When Krushchev and Kennedy announced they were in negotiations on 28 October 1962, the Cuban leadership only learned about the matter from a Radio Moscow broadcast by Khrushchev on that day. It was not until a few hours later that Fidel Castro received a brief message from the Soviet leader, who recommended that the Cubans not let themselves be carried away by emotion. 2 In the same vein, he requested that they suspend the order to fire on low-flying aircraft, in order to avoid a new incident that might scuttle the agreement with Kennedy at the last minute and allow the foolhardiness of the militarists in the United States to prevail.
In fact, there was no danger of this. After all measures had been taken for the defence of Cuba, the Cuban people remained calm and serene, informed of the evolution of events, attentive to their obligations, sure and confident that their dignity and interests were safe under the direction of the Revolutionary Government and the guidance of their Commander in Chief.
But Fidel was far from pleased. He later described the repercussions in Cuba of those agreements:
When this news reached us . . . it produced great indignation, because we had felt that we had become some kind of bargaining chip. Not only was this a decision taken without consulting us, several steps were taken without informing us. They could have informed us of the messages of the 26th and the 27th. . . . We heard over the radio on the 28th that there had been an agreement. . . . The reaction of our nation was of profound indignation, not relief. 3
Khrushchev argued that given the seriousness of the situation, there had not been time for consultation, but the Cubans were not convinced. The problem went deeper than merely bad procedure. Even allowing for a supposed “lack of time”, it was unacceptable that Khrushchev, in drafting the message to Kennedy, failed to consider Cuba’s participation in the negotiations. As Fidel said,
The simple solution of withdrawing the missiles because the United States gave its word it wasn’t going to attack us was inconsistent with everything that had been done, and inconsistent with the circumstances in our country that had to be overcome. It would have been enough for Nikita to say, ‘We agree to withdraw the missiles if you give satisfactory guarantees for Cuba’. 4
Besides, Khrushchev’s response could open the door for the US government to make new demands, as in fact Washington did, by demanding on-site verification of the withdrawal of missiles and other weapons. Thus Washington, in flagrant violation of Cuba’s sovereignty, tried to claim rights that belonged exclusively to Cuba.
On the afternoon of October 28, Fidel Castro reported Cuba’s position in a public statement:
“The guarantees mentioned by President Kennedy that there will be no aggression against Cuba will be ineffective unless, in addition to the removal of the naval blockade that he promises, the following measures, inter alia, are adopted:
1. Cessation of the economic blockade and all measures of commercial and economic pressure being carried out by the United States against our country throughout the world.
2. Cessation of all subversive activities, of the dropping by air and landing by sea of weapons and explosives, of the organization of mercenary invasions, and of the infiltration of spies and saboteurs – all of which are being carried out from the territory of the United States and certain accomplice countries.
3. Cessation of the acts of piracy being carried out from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico.
4. Cessation of all violations of our air space and territorial waters by United States aircraft and warships.
5. Withdrawal of the Guantánamo naval base and return of the Cuban territory occupied by the United States.” 5
Cuba’s position was sharp and clear: if a true solution were to be found to the tension and problems, these guarantees had to be conceded. They were five concrete points, soundly based, yet the US rulers did not want to consider them. They declared the five-point programme to be unfeasible at that time, while they also demanded inspection of Cuban territory as a way of verifying the Soviet commitment.
Why were the five points considered unfeasible? Weren’t Cuba’s demands absolutely just and based on the country’s indisputable rights? An end to the economic blockade and trade pressures, as stipulated by Cuba, were a necessity, because those were elements aggravating the situation that produced the crisis. Moreover, what was impossible about demands to end US subversive and covert actions, acts of piracy and violations of Cuba’s territorial waters and airspace? The Cuban government was simply asking that those crimes and other illegal acts not be committed against its country.
And as for the last demand – withdrawal from the US naval base in Guantánamo and the return of occupied Cuban territory – was this not a logical, reasonable request under the circumstances? It was simply absurd to ask for the withdrawal of the weapons provided to Cuba by a friendly power while leaving an enemy military enclave on Cuban territory. No one with a modicum of dignity anywhere in the world would question the inalienable right of the Cuban people on this issue.
