobia, or stopping hate speech and violent attacks. The biographies of activists and leaders make it possible to identify the facts (verified through the press and literature) that have indicated the most positive and effective actions in each city. Learning about Muslim activism in Paris and London might boost the odds of foreseeing a rise in anti-Islam resistance in a city with a more recent migratory experience like Madrid. Likewise, learning about the most innovative actions of young people in Madrid might also provide insights for London and Paris. A comparative analysis reveals mistakes and successes by identifying the practices, moments, and strategies that curb anti-Islam extremism and favor coexistence.
Results
The empirical and qualitative data presented below provide insight into the types of repertoires of actions against Islamophobia that urban Muslim civil society employs in Madrid, Paris, and London. The tensions (in terms of ideology and religion) and alliances found within the primary group (through bonding social capital) are shown, as are those occurring outside it when attempting to transform a particular interest into a general one (through bridging social capital).
London: Polarization in the Fight Against Islamophobia. Between Mainstream Anti-Racism and the Political Action of Muslim Activists
One of the greatest difficulties facing Muslim civil society in London today is its ideological polarity in both political and religious terms. This research has detected a very diverse range of trends currently under tension. The four most significant are classified as follows: traditionalism, mainstream neo-liberal secularism, activist or political Islam (those members of civil society who take Islam as a vector for political mobilization), and inclusive and progressive secularism.
The first is those representing the more traditionalist mosques. These are led by the first generation Pakistani and Bengali immigrants arriving in the 1950s-1960s. These organizations flatly reject any political manifestation in Islam—“religion is something personal, private, here we come to pray. If you want to do politics, you can go to the Labour Party,”—says the president of one of London’s oldest mosques, whose only allies are secular Muslim groups, non-Muslims, and other religious communities. They take a clear stand against what they call the “new Islamist currents”—fundamentalist organizations such as Hiz ut-Tahrir, Salafists and Wahavists, and other mosques belonging to the Jamat-e-Islami, a movement taken as the Muslim Brotherhood in South Asia—whom they equate with the extreme right. According to various informants, these groups, although banned after the July 2005 terrorist attacks, are still active under other names and hold significant influence over young people.
This first generation was responsible for starting the first anti-racism associations in the 1980s. The chairman of one of the most important mosques in London’s East End recounts the events following the 1978 murder of Altab Ali Park, a 25-year-old British-Bangladeshi man stabbed on his way home from work in a textile factory by three teenage white supremacists. This racist murder sparked the first anti-racism movement in London—led by the Asian Youth Movement and the Black Youth Movement in the borough of Tower Hamlets—which brought together descendants of Afro-Caribbean, Pakistani, Bengali immigration as well as white working-class English members and sympathizers.
The movement began in 1978. Altab Ali was killed by a group of racists. Our (immigrants) numbers kept growing and I think the extreme right was not happy … The police were very abusive. Then, when Altab was killed, the youth said they’d had enough and now had to defend themselves … I was involved in creating a youth group called Bangladeshi League. Then they formalized community groups to start fighting and have an impact (…) that’s the same time people started joining the Labour Party.
(Community leader of Bangladeshi background, London, December 2017)
This first generation used bridging social capital: “we need a collective anti-racism movement. In the 1980s, the Black and Asian communities stuck together. We went to their demonstrations, and they came to ours, out of solidarity.” For them, bonding social capital aids neoliberalism in dividing the working class. A kind of isolation and internal cohesion that only benefits extremists (the Far Right and Jihadists). This does not mean that they do not work on internal union, but their repertoires of action against racism are always focused on alliances with other ethnic groups and mainstream organizations.
The second kind of movement represents secularism from a religious point of view and neo-liberalism from a political point of view. Following recent terrorist attacks, new interlocutors with the government emerged who favored implementing the PREVENT Strategy as a way of ending Islamophobia. They are critical of what they call “Muslim victimhood” and believe, as stated by the leader of one of the most important organizations, that “Islamophobia is used as a tool, as a business and a tactic by Islamists to keep their Islam free from criticism and to present liberal Muslims as traitors.” This type of neoliberal association includes very media-friendly feminist figures (seen as traitors by many grassroots associations) who defend the need to end the oppression of women in Muslim communities, and to fight against misogyny and extremism.
In the fight against Islamophobia, neoliberal organizations believe defining British Islam is essential. They accuse what they call “Islamist organizations” of presenting the State as Islamophobic and Muslims as victims, putting Muslim-feeling and community ahead of citizen-feeling, while discriminating against the LGTBQ+ collective and fragmenting Muslim civil society. For these neoliberal structures, the reverse should be exercised:
(…) what British Muslim civil society must do is promote civic sentiment and individual and human rights. The problem is that many Muslims are promoting this sense of “the West doesn’t want us.” We say: “If you have been attacked, we will help you,” instead of “I have been attacked and I am a victim, I am a victim, I am a victim … Al-Qaeda is good for me because it makes me feel strong!” Many of these Islamist groups say: “Muslim first, Muslim first!!!” We want to change that mindset and tell them: “look, the system works, we will find another way” (…) We work with institutions, with the police and we make alliances with Jewish communities, trans and gay communities … no Muslim organization does this! Why?!
(Leader of an anti-racism organization, of Pakistani descent, arrived in London at age 11. He studied in a Catholic school).
