Introduction
Over the past three decades, the process of socialist construction and reform in Cuba has had many positive changes. It has both maintained the Revolution’s core political ideological orientation, and transitioned to a market economy. It has both focused on national identity, and integrated and adapted quickly to international changes. These have become both fundamental trends and goals. This article investigates, analyses, and evaluates the general situation of Cuba’s reform process over the past 30 years (1993–2023), key factors affecting Cuba’s development and its international cooperation, and the prospects, orientation, and room for the further development of Cuba.
Overview of Cuba’s innovation over the past 30 years (1993–2023)
After the end of the Cold War (after 1991) when its ally the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist system collapsed, Cuba entered a period of great difficulties. Cuba lost its close political partners, and therefore its economy no longer received support from them. Before that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries accounted for 80 per cent of Cuba’s export turnover; provided 95 per cent of its gasoline; 57 per cent of its food; 51 per cent of its meat; and most of its office tools, transportation, and essential consumer goods (Thao 2020). To overcome that situation, Fidel Castro and the Cuban government rapidly issued and implemented a series of crucial political adjustments and socio-economic reform measures beginning in August 1993. Within a few years they restructured the government apparatus, improved the management of state agriculture, allowed the expansion of individual occupations, restored health to their national finances, and legalised the use of foreign currency among the population.
Regarding the legal foundation in force during the reforms, until 2019 the 1976 Constitution still applied as the legal framework of the political system. It was amended in 1992 and again in 2002 to make it compatible with new situations and trends. Two amendments were the most important in 1992. The purpose of the first was to establish that the Cuban state is a secular state as opposed to an atheist state: it recognised and legitimised both symbols and organisations related to religious functions and activities. The second one eliminated some restrictions on foreign investment and granted foreign corporations limited ownership rights in Cuba if they entered into joint ventures with the regime. In the 2002 revision, the most essential amendment was the assertion that Cuba’s socialist nature is permanent and irrevocable (constituteproject.org n.d. a). 1
The 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba – PCC), which took place in October 1997, is considered an important milestone that initiated many of the adjustments, reforms, and innovations of the entire Cuban political system that were to occur after that. The documents from the Congress affirm that while the central political goals and ideals in Cuba cannot be changed, at each different historical moment appropriate paths must be determined, and corresponding measures taken. The principles of democratic centralism and of criticism and self-criticism are considered the most important factors for ensuring that the Party is a tightly organised and energetic strategic advisory body (Thao 2020). It is necessary to strengthen Party discipline, and to effectively fight against bureaucracy and corruption in the Party and state. A team of officials who are knowledgeable and practical must be developed, with priority given to recruiting young, female, and ethnically diverse officials. The government apparatus needs to be restructured to limit overlapping functions and administrative bloat, and to streamline staffing by 30–40 per cent (redundant people receive 70 per cent of their salary until assigned to a new job position). Democracy and human rights must be emphasised, including the right to food, the right to grow up healthily, the right to become a valuable, helpful person for society, and the right to enjoy equality, dignity, and development. For economic development, it is necessary to thoroughly grasp four principles: The state (1) only sets directional targets, not specific targets; (2) relies primarily on domestic efforts; (3) focuses on enhancing production and business efficiency as a critical task; and (4) ensures the socialist nature of the economic reform processes.
Cuba has maintained a planned economy, but at the same time there have been many changes redirecting it in more appropriate, practical, and compelling directions. First, it has created a larger spectrum of forms of both socialist and non-socialist ownership, business, and production. Second, it has worked continuously over the 30 years to rectify, reorganise, and consolidate the public ownership regime, consistently rejecting doing so by turning to privatisation. Third, it has paid serious attention to financial balances and added other new macroeconomic tools to the theory and practice of Cuba’s business and economic management.
In the field of foreign affairs, after the Cold War, Cuba gradually established and expanded diplomatic relations with most the countries in the world, and actively participated in many global and regional international organisations. Cuba prioritises developing all-around relations with socialist countries in Asia (China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea), and it restored and diversified its relationships (especially economic relations) with Russia and the Eastern European countries (even though they no longer follow a socialist regime). Cuba also strengthened relations and regained its role with Caribbean and Latin American countries. These relations increased in particular in the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, when many governments of Latin American countries were led by leftist forces. In December 2004, Cuba founded and became a crucial member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) – an alliance of a number of left-wing countries in Latin America. Cuba also developed a particular and unique political, economic, and social relationship with Venezuela after the left took power in that country after 1998. In relations with the West, a vital development for Cuba was its normalisation of relations with Western European countries based on the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement signed with the European Union (UE) in March 2016. With the United States Cuba necessarily maintained a determined struggle over the 30 years of its reforms, but responded flexibly to the US embargo policy that changed over the years. Under Presidents Bush (1987–1992) and Clinton (1993–2000), the United States increased the embargo on Cuba by implementing the Torricelli Act (issued in 1992) and Helms-Burton Act (issued in 1996). Under President Barack Obama (2009–2016), this policy was significantly relaxed, so that from July 2015 the two countries restored diplomatic relations and opened embassies in each other’s capitals. However, under President Donald Trump (2017–2020), the policy of a reinforced embargo and siege was applied again. The administration of President Joe Biden, who assumed the presidency at the beginning of 2021, has continued to apply and even extend the embargo throughout his term. It also applied additional sanctions after Cuba suppressed the July 2021 protests.
In recent years, Cuba has carried out many important changes. Two of the most important of those have been the new Constitution ratified in April 2019, and a number of the policies decided on at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in April 2021.
