Introduction
Nigeria’s population of approximately 200 million people makes it the most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1966, six years after independence from Britain, Nigeria experienced two successive military coups. The first coup in January resulted in the death of the country’s prime minister, Tafawa Balewa, and the premier of northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello. The death of these northern political leaders led a section of the military from the north to view the coup as Igbo in origin. This impression remains contentious, but it accounted for a countercoup in July by military officers of northern ethnic origin. This coup claimed the life of Nigeria’s head of state, Major General Ironsi, an Igbo. An Igbo pogrom ensued in northern Nigeria (Ekwe-Ekwe 2006).
The governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lt Col Ojukwu, was loyal to Ironsi and refused to recognise a new federal military government headed by Lt Col Yakubu Gowon. In a bid to resolve the impasse, and according to a peace accord mediated by the Ghanaian leader General Ankrah and signed in Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967, it was agreed that Nigeria should adopt what was in effect a confederal system (Ademoyega 1986; Ekwe-Ekwe 2006; Achebe 2012).
On returning to Nigeria, however, and apparently belatedly appraised of the full security, constitutional and political import of the agreement it had negotiated, the federal government reneged on implementing this aspect of the Aburi Accord, much to Ojukwu's annoyance. Instead, in March, the federal government adopted Decree no. 8, which gave regional governments unprecedented autonomy within a noticeably decentralised federation, but which also strongly reaffirmed the federal military government's supremacy, something which Ojukwu was implacably opposed to and sought to challenge, and was an important driver for Biafra's secession at the end of May. But persistent attacks on and deaths of Igbos in northern Nigeria, alongside the abrogation of Decree 8 and creation of 12 states out of the country's existing three regions by the federal government, would also contribute to the eventual declaration of the Republic of Biafra by Ojukwu, who continued to demand the implementation in full of the agreement signed at Aburi. A 30-month civil war (1967–1970) ensued, at the end of which the secessionists were defeated.
In 1999, Nigeria returned to democratic rule after decades of military rule. The social space created by democracy seems to have encouraged the resurgence of separatist protest as post-civil-war political and economic marginalisation of the Igbo persisted (Achebe 1983, 2012; Okaneme 2014; Igwe and Amadi 2021). In 2012, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) emerged under the leadership of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu. As director of the London-based Radio Biafra, he enabled IPOB to draw attention to post-civil-war Igbo marginalisation and the need for a separate state of Biafra.
The democratic context is crucial to understanding the agitation for self-determination by IPOB that represents a specific separatist group and not the entire region that belonged to the defunct Biafra. The context of the Nigerian state in a democratic setting seems to be repressive in matters such as organised protests and civil agitation for enhanced federalism and a separate state, the Republic of Biafra. Recent popular IPOB agitation has resonated across Nigeria (Amadi 2012; Onuoha 2014). The central objective of IPOB is the creation of a sovereign state of Biafra through non-violent means. It is predominantly a youth-based organisation, with membership across Nigeria and the diaspora. IPOB operates through non-violent demonstrations such as sit-at-home events in the region that belonged to the defunct Biafra. The group has confronted the Nigerian state, challenging post-civil-war Igbo marginalisation. In doing so this protest is linked to the broader Nigerian political context, where youth-based agitation currently plays a major role in the political process. This kind of protest has implications for social justice, power, the state and the political economy of underdevelopment of eastern Nigeria.
The persistence of protests and the consequent increasing crackdown on IPOB members by security forces is a major challenge to Nigeria’s democracy (ICG 2015). In January 2013, 50 corpses of what were thought to be supporters of Biafra and/or IPOB were found afloat in Ezu River in Anambra state (Mamah, Ujumadu, and Balogun 2013). On 2 December 2015, thousands of protesters gathered, blocking the Niger Bridge, a gateway into the commercial city of Onitsha, in Anambra, demanding a separate state. It ended in clashes between the protesters and security forces, leaving two officers and nine protesters dead (Onu and Orji 2015). In the wake of the incident, several protesters were killed in clashes with security forces across eastern Nigeria, in Owerri, Asaba, Aba, Onitsha and Port Harcourt (Nwankwo 2016).