The key to fighting Islamophobia is institutional collaboration. They believe institutions must be made aware of the need to both defend Muslim citizens by including them and to avert discontent and possible radicalization by restoring Muslims’ confidence in the British State and British society, thus demonstrating they can have a future in the country. They want to promote civic engagement instead of religious belonging, thereby reinforcing a kind of bridging social capital, one that ties the Police and private citizens with the State.
Their opponents are student movements, mosques, and local organizations who say that they have a real connection with Muslim communities and want to help reappropriate their cultural and religious heritage, which has been lost or damaged through years of domination and colonialism. Within these organizations, women’s groups claim to hold to the true feminism, rejecting both Islamic feminism and secular feminism and reclaiming their feminine specificity (which includes their body and maternity, restoring spaces and time belonging to women). They believe that by following this path, they can earn a place within the Muslim community and fight Islamophobia without betraying their own, through local actions in collaboration with religious, civic, and secular organizations, while also taking part in City Council forums (such as the forum on domestic violence and the interfaith dialogue forum). Their aim is to truly connect with the local community and earn the trust of residents, to unite against racism and Islamophobia in districts such as Tower Hamlets and Newham through interfaith collaboration, fighting for social rights and against attacks from the far right, such as the one perpetrated by the EDL (English Defence League) at an East London Mosque.
In the summer of 2019, we decided to have “1000 one-to-one contact” conversations with different people in the community. And we did it (…). The following March there was a silent march, with no shouting or screaming. And we knew everybody and the power of that was huge, because young people knew us and said, “Hi Brother, Hi Sister!” It was very personal. And that’s when we realized the barrier (against racism) we were creating was real and true. It did not come out of anger or frustration. And the EDL had no choice, the far right had no choice because we were willing to die for the cause. It was our community, and we were united.
(Community leader in a mosque. For her Islam can inspire a “new feminism”)
The strategy of these women’s groups is to combine bonding and bridging social capital and concentrate on working more closely together, specifically on community-building while also networking nationally and internationally with similar groups. They denounce Islamophobia while laying the groundwork—just as a group of women did in northwest London who had funds from the Pathfinder scheme, a precursor to the PREVENT strategy, by filing a very media-impactful report highlighting and denouncing the dangerous intent of the Prevent Strategy.
We were doing what the community needed, we were working on Muslim identity, trying to promote unity among Muslims, trying to get anti-Muslim hatred in the law (…) But with Prevent the aim was to divide us … we did a brilliant project (working with young Muslim boys), but we said to the Council that we were not going to do what they wanted (as we began to realize the real intent of the funding). (We were the first to immediately understand what “mainstreaming” Prevent meant). They wanted … every social worker or whatever, teacher, health worker … (to) report a Muslim as a potential terrorist, based on their ignorance (of Islam or Muslims)! Many children were accused without evidence. I asked them: “Are you going to train thousands and thousands of social workers? What kind of training will you give to be able to identify (a) potential terrorist?” It was so dangerous! (…) And there (is) also a lot of anti-Muslim thinking among public sector workers, there (is) a lot of Islamophobia among establishment people, teachers, doctors, lawyers, (and Prevent is) giving them power? So, I spent my Christmas holidays writing the report denouncing all these irregularities.
(Leader of a Muslim Women’s organization. A trip as a child she made to Pakistan with her father helped her to embrace her origins and positive Muslim identity and her experience with racism and Islamophobia as a child inspired her to fight and resist Islamophobia in the UK)
Most of the male leaders interviewed say they are working class, from poor, multicultural neighborhoods of London. They self-identify as classical liberals (defenders of equal opportunities) and progressives on the social level, inspired by Islamic values. They support the movement of Jeremy Corbyn because they say he is the first openly anti-racism candidate who wants to bring back classic English socialism with the rehabilitation of the Welfare State.
Religiously I think, like, more centre-conservative, but like … my roots is like … the morality of Islam as opposed to the rules of Islam. I believe that Muslims like us from vulnerable neighborhoods are pragmatic, and what we want is to apply the human values of Islam. In terms of my heart, I feel more affinity to liberal values, with … a focus on creating opportunities. The left is more trying to protect vulnerable people, the right is about creating capital, so I feel more affinity to classical liberal values. I am more interested in human dignity, equality, welfare ….
(Lawyer and leader of an organization in a vulnerable neighborhood that works with young people and seeks to empower them politically)
They started out as associations focused exclusively on religious issues but realized that to fight Islamophobia, they had to create a new “political culture” among Muslim communities. “At first we were alone, but many organizations only focused on religion are now doing our work” (political communication). In this sense, they feel powerful—“because you realize that the powerful class feels threatened”—but they also feel afraid, because the PREVENT strategy marks them out as “suspicious” organizations. One student leader explains that “whenever we organize something outside the university (speaking about a pro-Palestine campaign), PREVENT is always on our backs. They look at every speaker you invite (…) when you’re interested in politics and want to get involved. It’s very frustrating!” (Student leader of Pakistani origin, studying law and religious studies).