The 2019 Constitution replaced the 1976 Constitution, which had been amended to update it in 1992 and 2002. Fourteen of the most important new provisions follow: (1) Recognition of private property of means of production and the creation freer markets; (2) prohibition of discrimination based on gender, race, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability (this is the regulation that led to the legalisation of same-sex marriage); (3) ensuring women’s reproductive and sexual rights and the protection of women from gender-based violence; (4) defining marriage as creating a social and legal organisation (a family with at least two members); (5) allowing citizens to hold multiple nationalities; (6) restoration of the presumption of innocence and habeas corpus 2 in the judicial system (these provisions were last enshrined in the 1940 Constitution); (7) identification of the importance of the climate and the existing threats to it; (8) establishment an individual position of president (previously this position was called Chairman of the State Council and was part of the collective State Council) and a separate individual position of Prime Minister (previously called the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, concurrently held by the Chairman of the State Council); (9) establishment of age limits for candidacy, and number of allowed terms, for the position of President (the president cannot hold power for more than two terms and must be no more than 60 years old when first running for election); (10) transfer of the authority of the head of the State Council to the Chairman of the National Assembly (from now on, the Chairman of the National Assembly is also the Chairman of the State Council and the State Council is the standing agency of the National Assembly); (11) establishment of provincial councils consisting of provincial and city leaders; (12) the positions of provincial chairman and mayor (in charge of executive duties) are supplemented and separated from the position of chairman of the provincial and city councils (previously, the concurrent position of chairman of the provincial and city councils, responsible for both the legislature and the executive); (13) the president, and vice president of a province or city appointed by the president, must be approved by the provincial or city government; and (14) expansion of the term of district council delegates to 5 years (previously 2.5 years) (constituteproject.org n.d. c). 3
In the middle of April 2021, the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba occurred. The Congress passed resolutions as the basis for the country’s development in the current and upcoming periods. In addition to the (1) Political Report that is always a central document from the Party congresses, resolutions of fundamental importance for the transformation going on in Cuba today addressed (2) ideological political functions and activities, and relationships with the masses; (3) personnel policy; (4) updating the conceptualisation of the Cuban socialist socio-economic development model; and (5) guidelines for updating the socio-economic development model for the period 2021–2026. Especially important, at this Congress Cuba’s senior leadership team officially transferred power to the next generation, people more than 20 years younger than them (most were born after the 1959 Revolution). Of central symbolic and substantive importance, the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba was transferred from 90-year-old Raúl Castro to 61-year-old President Miguel Díaz-Canel.
Entering the second half of 2021 after the Congress, Cuba faced two significant challenges: the COVID-19 epidemic, which had been extremely contained since it broke out in March 2020, suddenly sharply escalated causing many different adverse effects for Cuba; and the largest protests against the government in over 60 years broke out. Regarding COVID-19, the number of new cases per day suddenly jumped. For example, from 5 to 1 July there were an average of more than 3,000 new cases per day (Thoa 2021), a worrying number when compared to the total population of Cuba which is just over 11 million. Cuba has prepared five types of epidemic vaccines, of which two had been successfully tested at that time (Abdala and Soberana 2). The government at that time had organised vaccination for about half of the population and had vaccinated everyone by December 2021, bringing the epidemic back under control. Regarding the protests which stemmed from shortages of food and medicine, the epidemic, which was then exploding, and some less democratic measures by the government, on July 11–13 tens of thousands of Cubans in more than 50 municipalities nationwide took to the streets to protest (The Economist 2021). The government crackdown left one person dead and hundreds arrested. On July 17, the Cuban Communist Party also responded by organising a massive protest in support of the government in Havana, with the participation of more than 100,000 people (Nicoll 2021).
Going forward from 2022, the protest movement has not recurred and the COVID-19 pandemic has been reduced to a remnant, but still Cuba must overcome the severe consequences left by the pandemic and deal with the strengthened US embargo. In just the first 14 months of US President Joe Biden’s administration (January 2021–February 2022), losses due to the economic embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba amounted to 6.35 billion USD (equivalent to 15 million USD per day (Tuyen and Hai 2022). On 3 November 2022, the 77th United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution with near unanimous support (185 in favour, 2 against, and 2 abstentions) calling for an end to the US economic embargo on Cuba.
Since 2017, the movement by the homosexual community in Cuba has increased, demanding the legalisation of same-sex marriage. The regulations on marriage and family in the new 2019 Constitution created conditions to address that issue. On 22 July 2022, the National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular – ANPP) voted to finalise the draft of the new Family Code, which includes regulations officially legalising same-sex marriage. The draft was put to referendum on September 25 and received 66.85% support. On 26 September the President of Cuba signed the law after which it was published it in the Official Gazette, and from 27 September 2022, the new Family Code officially took effect. This result is a significant step forward in expanding and developing human rights in Cuba, making Cuba the first socialist country, the eighth country in Latin America, and the 32nd country in the world to legalise same-sex marriage.
From 27–29 October 2022, Cuba successfully organised the 22nd International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties (IMWCP) in Havana. The meeting brought together 142 delegates representing 73 communist and workers’ parties from 57 countries from all continents, with the theme “Solidarity with Cuba and all struggling peoples. United, we will be stronger in the fight against imperialism, together with social movements and the masses, in the face of capitalism and capitalist policies, the threat of fascism and war; protect the peace, the environment, the rights of working people, solidarity and socialism.”
On 27 November 2022, Cuba held elections for local people’s council deputies. According to Cuba’s National Electoral Council (CEN), the election was “a victory for the people” when it took place vibrantly, objectively, and honestly with 5,728,220 voters (accounting for 68.56 per cent number of people on the voter list), electing 12,422 delegates (with 44.1 per cent female – this rate is higher than the 2017 election) who are responsible for directly managing issues, suggestions, and complaints within the communities they represent. This is the first election held in Cuba since it restructured its electoral system and promulgated a new election law according to the 2019 Constitution. Local people’s councils were officially established nationwide on 17 December 2022 ( Nhân Dân 2022).
During the two days of 9–10 December 2022, the 5th Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, term VIII, took place in Havana. The conference discussed the political, economic, and social situation in Cuba. It discussed the role of party members when facing difficulties, and the strategy for innovating, enhancing, and perfecting the Union of Young Communists of Cuba (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas de Cuba – UJC). The conference also addressed some other important issues in Cuba today such as dealing with crime and speculation, promoting food production, the electrical energy situation, and drug control.
