Introduction
Eritrean exiles are engaged in a series of battles between supporters and opponents of the Eritrean government. From the USA to Sweden; in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Britain and Israel, the opposition have attempted to halt Eritrean cultural festivals which have been an important source of revenue and support for President Isaias Afwerki and his party for over four decades. In recent years a cat and mouse game has played out among the Eritrean diaspora, with the president’s supporters attempting to win maximum participation, while keeping the location of the events secret until the last moment. Their opponents – critics of the Eritrean government’s notorious human rights abuses – have used a variety of tactics, from legal and political pressure to protests and demonstrations, to try to stop these gatherings. The protests have been escalating in ferocity, involving activists from both camps travelling across borders and passions running high. Clubs have been used, stones thrown, guns fired and police have intervened. The Eritrean regime is determined to retain control over the diaspora, from which it a receives a substantial proportion of its revenue from taxation and donations, as well as political support. The extent of funding provided by the regime’s foreign supporters in the exile community is opaque, but the best estimate was that in 2018 these flows of finance provided around one-third of the resources available to President Isaias’s government. The regime’s critics abroad, many of whom have risked their lives and put their families back home in danger by fleeing from their country, are determined that the festivals will not go unchallenged and that the financial flows will be reduced, even if they cannot be ended. The stakes are high for both sides.
Eritrea’s history of international festivals
Eritreans have celebrated a range of domestic festivals over the centuries, most of them religious, but the political festivals held abroad (associated with today’s ruling party) date back to 1974 (Plaut 2022). In that year the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) initiated the Summer Festival in the Italian city of Bologna. The aim was to draw the Eritrean community together and to cement their relationship with the fight for independence.
Festival Eritrea in Bologna was but an annual folk-fair where all these social, economic, and political resources were mobilised and negotiated and put together mainly in the form of live stage shows in the presence of liberation struggle representatives, exiles, refugees and other categories of diasporic Eritreans. (Kifleyesus 2007, 256)
As a pro-government blogger put it: ‘For all intents and purposes, Bologna was Eritrea’s second city, after Nakfa, from 1974 to 1991’ (Kidane 2014). With the capture from Ethiopia of the Eritrean capital by EPLF forces in 1991 the festivities were transferred to Asmara and attracted an estimated 600,000 people (Connell and Killion 2011, 253). During its time in Bologna, the festival served several purposes. It was an opportunity for the exiled community to come together and have a good time: to dance, eat and drink with fellow compatriots. There were football matches with teams representing the many countries in which they lived – Italy, Germany and Sweden – or the cities they were resident in: Milan, Florence and Bologna (Arnone 2010, 97). Eritreans held the Bologna festival in great affection. ‘All Eritreans scattered in the entire world, we all met there once a year. This is why it was different for us. Bologna was a miracle, something longed for which fell from the sky’, a woman told an interviewer (Arnone 2010, 96).
The purpose of the gatherings in Bologna went beyond this; they were designed to raise funds – as another government supporter made clear:
Festival of Eritrea in Bologna was highly instrumental towards boosting economic capability and strengthening political activities of the EPLF in a great deal … A total of US dollar 1.5 million was then sent from Eritrean communities abroad to the EPLF (inside Eritrea). (Arnone 2010, 96)
Eritreans went to extraordinary lengths to support the fight for liberation from Ethiopia. Those in the diaspora could not participate in the battles inside Eritrea itself; instead, they sacrificed their studies to take up work so that they could send money home. Some are even said to have taken to eating pet food to cut their expenditure so that their donations could be increased (Plaut 2016, 171).
Eritrea was internationally recognised as independent of Ethiopia in 1993 and Eritreans assumed that their government would establish the democracy they had been promised by the liberation movements they had backed. The international community thought that the new government would (like almost all countries around the world) publish an annual budget and establish normal relations with key organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both assumptions were proved wrong. President Isaias refused to ratify a draft constitution or to hold elections. When challenged he cracked down ruthlessly on opposition. In September 2001 he arrested some of his closest party associates (the G15) who had publicly criticised his authoritarian rule (Connell and Killion 2011, 276–277). All independent media were closed. Foreign governments and aid agencies were ostracised, and most international assistance was rejected. Eritrea had become Africa’s most insular and repressive state, comparable with North Korea.