Their mode of action against Islamophobia seeks to reinforce bonding social capital, fight independently and self-finance. They put pressure on power through social network campaigns (Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter), which can then turn into mobilizations of the Muslim communities. According to them, nothing can be achieved if the Establishment does not see their power of convocation and mobilization. The idea is to get included (as an ethnic and religious group) in the institutions little by little, through “tactical voting” to inform Muslim voters of suitable Muslim candidates (MPs), those who defend the anti-racism struggle, the goals of Muslims and the revival of the Welfare State. The goal is to generate counter-propaganda that engages young people.
One of our goals is to campaign. When we see signs or situations of Islamophobia, even racism, we try to create “public pressure” on the company, the institution or person to get an apology, change the (political) decision or, essentially, ah … manage it or investigate and try to condemn the injustice. Then we do the same as other minorities, who, for example have the “black vote,” we inform people of the candidates. The argument is always for Muslims to vote based only on issues that concern them as Muslims, but what we’ve found is that of course they care about their community, religion and all that, but they care just as much or more about social issues.
(Anti-Islamophobia activist. In charge of posting cases of Islamophobia on social networks. He seeks to apply Islam in politics through values such as compassion and solidarity)
During the interviews with these organizations, several former members spoke about their conservatism in the religious realm. They believe that in their eagerness to reappropriate their religious specificity and efforts at internal bonding, they take away freedom from their members, resulting in sexism and discrimination toward some groups, such as atheists and the LGTBQ+ community.
They don’t invite women speakers because they think the voice of a man is the only one, I know, it’s stupid! (…) If any of us girls have any questions, we must write them down on a piece of paper. It’s insane! And women aren’t allowed to be president!
(Student and humanitarian and pro-Palestinian activist. Worked for years in a university Muslim association)
Finally, there are the independent, secular “intermediary” associations who advocate for freedom of choice and respect for beliefs and ethnic diversity. They condemn both Islamophobia as well as cases of abuse and discrimination within the Muslim community, such as discrimination against women, homosexuals, and transgender people. Their secularism distances itself from what they call “French ideological secularism,” and they denounce the increasing influence of Saudi Arabia in mosques and religious education. They have the particularity of being mostly led by highly qualified Muslim women seeking to position themselves in the middle ground by being critical of both liberal feminism and the feminism of religious organizations.
(…) We reject extremes, ok? Secular law cannot be implemented without a humanistic perspective. You can be secular and pro-choice at the same time. (…) We are very worried about new kinds of religious indoctrination and its effect on gender equality and critical thinking …
(Leader and activist. Considers herself progressive in every way)
Like associations who defend political Islam, they believe work must be done on the ground, deploying bonding social capital, making Muslims aware of the importance of reporting the attacks they suffer daily. According to them, one fundamental limitation of neoliberal or mainstream associations is how they have lost the connection and trust of their base. These organizations instead rely on community leaders (men and women) as informants and allies.
The mainstream associations have all the media connections that we as an organization would dream of. But sometimes you think that’s the only thing these people do, promote themselves. We work on the ground, with families, with abused women. We don’t have time for all this! The fact that we are an organization where women play an important role seems key to me. I think you can’t be credible as a Muslim association if you don’t condemn hate crimes and the political environment where Muslims must operate. The reputation you have and your ability to network is also important.
(Leader of Pakistani origin. Collaborated with PREVENT but was very critical of its application)
These organizations operate in a single political arena and fight against the conflict and polarization hindering Muslims from uniting against the elites. To fight Islamophobia, they believe they must create alliances on two fronts, deploying a combination of both bonding and bridging social capital. First, they approach conservative student and religious associations (Shia and Sunni) more closely tied to political Islam by getting involved in the Syrian and Palestinian cause. And second, they build connections with pro-LGTBQ+ Muslim associations, feminist, and mainstream organizations who are defending human and civil rights.
Diversity is the key to success … you have to move. That means going to campuses, organizing focus groups with the ISOCs (Islamic Societies) and with the Shia societies as well. We operate in a single political space, as one political organization … therefore, by promoting democratic values, secular values, dealing with “Muslim” issues … sometimes it’s hard to find the niche and to establish or explain how nuanced our position is. Because now, as a result of populism and polarization, you have to be either “with them or against them.” You can no longer have a nuanced perspective, fighting Salafism from the Saudis and against Islamophobia and British foreign policy simultaneously. I think our organization is rather unique and the most important thing is that we try to connect with people on the ground, in the neighborhoods.
(Journalist and political activist of Pakistani origin. She collaborated with associations aiding battered women)
In conclusion, the ideological and theological polarization between organizations becomes a major handicap in the fight against Islamophobia for London’s Muslim civil society. Despite this, the power of pressure that more activist Islamic associations put on the government through tactical voting and mobilizations is clear. Moreover, the new space of convergence, deploying both bridging and bonding social capitals created by these recent associations, could contribute to reducing this polarization.
Paris: Between Secularist Elites, the Street Power of Political Islam and the Innovative Actions of De-Colonial and Feminist Groups
In Paris, we also find divisions within the Muslim community, but the widest gap is with a part of the political class who defends the principle of laicité and invalidates the existence of a Muslim civil society and its political expression, describing it as comunautariste (or ghetto-building) (Joly and Wadia 2017). Five types of organizations can be discerned: the institutional and secularist ones, the conservative and local ones, those defending a Muslim and anti-colonialist identity, and the “millennials,” defenders of Islamic and anti-racist feminism.