In January 2023 Cuba assumed the chairmanship of “The Group of 77 and China” – an alliance of 135 developing countries, designed to promote the collective economic interests of its members and enhance their collective bargaining power at the United Nations.
On 26 March 2023, Cuba held elections for the National Assembly (2023–2028), the first National Assembly elected according to the new provisions of the 2019 Constitution and the 2019 Election Law; 6,148,876 Cuban voters (equivalent to 75.87 per cent of Cubans eligible to vote) went to 23,468 polling stations to elect their highest representative. As a result, 5,565,640 votes (equivalent to 90.28 per cent of the total votes) were valid, electing 470 National Assembly deputies (64 per cent of which were new/first-time deputies) with an average age of 46 and 53 per cent are female, 20 per cent are young people under 35 years old, and 95.5 per cent have a university degree or higher ( Quân đội nhân dân 2023).
In his May–June 2023 speeches, President Díaz-Canel affirmed that the current socio-economic situation is still complicated, and that Cuba must deal with and overcome many challenges and difficulties caused by the severe consequences of the US embargo policy and the COVID-19 pandemic. He presented a long list things Cuba needs to achieve to be able to develop economically: promote a plan for macroeconomic and social stabilisation, including anti-corruption policies (especially among government officials, the military, civil aviation, and the food processing, telecommunications, nickel plating, and cigar manufacturing industries); reduce inflation; reduce the budget deficit; overcome the gap between wages and purchasing power; increase available foreign currency; promote domestic food production, including gradually moving towards self-reliance and food security; restore the role of state-owned agricultural companies; focus on investing in food production with domestic and foreign capital; restore the tourism industry to and above its pre-pandemic levels (in the first five months of 2023, Cuba welcomed 1,441,362 international visitors, an increase of 177 per cent over the same period in 2022, and set the target welcoming 3.5 million international tourists in 2023 (Vietnam News Agency 2023)).
Factors directly affecting Cuba’s development and cooperation
There are many factors that directly impact the speed of development and the expansion of international cooperation by Cuba. The following are centrally important:
Adjustment of the political policies of the Cuban Communist Party
The adjustment of Cuba’s political policy is comprehensive but cautious, step by step, not hasty, continuing aspects of its traditional policies but updating and closely following current reality.
First, determining the national vision is always a core issue for the country’s political adjustments. In the 8th Congress (April 2021) the Communist Party of Cuba recommitted to continue creating Cuba’s path to socialism, building a country with sovereignty, independence, socialism, and democracy, that is prosperous and sustainable. To do this, there must be four strategic pillars and corresponding driving forces for development: (1) building an effective state, creating vital changes in production, and international integration; (2) developing infrastructure, human resources, science, technology, and innovation; (3) promoting human development and social justice; and (4) protecting its natural resources and the environment.
Second, determining to build a socialist society, not to move towards a communist society. In previous traditional socialist thought, ‘socialism’ and ‘civilised communist society’ were considered the two highest socio-economic forms of humanity, inseparable. The reason to build socialism today was that it would serve as a transition to a communist society. That view is increasingly being rejected by people who believe that a civilised communist society is a fantasy. Supported by many people, the Communist Party of Cuba and the Constitutional Reform Committee [led by President Raúl Castro] decided not to include the provision ‘moving towards a communist society’ in Cuba’s new Draft Constitution. However after many fierce debates at the 8th Central Conference of the Communist Party of Cuba in December 2018 about removing or still including this goal, most delegates voted to maintain it, and the National Assembly then approved it and included it in the new Constitution in April 2019. However, in reality Cuba has abandoned the goal of ‘moving towards a communist society’. In recent years, discussions on ‘socialism’ are still frequently encountered throughout society, while the words ‘communist society’ are rarely mentioned. Even at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in April 2021, there was no mention of ‘communism’ or ‘moving towards a communist society’, while the discussion and documents repeatedly emphasised and affirmed ‘socialism’ and ‘the work of building a socialist society’.
Third, affirming the supreme and sole leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba. In each country, if there is one-party politics, the ruling party will have a much easier time to exist, operate, and organise, because it does not have to deal with, and suffer losses from, competing opposition parties as in a multi-party country. This also promotes the increased centralisation of the leadership of that ruling party, per the “principle of centralisation” popular in socialist countries. The old Constitution of 1976 with its amendments in 1992 and 2002 and the congresses and documents of the Communist Party of Cuba all clearly stipulated that the Communist Party of Cuba is the highest and sole force leading the Cuban state and society. The new 2019 Constitution and the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in 2021 both reaffirmed and continued to support the institutionalisation of this position.
Fourth, building and developing Cuba’s national socialist ideology. During the revolutionary struggle (1953–1962), under the leadership of Fidel Castro, the name, style, strategy, and ideology of the late national leader Jose Martí became the driving forces, and guidelines for the organisational tactics, of the revolutionary activities. Entering the period of socialist construction (1961–1991), Marxism-Leninism was extensively applied. Both of these ideologies (Martiano and Marxist-Leninist) were officially recognised by the 1976 Constitution, and together constituted the core political ideology of Cuba. Fidel passed away in 2016, and three years later the new Constitution of 2019 officially added his ideas (Fidelista) to the Cuban national socialist ideology. In addition, researchers have considered what the ordering of these ideologies in their collective appearance in Cuba’s different Constitutions indicates about their relative importance in Cuba’s national ideology at different times. In the 1976 Constitution Marxism-Leninism was recognised first, followed by Martiano ideology. By the time of amending the Constitution in 2002, Martiano ideology was placed close to Marxism-Leninism. In the 2019 Constitution the two Cuban leaders’ ideologies are listed before Marxism-Leninism: Martiano ideology (tradition, revolution, beginning); Fidelista ideology (revolution, practical, modern); Marxism-Leninism (reference, selection, application).