At the same time, the government continued its dependence on remittances and financial transfers from its diaspora. Nicole Hirt and Abdulkader Saleh Mohammad have argued that the regime ‘survives on very few financial lifelines, including the mining sector, opaque and illegal economic activities, financial support from shifting allies, currently mainly Saudi Arabia and UAE’ (Hirt and Mohammad 2018, 237). A range of taxes on the exile community (such as the 2% tax on all personal income earnings) provide what has been described as the ‘most constant and indispensable funding source for the regime’, amounting to one-third of the government’s budget. In addition, foreign exchange is provided via remittances to relatives at home. Together these gave President Isaias the finances required to fund his repressive regime domestically, and to extend his influence abroad. This is resented by many exiles, who are required to pay the taxes if they want any assistance from Eritrean diplomatic missions, or the government back home – such as birth, death or marriage certificates, travel visas and so on. Some (but by no means all) Eritrean exiles now resist the payment. One recent German study found that only a limited number paid willingly, but were disheartened by the pressure to make the payments (Santos 2019).
After the 2001 crackdown
Eritrea became increasingly isolated from the international community following President Isaias’s measures against his critics. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea in 2009 following the country’s support for al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist rebels (BBC News 2018). The UN Human Rights Council labelled the Eritrean government’s indefinite conscription of its citizens for minimally paid terms of service in the military and other state organs, in often brutal conditions, as tantamount to slavery (Keetharuth 2017). For President Isaias, who was dependent on the 2% taxation he extracted from the diaspora for his domestic expenditure and military forays abroad, ensuring the support of Eritreans abroad was critically important (AFFORD 2020). Consequently, the festivals took on an increased significance after 2001, as the diaspora’s disillusionment with President Isaias grew, particularly among new refugees fleeing from his oppressive regime.
In 2014, the fortieth anniversary of the first Bologna festival, the successor to the EPLF as Eritrea’s only legal party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice [PFDJ] held a three-day festival in the same city. Key figures from the Eritrean government were invited including Yemane Gebreab, political director of the ruling regime; Yemane Gebremeskel, the director of the Office of the President; Foreign Minister Osman Saleh; Hagos ‘Kisha’, finance director of the ruling party; and Woldenkiel Abraha, Minister of Local Government (Awate 2014). There is every indication that the festival was organised and facilitated by the Eritrean government. An opposition website, Awate, described what happened next:
For the last three days, the Italian city of Bologna has been a battleground for a showdown between the supporters of the Eritrean regime and its resistance forces.
Hundreds of supporters of the regime travelled from all of Europe to attend the festival that was sponsored and organized by the Eritrean ruling party. Almost all senior members of the Eritrean ruling party flew in from Asmara to attend the festival and brought along singers, music bands, poets, comedians, dancers and actors. At the same time, hundreds of resistance members flocked to Bologna to show their defiance of the Eritrean government. Several attempts were made by Eritreans opposed to the regime to dissuade Bologna city authorities from allowing the PFDJ festival to take place. The authorities didn’t heed to the appeals. (Awate 2014)
Infuriated that the Eritrean leadership could make their presence felt so directly in the city in which so many exiles had sought sanctuary, the opposition confronted the festival organisers. The response was violent, with a group identified as ‘Eriblood’ photographed with their fists in the air, beating up protesters and driving cars at them (Plaut 2014). Ever since this confrontation there has been a growing contest at festivals between supporters and opponents of the Eritrean government. In 2018, for example, a sporting event organised by the ruling party in Manchester attracted a protest. The response from the organisers was to attack them with hot chili sauce, bottles and cans (Assena 2018).
The 2023 festival conflicts
The festivals, once centred on Bologna or Milan, are now held across the Western world, wherever Eritrean foreign missions and their PFDJ members can gather their supporters. They are held in addition to other, less overt, interactions between Eritrea’s diplomatic missions and its diasporic community, which include receptions, gatherings at embassies and consulates and informal meetings. The public festivals have recently taken on a new tone. Gone are the major government figures who regularly took to the stage. In their place have come singers, musicians and performers who draw in the crowds – particularly younger Eritreans – together with representatives of the ruling party and consular staff. This change is, at least in part, explained by the sanctions imposed by the USA in August 2021 on named Eritreans and key Eritrean institutions, including the PFDJ, which made travel difficult for them (US Treasury 2021). The sanctions were introduced in response to Eritrea’s participation in the war raging in Tigray, which began in November 2020. As the US Treasury statement put it: ‘Today’s action targets Eritrean actors that have contributed to the crisis and conflict, which have undermined the stability and integrity of the Ethiopian state’ (US Treasury 2021).