The five-point programme received great popular support, because the Cuban people had long and bitter experience with the US government’s lack of sincerity. The repeated violations of international law by US administrations, economic aggression, the infiltration of teams of saboteurs, weapons, munitions and other supplies into different points of the country to promote counterrevolutionary groups, as well as the latest pirate attacks along the Cuban coast, all made it imperative to demand something more than words from the White House.
On October 28 Fidel Castro drafted a reply to Khrushchev to convey the position of the Cuban government and to clarify why it had given the order to fire on low-flying aircraft, noting that the Soviet command in Cuba could furnish additional reports on the downing of the U-2 plane. Castro also indicated that he agreed on the need to avoid an incident at that moment, when it might cause major harm to the negotiations. He said that he would therefore instruct Cuban anti-aircraft batteries to hold their fire, but only for as long as negotiations continued, and without revoking the previous day’s declaration on defending Cuba’s airspace. This message showed Fidel’s willingness to avoid obstructing the steps being taken by the Soviets, in spite of his disagreement with the basis on which they were taken. Finally, he reaffirmed that Cuba was in principle opposed to allowing inspection of its territory. 6
Events proved him right. On the afternoon of October 28, four State Department officials went to New York to try to persuade U Thant to order an immediate inspection of the missile bases in Cuba, since on-site verification had been approved by the Soviets. The UN secretary-general did not accept such a request, because it went beyond his authority.
Two days later, on October 30, the Cubans received Khrushchev’s reply to Fidel, seeking to explain the events leading up to the October 28 commitments. In an obvious attempt to justify his conduct, the Soviet leader argued that any other stance would have meant a global holocaust and the destruction of the Cuban Revolution. As an argument for his decision to withdraw the missiles, Khrushchev recalled that prior to that he had received various messages from Cuba, “each one more alarming”. He craftily claimed that Fidel’s cable of October 27 represented a sort of exchange of ideas between the two governments. “Wasn’t this consultation on your part with us?” Khrushchev asked. As if that were not enough, he criticized the Cuban leader for – according to Khrushchev – proposing that the Soviet Union launch a nuclear first strike against the enemy. Finally, he maintained the negotiations had won the objective for which the missiles had been sent to Cuba, since a promise had been extracted from the United States not to invade Cuba, nor to allow its Latin American allies to do so. 7
Fidel lost no time in replying. On October 31 he sent a message reaffirming the point of view of the Cuban leadership: “We knew,” Fidel wrote,
that we would have been annihilated, as you insinuate in your letter, in the event of nuclear war. However, that didn’t prompt us to ask you to withdraw the missiles, that didn’t prompt us to ask you to yield. Do you believe that we wanted that war? But how could we prevent it if the invasion finally took place? The fact is that this event was possible, that imperialism was obstructing every solution and that its demands were, from our point of view, impossible for the USSR and Cuba to accept.
Regarding Khrushchev’s serious allegation that he had proposed launching a nuclear first strike, Fidel replied that he never said any such thing “because that would be more than incorrect, it would be immoral and contemptible on my part”. He explained that “once aggression is unleashed, one shouldn’t concede to the aggressor the privilege of deciding”. Likewise, he reaffirmed, “Everyone has his own opinions and I maintain mine about the dangerousness of the aggressive circles in the Pentagon and their preference for a preemptive strike.” Fidel ended his message saying, “I do not see how you can state that we were consulted in the decision you took. . . . There are not just a few . . . but in fact many Cubans who are experiencing at this moment unspeakable bitterness and sadness.” 8
The Cuban leadership took up these disagreements directly with their Soviet counterparts, seeking not to harm friendly relations between the peoples of the two countries. That is why, after everything that had happened, when Fidel addressed the Cuban people on November 1, he explained that, in those moments when misunderstandings and disagreements had provoked hard feelings, it was good to remember that “in every one of the difficult moments we have had, every time the Yankees lashed out at us – with economic aggression, with the revocation of our sugar quota, with the cutoff of oil deliveries to our country . . . we have had the friendly hand of the Soviet Union at our side. We are grateful.” 9
On Monday, October 29, at the United Nations, the Soviet delegation announced the appointment of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasily V. Kuznetsov to lead its negotiations with the United States. It was also announced that Secretary-General U Thant would leave for Havana the next day, at the invitation of the revolutionary government, for direct discussions. U Thant arrived along with Undersecretaries Omar Loufti and Hernane Tavares de Sa, and military adviser Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye.