Fifth, rejuvenating the country’s leadership team. Until the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Cuba was still led by veteran members who were over 75 years old at that time: Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, and other leaders of the revolutionary struggle (1953–1962). There was an urgent need to rejuvenate the national leadership team. Chairman Raúl said that besides victories, achievements, capacity, experience, and opportunities, health and age are also two essential considerations for the leadership team. Hence, since 2011 he repeatedly proposed appropriate age restrictions for the Cuban national leadership, such as that state leaders and members of the Party Central Committee cannot be older than 60, and Politburo members not more than 70, when first taking a position. This issue was considered and discussed during the 7th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in April 2016. It was then implemented according to the following logic: first transfer power from people holding high positions, then from people holding lower positions; first make transfers of state power, then transfers of Party power (because the Communist Party is the political force leading the Cuban state, while state power is the nucleus of political power). In April 2018 Raúl (then 87 years old) handed over the Chairmanship of the State Council to Díaz-Canel (then 58 years old), and in July 2018, Díaz-Canel appointed five vice presidents, including two new people in their 50s. Then, at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in 2021, Raúl resigned as First Secretary of the Party when he was nearly 90, and Díaz-Canel (then 61 years old) succeeded him. Many members of the Party Central Committee and members of the Politburo of Raúl’s time who were over the age of 75 also resigned during this period, such as former Second Secretary José Ramón Machado Ventura (91 years old), Vice President Ramiro Valdés Menéndez (89 years old), and former Minister of the Armed Forces Leopoldo Cintra Frias (80 years old). Thus, the age of the current Cuban Communist Party and state leaders has been significantly rejuvenated, with the majority being in their 50s and 60s, compared to the previous leaders in their 80s and 90s.
Sixth, encouraging organisations and people to participate in political activities. The period of revolutionary struggle (1953–1962) was characterised by very enthusiastic and vibrant popular participation in political activities, combined with the armed struggle of the people and their socio-political organisations. During the period of building socialism (1961–1991), the popular movements were much ‘quieter’. The reason is that during this period of three decades, Cuban socio-political organisations were only ‘task-performing agencies’ for the Communist Party. They were subject to the natural and complete direction of the Party, with many limitations on work and activities. People were also hesitant to participate in the existing political organisations and activities because participation could only be in pursuit of specific goals that were consistent with the Party’s goals. At the same time, many more human rights and civil rights are needed. Under the old Constitution of 1976 political activities outside of those officially offered were handled strictly and suppressed by the government. From 1992 until now and especially in recent years, the Communist Party of Cuba has become more open when implementing political policy adjustments in encouraging organisations and people to participate in political activities. For organisations that are now considered ‘mission-sharing agencies’ with the Party, their status, role, and available resources have been enhanced, and they have both more rights and more responsibilities. This is especially true for the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución – CDR) and the Union of Young Communists of Cuba (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas de Cuba – UJC). For the people, the legal system and the new Constitution of 2019 expand, strengthen, and protect more human rights and civil rights. They are encouraged and organised by the Party to participate in popular and exciting political activities such as meetings, rallies, demonstrations, elections, and referendums. These political activities are increasingly making Cuban politics more vibrant, diverse, and practical. Their impact, however, is sometimes very difficult to predict and control. For example, the homosexual socio-political movement that broke out in 2017 has brought significant progress in terms of consciousness, democracy, and human rights to Cuba. In September 2022, the Cuban government issued a new Family Code, legalising same-sex marriage. On the other hand, anti-government forces took advantage of the popular discontent with the shortages of food and medicine and the exploding COVID-19 epidemic in July 2021 to promote protests against the government in more than 50 cities nationwide. This became the largest protest in Cuba in the past 60 years, caused political instability, and adversely affected the prestige and leadership power of the Communist Party and the state.
Promulgation and implementation of new socio-economic policies
The promulgation and implementation of new socio-economic policies is also a fundamental factor that affects many aspects of Cuba today. In April 2016 the 7th Congress introduced and discussed the National Plan for Socio-Economic Development until 2030, after which it was submitted to an extended popular discussion and consultation in many for a for the following year. In April 2021 the 8th Congress further edited and updated this plan addressing 200 appropriate and necessary issues (retaining 17 as they were, amending 165, adding 18, and removing 92 issues (My 2021)). At the same time it passed two other critical resolutions: “Updating the conceptualisation of the Cuban socialist socio-economic development model” and “Guidelines for updating Cuba’s socio-economic model for the period 2021–2026.” In the spirit of the proposed policies, guidelines, programmes, and plans, many new socio-economic policies of Cuba are currently being promulgated and implemented, with the following primary goals and contents: (1) Ensure public ownership of primary/essential means of production and consolidate a socio-economic development model that promotes both the effective operation of state agencies and the enterprise system, and the increased and effective participation of society in policy-making; (2) develop production and service provision activities that take full advantage of the country’s strengths; (3) increase efficiency and competitiveness in all economic sectors. Gradually build a more open environment and mechanisms for the economic sectors. Quickly expand many opportunities and fields of activity for the private economic sector (previously private individuals were only allowed to participate in 127 economic activities, but subsequently this increased to more than 2,000 activities (My 2021)); (4) develop production and commercialisation of agricultural and fishery products, ensuring self-sufficiency in food; (5) prioritise, ensure, and protect the overall development of strategic industries; (6) ensure continuity and cohesion in monetary, credit, price, exchange rate, and tax policies. Gradually increase national savings and ensure financial investment funds; (7) focus on prioritising the implementation of monetary unification measures (that were introduced on 1 January 2021 to eliminate the parallel circulation since 1994 of two currencies – the national peso and the convertible peso, and to form a single exchangeable peso). Reform wages and eliminate subsidies for many non-essential products; (8) quickly eliminate prejudices about foreign direct investment (FDI). Diversify and expand FDI sources in the medium and long term. Consider FDI as an essential factor in national development; (9) create conditions to develop and perfect the domestic market. Expand and diversify foreign trade activities and international cooperation; (10) affirm and emphasise that the sustainability of socialism can only be successfully based on protecting values and improving labour productivity, creating more material wealth associated with public distribution equality, and improving people’s living standards and quality of life; (11) ensure necessary employment sources. Ensure that work is a perceived goal and individual need of each person; (12) distribute production resources geographically evenly; (13) always ensure that the annual budget for social security is maintained at over 50% of GDP; (14) Affirm, promote, and concretise the principles of openness, fairness, and equality in social security; (15) consolidate and develop the achievements of the Revolution in health, welfare, social support, education, culture, sports, entertainment, security, and citizen protection.
