Introduction
Scrutiny on the ability of the state to manage evolving and complex socio-ecological systems has led to the emergence of at least two main perspectives. The first is that the state has lost control over the environment due to many factors including the erosion of state power under neoliberalism, the setting of environmental agendas by global actors, and the influence exerted by a well-established network of environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on international and domestic environmental policies and conservation strategies (MacDonald 2010). The second perspective is that the state remains central to approaches towards solving the environmental crisis facing humanity, it offers the necessary legal backing, and it is a conduit for global efforts towards meeting environmental targets. It emphasises that the state is an enabler of operations within its territory and has legitimate and coercive powers to deal with socio-ecological problems and to impose collective environmental action in ways that simultaneously express and expand state power (Duit, Feindt and Meadowcraft 2016; Mol 2016). This perspective further holds that the state’s ‘relative monopoly on administrative resources, technical expertise, bureaucratic intelligence and institutional influence’ (Whitehead, Jones and Jones 2007, 415) gives it unique capacity to manage the human–environment interface better than any other actor.
These two perspectives raise the questions of the form and functions that the state might take within the global capitalist economy. The questions are pertinent because of the capital trap in which the state is expected to orchestrate a post-growth political-economic model, when in fact it relies on the proceeds of private capital accumulation (Craig 2018). In this paper we illustrate how Botswana orchestrated its greener model of capitalist accumulation and gross domestic growth through the wildlife economy. That economy is anchored in environmental policies that fuse together domestic and global interests. Domestic interests include those of political elites – mainly from the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) – and bureaucratic and business elites in the tourism industry, who are well connected to the political elites. Makgala and Botlhomilwe (2017) are of the view that politicians and military generals in Botswana often have similar business interests. Consequently, economic strategies are driven by the interests of the elites who are more concerned with wealth accumulation (Ulriksen 2017). Regarding global interests, the ruling elite is indebted to foreign capitalist interests, namely the multinational corporations. For instance, Good (2017) claims that De Beers, a company that is at the helm of Botswana’s diamond trade, has made financial contributions to the leadership of the BDP. As we shall see below, the environmental policies of the state have enabled multinational companies to dominate the tourism sector, which is one of the main pillars of Botswana’s economy, contributing over 13% to the country's GDP in 2018 (World Travel and Tourism Council 2018).
More importantly, the wildlife economy is dependent on and also contributes to the greening of the state: the process by which the state interacts with NGOs, civil society and international agencies to achieve certain environmental outcomes. Globally, such interaction may be initiated by the state or by non-state actors who are determined to pursue an environmental agenda or to implement environmental strategies through state institutions. In practice this means that the state pursues environmental goals through various means, including the implementation of environmental policies that resonate with national needs as well as global aspirations. The outcomes of policy implementation favour the wealthy and powerful in society (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Death 2016), and Botswana is not exempt from these experiences, as this article will demonstrate.
While there has been much work on the politics of the state in wildlife conservation in African contexts, not much attention has been paid to the role played by heads of state in the greening of their countries. We argue that the greening process in Botswana was driven by political leaders (i.e. heads of state), who authorised environmental policies that in turn configured power relations in the wildlife economy between 1966 and 2018. This period, which covers the presidencies of Seretse Khama, Ketumile Masire, Festus Mogae and Ian Khama, allows us to trace shifts in wildlife conservation policies and practices and the consequent inequalities they engendered. We foreground the greening of the state in Botswana by analysing the production of the green state within historical periods in the African context. While such historical phases have been used to understand the development of the green state in countries falling under the umbrella of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Mol 2016), a distinction needs to be made between process and outcome. Analyses of the green state in OECD countries overemphasise environmental outcomes but pay inadequate attention to various processes that produce the green state. That approach excludes many countries in the global South that have embarked on environmental reforms but which are seen as ‘not green enough’ to be analysed through theories of the green state. We refer to Botswana to demonstrate how the process of greening unfolds and how heads of state are agents of that process.
Our paper draws primarily on archival research and on key informant interviews with academics, environmental consultants, politicians, representatives of civil society, the Ministry of the Environment, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, the private sector in tourism, and an interview with former President Lt General Ian Khama. The information solicited from key informants included the historical development of wildlife conservation policies, institutions, and practices in post-independence Botswana. Before we dwell on the greening of Botswana, we recount briefly the theories of the green state as a background for the discussion in this paper.