Institutionalized organizations, such as the mosque of Paris and the anti-racism secularists born during the Beur Movement, have been the main interlocutors with the State, reinforcing only one kind of bridging social capital. Seconded by a feminism defending the freedom to not wear the Islamic veil and the need to relegate religion to the private sphere, they believe in the need to build an Islam of France and to train imams in the values of la République. They believe that the solution lies in strengthening social rights and making Muslims feel French again. They are highly critical of the more vindictive/activist Islamist movements and anti-colonialists, believing that struggle contributes to dividing and legitimizing values that threaten individual freedoms. They reject the concept of Islamophobia as creating a “ghetto within the struggle against racism,” as explained by a leader of a new feminist movement in the suburbs.
Despite the institutional and media power of these organizations, the new federations of mosques in the banlieues are the ones who have been exerting the most pressure on institutions over the last ten years. These have proven capable of overcoming national and ethnic differences and unifying first and second generations of Muslims under a single “common and universal Muslim identity.” Composed of a very diverse range of mosques inspired by various Islamic movements—from Barelvi, Deobandi-Tablighi, Salafists, Muslim Brotherhood, and more traditional and Sunni ones like Hanafi and Maliki—they define themselves as secularist, republican and universalist, accepting the original and non-ideological principle of laicité that guarantees freedom of worship and respect of difference. However, they reject homosexual marriage (le marriage pour tous) and any feminist interpretation of the Koran. Their strength lies in their ability to distance themselves from political labels and having carved out a cultural and even political identity in the banlieues in religious terms. From this position, they hold a place in the political landscape where they defend their own interests, propose candidates in local elections through their connections, hold meetings, and host meals with representatives from the different political parties. They say they do not want to fight Islamophobia through victimhood, but rather through pragmatism, by holding an institutional, political space at the local level. By dominating the local political arena, they have room to maneuver when it comes to influencing discussions over certain laws, opening mosques and defending victims of discrimination and Islamophobia. To them, Muslim cohesion (bonding social capital) and pressure on political power have been key to fighting Islamophobia.
There is real cohesion. This is truly unprecedented in the associative and Muslim world. We organized the demonstrations in Paris with over a million people … when the caricatures of Mohamed came out … in Holland and Denmark. The demonstration had major media impact and gave us power (…) The State realized their connection with the Grand Mosque of Paris was not enough to understand Islam in France and they lacked information from the field on the reality of the mosques … Through several meetings with the Ministry of the Interior, the office of worship … members of the government, several prefects, we have an exchange, it is not a friendly relationship of course (laughs), there is always a rapport de forces, but it is constructive. But this could only be built through a methodology. Through the meals organized in Ramadan and other festivals, we now invite politicians because the Muslim community has electoral weight. Muslims exist as an electoral reality and politicians come; it’s a business (laughs). We can be active when there is an Islamophobic law, like when the veil and the niquab were banned. We have a voice in the media.
(Leader of a federation of mosques in a Parisian banlieue, Imam Tabligh. Considers himself “French by culture and Muslim by blood”)
The third typology includes new anti-colonialism and anti-Islamophobia movements. Second, third, and fourth generations, disillusioned by the first anti-racism associations for their politicizing of the Beur Movement and for exploiting its success for individual benefit, are clear about what they want: they reject ideological secularism, choose whether to wear the hijab and fight against French disdain for Muslims. Muslim, religious and ethnic identity becomes the new engine of political recognition (Eseverri-Mayer 2019), reinforcing inter-solidarity, a kind of bonding social capital. Paradoxically, in the country of secularism, the first Muslim political party was born and is gaining increasing support at municipal level. 13
It is compatible to be Muslim, a democrat and a secularist! It is a new belonging, we are democrats. It is important for others to understand that “we are French.” Valls (former interior minister) said: “Whoever touches a Jew is attacking France.” I would like him to say one day: “Whoever touches a Jew and a Muslim is also attacking France.” When we introduced the party to a group of friends, mostly Black and Arab, of course (he laughs), they told us that in the climate of Islamophobia, calling ourselves a “Muslim party” was going to stir up controversy. As a solution, they told us we should put a Frenchman at the top of the list, a white Frenchman, of course … (laughs).
(Political leader, ex-militant of the Beur Movement)
Political Islam is not the only logic of action chosen by the third and fourth generations in Paris. Other leaders from universities and civil society have raised their voices and believe the fight against Islamophobia and racism cannot be waged without recognizing the disadvantages and mistreatment suffered during colonialism and how they are reflected in relations of domination today. They place themselves at the bottom of French society, below the working classes, where the white population are seen as “opponents” because they represent the ruling class. They defend political emancipation from the “white paternalism,” seeking to civilize and domesticate Islam, and they hope to revise the history of colonial domination in order to regain their dignity, origins, race, and religion—they feel “Black,” “Arab” and “Muslim” —so as to finally be able to become political actors and reclaim their status as citizens “from below,” from the suburbs.
We want to speak out: France was, and still is, a colonial country, contrary to what all the white political parties might think. In France there is a social, economic, as well as racial fracture. Leftists talk about “the social gap” between capitalists and workers. We agree but would also add that these two classes also exercise domination over the indigenous people living in the most segregated neighborhoods (…) Our political party works for a total political re-appropriation of ourselves. Not only through religion. We are a political party, and it is very important for us to review our history and gain respect by going back to our roots. We work with white organizations or make alliances only if they recognize that they hold a position of privilege.