The expansion and development of human rights and civil rights
In modern society, each citizen is like a primary cell of politics. Their role and level of political participation are proportional to the power they are equipped with - both in theory and in practice. Therefore, the affirmation and expansion of human and civil rights in Cuba today have developed the political activities and organisation of the people, who have become a vital factor influencing the political system. Concerning the issues of human rights and civil rights, the new 2019 Constitution has edited and improved many rights recognised in the old 1976 Constitution, removed many restrictions and prohibitions, and at the same time added many new rights. Then, laws such as the new Election Law in 2019 and the new Family Code in 2022, and the documents of the 8th Party Congress in 2021, have been developed, concretised, and put these regulations into practice, and of particular importance for the following issues:
First, recognising private property rights. “Private ownership” is the control, use, and disposition by any human being of the means of production, consumption, and living, to meet their material and spiritual needs. Private ownership includes three types: individual or personal ownership, small owner ownership, and private capitalist ownership. Previously, in Cuba, only personal ownership was recognised (stipulated in Article 21 of the old Constitution of 1976), meaning that private ownership was not recognised. At that time, two types of private ownership, small owner ownership and private capitalist ownership, were considered illegal because it was believed that those two types of rights were used by the owners to use the time and labour of others (hence exploiting them) to create income and assets for the owners, and that is the basis and driving force for the formation and development of a capitalist society – contrary to the goal of building socialism in Cuba.
However, due to the need to adapt and develop, many factors have arisen that have pushed the Cuban legal system to recognise private ownership of all three types, for two primary reasons. First, before the 1959 Revolution capitalism was relatively developed in Cuba, with all types of private ownership. When the Revolution succeeded and began the process of building socialism, despite the extensive and robust application of the prohibition of small owner ownership and private capitalist ownership, the government only achieved their formal prohibition. Because these two types of ownership were common before their prohibition and because they contribute together with individual ownership to create the true nature of private ownership, they continued to exist implicitly. Second, after the Cold War period, in addition to its two main economic components of the state economy/state-owned economy and the collective economy/cooperative economy, the Cuban economy developed two other economic sectors: the joint venture/associated economy and the private economy/self-employment economy. The efficiency, the benefits, and objective necessity have made Cuba accept and increasingly create conditions for these two new economic sectors, in particular with policies such as the Foreign Investment Law passed by the National Assembly in 2014 and strategies such as the National Socio-Economic Plan Until 2030 introduced by the Communist Party and passed by the National Assembly. However, the development of these two new economic sectors (especially the private sector) will lack resources and face fundamental obstacles if private property rights are not fully recognised. This is an urgent need that is addressed in the provisions of the new 2019 Constitution, which officially recognises the role of the free market and private property rights.
Second, allowing citizens the right to hold multiple nationalities. ‘Nationality’ is a legal-political relationship that is long-term, durable, highly stable in time and not limited in space, between a specific individual/natural person and a certain government/state. Every individual with a legitimate need can apply to renounce their current nationality, or they can have their nationality revoked if they commit a serious crime related to honour, reputation, sovereignty, or national security. Every individual can apply for citizenship (naturalisation) if they do not yet have citizenship. In addition, every individual can apply for a second (or more) nationality (multiple national citizenships) if the countries involved have regulations allowing this. Multi-nationality is increasingly common due to the growing need for integration and globalisation, and for the many benefits it can offer both to individuals/natural persons and to states/governments.
Previously, Cuba allowed its citizens to have only their Cuban nationality (specified in Article 32 of the old 1976 Constitution). But this regulation conflicted with the growing desire by Cubans to hold multiple nationalities, and also with the government’s efforts to promote investment from the Cuban diaspora. Therefore, the new 2019 Constitution has formalised the regulation allowing holding multiple nationalities in Article 36: “Having another nationality does not mean losing Cuban nationality …” (constituteproject.org n.d.c). Currently, Cuba is drafting new nationality laws in the spirit of this provision of the 2019 Constitution, including guarantees and precautions against adverse effects that the multi-nationality mechanism may bring (for example and in particular, for Cubans who hold both Cuban and US citizenship).
Third, legalising the right to same-sex marriage. Homosexuals (and more broadly LGBT) are a significant segment of Cuba’s population and its social life. Previously, there was a long period of discrimination against them from different strata of the population, and back in the 1960s extreme treatment by the government. However, by the mid-1970s discrimination began to gradually decrease, and the government began to introduce policies to support their equality. Homosexuality was legalised in 1979. The right to serve openly in the military was established in 1993. The right to change gender was instituted in 2008. Anti-discrimination laws against homosexuals in labour and employment have been enforced since 2013, and in the provision of goods and services since 2018. Article 42 of the 2019 Constitution stipulates that all people are equal before the law regardless of sexual orientation. The new Family Code adopted overwhelmingly by a popular referendum in 2022 is one of the most progressive such guarantees of the family rights of homosexuals in the world, including the recognition of same-sex couples and their right to stepchild adoption and joint adoption. Looking in detail at the history of Cuba’s evolution on the issue of “same-sex marriage,” which is such a big political issue on the world stage today, reveals the large change in the whole issue of homosexuality over the decades by not only the Cuban government but even more important by Cuban society.