In June 2016, Amnesty International reported that the Nigerian military had attacked and killed unarmed Biafra supporters in Onitsha ahead of their planned May 2016 commemoration of the declaration of the Biafra republic. The report asserted that ‘since August 2015, the security forces have killed at least 150 members and supporters of the pro-Biafran organisation IPOB and injured hundreds during non-violent meetings, marches and other gatherings. Hundreds were also arbitrarily arrested’ (Amnesty International 2016, 5). The arrest of Kanu on 19 October 2015, on charges of sedition, ethnic incitement and treasonable felony (ICG 2015), led to protests and in 2017 IPOB’s ‘sit-at-home’ directive led to the proscription of the organisation by the federal government on 17 September.
Exploring civil agitation to understand patterns of state response aids reflection on the nature of democracy in Nigeria (Onuoha 2011; Ukiwo and Chukwuma 2012; ICG 2015; Ibeanu, Orji, and Iwuamadi 2016). While there have been various scholarly discourses on post-civil-war political crises in Nigeria (Tamuno 1970; Kirk-Greene 1971; Dudley 1973; Post and Vickers 1973; Williams 1983; Omeje 2005; Igwe and Amadi 2021), we highlight post-civil-war marginalisation of Biafra through a review of patterns of political appointments that have under-represented the Igbo. We contribute to the discussion by exploring key aspects of the extensive post-civil-war Igbo marginalisation, the resurgent separatist agitation of IPOB and patterns of state response. This chronicle demonstrates how and why inclusive democracy is essential to transform Igbo marginalisation and, in particular, douse organised separatist protests. We argue that there is a need for a policy to find local and international consensus to address the right to self-determination of the Igbo or their full reintegration into the mainstream post-civil-war politics and governance of Nigeria. This debate cannot be separated from the political economy of development linked to participatory and inclusive democracy as well as distributive justice. Civil agitation is linked to matters of social justice and the demand for inclusive governance.
We show that to understand the nature and extent of IPOB agitation, it is necessary to identify the factors that fuel the agitation. It is also necessary to understand the difference between separatist agitation and terrorism, which IPOB stands accused of and is the federal government's justification for the prohibition of the organisation. Since the end of the civil war, the absence of a Nigerian president of Igbo origin has been at the heart of the agitation. In addition, protest movements from south-east Nigeria have raised the question of the ethnic composition of appointments to high-level political positions.
Political economy of power and resistance in South East Nigeria
Since political independence in 1960, there has been organised agitation in many parts of Nigeria. This has been driven by inequalities in political power in which the northern region of the country has been hegemonic. Adekson (2003) captured the rise of radical civil society in South West Nigeria and explained that this was fuelled by the struggle for power and increasing state repression. Recent evidence of popular agitation in South West Nigeria is exemplified by the demand for an Oduduwa republic, championed by the Yoruba activist Sunday Adeyemo, primarily as a result of insecurity arising from persistent attacks by herdsmen from northern states and a lack of response from the state (Akinrefon et al. 2021). Related resentment against the Nigerian state is also encountered in the minority areas of the Middle Belt where predominantly farmers have been attacked and killed by Fulani herdsmen, as conflict intensifies over access to land (Maya 2016; Ojo 2020; Obaji 2021). Political power and northern hegemony have undermined social justice and inclusive governance, and exacerbated political and socio-economic asymmetry and resistance in the form of agitation.
Despite such agitation from other sections of Nigeria, Igbo agitation stands out in that it emanates from perceived post-civil-war marginalisation. Critical analysis of post-civil-war Igbo marginalisation needs to transcend mere claims, and rather deepen assessment of the incidents in terms of accuracy and historical context. At the end of the civil war in 1970, in an attempt to allay the fears of possible marginalisation, General Gowon declared ‘no victor, no vanquished’ (Ekwe-Ekwe 2006). The government introduced programmes targeting national integration, such as the National Youth Service Corps and unity schools, which are federal government-owned schools set up across the states to foster national unity. Despite these programmes, the structure of political power in post-civil-war Nigeria remains asymmetrical as a result of marginalisation stemming from what Igbos perceive as their unfair treatment in the allocation and distribution of power and resources (Anugwom 2000).