On the green state
The role of the environment in state-making processes has a long history, but this relationship is being investigated afresh due to the deepening environmental crisis, and also because of the need to develop appropriate solutions to socio-ecological problems. The role of the state is central to these solutions, especially because there is a need to develop institutions within the state that can implement environmental policies and appropriate interventions. Against this backdrop, the concept of a green state has emerged as a normative ideal and a potential state form in pursuit of environmental objectives, though the green state is not a formal category (Mol 2016; Craig 2018).
The normative-prescriptive form of the green state has been steered by Eckersley (2004, 2), who considers it as a ‘democratic state whose regulatory ideals and democratic procedures are informed by ecological democracy rather than liberal democracy’. In her view, ecological democracy ensures environmental protection and environmental justice and incorporates them into the formal political and legal decision-making procedures of the state. Associating the green state of the global North with environmental justice is debatable because the poor and people of colour in that region have suffered from the injustices of environmental policies (Bullard 2018). This happens even though the greening process entrenches certain norms and rights. Christoff (2005) is of the view that ecological sustainability should take precedence over other functions of the state such as economic growth and welfare spending.
For others, the potential for the emergence of the green state emanates from the influence of an active environmental movement which can put pressure on states to incorporate environmental reforms (Dryzek et al. 2003). The implementation of technological green innovation is considered a driving force towards the greening of the state, which in turn allows it to create markets for scarce environmental goods and to set progressive environmental standards that will stimulate technological progress (Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002; Mol 2016). Other ideas of the green state accommodate a range of aspects of environmental governance. Johnson (2019) sees the greening of the state as building ‘green’ institutions of the state and the capacity required to achieve environmental objectives. This process leads to green governance, i.e. the use of green institutions to transform and strengthen the nation state, to deepen the democratic process, and to contribute to sustainable development (Johnson 2019). Duit, Feindt and Meadowcraft (2016, 5) conceptualise the green state in broad terms, namely one that integrates environmental goals and that consists of a ‘significant set of institutions and practices dedicated to the management of environmental and socio-environmental interactions’. These broad terms draw attention to the contexts under which the process of greening takes place in many regions of the world.
However, much of the work on the green state is based on countries in the global North and is preoccupied with the character of the state, the nature of state institutions, the types of state activities, and the nature and level of democracy as if these are universal. States that do not fit neatly into this normative view, especially African states, are excluded from the analyses of the green state even though they are actively involved in environmental reforms. Our view is that states in Africa pursue environmental goals as signatories of various environment-related conventions and treaties. They have also developed the institutions to manage their environment. Death (2016) makes a compelling argument that environmental and ecological imperatives have been central to the production of the state in Africa even though African states are weak and do badly in most indexes of environmental performance and governance. We support Death’s argument for two reasons. First, he shows that the environment is involved in the making of the African state through various territorial strategies such as protected areas, green militarisation, community-based natural resource management and peace parks. These strategies are an attempt to enforce and experiment with the greening of the state. Through these processes the state can include local communities into the green agenda and enlist international financial institutions and environmental NGOs in its conservation projects. Second, and more importantly, he draws attention to the process of greening, which is as important as the environmental performance of the state.
Botswana may not have facilitated the development of an effective ecological citizenship to qualify as a green state from the perspective of green state theorists, but successive governments in that country have demonstrated sustained efforts towards managing the environment, especially wildlife. These efforts were supported by policies and institutions that strengthened environmental reforms in Botswana. Unlike the green state of the global North, which is post-materialist, environmental governance in Africa must confront the sharp contradictions between socio-economic development and the protection of the environment. Consequently, environmental protection tends to limit access to natural resources by ordinary people. The discussion that follows shows the pace of greening in Botswana over time and the power relations embedded in that process.