Article 36 of the 1976 Constitution stated: “Marriage is a voluntary union established between a man and a woman, who are legally fit to marry, in order to live together” (constituteproject.org n.d.a) and thus stated that same-sex marriage was illegal. But starting at the end of 2017 there was a prominent public campaign by homosexual groups demanding to amend the Constitution to allow same-sex marriage. In July 2018, the National Assembly passed the new Draft Constitution, in which Article 68 only stipulated that marriage is a voluntary union family marriage “between two legally eligible people” (constituteproject n.d.b) without specifying their gender, thus indirectly legalising same-sex marriage. This issue was of interest to, and was supported by, many people in Cuba’s leadership team, including President Díaz-Canel. However, after more than 82 per cent indicated in a popular referendum that they preferred to retain Article 36 of the 1976 Constitution, the wording allowing same-sex marriage was removed from the proposed new Constitution by the National Assembly on 18 December. There were many reasons for this broad opposition, but the most important reason was the influence and intervention of the Catholic Church. Priests were said to be the leaders in the fierce opposition to same-sex marriage because their teachings and ideology have always considered same-sex marriage to be “intrinsically chaotic and unacceptable” (Toan 2021). So in response to this public pressure and with the desire to not have the full new Constitution rejected because of this one issue, the new Constitution approved by the National Assembly on 10 April 2019 replaced the earlier proposal with Article 82: “Marriage is a social and legal institution … based on free consent and on the equality in rights, obligations, and legal capacity of the spouses” (constituteproject n.d.c). Without specifically validating the then socially unaccepted legalisation of same-sex marriage, this formulation rejected a continuation of the discriminatory Article 36 of the 1976 Constitution and replaced it with inclusive and indirect language that would not constitutionally preclude the possibility of subsequent laws legalising same-sex marriage.
With this accomplished, the homosexual movement demanding the legalisation of same-sex marriage continued. In May 2019 right after the new Constitution was approved, the government worked with various Cuban legal organisations to launch a plan to complete the legalisation of same-sex marriage. The critical activity was drafting a new Family Code (replacing the old Family Code implemented in 1975), which would include provisions officially recognising same-sex marriage. In September 2021 the proposed new draft Family Code was published, and unanimously approved by the National Assembly on December 21, 2021. Of greatest importance, the government then launched a broad social discussion on the Family Code to be followed by a national referendum on its acceptance. The social consultation lasted for months starting 15 February 2022. About 61 per cent of the opinions concerning same-sex marriage supported it, and on June 6 version 25 of the Family Code was promulgated reflecting this (and also modifying 48.73 pre cent of all the articles). The Cuban National Assembly approved the draft of the new Family Code on July 22, and it was put to a referendum on September 25. About two-thirds (66.85 per cent) of the roughly six million votes cast were in favour. The new Family Code was officially issued, effective September 27, and the first legal same-sex marriage in Cuba was held on 5 October 2022, in Manzanillo. This result made Cuba the first socialist country, the eighth country in Latin America, and the 32nd country in the world, to legalise same-sex marriage. This constituted a significant step forward in the expansion and development of human and civil rights in Cuba.
Fourth, implementing the ‘presumption of innocence’ and ‘habeas corpus’ for the suspect. ‘Presumption of innocence’ is the assertion that every suspect is innocent until reasonably and legally proven guilty. Habeas corpus means that citizens have the right to request the court to require their custodian to either show the court just cause for their detention or release them. These are two basic principles that ensure human rights and citizens’ rights before the law.
In Cuba, the capitalist government’s 1940 Constitution stipulated these principles, but they were not included in the socialist government’s 1976 Constitution and its related legal system. This created a one-sided situation, that facilitated the abuse of power and irresponsibility by the courts and administrative civil servants in the processes of reviewing cases (recognising, prosecuting, investigating, adjudicating, and executing judgements). This led to many cases being mishandled according to the law, being heavy on imposing authority, creating injustice, and causing damage to and discontent among the people. The new 2019 Constitution has begun to rectify that situation by introducing provisions for the presumption of innocence and habeas corpus. Specifically, Article 95 affirms that all citizens are guaranteed “… the presumption of innocence until declared guilty through a final judgment of a court.” Article 96 notes: “Anyone who is unlawfully deprived of their liberty, of their own account or by a third party, has the right to submit a writ of habeas corpus to a competent court, according to the requirements established in the law.” In addition, citizens can, when necessary, “… bring a pertinent action or procedure against the judicial or administrative ruling, when appropriate” (Article 94) and sue government agencies, court officials, and individual civil servants, demanding legal settlement and compensation if these groups and individuals operated negligently, abused power, or were irresponsible, causing negative impacts on their rights and interests (Article 99) (constituteproject n.d.c).
United States intervention
From the early sixteenth century to the very end of the nineteenth century, Cuba was governed and had to depend closely on the Spanish government because it was a colony of that European country. From the beginning of the twentieth century until 1958, although it had become an independent country and had many different political regimes over that time, Cuba was always dominated, manipulated, and interfered with by the United States.
In January 1959, the revolutionary movement under the leadership of Fidel Castro overthrew the pro-American Batista dictatorship and established a popular revolutionary government. The United States immediately and aggressively carried out a series of interventions and sabotage measures: hostile propaganda, diplomatic isolation, an economic embargo, inciting people to evacuate, support for terrorist groups, and air strikes on the capital Havana. In 1961 they organised more than 1,500 reactionary Cuban exiles to invade the island to destroy the fledgling Cuban government. The landing on Giron beach in April 1961 was rapidly crushed. The United States was further enraged by the ideological challenge to it presented by Cuban leadership’s subsequent declaration of the socialist nature of the revolutionary cause. The United States’ very strong and uninterrupted intervention in Cuba since then has focused on two primary areas: the economic embargo on Cuba (since 7 February 1962), and support for the reactionary organisations of Cuban exiles to sabotage and try to overthrow the Cuban government.
After more than half a century of tension, due to the needs of both Cuba and the United States relations between the two countries became more open and peaceful in the second term of US President Obama (2013–2016). In June 2013 the two sides agreed to promote an 18-month round of secret negotiations (with the mediation of Canada and the Vatican). On 17 December 2014, Cuba and the United States normalised relations, ending that very symbolic aspect of their half-a-century of confrontation. In April 2015 the United States removed Cuba from its list of ‘terrorist countries’. In July 2015 the two countries opened embassies in each other’s capitals. In March 2016, for the first time since the 1959 Revolution, the President of the United States visited Cuba. In 2016 the US also abstained for the first time in the yearly voting in the United Nations General Assembly to lift the embargo on Cuba (it had voted against it all previous times). During the two years 2015–2016, the two countries signed 22 agreements of cooperation in the fields of anti-terrorism and drug trafficking, security, the fight against information crimes, cancer treatment, oil spill prevention and cleanup, and maritime cooperation. The United States loosened some trade restrictions and eliminated some restrictions on money transfers, travel, customs, and maritime regulations. The United States also limited, suspended, or completely stopped a number of types of support for the reactionary organisations of Cuban exiles who opposed the Cuban government, especially organisations based in the United States.
