Introduction
The coronavirus (Covid-19), first detected in December 2019 in China, spread rapidly to other countries and regions: as of April 2021, Zimbabwe had recorded 1567 deaths and 38,235 cases. In response, the government instituted a draconian lockdown through Statutory Instrument 83 of 2020 (Government of Zimbabwe 2020). This regulation led to the closure of national borders, suspended intercity travel, prohibited all business activities except for essential services (in the mining, manufacturing, security and health sectors) and threatened heavy fines and imprisonment for any transgressors. Informal sector workers, who between 1991 and 2015 contributed an average of 61% to the country’s gross domestic product (according to the United Kingdom Department of International Development, cited in Mujuru 2021) were drastically affected, as their livelihoods immediately became illegal (Ndoma and Moyo-Nyede 2020).
Zimbabwe’s informal sector had expanded dramatically at the turn of the millennium, following several events: the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme, political violence, currency collapse, hyperinflation, closure of industries and rising corruption. These events created serious hardships which forced many to join the informal sector (Hove and Chenzi 2020). This situation was exacerbated by the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic. From 30 March 2020 until May 2021, Zimbabwe’s borders were closed, except for air travel which the majority cannot afford. The lockdown, initially supposed to last for only 21 days, was extended twice, and then a further ‘indefinite’ extension was announced in the middle of May 2020 (Chenzi 2023). Both Level 1 and 2 lockdowns restricted citizens to their homes, except to purchase foodstuffs nearby or for health emergencies. Most shops were closed and security personnel were deployed throughout Zimbabwe to guarantee compliance (Government of Zimbabwe 2020). Movement inside the country was banned; church services were prohibited; funeral gatherings were limited to 30 people; all public transportation, except for the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company and flights in and out of the country, were suspended. In Harare, police and military checkpoints on highways leading to the Central Business District (CBD) turned back pedestrians and vehicles, allowing only essential services personnel through. Wearing a face mask in public spaces became compulsory. Zimbabwe’s borders were shut to foreign nationals, and public meetings of more than 50 people were forbidden.
The police conducted raids and spot checks to arrest those who contravened the lockdown regulations. Such harsh police interventions worsened the situation for informal workers, as several informal activities were already classified as illegal – including private taxi operations, underground foreign currency dealing and shebeen (illegal drinking) operations. These could attract a prison sentence, heavy fine or both (Chenzi 2023), and were now more heavily policed in order to protect the population from Covid-19.
More than 90% of the Zimbabwean labour force is estimated to work in the informal economy, many surviving from hand to mouth, while 70% subsist below the poverty line (Hove and Chenzi 2017). The Zimbabwean government promised an informal sector cushion fund of ZWL200 (US$2) to help informal sector workers during the lockdown (Ndoma and Moyo-Nyede 2020). However, only 202,000 of the 1 million targeted households received this. As Mukeredzi (2020) argued, ‘If vendors and other self-employed workers are barred from leaving their homes to ply their trade, how are they to feed their families?’ Informal workers were therefore forced to defy state lockdown regulations and resume informal activities in order to survive. However, our argument here is that this crisis affected informal workers unequally. First and foremost, the lockdowns had a gender dimension, having a greater impact on women than men, in ways that will be documented.
For some, ‘survival’ was a matter of life and death; for others it was more a crisis of accumulation. As Tapiwa Chagonda put it in relation to the hyperinflationary period of the early 2000s: “the Zimbabwean crisis did not only bring doom and gloom to Zimbabweans, but it also created opportunities for those with the requisite economic and social capital and courage to make a ‘quick buck’” (Chagonda 2016, 139).
The challenges affecting the informal sector following the introduction of Covid-19 lockdown regulations were not unique to Zimbabwe. The International Labour Organization raised similar concerns: that social protection systems would fail on a global scale to safeguard the lives and livelihoods of most vulnerable groups, including informal workers (Dongozi 2020). In Zimbabwe, the abrupt announcement of the lockdown gave informal sector workers no time to organise their savings or stock up on food. They argued that they could not afford to stay at home, even though going out to work exposed them to police brutality and potentially to contracting Covid-19 (Interview, 13 February 2021). Given this, our research investigated the different approaches adopted by members of Zimbabwe’s informal sector – particularly vendors, shebeen operators, private transport workers, foreign currency dealers and cross-border traders – to circumvent Covid-19 lockdown rules between March 2020 and April 2021.