The role of Botswana’s wildlife policy in the greening of the state
The development of Botswana’s wildlife policy provides an avenue through which we can understand ways in which domestic and external forces are involved in the production of the green state, and in shaping power relations and control of the wildlife economy. External influences on the country’s biodiversity conservation policies can be traced from the Fauna Conservation Act of 1961 – amended in 1979 – that was promulgated by the British colonial administration to regulate the unprecedented high levels of hunting and trading in wildlife and wildlife products by foreigners (Botswana National Archives & Record Services, hereafter BNARS 1987). Before the passage of this act, the London Convention of 1933 had already introduced the national park system in Africa (Spinage 1991; Kameri-Mbote and Cullet 1997) but this system emerged through the development of game reserves in Botswana.
To better understand the crucial role played by wildlife policy as a medium through which domestic and international actors interact, this section analyses some of the key features of the policy and the institutional arrangements that emerged or were sustained or broken under each presidency. Our starting point in the analysis of the wildlife economy under each presidency is that all four presidents represented the elite class of the country but used different tactics in their pursuit of the liberal capitalist economy. These tactics account for the differential impact of the wildlife economy on ordinary people and on the alliance between the state and business.
Seretse Khama’s presidency (1966–1980)
During the presidency of the founding father of the nation, Seretse Khama, the government was preoccupied with pressing developmental priorities such as infrastructure, education and health. As a cattle baron, Seretse Khama prioritised the development and marketing of beef and was not sentimental about wildlife protection (Interview, historian, 24 April 2018). Wildlife was perceived as a threat to the beef industry, especially because there was a lack of knowledge and expertise in the control of foot-and-mouth disease. There were however attempts to conserve the country’s wildlife through colonial and new protected areas. Botswana inherited several game reserves from the protectorate which were gazetted during the 1950s and 1960s. At independence, the Seretse Khama government promulgated the National Parks Act of 1967, which formed the basis for upgrading Chobe Game Reserve into the country’s first national park in 1967 (Spinage 1991). The Fauna Conservation Act and the National Parks Act were consolidated into the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992, which incorporated the provisions of the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, which Botswana ratified in 1978. New protected areas established under Seretse Khama include Mabuasehube Game Reserve (1971), Makgadikgadi Pans Game Reserve (1970), Khutse Game Reserve (1971) and Nxai National Park (1970) (MFDP 1978). The Moremi Game Reserve was extended to include the Chiefs Island, and the African Wildlife Foundation provided financial assistance for the development of national parks in the country.
It was under Seretse Khama that Botswana adopted the zebra as its national animal. The black and white stripes of the zebra reflected on the flag represent the harmony between people of different races and ethnicities (Interview, former government spokesperson/historian, 30 April 2018). Two zebras also adorn the Botswana coat of arms, which shows the animal as a symbol of national unity. It is understood that Seretse Khama’s quest for unity arose from his experience of how his marriage to Ruth Williams Khama divided Batswana people, and also how he became a victim of racial discrimination in neighbouring South Africa. The symbolism of the zebra was more a reflection of Khama’s political ideology of racial equality and peaceful co-existence of various cultural groups than a preoccupation with the protection of wildlife (Carter and Morgan 1980). However, the coat of arms signalled the initial stages at which the state paid attention to wildlife and began to bring wildlife into the national psyche.
A further step in the development of this psyche was spurred by concern over the overexploitation of wildlife by local people. The state recognised that the protection of the country’s wildlife resources could not be guaranteed by prosecutions and incomprehensible restrictions. A wildlife education unit was established in the Department of Wildlife and National Parks with the view of educating the nation on the importance of wildlife as an economically and aesthetically valuable national asset (MFDP 1978). The first government in postcolonial Botswana believed that teaching people the value and benefits of thriving populations of wildlife was an essential preventative measure (Ibid.). Hence, it initiated the education programme ‘Tshomarelo tikologo’ (environmental conservation) broadcast on national radio.
It would be naïve to ascribe wildlife conservation in early independence in Botswana to the Khama government alone. Independence opened the country to international actors who influenced environmental policies in Botswana. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization – with the assistance of, among others, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, De Beers and the Okavango Wildlife Society – conducted various scientific studies on environmental issues and recommended programmes that would arrest environmental degradation in the country (Botswana Society 1976). Subsequently, the Botswana Society convened several symposia, among others, the symposium on the sustained use of the Kalahari (1971); on the Okavango Delta and its future use (1976); and on drought (1978).1 These events were financially supported by institutions and organisations such as the British High Commission, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisations, the UNDP, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Embassy of the United States of America, De Beers, and the Okavango Wildlife Society (Botswana Society 1971, 1976, 1978).