Talks began immediately and lasted into the following day. The Cuban participants were Prime Minister Fidel Castro, President Osvaldo Dorticós, Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, and Carlos Lechuga, newly appointed Cuban representative to the UN.
U Thant explained the efforts he had made and the proposals by the US and Soviets to verify removal of the missiles. He explained that the United States wanted to devise a UN mechanism that could provide assurance that missile sites were dismantled and withdrawn, and that such weapons did not enter Cuba thereafter. To do that, he proposed that an aircraft with Cuban, US and Soviet crew members verify the process for several weeks. Concerning the Soviet proposal, he said that they would allow a commission of the International Red Cross to monitor the movement of their ships. U Thant stated that he had no authority to associate himself with those initiatives unless the Cuban government agreed to them. He also reported that the Movement of Nonaligned Countries was willing to assist. 10
Fidel asked him what right the United States had to demand those conditions of verification. None, replied U Thant, since something like that could be done only if it were accepted by Cuba’s government. The Cuban leader then argued for the guarantees that Cuba was demanding, based on its five points. If these were taken into account, then the negotiating process could lead to real peace in the region. Fidel also put forward the reasons of principle underlying Cuba’s rejection of the proposed verification. “If what the United States is actually seeking . . . is to humiliate our country,” he stated, “it will not succeed!” 11
The reasons for not permitting inspection were based, in the first place, on the country’s unwillingness to sacrifice its sovereignty, especially when the power that demanded those conditions wanted to interfere in Cuba’s internal affairs – in this case, trying to dictate what kind of weapons Cuba could possess. Secondly, this was a demand under threat of force, to which Cuba would never give in. Finally, there was the logical question that if the Soviets and the United Nations both trusted Washington’s public promise not to invade Cuba, why then did the US government doubt that the USSR would remove the missiles? Why impose the additional guarantee of inspecting Cuba?
Throughout the second day of talks, Cuba maintained its point of view and warned of the danger of violations of its airspace, stressing that these must cease.
U Thant expressed his view of what was happening:
My colleagues and I believe – and I have let the United States know this – that the blockade is illegal, that no state can tolerate a blockade, whether military or economic. . . . I also told them that the reconnaissance flights being made over Cuba were illegal and unacceptable. These three things – economic blockade, military blockade, and aerial reconnaissance – are illegal.
Likewise, the secretary-general told the Cuban leaders that in his talks with US representatives he had told them that “if they did something drastic, he would not only report it to the Security Council, he would also accuse the United States in the Security Council; and even though the United States might have the votes and the veto, there could still be a moral sanction.”
U Thant requested the return, on humanitarian grounds, of the body of the US pilot who had been shot down, to which the Cuban government immediately agreed.
When he returned to New York, U Thant indicated that his talks with the Cuban authorities had been fruitful, and he reported having reliable evidence that the missile sites were being dismantled and the necessary measures were being taken for their return to the USSR. This last statement was based on meetings held at the Soviet embassy in Havana, where Soviet officers assured him that the missiles would be dismantled by November 1 and sent to the ports from which they would be shipped.
The withdrawal of medium-range missiles had begun October 31, as promised by the USSR. Cuba did not put up any obstacle to the withdrawal. The Soviet and Cuban attitude stood in contrast to that of the US administration, which maintained the naval blockade and stepped up its low-level flights over Cuba.