Despite these restrictions the PFDJ has managed to hold successful festivals in the USA – including a conference followed by a festival in Dallas in August 2022 (African Business 2022). The event is reported to have been attended by Sofia Tesfamariam (former Eritrean spokeswoman in the USA and currently Eritrea’s Ambassador to the UN) and some 12,000 Eritreans and their supporters. It has been estimated that the events raised up to US$1 million. The mayor of Dallas officially welcomed the festival, in sharp contrast to similar events in Europe. While some European gatherings have also gone ahead, organisers have run into trouble in the Netherlands, Germany and Britain (where they had to be cancelled) and have been challenged in Switzerland and Sweden. Sometimes the events have been called off because the authorities refuse to issue permits on the grounds that speakers use ‘hate speech’ and stir up animosity (Eritrea Hub 2022a). In other instances they have been cancelled because of the perceived high risk of violent confrontations and protests (Eritrea Hub 2022b).
An attempt to hold an event in the German city of Giessen in July 2023 ended in violent clashes. The BBC described the confrontation:
Hundreds of German police have used batons and pepper spray to quell crowds targeting an Eritrean cultural festival in the central town of Giessen. The protesters were angry that the festival went ahead in Giessen, calling it a propaganda exercise by the authoritarian Eritrean regime. A police statement said clashes took place for hours on Saturday, and that 26 police officers were injured. Police arrested nearly 100 people and had to stop traffic in the town centre. The police statement said protesters threw bottles and stones at police, damaged some vehicles and ripped down fencing around the festival venue. They also threw stones at buses carrying participants to the festival, the statement said. (BBC News 2023)
The fiercest clashes have taken place in Israel. Both sides had mobilised extensively and clashed outside the Eritrean embassy in Tel Aviv on 2 September 2023 (Peleg, Breiner, and Efrati 2023). Fighting erupted between Eritreans, with stones thrown and sticks and batons wielded. There were even photographs of guns being fired by government supporters on social media, although these could not be verified. Police opened fire on the Eritrean opponents of President Isaias, chasing them through streets, despite having given permission for the protests to take place. Israeli medical staff said more than 114 people had been treated for injuries, including about 30 police officers (Amichai 2023). Prime Minister Netanyahu was furious, declaring that the approximately 25,000 Eritrean asylum seekers had ‘crossed a red line’. ‘Riots, bloodshed – this is lawlessness that we cannot accept’, he said. In a government press release Netanyahu expanded on what he expected to happen:
Today, at the special ministerial team that I established, we sought several quick measures, including the deportation of 1,000 supporters of the regime who participated in these disturbances. Of course, they have no claim to refugee status. They support this regime. If they support the regime so much, they would do well to return to their country of origin. (Israeli Government Press Office 2023)
The Israeli government was not alone in planning measures against the Eritrean exile community. The Swedish authorities, furious at the clashes on their streets, are contemplating removing Eritrean asylum seekers from the community and placing them in what are termed ‘reception centres’ (Nygren 2023). These measures could be replicated in other countries, as ministers react to the violence.
In Giessen – as in other protests – much of the violence was initiated by government supporters, rather than the opposition. The once almost universal support for the Eritrean government among the diaspora is now a thing of the past. For President Isaias this is a clear challenge to his authority and legitimacy. He has expended considerable time and energy trying to shore up his hold on the support and finances provided by the exile community; however, this is gradually eroding. Of course, young Eritreans love to meet each other, drink and dance to the music from back home, but many have now seen beyond these attractions and are determined to resist the regime that dangles enticing cultural events before them. There is a great deal at stake in terms of the Isaias regime’s credibility and finances, and the festivals are becoming sites of regular confrontation.