Research outline
The fieldwork for the study was conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital, between 1 December 2020 and 30 April 2021. The investigation was largely confined to Harare because of the lockdown restrictions. Nevertheless, sustaining links between Harare and surrounding rural areas, as well as the country’s border regions, were also covered. A total sample of 43 informants (26 men and 17 women) involved in various informal activities were interviewed. Participants were selected through purposive and snowball sampling techniques, and included: four vegetable and fruit vendors; 12 cross-border traders; five second-hand clothes salespersons; four shebeen operators; eight foreign exchange agents; and seven illegal taxi operators. Three police officers were also interviewed. Although children were also involved in lockdown violations, only participants who were over 18 years old were interviewed. The oldest were in their mid sixties, but most were in their twenties.
More men than women were interviewed, because most of the men stated that they were involved in informal business activities on behalf of their female counterparts (wives, sisters and mothers) due to the risks involved in the activities during the national lockdown (Interview, 8 February 2020).
The researchers utilised open-ended questions, allowing informants to share their experiences with very little intervention from the researchers. Interviews lasted on average for three hours. Qualitative data drawn from the interview sessions were analysed using summative content analysis. The research was bolstered with secondary data from scholarly works and online reports relating to the Covid-19 pandemic. The study adhered to ethical protocols, with participants guaranteed anonymity given that the study investigated behaviour that was illegal and punishable according to Zimbabwe’s laws at the time. The participants’ real names have been replaced by pseudonyms which were chosen by them.
Findings: informal sector activities during Zimbabwe’s Covid-19 lockdown
It is much better to die from the Covid-19 virus than from hunger … We are already ruined. What more harm can coronavirus do? Plus, this virus might not even kill us … Therefore it’s better to get coronavirus while looking for money than to sit at home and die from hunger. (Mr Mahvenga, vegetable vendor, interview, 8 February 2020)
As in other African nations where a large part of the population relies on informal markets, a lockdown meant immediate food shortages. Police efforts to clear vendors from the streets were in vain, given that drought in 2019 had cut the annual cereal harvest by more than 50% (from 1.7 million metric tonnes in 2018 to 776,000 metric tonnes in 2019), creating a huge demand for food (Dongozi 2020). Diaspora remittances from Zimbabweans working outside the country also dried up, as other economies were also devastated by the pandemic. Thousands of Zimbabweans working abroad lost their jobs and were forced back home (Mujuru 2021). While other vulnerable countries could access billions of US dollars in emergency Covid credit, Zimbabwe was denied access due to its US$2 billion arrears to the World Bank and the African Development Bank. By March 2020, Zimbabwe confronted a triple threat of Covid-19, food shortages and economic meltdown, which effectively forced people in the informal sector to defy state-gazetted lockdown regulations in order to avoid starvation.
Although most informal operators violated Covid-19 lockdown protocols for survival purposes, it would be too simplistic to posit that this was true for everyone. Some operators joined the informal economy for accumulation purposes, to seize the opportunities that were presented by the lockdown. This was especially true for foreign currency dealers, transporters and shebeen proprietors. During the lockdown period, intercity travel was prohibited, but farmers were desperate to sell their perishable produce in Harare’s vegetable market, where there was a high demand. This provided a lucrative opportunity for informal transporters to charge farmers exorbitant prices (Interview, 22 January 2021). Foreign currency dealers were lured by high demand during the lockdown, as private hospitals and pharmacies in Harare no longer accepted local currency but instead were charging in US dollars (Interview, 19 January 2021). Shebeen operators were driven by a high demand for alcohol since liquor stores and nightclubs were closed during lockdown (Interview, 22 March 2021).