Soviet Vice Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan was sent to Cuba to discuss the differences that had arisen between Moscow and Havana. Prior to his arrival he made a brief stop in New York, where he talked with Vasily V. Kuznetzov, head of the Soviet delegation at the United Nations, and with U Thant. In addition, he exchanged opinions with Adlai Stevenson and John J. McCloy, the US representatives appointed by Kennedy to negotiate with the Soviet delegates. Stevenson and McCloy insisted on inspection of the dismantling of the missile sites in Cuba, and hinted at new demands.
U Thant assured the press in New York that the Cuban perspectives for peace in the region seemed good for all involved, and said that he would not convene the Security Council until an agreement was reached among the parties. Meanwhile, in Washington, President Kennedy continued to insist on international inspection of the missile sites before he would agree in the United Nations that Moscow had fulfilled its commitments. The US administration tried to ignore Cuba, and would not make contact with Cuba to discuss matters that directly concerned it. This attitude hampered the process of negotiations.
Mikoyan arrived in Havana on Friday afternoon, November 2. His stay in Cuba would stretch out to three weeks. 12 The talks, which began the morning of November 4, were by no means easy for the Soviet leader. No matter how strongly he argued for the necessity of precipitously withdrawing the missiles, it was no simple matter to defend the unilateral decision to withdraw them without consulting Cuba – the main interested party and participant in the events. The first point discussed was the proposed verification of the missile withdrawal by an international commission. The Soviet leader proposed various alternatives, none of them essentially different. Fidel argued Cuba’s position of rejecting inspection, because the US goal was to violate Cuba’s sovereignty.
Mikoyan then proposed allowing inspection of the ships. Fidel responded that this was up to the Soviet Union, as long as it was not done in Cuban territorial waters. The Cuban attitude was not capricious, he pointed out, because if Cuba gave in to the asserted US right to inspect, Washington would then demand new concessions. Mikoyan promised he would not allow the imposition of new conditions, such as withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers. Later he had to explain that the Soviets had given in to that demand, which was undoubtedly very embarrassing. Nevertheless, both parties made efforts to overcome stumbling blocks, so as not to make their relations tenser than they already were.
On Tuesday, November 6, the US government – now convinced that the missiles had been dismantled, and accepting the Soviet proposal to inspect its ships on the high seas – officially added a new demand: withdrawal of the IL-28s, which were suddenly declared to be “offensive” weapons. In an attempt to step up tension and exert more pressure on Cuba, the US Defense Department reported that it was closing the Panama Canal to other traffic to allow passage of seventeen warships – including aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines – to join the forces already deployed in the Caribbean.
On November 7, the US delegation at the United Nations announced agreement with the USSR on visual verification of the missile withdrawal and inspection by the International Red Cross of Soviet merchant ships bound for Cuba. This still wasn’t enough for Washington, however, which maintained that adequate verification had to be performed on site and demanded withdrawal of the IL-28s. This stance was maintained as a lever of political pressure, in order, at the right moment, to justify its failure to fulfil its own commitments.
Negotiations continued at the United Nations. On Thursday, November 8, U Thant met separately with Lechuga and Kuznetzov to discuss the new US demand to withdraw the bombers. Later, US and Soviet delegates met about the same issue, but after four hours of talks were unable to reach any agreement. The United States insisted that the IL-28s were “offensive weapons” and therefore had to be removed in line with the Khrushchev–Kennedy agreement. The Soviets replied that they were outmoded aircraft and represented no threat to the United States.
On Monday, November 12, the head of a CIA special operations group, Miguel A. Orozco Crespo, was shown on Cuban television. He had been captured on the Malas Aguas farm in Viñales, Pinar de Río province, while preparing a bloody sabotage of the Matahambre copper mine and the Sulfo-metals plant in Santa Lucía. Had this sabotage been carried out, hundreds of workers would have lost their lives. 13
Meanwhile, an official statement by the US administration reported that the withdrawal on board Soviet ships of forty-two missiles installed in Cuba had now been verified. With the hysteria around the missiles dissipated, the United States tried to step up pressure to obtain a second demand. The White House press secretary announced on November 12 that the US government had not changed its position that the IL-28s were offensive weapons and therefore must be removed before the naval blockade would be lifted.