The symposia resulted in a well-informed body of opinions and guided government policies. For instance, the 1971 symposium on the sustainable use of the Kalahari led to the formulation of the country’s tribal land-grazing programme and the Tribal Land Grazing Policy of 1975, which sought to reduce overgrazing through land zonation (Botswana Society 1976; GoB [Government of Botswana] 1975). The grazing policy categorised land into three zones, namely commercial farming areas, communal grazing areas and reserved areas (Ibid.). It further divided the reserved areas into two categories: (1) areas reserved for future use by those with only a few cattle; and (2) areas reserved for alternative uses such as wildlife, mining and cultivation (Ibid.). The reserved area category for alternative use paved the way for the establishment of wildlife management areas, which were endorsed by the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986. We discuss how this was developed under the presidency of Ketumile Masire in the next section.
For the moment, we pay attention to another important layer in the development of the country’s wildlife policy, namely the 1976 symposium on the Okavango Delta and its future use that focused on wildlife conservation and tourism. This symposium influenced the adoption of the country’s wildlife-based tourism that sought to maximise profits from a low number of tourists while protecting the natural resources on which tourism depends (Botswana Society 1976). We argue that the emergent wildlife-based tourism laid the foundation for the dominance of the private sector and individual entrepreneurs in the country’s wildlife economy, and for the development of the tourism policy of 1990 (GoB 1990). The policy was embraced by private investors involved in ecotourism (Johnston 1976). While the seed of a high-cost, low-density tourism model was sown during the presidency of Seretse Khama, subsequent governments embedded it as a key part of the wildlife economy. Before we dwell on this policy shift, we highlight the impact of the convergence of domestic and external interests on the transformation of the state in the early years of independence.
Environmental policies are crucial for state-making in that they often – though not always – transform the internal structure of the state. As with many other states, state agencies in Botswana are responsible for implementing green policies. The Department of Wildlife and National Parks was established in 1967 to give effect to the National Parks Act of 1967. The department was part of the civil service bureaucracy that Botswana inherited from the British administration. Its main objective was to provide effective leadership and coordination of all matters concerning wildlife and national parks in Botswana.
At independence, Botswana did not have a dedicated environmental conservation ministry (Interview, Minister of Environment, Natural Resource Conservation and Tourism, 24 April 2018). As such, environmental conservation was administered under the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Investment in recognition that wildlife resources and tourism are inextricably linked, and that wildlife was an asset to be utilised towards economic development (Interview, senior official in the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, 18 July 2018). It was estimated that wildlife hunting contributed US$2.4 million, or 5.2% of gross national product, in 1968 (Child 2003). In 1976, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks was merged with the Tourism Department to strengthen the wildlife-based tourism industry (Interview, senior official in the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, 18 July 2018). Subsequently, the department was renamed the Department of Wildlife, National Parks and Tourism. These developments during Seretse Khama’s presidency illustrate the initial steps taken by the state to insert the environment into the national agenda of the state. Other presidents built on this foundation, as we shall see below.
Environmental policies during the presidency of Ketumile Masire (1980–1998)
The leadership of Botswana’s second president, Ketumile Masire, coincided with two major catalysts of environmental policies, namely severe drought in the region and the hegemonic global environmental discourse of sustainable development. In its attempt to coordinate conservation efforts, the government of Botswana invited the United Nations Environment Programme to conduct a Clearing House mission in 1983 (BNARS 1990).2 The mission recommended the development of a national conservation strategy, which the government accepted. It initiated the national conservation strategy built around overgrazing, pollution, and depletion of veld and wildlife products. This strategy was developed with the financial and technical assistance of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Norwegian Agency for International Development, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the European Commission, USAID and the UNDP (Ibid.).