Our research found that each group of informal actors had a unique set of survival and/or accumulation strategies which they utilised to overcome the state-imposed Covid-19 protocols. Vendors (especially retailers of fruits, vegetables, bread, gas, second-hand clothes, household utensils and snacks) resorted to a number of devices. Mr Mpoperi, a gas retailer and repairman in Gazaland (one of Zimbabwe’s oldest thriving informal markets) described how, in order to continue day-to-day business, people in Gazaland bought whistles to signal the presence of state agents:
Different whistle sounds convey different messages. For example, one whistle screech means that the police or soldiers are coming but they are still far away. If the whistle is repeated in a twofold piercing and loud sound, it means they are very close and approaching in our direction. Therefore, everyone has to scamper. However, if the repeated whistle sound is blown again once in a drawn-out tune, it means they are not coming in our direction and everyone relaxes. (Interview, 13 February 2021)
Cross-border traders also came up with strategies to stay in business. Since lockdown protocols shut down national borders indefinitely, nearly all cross-border trade was officially banned as a business venture (Government of Zimbabwe 2020, 13–18). Nevertheless, some traders came up with measures to overcome this predicament. For instance, Mutambo, a woman cross-border trader from Machipisa, one of Harare’s bustling bazaars, said that:
Since all the borders are shut due to the Covid-19 lockdown protocols, I am now sending truck drivers to buy new stuff for my business because trucks are the only vehicles allowed to cross the border. However, sending someone to buy goods on your behalf is a bit challenging since they just buy whatever they find and at times they swindle my money since I am a woman, but at least it’s better than staying at home doing nothing. (Interview, 12 December 2020)
Due to the challenges caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, I had to open an online store on Facebook where I advertise my commodities so as to stay in business. In order to safely travel when delivering goods to my customers, I bought a forged letter from Chitungwiza which I present to the police and military personnel when stopped for inspection. (Interview, 22 March 2021)
Foreign currency dealers (popularly known as ‘money changers’) came up with their own survival strategies during the lockdown period. Money changing in Zimbabwe was already illegal under financial and monetary regulations, but was now also in violation of the national Covid lockdown and police were given the power to confiscate currency and arrest all those suspected of money changing (Interview, Isaac 2021). As money changers normally stood along sidewalks and called on pedestrians to buy or sell foreign currency, they risked being apprehended by undercover police officers. Many began to relocate from central Harare into surrounding residential areas, especially business centres. This not only lowered the chances of being arrested, but also reduced the costs incurred in travel and needing fake travel documents to enter the CBD. This move was also better for their clients, enabling them to purchase foreign currency closer to home (Interview, 19 January 2021).
Other money changers remained in central Harare, but began to use advertisements along the street to identify potential customers (Interview, Isaac 2021). They also resorted to hiring touts – young men who lured customers on behalf of the money changers and were paid on commission. Melvin, one of the touts who operated at Copacabana, Harare CBD’s bustling informal market place, said:
I’m the broker, I merely connect customers to my boss and the transaction is concluded in a car parked a safe distance away. It’s perilous work, but I don’t have an option. I need to eat at the end of the day so taking risk simply comes with the job. All I have to do is to persuade a client that my boss has the best rates in town and if the customer wants to change forex, I will take him or her to the boss’s car. The more clients I bring, the more money I’m paid. (Interview, 19 January 2021)
Private transport operatives were also forced to resort to extreme measures. The lockdown regulations specifically suspended all public transportation, including intercity travel, except for Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) buses. This meant that all private bus and taxi travel firms were summarily and indefinitely forced to close (Government of Zimbabwe 2020, 8). Over 140,000 workers in the transport sector in Harare alone lost their jobs (Interview, 19 January 2021). In order to stay in business, firms started to use fake ZUPCO emblems to avoid police harassment. Mr Chintengo, a commuter omnibus operator, disclosed that several syndicates offered ZUPCO insignias for vehicles at a cost of US$120 (Interview, 19 January 2021). Other private commuter operators offered their vehicles for hire at lower prices to companies that were designated as essential services by the government (Interview, 22 January 2021). Some bus companies joined the smuggling business, trafficking farm products during curfew hours at night from surrounding rural areas to Mbare Musika, Zimbabwe’s biggest agricultural informal market. By bribing police officers manning the roadblocks they made huge turnovers.