The term ‘abandoned property’ in post-civil-war eastern Nigeria denotes a strategy adopted by the federal government whereby Igbo who fled the war were dispossessed of their landed property. This pauperised the Igbo and economically alienated them from their property (Achebe 1983; Ekwe-Ekwe 2006). One of the vocal critics of the immediate post-civil-war policies against the Igbo is Chinua Achebe. He argued (Achebe 1983) that evidence of Igbo marginalisation was Nigeria’s immediate post-civil-war banking policy, which led to Ndigbo (Igbo people) losing more than 50 million Biafra pounds (approximately £25 million) in foreign exchange at the end of the war in 1970. The banking policy closed any Igbo bank account which had been used during the civil war. Chief Awolowo, then finance minister, introduced a banking policy which gave the Igbo only 20 Nigerian pounds, irrespective of how many Biafran pounds they brought for exchange and irrespective of how much they had in their account (Achebe 1983; Ekwe-Ekwe 2006). This had the immediate result of pauperising the Igbo middle class while earning the government treasury a profit of £4.5 million (Achebe 1983).
In 1979, ahead of Nigeria’s general election, Chief Awolowo declared openly that he no longer wished to be regarded as ‘Leader of the Yorubas’ (Joseph 1991, 122). He sought to establish political ties beyond his ethnic group as the presidential candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and to secure a running mate from the north. He said that ‘the rebuffs he received from all the prominent northerners he tried to attract, suggested that they were under oath to the late Sardauna or Balewa not to join forces with him’ (Joseph 1991, 124). He later settled for Chief Philip Umeadi, an Igbo, as his running mate. In a town hall meeting in Abeokuta, Chief Awolowo responded to some of the grievances regarding his perceived anti-Igbo stance(s) during and after the war, several of which represent key drivers of post-civil-war Igbo claims of victimisation and marginalisation.
On the question of the change of the national currency in the run-up to and following the outbreak of war, Chief Awolowo stated:
We discovered he [Ojukwu, then head of the secessionist Biafra state] looted our central bank in Benin, he looted the one in Port Harcourt, looted the one in Calabar and he was taking the currency notes abroad to sell[,] to earn foreign exchange to buy arms. So I decided to change the currency. (The News 2020)
at the close of the war some people wanted their Biafran notes to be exchanged for them. Of course I couldn’t do that, if I did that the whole country would be bankrupt. We didn’t know about Biafran notes and we didn’t know on what basis they have printed them, so we refused the Biafran note, but I laid down the principle that all those who had savings in the banks on the eve of the declaration of the Biafran war or Biafra, will get their money back if they could satisfy us that they had the savings there, or the money there. Unfortunately, all the banks’s [sic] books had been burnt, and many of the people who had savings there didn’t have their savings books or their last statement of account, so a panel had to be set up.
I didn’t take part in setting up the panel, it was done by the Central bank and the pertinent officials of the ministry of finance, to look into the matter, and they went carefully into the matter, they took some months to do so, and then made some recommendations which I approved. (The News 2020)
Regarding abandoned property, he stated: ‘I saw to it that the houses owned by the Ibos [sic] in Lagos and on this side, were kept for them’ (ibid.).
While there is a long history of post-civil-war policies ostensibly targeted at Igbo reconciliation and rehabilitation, the logic of present-day strong-arm tactics favoured by the federal government is to advance northern hegemony and a fractured federal system, which it believes will foster ‘unity in diversity’. Contradictory as this has been, there is inequality both in terms of the size of Nigeria’s federal states and in the revenue allocation formula. The eclectic federal structure creates unequal and uneven development, a tenuous state–central government relationship and a deep sense of mutual mistrust, suspicion and animosity, as ‘federalism’ is manipulated by the northern hegemonic elite to consolidate its hold on power.