(Leader of an anti-colonial political organization. He self-identifies as “Arab and a citizen and resident of the suburbs”)
These groups believe the 2004 law banning religious signs in schools is Islamophobic and marks a turning point in peaceful coexistence within the Republic. Their slogan is nous aussi sommes la nation (“we too are the nation”), and they represent the ethnic and religious diversity of France on banners that mimic Jacques-Louis David’s painting of the French Revolution. They call for a re-foundation of the principles of the Republic and a return to the 1905 law of secularism.
At school we are taught about freedom, equality, and fraternity and suddenly you realize … wow, they pass a law against the foulard and consequently against Muslim students (…) Maybe our generation is more virulent than parents’ was, but it all depends on how you conceive of dignity, justice, and equality. If someone comes around to tell you how to dress, it should be questioned, right? It means he doesn’t put himself on the same level of equality as you, doesn’t it? (…) We conceive of secularism from a legal and historical point of view as a vector for protecting freedom of thought and religion. But they have warped it … We encourage girls to study, go to university, get involved in society and now society is the one rejecting them by banning the veil. Then they accuse us of being “communitarians” and demonize us, when we, through the law, are working to help mistreated young people regain trust in institutions. It’s crazy! You have to live it to understand it, all these twisted mechanisms …
(Leader and jurist of an anti-Islamophobia association. Self-identifies as mixed Algerian, French, Muslim and from the village in the south of France where she grew up)
The allies of these groups are the extreme Left (Lutte ouvrière, Action Antifascistique-Paris-Banlieue, Ligue des droits de l’homme and France Insoumise), certain charismatic religious leaders and imams who have millions of followers on social networks, Muslim MPs and councilors from independent parties and renowned intellectuals and academics. They do not, however, have alliances with LGTBQ+ collectives and atheist Muslim groups. This group now holds the most support, filling the vacuum left by the new party, La République en Marche, in the absence of an anti-racism left-wing movement. Its ability to mobilize was demonstrated by the March against Islamophobia held in Paris on 10 November 2019, attended by over 13,000 people. This historic event was meant to raise awareness and bring about a change in mentality among part of the French left. One of its greatest achievements, according to one of its leaders, is “the recognition by the white left, not only of the term ‘Islamophobia,’ but of the legitimacy and urgency of fighting racism.” For Muslims and much of the anti-racism movement in Paris, this march represented a new beginning, a revival in political representation (an opportunity to reinforce both bonding and bridging social capital) through new alliances with some of “the leaders of the White French Left,” who they had step away from in order to defend themselves independently.
Lastly, there are Muslim feminist organizations, led by the “millennial” generation. These stand for individual rights to build communal solidarity—an international umma that connects women and Muslim progressivism around the world. New generations of feminists in Paris are organizing to defend wearing the veil and raising their voices against Islamophobia, Negrophobia and the ongoing colonial domination reflected in new forms of social segregation and inequality. They defend a de-colonial feminism and tend to distance themselves from “white feminism” by creating a new, non-elitist model of feminism that reaches out to women in the suburbs living in poverty, exclusion, and Islamophobia. They defend a gendered reading of the Koran.
This is also the struggle of the LGBTQ+ community and the first inclusive mosque in France where same-sex marriages are celebrated, where women can be imams and there is discussion on how to reform Islam. In the face of the imposed equalizing of people under a false guise of outdated, republican universalism, and in the face of movements inspired by anti-colonialism and political Islam, these new leaders strive for an inclusive struggle (combining bonding and bridging social capital) that does not veto “Whites,” one that unites feminist groups, LGBTQ+ organizations, and atheist Muslim groups in the fight against discrimination against Muslims. The leader of a group fighting the educational system for the right to accompany their children on school outings or attend parent-teacher meetings while wearing their hijab, is a good example of this kind of repertoire of action.
We saw they had announced school trips and notified fathers about them, but not Muslim mothers. The school officials made a distinction between mothers who wore a hijab and those who didn’t. Absurd! So, we started to complain and not to take our children on school trips. They told us we couldn’t talk about our religion in front of the children … So, what are we supposed to do? Just disappear? We can’t be seen at the school gates either? (…) So we joined other anti-racism and anti-Islamophobia and feminist collectives, but not the white ones … even LGBT … And one night we happened into a meeting with all of them and they helped us out, taught us how to print leaflets, how to talk to journalists … we organized demonstrations, citing the horrible things that some teachers were saying (…) Now things have changed somehow … I am a young mother worthy of accompanying my child in kindergarten, but not in primary school …
(French Mother of 4 of a Moroccan background, anti-Islamophobia activist)
In Paris, the consequences of 40 years of ideological secularism can be seen in both the emergence of identity- and ethnic-based political movements, as well as in the ability of Muslim civil society to unite and collaborate in the face of a political elite incapable of recognizing cultural difference. The third and fourth generations have returned to their roots (reinforcing their internal solidarity) to revive the memory of their parents and grandparents. They have also appropriated feminism, adapting it to their values and beliefs, using it as a tool for resisting all kinds of submission and for bridging the gap with different political and civil organizations from the mainstream.