The number of shebeen proprietors increased during the Covid-19 lockdown period. Many informal sector workers, especially women whose normal activities had collapsed, resorted to operating shebeens which were largely located in residential areas. Clients would arrive in ones and twos to reduce suspicion (Interview, 24 March 2021). Most of the beer that was sold was smuggled by suppliers who violated lockdown regulations.
Another strategy which all the five branches of the informal sector utilised to stay in business was bribing police officers, who were paid meagre salaries (Interview, 8 March 2021). In March 2020, police, teachers, nurses and soldiers were paid the equivalent of US$35 per month. This was doubled to US$72, but remained inadequate (Hove and Chenzi 2020, 87). Therefore, most police officers ended up accepting bribes as low as US$1 (Interview, 8 March 2021). As Mafunga, a police officer stationed in Kambuzuma area 3, reported:
We are getting peanuts from the government and we are expected to do our work properly whilst our families are starving. With the money I am getting I can’t even afford to meet my rental obligations let alone school fees for my children. Therefore, the only way to survive is to accept the kickbacks from these felonious clients. (Interview, 8 March 2021)
Wilson (2011) noted that bribes and fines that never make their way into municipal coffers are a common feature of the informal economy. The ambiguous status of informal actors in relation to the massive number of regulations lead to both confusion and corruption. The issue of bribing officials is not unique to Zimbabwe; scholars such as De Soto (1989) also point out that bribery is one of the global ‘costs’ of informality. Nevertheless, the lockdown augmented corrupt activities from both informal actors and police personnel.
Survival was the main theme of most informal workers’ accounts of the lockdown. Most experienced huge setbacks due to the challenges involved in running informal businesses during this time. A huge number closed down or changed their trade. Momz, an old lady who was initially a night vendor outside Maglaz nightclub in Kambuzuma, found a way to manage:
Soon after the lockdown I was desperate for food since all the beer halls and clubs were forced to shut down. Therefore, I started my own business selling alcohol and cigarettes at my house to my former clients. (Interview, 24 March 2021)
Smuggling goods from rural areas to Mbare is very risky and therefore I only accept US dollars since the police also want greens [US dollars] and nothing else … However, I am making more money than what I was getting prior to the Covid-19 lockdown. (Interview, 2021)
It is worth noting that some formal sector enterprises, especially in the entertainment industry (bars, nightclubs, sporting events and music concerts) also suffered drastically from draconian Covid regulations. In order to avert bankruptcy, some formal enterprises, especially pubs and nightclubs, resorted to underground informal survival strategies, such as clandestinely opening during curfews to regular clients (Interview, 22 March 2021). Several formal businesses also expanded their market share, especially in the retail sector, by increasing the sale of items such as fruits, vegetables and alcohol which had previously been dominated by informal vendors and liquor establishments.
State responses to informal survival and accumulation strategies during the Covid-19 lockdown period heightened authoritarianism and inequality. Measures such as fines, confiscation of merchandise, spot checks during and after curfew hours, imprisonment of offenders for a maximum of one year, and police and military raids, were despotic and discriminatory. Poor and marginalised members of society were disproportionately accused of contravening these measures when they were caught plying their trade. Frequent raids on local market areas in high-density areas were conducted close to curfew times. Anyone caught outside was whisked away in police or military vehicles to the nearest station where they spent the night awaiting trial the following day (Interview, Taru 2021). During the lockdown period, the police reported that 224,037 violators had been arrested, while hundreds of vehicles were impounded. Police officers claimed that the majority of the apprehended civilians were Covid violators who had failed to bribe the police (Interview, 8 March 2021).
The informal economy’s survival and accumulation strategies also impacted on public health. In the process of plying their trade during the lockdown period, members of the informal economy risked contracting and spreading the virus since they could not respect World Health Organization guidelines. They lacked the financial resources to access personal protective equipment and the state did not provide any.