Mustapha (2006) and Itumo, Nwobashi, and Offor (2018) provide findings that underscore post-civil-war Igbo marginalisation in the public sector. For instance, Mustapha (2006, 21) posits that ‘while there have been periods of Hausa-Fulani domination of the cabinet, the Igbo have been, by and large, underrepresented.’ Equally, Itumo, Nwobashi, and Offor (2018, 398) show that by the end of the civil war, the control of power and the distribution of Nigeria’s socio-economic resources at the centre had fallen into the hands of the victors of war. Duruji (2012) maintains that this increasing marginalisation gave rise to the renewed demand for Biafra in south-east Nigeria. Similarly, Onuoha (2014) identified the rise of the separatist agitation as an attribute of ‘generational identities’. These have become critical to the balance of power affecting largely the young(er) generation, which he termed the ‘vanguard’ generation, agitating for self-determination. Issues of balance of power are less discussed by the Nigerian political elite compared to the Igbo and other major ethnic groups (Nigeria has Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba as major ethnic groups). For instance, the absence of a president of Igbo ethnicity and Igbo incumbents in top political offices in Nigeria in more than 50 years since the civil war remains an issue partly accounting for separatist protest.
Table 1 points to the imbalance of representation of ethnic groups in the highest political office. While people of Igbo ethnicity, like those from other ethnic groups, have served as senate president, deputy senate president and deputy speaker in the national assembly, the absence of a national president who is Igbo increases the sense of marginalisation of the Igbo and creates space for separatist agitation. This is one of the central contentions of the IPOB, which radically opposes current Igbo political elites on the grounds of their being passive and anti-revolutionary. The passive nature of the Igbo political elite reflects political fixes and patronage. The Nigerian national project of politics, in the case of the presidency, is built on a consensus termed ‘rotation presidency’, although the practice is not constitutionally entrenched. It is an arrangement for rotation of the presidency among the ethnic groups specifically structured between northern and southern Nigeria. Beyond the widely held notion of rotation of the presidency is the role played by social class that suggests the Igbo political elite may be passive or compromised through political patronage. Such a scenario triggers separatist agitation by the youth who distrust the elite (see Onuoha 2014).
Ethnicity of Nigerian presidents, 1999–2021.
| President | Ethnic group |
|---|---|
| Olusegun Obasanjo | Yoruba |
| Umaru Musa Yar’aduah | Hausa/Fulani |
| Goodluck Jonathan | Ijaw |
| Muhammadu Buhari | Hausa/Fulani |
Table 2 sets out the regional origins of key government appointees and highlights the poor representation of indigenes from the South East which, we suggest, is clear evidence of post-civil-war marginalisation of the Igbo. Indeed, Igbos are completely unrepresented in any of the major political offices in the current Buhari administration, as indicated in Table 3. The distribution by geopolitical zone of origin of chiefs of defence staff since the Second Republic in 1979 to 2017 shows that out of 16, only one person of Igbo ethnic origin served as chief of defence staff in that period (Itumo, Nwobashi, and Offor 2018) (Table 4). Also, only a single Igbo person has served as Inspector General of Police, making the Igbo the least represented ethnic group or region. This suggests poor reintegration of post-civil-war Igbo into the mainstream politics and governance of Nigeria.
Regional origins of key government appointments by President Buhari, 2015–2017.
| Region | Percentage of key appointments |
|---|---|
| North East | 21.10 |
| North Central | 13.90 |
| North West | 34.80 |
| South East | 9.30 |
| South-South | 8.90 |
| South West | 12 |
Source: Itumo, Nwobashi, and Offor (2018).
Ethnic distribution of political office among the three arms of government, 2021.
| Arm of government | Position | Ethnic origin |
|---|---|---|
| Executive | President | Fulani |
| Vice president | Yoruba | |
| Judiciary | Chief justice of the Federation | Hausa/Fulani |
| Legislature | Senate president | Hausa/Fulani |
| Deputy senate president | Urhobo | |
| Speaker of the Federal House | Yoruba | |
| Deputy speaker | Wase (Plateau State, North Central) |
Source: Compiled by the authors.