Table 1 summarises the pro-government festivals in Europe and the USA, and the reactions of the Eritrean opposition and the governments of the countries in which the events took place. It is drawn from social media, websites and newspaper reports and is incomplete, but gives an indication of how widespread these events have been.
Eritrean government-sponsored festivals, 2022–2023.
| 2022 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| City and country | Date | Violence | Cancelled and by whom? | Reaction by media and government |
| Valais, Switzerland | 23–24 July | No | No | |
| Rijswijk, the Netherlands | 12 August | No | Yes, by municipality, then ban upheld by court when embassy sued | |
| Harrow, London, UK | 23–24 July | No | No | |
| Lambeth, London, UK | 4 September | No | Yes, by city council | |
| Eritrean Embassy, London, UK | 4 September | Yes | No | Protesters arrested; police blamed Tigrayans |
| Stockholm, Sweden | 28–31 July | No | Cancelled by municipal authorities fearing violence, after massive street protests | |
| Giessen, Germany | 20 August | Yes | Yes, after protesters lost a pre-event lawsuit and then clashed at the venue | |
| Giessen, Germany | 3 September | No | Yes, by consulate, after municipality required participant info and the construction of fencing | |
| Oslo, Norway | 3 September | No | Yes, by municipality | Government has been withdrawing some PFDJ residence permits since 2019 |
| Sion, Switzerland | 27 July | No | No | |
| Secret location, Switzerland | 27 August | No | Yes, by unknown Swiss authorities | |
| Dallas, USA | 5–7 August | No | No | Municipality welcomed the regime |
|
| ||||
| 2023 | ||||
|
| ||||
| City and country | Date | Violence | Cancelled and by whom? | Reaction of media and government |
|
| ||||
| Tel Aviv, Israel | 2 September | Yes | Yes, by city authorities | Protesters arrested; police brutality (use of live ammunition); deportation threat for all, but especially loyalists; at least 170 people injured, some with police gunshots; Refugees fear PFDJ revenge |
| Giessen, Germany | 8 July | Yes | No | Arrest of 130 protesters and 26 police injured |
| Copenhagen (Amager), Denmark | 9 September | Yes | Protesters arrested | |
| Harrow, UK | 15 July | No | Yes, by city authorities, fearing Giessen-type violence | |
| Stockholm, Sweden | 3 August | Yes | Protesters arrested; 50 injured | |
| Toronto, Canada | 5–6 August | Yes | Yes, by city authorities, fearing for public safety | Considerable |
| Seattle, USA | 4–6 August | Yes | No | City: embassy has right to assemble and speak |
| St. Gallen, then Opfikon (Zurich), Rufenacht, Switzerland | 2 September | Yes | Two out of three venues cancelled, by embassy or police | Supportive of protesters |
| Oslo, Norway | 3 September | Yes | Protesters arrested, with five charged | |
| Stuttgart, Germany | 16 September | Yes | No | |
Increasing organisation and confrontation
Both pro-government members of the diaspora and their opponents are busy organising themselves for future clashes. The language employed across multiple social media sites does not appear conducive to reconciliation or dialogue. The ruling party, apparently working closely with Eritrean embassies or consulates, denounced the protests against the festivals as the work of racists, xenophobes or even Tigrayan exiles (Negusse 2023). This has been accompanied by a fresh initiative, described as the ‘Fourth Front’, which was said to represent Eritrean youth living abroad. (The idea of such a front has been in gestation for some time, with plans initiated four years ago (Eriyouth 2023a)). Fourth Front social media posts attacked attempts to halt the extraction of taxes from the Eritrean diaspora, claiming that: ‘during the past decades evil surrogates have been working day and night to stop this Diaspora tax and obstruct the Diasporas’ engagement to discourage their attachment with their country’ (Eriyouth 2023a). It is reported that the Fourth Front held its first meeting on 26 January 2023, bringing together Eritreans aged 18–40 from the USA, Germany, Sweden, the UK and Canada. Since then, confrontations have taken place at various Eritrean festivals. Images of Eritreans wearing identical T-shirts have appeared on social media, apparently indicating that the old pro-regime ‘Eriblood’ security forces are being reorganised and strengthened with a younger cohort (Eriyouth 2023b).