Madrid: The Tension Between the First and the Second Generation and Women’s Struggle for a New Urban Citizenship
In Madrid, the structure of Muslim civil society and its approach to Islamophobia varies along generational and gender lines. There are three very different types of associations: 1) those of the first generation of Moroccan immigrants (traditionalists); 2) those led by the second generation (associations of young Muslims) and 3) the trailblazing and innovative proposals of young women (defenders of a progressive and inclusive Islam).
Islam in Spain is represented by, and interacts with the State through, a single organization led by the first generation of educated Muslim immigrants. They created ties with the State, the principal mosques and, since the Atocha attacks in 2004, also collaborate with the Police. This federation is trusted very little among the political and religious orientation of the younger generation and presents itself as backstop against extremism and the “suspicious” new tendencies of “political Islam” imported from other countries. They present themselves as “apolitical,” unlike the more irreverent young people attracted by new trends in political Islam. They oppose any form of renovating or liberal tendency in Islam.
For this generation, Islamophobia does not exist, and the solution lies in setting a good example as well-behaved Muslims, creating external links (bridging social capital) by opening mosques to the public and building trust. Ignorance and isolation are, according to them, the main reasons for rejection. They do not want to play the victim card; when comparing their rights in Spain to the situation in Morocco, they state “we should be grateful.”
There is no Islamophobia. There is this stance taken when certain attacks occur and that (…) We have a school approved program (for spreading Islam); they come to visit the mosque, we give them tea, a sweet and they stay, and they don’t want to leave! It was a highly valued program for the Ministry of Education to make the Muslim community a widely known part of society. (…) I hope the new generations will be practical when it comes to the future, to cooperate and not complain. Complaining, complaining, no work. That does no good.
(Arrived in Spain in the 1960s, studied law and created the first Muslim association. He participated in passing the 1992 Cooperation Agreements)
Over the last 15 years, the new generations have organized into associations ranging from moderate to progressive and are highly critical of those more institutionalized associations. Two positions that sometimes intersect within the city of Madrid have differing strategies when it comes fighting Islamophobia. Firstly, there are young people, mostly qualified women, who favor reforming Islam, a feminist reading of the Koran, greater intersectionality within the anti-Islamophobia movement and who feel simultaneously Muslim as well as citizens of Spain. They believe Islamophobia cannot be countered if Muslims stay confined to their communities. According to the first Muslim councilor on the City Council of Madrid, women should leave the mosques and join student unions, local associations, local and national political parties. She got involved in Más Madrid, the leftist political party, and thanks to her work—she approached every councilor to raise awareness about Muslim needs—now a new Muslim cemetery is set to open in the south of Madrid.
(…) mosques provide no benefit to the other associations in many cases, or do not collaborate in such an equal way. So, I believe we need more of a presence, and more capillarity, at the level of coordinated social activism. And that in the plenary sessions of the town halls and municipalities, they should be open once a month to listen and take part in this development of the law, but from an Islamic perspective. Not because I am a Muslim that I want to sweep for my people, but as a citizen I need the sidewalk to be expanded; as a citizen I need it to happen …
(Councilor on the Madrid City Council since 2019, member several youth associations and youth groups in different mosques)
Secondly, there are young people who hold a conservative to moderate view of Islam, who focus on work within the mosques and training new leadership. Within this group, men are in the majority. They believe Islamophobia cannot be fought unless the leadership within the Muslim community changes to one capable of pressuring the institutions. They take London Muslim civil society as a model, which acts as an interest group that influences voting within the community and puts forward candidates. With the rise of the extreme right, they see greater need for the Muslim community to arm its defenses and propose other narratives, demanding compliance with the 1992 Cooperation Agreements. The male leaders therefore limit their leadership to mosques, solely focusing their demands on religious issues or those affecting the Muslim community, thus unconsciously practicing political Islam, reinforcing internal cohesion, and bonding social capital (Eseverri-Mayer 2021). They also believe that if the Spanish state lacks the political will to include Muslims as spokespersons and implement laws punishing hate crimes, it will be difficult to change any mindsets and prevent political parties like VOX from gaining followers. The men also point out the rise in Islamophobia in Spain and demand measures to curb this trend, which they call an “emergency,” just as cities like London do.
I would even talk of an Islamophobia industry (…) The media, think tanks, pressure groups trying to project the idea of a Spain in decline because of the Muslims … There is a crisis of leadership in the Muslim community. We need someone who is a good interlocutor with the State, with the media, someone charismatic with clear ideas and a message (…) To me, it’s a matter of political will. I always say: the one in charge here is first the State, the administration, and it does not have the will.
(Islamic educator and head of youth projects. He self-identifies as a religious conservative and social progressive)
Women, on the other hand, far from denying the existence of Islamophobia, warn against falling into “I cannot because I am Muslim, and I will be rejected.” They have a broader, pro-active vision of citizenship and participation. “I’m not going to wait until my leader, or a representative really, comes along working wonders …,” says one of the presidents of a women’s association in Madrid during a focus group. They have also strengthened their ethnic and racial identity, taking part in the Anti-racism Movement in Madrid, following the example of Black Lives Matter, denouncing the death of Samba Martine (after being ill for 38 days in a CIE—a Foreigner Internment Centre), Mame Mbaye (a street vendor who died during a police persecution) and Iliass Tahiri (who died after being handcuffed and pinned to the ground by agents for 15 min in a juvenile detention center). The first anti-racism demonstration in 2020 brought together Latin American, Maghrebi, African, Roma and Feminist collectives who symbolically gathered in front of the Christopher Columbus statue in the square that bears his name, to denounce all kinds of racial domination in Spain. These mobilizations and the collaboration of some municipalities of Madrid (as Getafe and Fuenlabrada) with mosques and civil society networks allows new programs to be set up, such as the “Action Plan against Hate” which persecutes, and monitors hate crimes and attitudes at a local level.