Ethnic origin of Nigeria’s chiefs of staff, 1980 to January 2021.
| Names | Years in office | Ethnic origin | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lieutenant General Ipoola Alani Akinrinade | 1980–81 | Yoruba |
| 2 | Lieutenant General Gibson Jalo | 1981–83 | Hausa Fulani |
| 3 | General Domkat Bali | 1984–90 | Tarok Langtang (Plateau State, Middle Belt) |
| 4 | General Sani Abacha | 1990–93 | Hausa/Fulani |
| 5 | Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya | 1993–97 | Yoruba |
| 6 | General Abdulsalami Abubakar | 1997–98 | Hausa/Fulani |
| 7 | Air Marshal Al-Amin Daggash | 1998–99 | Northern Nigeria (Shuwa Arab ethnic group) |
| 8 | Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi | 1999–2003 | Igala (Kogi State, North Central) |
| 9 | General Alexander Ogomudia | 2003–06 | Isoko (Delta State, South-South) |
| 10 | General Martin Luther Agwai | 2006–07 | Gidan Mana (Kaduna State, North West) |
| 11 | Owoye Andrew Azazi | 2007–08 | Ijaw (Bayelsa State, South-South) |
| 12 | Air Chief Marshal Paul Dike | 2008–10 | Igbo |
| 13 | Air Chief Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin | 2010–12 | Yoruba |
| 14 | Admiral Ola Ibrahim | 2012–14 | Yoruba |
| 15 | Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh | 2014–15 | Hausa/Fulani |
| 16 | General Abayomi Gabriel Olonisakin | 2015–21 | Yoruba |
| 17 | General Lucky Irabor* | 26 January 2021 – | Igbo |
Source: The authors.
*Following protests regarding Igbo marginalisation, General Lucky Irabor was appointed Chief of Staff on 26 January 2021.
The prevailing political power structure is one of marginalisation and imbalance. While the appointment of federal ministers is constitutional according to Nigeria’s democracy, a critical analysis suggests that many of the positions assigned to the Igbo are classified as ‘less important portfolios’ (Mustapha 2006, 22). More attractive portfolios such as Ministry of Works, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Petroleum have bypassed the Igbo. The notion of ‘Igbo marginalisation’, as both a post-civil-war memory and a discursive analysis, evokes anguish among the younger Igbo generation. Resistance to marginalisation gave rise to calls for self-determination since 1999 following Nigeria’s return to democracy.
Class and elite interests in the separatist agitation
There are class/elite interests across Igbo/non-Igbo and north/south divides regarding IPOB’s separatist agitation. Elite politics provide an important understanding of various contending interests in the agitation. For instance, Joe Igbokwe, an Igbo and a member of the political elite, spokesperson of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) Lagos state chapter, opposes the agitation (Chukindi 2022). Similarly, Onuoha (2014) has identified ‘generational dimensions to Igbo nationalism’, pointing out a generational gap between the younger generation who constitute the bulk of the agitation and the older generation who are more reticent (Onuoha 2014). In 1999 Ralph Uwazuruike formed the Movement for the Actualization of a Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), which championed the separatist cause but seemed restrained in recent decades. Uwazuruike had ideological differences with the younger generation and would often describe Kanu as his son. Subsequently, Uwazuruike left MASSOB and formed the Biafra Independence Movement (BIM). In a related account, Daly (2021) reinforced Onuoha’s argument by highlighting that different stimuli and people animated the Biafra war and present-day agitation. He identified conditions of extreme hardship of the war and highlighted how the war paved the way for Nigeria’s long experience of post-war political crises. In short, present agitation takes the form of mostly non-violent protests organised by Igbo youth who are apprehensive about their future within a federation which they see as deliberately marginalising them and limiting their livelihood and other prospects for individual and group advancement. At the same time, Igbo elders and sections of the Igbo political elite appear less convinced that the agitation will lead to significant change in the long run, and are fearful of the prospects of it descending into another civil war, whose outcomes are unlikely to enhance long-term Igbo prospects any more than in the years since 1970.