Following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment of 1972 and the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, Masire’s government adopted four strategies towards sustainable development in Botswana. These were the licence to hunt, the implementation of a wildlife policy underpinned by sustainable development, the implementation of a community-based natural resource management programme, and the consolidation of an ecotourism model that seeks to maximise profit with a low number of high paying tourists. In order to involve citizens in prudent wildlife utilisation, the Masire government implemented the ‘Special Game License’ in wildlife management and conservation under the 1979 unified hunting regulations (BNARS 1991). This licence was issued to persons whose livelihoods depended on hunting and on gathering veld produce, particularly those living in remote areas. The government held the view that the sustainable utilisation of wildlife would improve the welfare of rural households as a source of food in the form of animal protein, and as a source of income through sales of trophies and curios (Ibid.).
To realise the economic benefits of wildlife, a wildlife conservation policy was formulated in 1986 to encourage the development of a sustainable commercial wildlife industry. The policy underlined the importance of wildlife to economic development, and it called for the participation of citizens in wildlife-based tourism (GoB 1986; BNARS 1988). It also set the tone for landscape conservation through the establishment of wildlife management areas whose primary focus is wildlife use and activities compatible with wildlife protection. As noted earlier, establishment of wildlife management areas was facilitated by the grazing policy on tribal land (Ibid.). The wildlife conservation policy converted stretches of land designated as reserved under the grazing policy, with the wildlife management areas (WMAs) forming a buffer between protected areas and agricultural areas. They also serve as migratory corridors to allow for the movement of wildlife. The WMAs were further subdivided into controlled hunting areas which serve as the major land units utilised for community-based natural resource management projects. In post-independence Botswana, WMAs cover approximately 22% (116,000 km2) of the country's land (GoB 2013).
Of significance to the theme of this paper is that WMAs form the basis for the devolution of wildlife management to landowners and local communities to instil greater accountability of the resource (Ibid.). The devolution of state power over wildlife is important in the making of the state because it implies the sharing of power between the state and the citizens, it demonstrates that the state cherishes democratic values, and it shows a good face of the state to the public even though this characterisation of the state has been questioned (Poteete and Ribot 2011; Hoon 2014; Ramutsindela and Büscher 2019). Devolution further allows for compliance with multilateral agreements, international protocols and conventions related to the wildlife sector. For example, in the 1980s the wildlife sector promoted a people-centred approach in the form of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). This approach decentralises governance while also recognising formal and informal rules in resource management. The shift towards CBNRM occurred mainly in the global South and the initiative was driven by powerful foundations, development agencies, conservation NGOs and multilateral organisations in the global North (Rihoy and Maguranyanga 2010). The CBNRM is a key aspect of the greening process because it appreciates local communities as important agents in facilitating the implementation of the green agenda at the local level.
The CBNRM was introduced in Botswana in 1989 as part of the Southern African Development Community natural resource management programme (BNARS 1992). In Botswana this programme was jointly funded by the government of Botswana and USAID (BNARS 1992; USAID 1996). The Botswana government contributed approximately US$5.5 million, while USAID contributed US$19.9 million, for a period of eight years (1989–1997) (Ibid.). A pilot project of the CBNRM was initiated in the Chobe Enclave in the northern conservation zone of the country (Thakadu 2005). From this initiative, a community-based organisation (CBO) was established in 1993 with the registration of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (Ibid.). By 2006, there were 91 CBOs involved in CBNRM in Botswana (Schuster 2007). The establishment of CBOs in Botswana sent two powerful messages to the donor community: (a) the government of Botswana has given local communities power over their resources; and (b) local communities benefit from the wildlife economy. This messaging masked unequal power relations and the negative experiences of local communities, as we shall see below.
Masire’s government aligned Botswana’s model of ecotourism with the global sustainable development frame of the 1980s. Under his government, international support for the management of natural resources by communities grew in the country, and wildlife conservation became central to environmental management in Botswana. It is our view that this focus on wildlife conservation and the policy articulation that supported it enhanced the greening of Botswana. Masire’s successor, Festus Mogae, further established Botswana’s tourism model but also paid greater attention to the internal restructuring of the state that was necessary for the greening of the state.