New declarations were issued for the purpose of maintaining tensions in the Caribbean. On Wednesday, November 14, State Department spokesman Lincoln White declared that the United States would not tolerate the building of “military installations” in Cuban ports. He was referring to the construction of a fishing port near Banes, in Oriente province.
Washington compounded all these threats with constant violations of Cuban airspace by low-flying reconnaissance aircraft. A policy of force and pressure was being given top priority in order to block resolution of the crisis. Under those circumstances Fidel sent a letter to U Thant on Thursday, November 15, protesting the incursions by US aircraft, which were photographing not only the dismantled sites but the entire territory of Cuba. The prime minister explained in his letter that such actions not only infringed upon the vital security of the country, but also insulted the dignity of the Cuban people. It was not possible to ask Cuba to tolerate such an outrage in the name of negotiations, Fidel said. He warned: “To the extent of the firepower of our antiaircraft weapons, any warplane that violates the sovereignty of Cuba by invading our airspace will do so at the risk of being destroyed.” 14
A US State Department representative replied to the Cuban protest the next day, insisting that such flights over Cuba would continue and that they were being carried out in accordance with OAS agreements of October 23. In fact, however, the low-level flights ceased, while high-altitude U-2 flights continued. During a television interview on November 17, Roswell Gilpatric, deputy secretary of defense, went to the extreme of declaring that such flights “were a right” of the United States.
Negotiations continued at the UN on Sunday, November 18, with none of the parties yielding. The White House had officially said it would lift the blockade as soon as the Soviet Union agreed to remove the IL-28s, but the Soviets refused to do so without Cuba’s consent.
A press campaign was now unleashed in the United States accusing Cuban leaders of obstructing resolution of the crisis because they refused to accept on-site inspection, would not tolerate reconnaissance flights over Cuba, and opposed withdrawal of the IL-28s. With the deterrent threat of the missiles removed, and with the Soviet Union showing signs of vacillation on the US demands, conditions were being created in the eyes of US and world opinion to justify a military attack on Cuba.
Kennedy rejected various offers by Khrushchev, maintained the “quarantine”, and then announced that he would report to the press on November 20 what further steps the US government might take. On November 19 he prepared letters for British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and French President Charles de Gaulle informing them that the crisis was about to heat up again and that he was considering extending the naval blockade and carrying out a massive air strike against Cuba.
On Monday, November 19, the Cuban prime minister made public a new message to the UN secretary-general, in which he warned about the dishonesty of the anti-Cuba campaign by the US administration and press. “The Government of Cuba”, Fidel stated, “has not created the slightest obstacle to the negotiations that are taking place. This has been and it is our position. Our attitude to the threats and insults of the Government of the United States is something very different.” He also explained how Washington had made withdrawal of the IL-28s the crux of the problem, and how this showed its arrogant attitude aimed at maintaining tension, prolonging the conflict and continuing the US policy of force. Fidel pointed out that those aircraft were the property of the Soviet Union, and that if the USSR considered their withdrawal beneficial to the negotiations and the solution of the crisis, Cuba would not object to such a decision. 15
On Tuesday, November 20, fifteen hours after Fidel’s communiqué to U Thant, a message from Khrushchev arrived at the White House, in which he announced that the IL-28s would be withdrawn within thirty days.
In a news conference that day, Kennedy stated that dangers had been reduced due to the Soviet decision to withdraw “offensive weapons”. He added, “If all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.” He immediately added the threat: “We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic, and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall someday be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.” 16
Kennedy also let it be known that he would continue air incursions over Cuba, under the pretext that the Cubans had not permitted international observers into the country. These words expressed the determination to maintain a provocative and aggressive policy against the Cuban Revolution.
Moments after the news conference ended, Defense Secretary McNamara announced that he had ordered the Navy to end the blockade that had begun on October 24. Also on November 20, the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact declared that their armed forces had returned to normal status. Similar measures were taken in Cuba two days later.