IPOB, the rise of agitation and state response
A new separatist movement, with a more radical approach, emerged in the twenty-first century. It was emboldened by the ideology of a new generation of young ‘Biafrans’ under the umbrella of IPOB. Some pro-Biafra Igbo in the diaspora supported IPOB and staged solidarity protests at Nigerian embassies and High Commissions in the USA, UK and across Europe (Egwu 2020). Alongside this, the Igbo diaspora funded IPOB’s activities.
The arrest of Kanu
Kanu was arrested by the federal government in October 2015 on allegations of treason. He was held at Kuje prison. Various applications for bail were refused (Okakwu 2017). His arrest intensified the agitation, as IPOB members conducted several press conferences and peaceful demonstrations demanding the release of their leader. While he was in detention, an alliance was formed by Kanu’s followers between pro-Biafra agitators and the Niger Delta ex-militants (Okakwu 2017). Kanu’s supporters gave the federal government a 31-day ultimatum to release him or face the consequences. They threatened to resume attacks in the region, including vandalising oil installations and abducting foreign oil workers, if Kanu was not freed within that period. The ultimatum was accompanied by agitation in eastern Nigeria with protests and demands for both a referendum and for the restructuring of the Nigerian state. The solidarity of pro-Biafran groups – MASSOB, the Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) and BIM – gave the agitation added impetus.
The release of Kanu and the 2017 sit-at-home directive
After persistent organised protests, Kanu was released on conditional bail in April 2017. Justice Binta Nyako ordered Shuaibu Usman of the Magistrate Court in Wuse Zone 2, Abuja, to discharge Kanu of all counts of criminal conspiracy, intimidation and leading an unlawful society that had been levelled against him. Kanu’s counsel, Ifeanyi Ejiofor, confirmed in April 2017 that his client had fulfilled the bail conditions given to him. The three people who stood as surety for Kanu were Enyinnaya Abaribe, chairman of the South East Senate Caucus; Immanuel Shalom, a Jewish priest; and Tochukwu Uchendu, accountant and Abuja resident (Okakwu 2017).
During the raid by the Nigerian armed forces on Kanu’s country home in 2017 after his release, Kanu was whisked away. A few months later a video of him praying at the Western Wall in Jerusalem was shared online (BBC News 2018; Egwu 2020). Little is known about those directly involved in Kanu’s escape to Israel, as Kanu’s two international passports (Nigerian and British) were seized by the federal government. There was no official release from the Israeli government in this regard (see AFP 2018; Egwu 2020).
The quest for self-determination resonated locally and internationally through Radio Biafra, which attracted a wide audience (Egwu 2020). In spite of the growing awareness and popularity of IPOB’s agitation, in several instances of mass protests, members of the IPOB were attacked, shot and detained by the Nigerian police force, as there was no avenue for a national dialogue on the issues raised by the group.
Following Kanu’s release, it was envisaged by the federal government that the proposed sit-at-home protest could be avoided. However, on 30 May 2017, a sit-at-home was declared by IPOB to mark the 50th anniversary of the declaration of the Biafran Republic, and in honour of compatriots who had lost their lives in the struggle to bring about the Biafran Republic. The protests intensified and spread to include a wide geographical area (Chioma et al. 2017). Economic activities came to a halt in Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo states. In Asaba (in Delta state), and in parts of Rivers and Bayelsa states, most schools, banks and markets were closed and roads deserted (Chioma et al. 2017). The closure of commercial activities in Eastern region states in solidarity with IPOB’s sit-at-home order persisted, despite appeals by the state governors.
Militarised response and proscription of IPOB
The federal government’s preference in dealing with IPOB and agitation has been to use the military. This was the case in September 2017, when the military declared Operation Python Dance 2 in the Eastern region. Kanu’s country home was attacked and some IPOB members were killed. After the military attack, Major General John Enenche, the ‘Director Defence Information’, declared IPOB a terrorist organisation. The organisation was proscribed on 17 September 2017 by the Nigerian army, the federal government and the governors of eastern Nigeria. A timeline setting out details of the proscription of IPOB is presented in Table 5.