In December 2020, Zimbabwe had 13,867 reported Covid-19 cases with a total of 363 deaths. However, within a month, on 31 January 2021 it reported 33,388 cases and 1217 deaths (Chenzi 2023). This sharp spike demonstrated the consequences of continuing informal activities during the lockdown period. For example, the proliferation of shebeens throughout Zimbabwe during the lockdown led to an influx of South Africans from Limpopo province entering Zimbabwe via unofficial routes, as alcoholic beverages had been banned in South Africa (Bulawayo24 2020). Shebeens also sold illegal drugs, especially marijuana, Bronco (cough syrup), Mangemba (anti-psychotic pills) and Mutoriro (crystal meth), which were smuggled into Zimbabwe from South Africa (Interview, 22 March 2021). This illicit activity contributed to the spread of a deadly and vaccine-resistant South African Covid-19 variant in Zimbabwe.
The public health crisis in Zimbabwe could also be attributed to authoritarian responses by the state which resulted in the incarceration of tens of thousands of people. At the beginning of the lockdown in March 2020, Zimbabwe’s prisons, designed to accommodate a capacity of 17,000 people, already had a population of 22,000. This further increased to accommodate tens of thousands of Covid-19 violators, thereby heightening the risk of spreading the virus (Roth 2021). Zimbabwe’s prisons and detention centres were unsanitary, overcrowded and had no running water in cells for detainees to observe the sanctioned hygiene practices to stem the spread of Covid-19.
Conclusion
The informal economy is generally defined as income-generating activity which is unregulated by state or other official organisations within society, compared to the formal sector which is lawful and regulated (Castells and Portes 1989, 12). Informal economies can be seen as a source of vitality and economic growth; with state regulation a barrier to expansion and diversification (see Wilson 2011; Lindell 2002; De Soto 1989). The reality is that in most African settings informal or unregulated workers are not successful entrepreneurs, but rather petty commodity producers on the margins of subsistence. Internal class divisions and exploitative relations are as integral to the informal economy as to the formal sector. Many informal workers (such as the touts here, or child workers) are exploited by others who are more secure. A whole ladder of monetary cuts characterises the relations between farmers, smugglers, alcohol sellers and market vendors. Rich vendors or traders on wheels who possess the means to escape law enforcement agents and acquire bulky goods end up supplanting poorer vendors (Toriro and Chirisa 2021).
Inequity in class terms is compounded by gender. Across the world, women embark on informal economic activities more than men, especially those entered into for survival. A survey of 26 municipalities in Brazil by Williams et al. (2012) indicated that men participate in informal entrepreneurial endeavours primarily because of the opportunities presented, while women are likely to enter into informal activities out of necessity, propelled by exclusion from the formal economy. Lindell’s (2002) study on Guinea-Bissau’s informal sector found reports of frequent collapses of small informal businesses, widespread economic hardships undermining collaborative efforts among the poor, and changing norms of assistance which exposed many women to the ravages of economic change. It is clear from our evidence that lockdown restrictions undermined women’s growing independence and agency as they became increasingly reliant on men to transact their business, within a context of police harassment as well as male violence and robbery.
Zimbabwe was not the only African state that experienced the widespread rebellion of the informal sector in contravention of lockdown protocols. Megersa (2020) found that in sub-Saharan Africa the livelihoods of the informal labour force were grossly affected by the pandemic, especially in those states (e.g. Ghana, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya) which introduced stringent lockdown regulations. The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic in Africa had devastating effects for the whole continent beyond its threat to public health. State policies that institutionalised lockdown measures without considering the economic ramifications were primarily behind the crisis among the 80% of the population who work in the informal sector.
These lockdown policies were adopted from the global North. Unlike African countries, countries in Europe and North America had smaller numbers of informal workers and the financial resources to cushion their citizens from the ravages of lockdown measures. In Africa, lockdown protocols were institutionalised abruptly with little or no financial assistance to the most vulnerable groups in the informal sector. Consequently, informal sector workers adopted risky survival or accumulation strategies to circumvent the protocols. Links were also created that went beyond national borders. A consequent rise in smuggling, corruption, crime and state brutality enhanced the risk of spreading the virus, especially for the poorest, thereby defeating the purpose of the lockdown regulations. Yet we also note that the informal sector’s resistance to lockdown restrictions is an instance of counter-hegemony and opposition to the authoritarian state.