Consequently, even though the Muslim community is still represented by the first generation of immigrants, new grammars of action are emerging. The most innovative work is being seen in youth associations and women—who can harness their potential and training to carve out a space in the public arena through writings and artistic expressions or through political candidacies at municipal level. They are also beginning to forge ties with the anti-racism movement in Madrid led mainly by Afro-descendants of Latin American origin demanding a new historical memory of colonialism.
Discussion and Comparison
Actions organized by community associations in East London against far-right attacks on Muslim communities in 2010, protests led by anti-racism groups in Madrid in 2020 and the first anti-Islamophobia movement in Paris in 2019 are examples of successful actions against anti-Muslim hate. The first brought an end to attacks by the EDL on Muslim buildings and religious gatherings. The second brought about the creation of anti-hatred police units in several municipalities, and the third allowed Muslims to reconcile with part of the Left and other social movements with whom they had severed ties since the end of the Beur Movement (early 1990s).
As far as the similarities, one of the most remarkable pieces of evidence to be gathered from this comparative research is that successful examples of anti-Islamophobia actions required different groups to come together, in a kind of convergence of struggles. The most effective actions against Islamophobia are those carried out by organizations which deployed both bonding and bridging social capital, which managed to turn a particular interest into a general one, as other researchers about social movements have pointed out in the past (Touraine 2015; Wieviorka 1992).
This research has additionally shown that, on occasion, reinforcing internal solidarity and primary cohesion in these three cities was necessary for the survival of the group during periods when the political elite used Muslim hate for its own benefit. Under these circumstances, the prevalence of bonding social capital works as a defense mechanism or a path towards finding new courses of action. However, when these internal strategies become the norm, actions to combat external racism become ineffective and the internal dynamics might encourage chauvinism and sectarism, as this research has demonstrated in the case of several religious associations from the first generation in Madrid and in London.
In addition, this research has shown that the intersection of new social movement perspectives, research on Muslim activism and social capital theory is useful in that it sheds light on the current fight against Islamophobia in Paris, London, and Madrid. On the one hand, it confirms the findings of experts of new social movements such as Wieviorka (2005), Macdonald (2006) and Touraine (2015), who explained that new activists are increasingly skeptical of traditional organizations and are reinforcing their religious and cultural (instead of ethnic) identity to engage politically and civically (Lewicki and O’Toole 2014; O’Toole and Gale 2009). However, it also shows that, in the specific case of anti-Islamophobia engagement and at specific times, Muslim activists are capable of acting beyond the primary group to build alliances with traditional and institutional structures and groups similar to them from diverse religious, sociological, ideological, and gender backgrounds. They are creating new and hybrid spaces of mobilization—single political arenas—where nuanced perspectives about Islam and politics are allowed as is, simultaneously fighting against extremism while being critical of the government. In sum, this research has found that the existence of identity-based isolationism and an increase in personal, cultural, and religious-based identity-building is also combined with a growing capacity (especially in the case of women) for forging alliances and building bridges with a diverse range of movements, political parties and local administrations.
As far as differences, this research has shown that current London Muslim civil society is very divided and polarized between neoliberal Muslim organizations which support the State on the one hand, and on the other, religious organizations which mobilize people at universities and in neighborhoods in order to draw attention to it through activism, lobbying, tactical voting, and political Islam. For the former, the concept of Islamophobia is questionable. They do not believe Europe’s Muslim populations suffer systemic discrimination and do not want to play the victim card. They instead advocate for Muslims exercising their rights and individual liberties by denouncing mistreatment on an individual level more than by building up group solidarity based on religion or ethnicity.
The second group is currently generating greater cohesion between, and mobilization of, Muslim communities. They attract members and sympathizers by means of the vector of ethnic and religious affiliation (bonding social capital), while claiming to be the most effective strategy for lobbying and negotiating with institutions at local and university level. They also create links with some of the leading figures of the Left (such as Jeremy Corbyn). This research has found that this group is the most prepared for building unique and unprecedent cohesion among Muslims communities in London. Their most successful actions (such as the unity over the violent attacks of the extreme right in Tower Hamlets and Newham) are those arising from alliances outside the ethnic group and promoted by groups of women in mosques who are collaborating with the City Council forums, working on interfaith dialogue, and linked with different civic and secular organizations.
Lastly, a door is opening up between these two positions, where women are taking the lead to defend an inclusive struggle—like in the 1970s and during the rally in 2010—encouraging fresh dialogue with religious young people while also including LGBTQ+ and Muslim feminist associations. This women-led group would rather speak about Muslim hate than about Islamophobia, pointing out the fact that it is a form of discrimination based on the hate speech promoted by the far right more than one stemming from any unconscious fear. While they are willing to open the necessary middle ground for dialogue, the problem is that they fail to mobilize and unite Muslim communities and are often judged as being too liberal.