Timeline of the proscription of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).
| Activity | Year |
|---|---|
| The return of democracy in Nigeria | 1999 |
| Formation of Movement for the Actualization of a Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) | 1999 |
| MASSOB claims that 2020 of its members were massacred by the state in an extra-judicial killing | 2008 |
| Establishment of Radio Biafra in London | 2009 |
| Formation of IPOB | 2012 |
| Persistent crackdown by security forces to silence pro-Biafran movements targeting MASSOB and IPOB | 2014 to present |
| Nnamdi Kanu is arrested by the federal government | 2015 |
| Protesters and police clash at a protest against Kanu’s arrest, leading to the death of nine protesters and two policemen in Onitsha, Anambra state | 2 December 2015 |
| Amnesty International release a report detailing countless IPOB protesters killed during a government operation | 29 and 30 May 2016 |
| Kanu is held in detention for a year before being brought to trial | October 2015–8 November 2016 |
| Kanu is granted conditional bail | 2017 |
| Sit-at-home directive is issued in south-east Nigeria by IPOB | 30 May 2017 |
| The Biafra Secret Service is inaugurated by IPOB | 2017 |
| IPOB is labelled a terrorist group and proscribed by the Federal High Court in Abuja | 18 September 2017 |
| Attack on Umuahia, Kanu’s home village, by the combined forces of the Air Force and Army; Kanu disappears | September 2017 |
| Unsuccessful legal attempt by IPOB to reverse the court’s decision on its proscription | 2018 |
| Post-proscription frustration aggression, and civil agitation met by a continuing government crackdown | 2018 to date |
| Kanu’s abduction in Kenya by the federal government and continued detention in Nigeria | June 2021 |
| The UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention indicted both Nigeria and Kenya governments for the arrest and extraordinary rendition, torture and continued detention of Kanu, without due process | July 2022 |
| Court of appeal of Nigeria granted a dismissal of the criminal proceedings against Kanu because his transfer from Kenya constituted a ‘a clear and egregious violation’ of applicable and international and domestic law and ordered the federal government to return Kanu to Kenya | October 2022 |
| Violation of court rulings and federal government’s continued detention of Kanu | November 2022 |
| Federal government appeal against the Supreme Court’s decision for him to be released is still pending | Ongoing |
Source: Amnesty International (2016), authors’ adaptation.
It appears there was some form of external influence in the ongoing agitation. We noted above that Kanu resurfaced in Israel in 2018 and was rearrested in Kenya in 2021. Following his rearrest the United Kingdom asked the Nigerian government to explain where and how Kanu, who holds British citizenship, was arrested (Okoli and Oko 2021). In July 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention indicted both the Nigerian and Kenyan governments for the arrest and extraordinary rendition, torture and continued detention of Kanu, without due process (Oko 2022). The Council urged the Nigerian government to ensure ‘immediate release of Kanu unconditionally’ and pay him adequate compensation for the arbitrary violation of his fundamental human rights (Oko 2022). Kanu is still detained in Abuja. The federal government’s appeal against the Supreme Court's decision for him to be released was still pending in December 2022.
Conclusion
We have explored the resurgence of civil agitation in the era of democracy in Nigeria, and the need for a more democratic state response. After five decades of popular expectations for inclusive governance, and economic development in post-civil-war eastern Nigeria, and, in particular, democratic rule since 1999, the country’s Eastern region has experienced political marginalisation by the federal government. Such marginalisation is presently deployed by the younger Igbo generation in debates about separatist agitation and their demand for self-determination. The rise of IPOB constitutes such radical and popular agitation. The repressive patterns of state response show that the promised benefits of representative democracy, human rights, dialogue and freedom of expression and association, which are features of a more democratised political order, seem unlikely to materialise in the Nigerian context (Adangor 2018).