State restructuring for greening Botswana: the presidency of Festus Mogae (1998–2008)
Leaders of nation states are crucial for the greening of the state in that they articulate the green agenda, and have the authority to pursue such an agenda through the organs of the state (Johnson 2019). Festus Mogae’s presidency was characterised by the internal restructuring of the state in pursuit of a green economy founded on the ecotourism model we noted above. The restructuring was guided by economic perspectives for which President Mogae was well qualified. He embraced the neoliberalisation of conservation by linking conservation with business. At the ‘Conservation is good business’ symposium held in Washington, DC in 2013, Festus Mogae said:
in our land use policy, we have made conservation a priority. These policies have ensured that the utilization of wildlife resources is sustainable. There is no doubt in my mind that conservation is good business. (cited in African Wildlife Foundation 2003)
In practice, this meant the commercialisation of safari hunting took precedence over the licensing of hunting for livelihood, the introduction of a communal quota system, and the establishment of joint venture partnerships between community trusts and private hunting/photographic companies. The community trusts would sublet the resource use rights (the quota) to a private company at a fee. The expectations of joint venture partnerships are that they enable better wildlife management and bring benefits to rural households. It was during Mogae’s presidency that the tourism sector became the second highest contributor to the country’s GDP, contributing 7% to it (Gaolathe 2007). Mogae’s government also oversaw the first step in Botswana’s involvement in the establishment of southern African peace parks: large conservation areas straddling the borders of two or more countries with the aim of re-establishing or protecting the integrity of ecological systems, promoting peaceful co-existence among neighbouring nations, and providing an avenue for local economic development through ecotourism (Ramutsindela 2007). Peace parks are a neoliberal project underpinned by a business model that treats habitats and wildlife as assets for the maximisation of profits (Ramutsindela 2017).
Since economic growth and development are state driven in Botswana, the country required the establishment of strong and dedicated environmental institutions of government. This was necessary because the management of the environment was the responsibility of several departments in different ministries. For instance, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks fell under the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Investment, the Department of Environmental Affairs was housed under the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing and Forestry, and Range Resources came under the Ministry of Agriculture (Interview, senior official in Ministry of Environment, Natural Resource Conservation and Tourism, 11 July 2018). This fragmentation was resolved through the establishment of the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resource Conservation and Tourism in 2002 (Interview, Minister of Environment, Natural Resource Conservation and Tourism, 24 April 2018). The Minister of Environment noted that:
Every act depends on the environment; hence the environment comes first. When you have a healthy environment, you will have a healthy biodiversity and tourism will be sustainable. Environmental sustainability is inevitable – the sustainability of wildlife and tourism depends on a healthy environment, hence the name of the ministry. (Interview, 24 April 2018)
The Ministry of Environment, Natural Resource Conservation and Tourism is composed of the following core departments: Wildlife and National Parks, Environmental Affairs, Tourism, Meteorological Services, Forestry and Range Resources, Waste Management and Pollution, and National Museum and Monuments, as well as a quasi-governmental entity responsible for marketing the country’s tourism product, the Botswana Tourism Organisation.
President Mogae’s tactics towards local communities were marred by his government’s handling of the ‘Bushman problem’, i.e. the state’s shorthand for the poor living conditions and dependencies of the ‘Bushmen’ that needed to be addressed to suit the state’s plans to control the marginalised Basarwa (Bushmen) minority ethnic group and the natural resources in central Kalahari (Sapignoli 2018). The state’s plan to relocate Basarwa from their ancestral lands in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve between 1998 and 2005 was more than a strategy to resolve the incompatible co-existence between people and wildlife and to protect wildlife. Rather, it reveals the state’s denial of the identity and legal status of Basarwa as indigenous, and its opposition to ‘the framing [of] their rights in terms of their distinct contributions to humanity, … the embodiment of hunting peoples’ ethics of egalitarianism, social intimacy, and ecological wisdom in a time of global crisis’ (Ibid., 3). We recall the state action against Basarwa in the reserve and the international campaign that ensued as evidence of the harmful effects of the greening of the state under conditions of reliance on natural resources by ordinary people. These dynamics became more visible under Ian Khama’s presidency, as we shall see in the next discussion.