However, immediately after taking office in January 2017, the new US President Donald Trump decided to tighten the embargo on Cuba and support the reactionary organisations of Cuban exiles that oppose the Cuban government. The Trump administration greatly strengthened the embargo by introducing and applying 243 additional economic measures against Cuba (My 2021), and increased funding for organisations that sabotage the Cuban government. The trade embargo during the last 20 months of Trump’s term (April 2019–December 2020) caused a loss of 9.1 billion USD to Cuba (Nga 2021). On January 12, 2021, as one of the last actions of the Trump administration’s term, the US State Department added Cuba to its list of ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’.
Although when running for US president in 2020 candidate Joe Biden had promised to lift restrictions on Cuba, when he took power on 20 January 2021 Biden did not do so, but rather continued to maintain the previous Trump administration embargo restrictions and policies against Cuba. In June 2021 the Biden administration continued the US tradition of voting against the annual United Nations General Assembly Resolution calling for an end to the US economic embargo on Cuba, which for decades was overwhelmingly adopted, this time by 184 votes in favour of two against (the United States and Israel), with three abstentions. Immediately after the large protest against the Cuban government in mid-July 2021, President Biden declared his dissatisfaction with how the Cuban government had suppressed it and promised to increase support for dissidents in Cuba. Of very minimal real significance, he introduced sanctions against a series of Cuban officials who the US claims ordered repression of the protesters. Of great significance, for political reasons, he loosened policies on immigrants from Cuba. As a result, by the end of 2021 alone, about 300,000 Cubans (i.e. nearly 3 per cent of the country’s population) were able to immigrate to the United States, many of them due to discontent with and opposition to the Cuban government.
In mid-May 2022, the United States lifted a few of its restrictive measures against Cuba, with three of these being the most important. First, the Biden administration re-established the Cuban family reunification programme that had been discontinued under Trump, greatly accelerating visa issuance. Second, it removed the Trump administration’s sharply reduced limit on money transfers to Cuba, under which each person in the United States could only send back to Cuba a maximum of 1,000 USD per quarter. Third, it increased flights between the United States and Cuba, which had been sharply reduced under the Trump administration. However, soon after, on 20 May 2022, the Biden administration formally announced that it was maintaining the Trump administration’s decision to classify Cuba as one of the few countries in the world the US alleges to ‘not fully cooperate’ with in the fight against terrorism. As the US government needs to formally decide each year (usually in September) if it will continue, suspend, or cancel many of the most important parts of the embargo against Cuba, in 2022 and 2023 it again officially continued it, as it has every year for decades.
Cuba’s development orientation and its prospects
Looking at the process of building socialism, the reform process in Cuba over the past 30 years, and the most important factors, we can see Cuba’s orientation, potential for development, and prospects.
First, it is necessary to insist on the comprehensive and sole rule by the Communist Party of Cuba and the building of a socialist regime with Cuban identity. Specifically, it is necessary to: (1) Strengthen, including specifically the formal legal expressions of it, the rule of the Communist Party and the single-party leadership regime in Cuba. Article 5 of the new Constitution 2019 recognises this issue, but it is still general. It is necessary to promulgate additional laws and procedural documents to concretise the laws. Clarification is needed on the election laws. The current election laws in Cuba stipulate that no political party, including the Communist Party, can nominate candidates in elections to state offices. Given this an explanation is necessary for why the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba still nominates people to be elected by the National Assembly to key state positions; (2) spread widely and practice core political ideas regarding socialist construction, especially ideas with a Cuban identity such as by important Cuban historical figures such as Martí and Fidel; (3) increase both the quantity and quality of party members. In recent years, the average admission of about 40,000 party members each year is a pretty positive increase in quantity. However, (i) the necessary high quality of party members is not guaranteed, and (ii) the number of elderly party members is quite large (42.6 per cent of party members are over 55 years old) (Castro 2021a); (4) promote the activities of political-social-professional organisations, especially the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Union of Young Communists of Cuba; (5) exercise leadership of and strict management of the media. The 8th Congress recognised the role of the media (especially the internet) as a “double-edged sword”: it can be a tool for widely, quickly, and effectively transmitting the Party and state’s guidelines and policies to the people, and it can also be an effective tool for hostile forces to use propaganda against Cuba; and (6) build and develop a great unity of the people around the Party and state.