In Paris, the universities are not as influential as the banlieues are, where certain mosques have gained great influence by promoting a Democratic Muslim political party to claim social and religious rights in the country of secularism. This activism is also led primarily by men and defends internal cohesion (bonding social capital). Unlike in London where organizations can make themselves heard by participating in community councils, in France the actions of anti-colonial and anti-Islamophobia groups have grown much more restricted due to the new law on Islamist separatism. Many have been outlawed and curtailed their activity out of fear of being labelled “Islamist.” For this reason, and paradoxically in the country of secularism, activism gets concentrated in the mosques of the banlieues. In addition, anti-colonial and anti-racism groups are gaining traction, reinforcing the ethnic, racial and religious belonging (bonding social capital) though also forging the first ties with the far Left since the 1980s (bridging social capital). Then there is an emerging feminist Millennial movement, which believes that a convergence of struggles (a combination of bonding and bridging social capital) is the best way to fight Islamophobia. However, as in London, these recently created inclusive and secular Muslim women’s groups are working hard but still struggle to find an alternative space where nuanced approaches are accepted.
Thanks to the alliance between the federations of mosques in the banlieues, the anti-colonialist groups and some factions of the Left, the first march in Paris against Islamophobia could be organized, where this kind of hate was named publicly for the first time. These groups, including the feminist Millennial movement, condemn the way France hides the phenomenon of Islamophobia under the cover of universalism. In their perspective, in the words of the ideologist behind one of the anti-colonialist movements, Said Bouamana, the republican and secularist model, in seeking to promote equality, generates a hidden kind of racism that is never stated publicly (and is even denied) because it is rooted in the very model of integration itself (Bouamana 2000). Anti-racism associationism that calls itself “secularist,” on its part, refuses to use this concept and criticizes Muslim associations who join together along religious or ethnic lines to fight against it, because they think they are betraying the Republic and promoting communautarisme (ghettoization). Even though 40 years of ideological secularism has led to a bolstering in religious and ethnic identity, this research shows that Muslim activists in Paris are also capable of building partnership and alliances with various new and traditional groups outside the ethnic community.
In Madrid, there is a crucial difference between generation and gender. Having been expelled from leadership positions, women seek alternative forms of representation and participation. Madrid is the greatest example of how Muslim activism is not based on the bolstering of their religious and cultural identities alone. They used Islam as an inspiration for action, a force motivating them to participate in the public arena, though they clearly define the difference between a religious engagement and a political one. They want to fight against hate crimes using bridging social capital, by engaging in traditional political parties, trade unions, student organizations, and anti-racism movements. Instead of using religion as a means of participation, they demand, first of all, the right to be urban citizens. In Madrid, even though the associations are very recent and have less experience, the actions being carried out in collaboration with certain city councils are very interesting, for instance the Fuenlabrada City Council’s “Plan Against Hate” mentioned above in the findings.
Regarding the use of the term Islamophobia, for the first generation this concept should not be employed because Spain is an inclusive country where this problem is not experienced. For the second generations, though, it most certainly does and reporting this kind of differential treatment is important. However, women believe it is more effective to concentrate on individual trajectories and exercising citizen rights to participation (completing university studies or participating in political parties and being visible in the media) in order to combat hate and prejudice. Men, on the other hand, believe there should be stronger leadership in Muslim communities in order to gain greater protection against attacks.
Confirming other studies in the field (Lewicki and O’Toole 2016; Lewinski et al. 2014; Joly and Wadia 2016 2017; Massoda and Kalmbach 2012; Eseverri-Mayer and Khir-Allah 2022), this research has found that women’s organizations and young Muslim women leaders are, as one interviewee in Madrid expressed, achieving capillarity, which means claiming rights in a complex and hostile context by both working on internal cohesion (reinforcing bonding social capital at a local level and international level) and building networks outside the primary group (bridging social capital) with religious, interfaith, and secular organizations; local authorities and scholars. This was the case with actions organized by a group of women in northwest London against the Prevent Strategy in 2008; the struggles of women’s organizations in Paris against the ban on mothers wearing the hijab when taking their children on school outings; and in Madrid, the first Muslim councilwoman’s fight for a new Muslim cemetery. In contrast, movements mostly led by men have a high capacity for mobilizing Muslim communities and bringing them closer together by being very present on social media and associating with part of the left, as is also the case for the anti-colonialism movements in Paris and the movements in London fighting for a new classical liberalism based on Islamic values. They also advocate for tactical voting and negotiating with certain political parties in order to gain political representation.
Conclusion
Actions combatting Islamophobia are less successful in organizations which only reinforce bonding social capital, as they suffer internal ideological conflicts and fail to have an inclusive perspective in inter-generational or gender terms. Paradoxically, in all three cities, it can be seen that, on the one hand, the local authorities build alliances with the more conservative and neoliberal organizations in their fight against extremism. While on the other, they yield to the pressure of Islamic and religious associations by including political leaders who seek representation that focuses more on the (ethnic and religious) community struggle than it does on citizenship. Along the way, they ignore new young initiatives seeking to exercise their citizenship freely and independently. This research shows that the way forward is to open up dialogue by creating a new inclusive space that might help overcome the limitations brought on by ideological, religious and gender differences within Muslim civil society in order to focus on eradicating all forms of discrimination against Muslims in European cities today.