Opponents of the Eritrean government have also been busy organising their supporters. One movement – Global Yiakl (Tigrinya for ‘Enough!’) – has been attempting to unite the fragmented oppositional groups since late 2018. Describing itself as ‘a grassroots public movement without affiliation with established opposition political parties or groups’, Global Yiakl aims to bring about ‘peace, justice and democracy in Eritrea by mobilising and uniting the Eritrean public at home and abroad to participate in national politics and to speak up for their rights and freedom’ (Eriyiakl 2023). While many meetings and discussions have taken place, they have yet to successfully unite the disparate opposition groups, to the considerable frustration of young Eritreans who find it difficult to understand why their elders remain so divided. At least some of the discord can be put down to the regime’s policy of surveillance and infiltration of opposition movements, as well as the institutions of the governments where the exiles live.
As a result, two new movements have been launched. Together they have worked to mobilise the opposition, encouraging them to confront regime supporters, raising funds for buses and train tickets to transport Eritreans across national boundaries, and providing resources to defend their supporters if they get into difficulties with the police. The first is ‘Bright Future’ (led by Beyene Gerezgiher) which published the names and contact details of its leaders around the world (Eritrean Bright Future Movement 2023).
The second is ‘Brigade N’Hamedu’ (which roughly translates as being ready to fight and sacrifice). This is a more informal grouping which uses social media to organise its supporters. It describes itself as:
an Eritrean protest response to the renewed aggressive, hateful and warmongering PFDJ propaganda and fundraiser event[s] billed as ‘Eritrean Festival[s]’. The protest networks have disrupted multiple events of the totalitarian Eritrean regime that it has planned for its summer of hate. (About Brged Nhamedu 2023)
Unlike many leaders in the Eritrean opposition, Beyene Gerezgiher is not afraid of being quoted or of having his photograph taken at protests. He is unequivocal about his determination to disrupt attempts by the Eritrean government to hold events to raise funds or to attempt to win over members of the diaspora to their cause.
Beyene Gerezgiher and his colleagues work with Brigade N’Hamedu to mobilise Eritreans living abroad to join demonstrations and protests wherever the Eritrean ruling party holds events (About Brged Nhamedu 2023). ‘Our movement helped and participated in recent rallies against the so-called Eritrean festival’, he said. In pursuit not only of halting the festivals and the regime’s overseas grassroots fundraising, but of actual regime change in Eritrea itself, the new group says it plans to act via ‘lawful democracy, sharing information with the international community and disturbing the situation’. ABC News quoted Henok Tekle, an American-based organiser of the Brigade N’Hamedu, as saying that the group represented a ‘mass discontent and anger against the regime’ led by young Eritreans who had experienced the injustices of Eritrea’s one-party state (ABC News 2023). According to Henok (the executive director of an opposition satellite television station), the group does not advocate violence. However, he acknowledged that protests at festivals often turn violent because different factions are present. ‘We regret any damage to property and person from either side, as we didn’t have any intention to hurt anyone’, he said (ABC News 2023). In November 2023 Brigade N’Hamedu held a well-attended conference in the British city of Coventry which elected a new leadership, with a woman at its head. They also discussed strategies for the coming year (Plaut 2023).
Conclusion
These two opposition movements are only nascent and their future is unclear. With the Eritrean government and its allies in the diaspora planning future rallies and festivals, and the newly invigorated opposition determined to do all they can to halt them, the scene appears set for further confrontations. The government and the opposition are mobilising and images on social media suggest both that the security around events will be stepped up and that protesters are planning vigorous responses. Both sides say they wish to be peaceful and are merely exercising their democratic rights (which, ironically and tragically, cannot be exercised in Eritrea itself). In the meantime, governments and local authorities in the West appear poorly prepared for the ensuing confrontations. Protesters and police have been injured in recent clashes. The danger is that further injuries may take place, with the loss of life a real possibility. For President Isaias Afwerki, retaining a firm hold over the growing diaspora is important to his regime’s survival. It not only provides one-third of its income and vital foreign exchange, but argues his government’s case in foreign fora. Young Eritreans, many of whom have risked their lives to reach safety in exile, are equally determined that they will no longer be intimidated and spied upon (Expressen 2023; Rohner 2023a, 2023b). Neither side appears willing to back down.