Second, focus on economic development and then use the economy as the driving force for social development, gradually pursuing a transition to a socialist-oriented market economy, and avoiding dependence on capital in the form of financial capital, equipment, or technology. Specifically: (1) National economic development, along with the struggle for peace and a steadfast ideological stance, are the critical tasks of the Party. Financial decisions must not depart from the Revolution’s ideals of justice and equality, nor must they weaken the great unity of the people; (2) follow through on the socio-economic policies/solutions proposed by the 7th Congress in 2016, as then edited, supplemented, and completed by the 8th Congress in 2021 (which maintained 17 policies, adjusted 165 policies, eliminated 92 policies, and added 18 policies, and thus reduce the overall 274 old policies/solutions into 200 new policies/solutions); (3) address the harmful effects of bureaucracy and poor human resource management, which are the causes of, and create the conditions for, the emergence of corruption and other illegal acts that impede the necessary improvement of productivity and labour efficiency; (4) overcome irrationalities in the structure of the economic model, creating enough motivation to encourage labour and creativity; (5) increase the intensity of the process of updating the socio-economic model, moving towards a harmonious and appropriate combination between the characteristics of centralised planning with autonomy and decentralisation management required at intermediate levels; (6) maintain national ownership of the fundamental means of production as the basis for the real power of workers. The state-owned enterprise system must be strengthened, and it must prove in practice its superiority as the dominant form of economic management. Implement a comprehensive reform of corporate structures to eliminate stagnation, permissiveness, lack of creativity, and passively waiting for instructions from higher-level. Correct bad habits (both old and new), and at the same time, stimulate and promote the spirit of entrepreneurship and dynamism in the ranks of business and grassroots leaders, so that they become more and more autonomous, increase productivity, and achieve greater efficiency; (7) promote productivity and operational efficiency of the state economic sector in areas that determine the country’s development, while both being flexible with and institutionalising non-state management forms. Forms of self-employment have expanded significantly, with the types of licensed activities increasing from 127 to more than 2,000; (8) have enough capacity to regulate the market through indirect measures and increasingly simplified administration. Turn the people’s unmet or unsatisfied needs into leverage to create additional domestic production establishments, based on practical and reasonable use of physical and financial resources; (9) promote production nationwide, especially of food. Limit imports and increase exports with diverse and competitive products; (10) ensure that the state can serve as a significant source of allocation of foreign currency, and at the same time encourage the sending of remittances from Cubans living abroad to relatives in the country; and (11) continue to implement measures to encourage foreign investment. Eliminate rigidity or passivity in foreign investment solutions. Amend, supplement, or replace the 2014 Foreign Investment Law (Law No. 118) with a new, expanded, convenient, appropriate and more effective law.
Third, comprehensively evaluate existing and implement new social security measures; continue to promote socialism’s advantages in education and health. Specifically: (1) Never allow measures that harm vulnerable people or leave anyone in a helpless/abandoned situation; (2) overcome the phenomenon of waste and competition. Determining what can be avoided from being spent is the fastest and safest form of income. Adapt to what Cuba has and do not spend more than the country can provide; (3) the Cuban people’s standard of living and consumption must be determined by legitimate sources of income, and not by excessive subsidies or complimentary products and services. Eliminate the notion that it is normal to rely on government support in the form of subsidies in production and social benefits in consumption in the welfare regime in Cuba; and (4) maintain a free education and healthcare system for the entire population. Consolidate and promote the development of achievements in education and health. Strengthen ‘educational diplomacy’ and ‘health diplomacy’ in foreign policy.
Fourth, always be alert to the plots and sabotage of hostile forces at home and abroad. Specifically: (1) Pursue strongly ideological security work, maintaining the Party’s leadership in the direction of socialist construction; (2) identify, properly evaluate, and provide appropriate and effective handling of hostile forces’ plots, sabotage, and efforts to overthrow the government; (3) enhance the vigilance against covert and sophisticated forms of sabotage through the implementation of the “peaceful evolution” of civil society, private capitalism, religious freedom, and democracy; and (4) build a large, multidimensional, and modern internal security force, ready to detect and neutralise or suppress plots, subversion, and sabotage by enemy forces.
Fifth, expand international relations and cooperation based on coexistence, mutual benefit, and mutual development, without interfering with each other’s internal affairs, in particular maintaining and promoting relations with traditional friends and socialist countries, and when possible, fully normalise relations with the United States. Specifically: (1) Foreign policy must fully protect independence, fully demonstrate sovereign rights, and meet the needs and aspirations for solidarity and integration of the country and its people; (2) respect the principles and regulations of the United Nations Charter and international law, pursue peaceful resolution of disputes, adhere to the principle of non-interference (directly or indirectly) in the internal affairs of other countries, and respect the principles of national sovereignty, equal rights, and self-determination of peoples. Commit to promoting friendly relations and cooperation between countries in the region, as well as with other countries, regardless of differences in political, economic, and social systems or levels of development. Promote the spirit of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Respect the inalienable right of all countries to choose their political, economic, social, and cultural systems as an essential condition for ensuring peaceful coexistence among countries (Castro 2021b); (3) strengthen solidarity, cooperation, and sharing with countries with leftist governments in Latin America, especially with Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Mexico, and Brazil; (4) continue to encourage and support the struggle for freedom and independence of peoples and countries around the world, especially Palestine and Western Sahara (Sahrawi); (5) expand cooperation with powerful developing countries, in particular the countries in the BRICS bloc. Pursue close relations with Asian socialist countries (China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea); (6) continue to promote relations with the European Union based on mutual respect and support, developing cooperative relations, especially in the fields of culture, agriculture, and renewable energy; (7) enhance Cuba’s position in organisations in the Latin American region (ALBA, CELAC, OAS …)and consolidate and develop Cuba’s relations with neighbouring countries in Central America and the Caribbean, including bringing Cuba into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); and finally (8) Try to promote respectful dialogue and build a ‘new type’ of relationship with the United States. Identify why the United States is today still as hesitant as it is, including considering the following: (i) the previous US Trump administration tightened the embargo on Cuba, creating a situation the current Biden administration cannot change quickly, (ii) the political and economic ideologies of Cuba and the United States are very different and contradictory, (iii) if the United States fully normalises relations with Cuba, it will have to pay a massive amount of compensation. Cuba is demanding 302 billion USD from the United States as compensation for damage from the blockade and embargo policy – 181 billion USD in human damages and 121 billion USD in economic damages-, while the United States is only demanding 8 billion USD in compensation from Cuba for some US private companies that Cuba nationalised (Tuan 2021)), (iv) The United States would have to return Guantanamo to Cuba, losing an essential geostrategic base, and (v) it is difficult to find a suitable solution for the large number of Cuban exiles who oppose the Cuban government who live in the US.
Conclusion
The past three decades have been a long period of change in the process of innovation, development, and building socialism in Cuba. It has recorded many important achievements as well as difficulties and challenges for the country. It has also been directly affected by many factors, such as the adjustment of the political line of the Communist Party of Cuba, the process of promulgating and implementing new socio-economic policies, the expansion of human rights and civil rights, and the methods and intervention activities of the United States. Looking at the issue comprehensively, it can be seen both that Cuba has a positive outlook with a clear, certain orientation and substantial room for development, and that at the same time it must also cope with and overcome significant difficulties and challenges to complete its innovation and achieve its socialist goals.