The ‘pre-eminent environmentalist’: Ian Khama’s presidency (2008–2018)
Ian Khama’s presidency was characterised by the centralisation of power, which was also reflected in the governance of wildlife. Good (2010, 318) has argued that Khama’s leadership style was relatively confined ‘to three areas alone: the military, chieftaincy and dynastic politics and state power, briefly at the highest level’. For our purpose in this paper, we focus on how Khama’s presidency deepened the greening of Botswana but also entrenched state authority over wildlife. We also draw attention to the consequent power relations between the state and its citizens.
Ian Khama has been described as an authoritarian leader who made decisions on his own and who was intolerant of criticism (Interview, political scientist, 27 April 2018). It is claimed that he ruled by edicts or directives and made decisions by caprice (Good 2010). He militarised the state by appointing former army generals to senior positions in state institutions. Prior to his time in the realm of civilian politics, Khama – as the commander of the Botswana Defence Force – brought the military to the service of wildlife conservation, especially to stem the tide of poaching in Botswana. For example, he brought in the secretive commando squadron of the defence force to undertake an anti-poaching mission in 1987 (Henk 2007). In 1989, anti-poaching was extended to the rest of the defence force. During his time as president of the country, Khama vowed to continue using security agencies to protect wildlife as a national priority.
Khama strengthened anti-poaching efforts by deploying other law enforcement agencies. The protection of wildlife was placed under a wide range of security agencies including the defence force, the Anti-Poaching Unit in the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, the Directorate of Intelligence Security Service, Botswana Police Service, and Botswana Prisons Service (Interview, President Ian Khama, 4 March 2019). The Anti-Poaching Unit was staffed, trained and armed with military-grade weapons. The Unit was brought in to protect and ensure the safety of rhinoceros in the Okavango Delta (Ibid.). Hence, a specialised paramilitary protection and intelligence gathering unit, the Elite Rhino Squad, was set up in 2014 within the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. Major General Otisitswe Tiroyamodimo was appointed to lead the wildlife department. As a rule of engagement in the protection of wildlife, the security agencies employed the unwritten, controversial ‘shoot to kill’ policy.
President Ian Khama’s militarisation of conservation and his general interest in wildlife profiled the green image of the state on international platforms while also deepening state legitimacy. This profile is evidenced by the green-related awards he received from environmentally minded organisations and institutions. These awards include the Africa Conservation Award from the Safari Club of Washington (1991), the Paul Harris Fellow and Endangered Wildlife Statesman Award (2001); international conservation caucus Teddy Roosevelt International Conservation Award (2011), the 2014 Rhino Conservation Award for best political and judicial support, and the Global Citizen Award from the University of Wisconsin (2017). He is currently serving as a distinguished fellow of Conservation International.
If Mogae’s presidency achieved major internal restructuring of the state to drive the green agenda, Ian Khama’s presidency was characterised by a significant shift from sustainable utilisation to a preservationist approach to wildlife conservation policy. Khama used his state of the nation address in November 2013 to announce an indefinite suspension on hunting in all controlled hunting areas save for private land, with effect from January 2014 (BNARS 2013). The official justification for the decision to impose a moratorium on hunting was to arrest the decline in wildlife populations. The government also argued that the shooting of wild game purely for sport and trophies is incompatible with the national commitment to conserve and preserve local fauna and the long-term growth of the local tourism industry (MEWT 2013).
The presidential decisions to establish the National Environmental Fund in 2010, the Tourism Land Bank in 2014, and the hunting ban of 2014 shifted power in the wildlife economy in three main ways. First, they recentralised state power over wildlife. For example, as a financing mechanism, the National Environment Fund centralised 65% of resource royalties from community trusts so they could be distributed nationally for green-related projects. Since its establishment, the fund has provided support to a total of 37 projects to the value of just under US$2.9 million (GoB 2018). For its part the Tourism Land Bank that was created with the support of tour operators brought 44 concession areas – prime tourism sites – under the control of central government through the Botswana Tourism Organisation. This marginalised land boards as decentralised institutions responsible for the administration and allocation of land and concession areas on tribal land. The government argued that this process would attract foreign direct investment through the maintenance of an adequate and constant supply of land for tourism activities (Interview, President Ian Khama, 4 March 2019).
Our view is that the Tourism Land Bank served as the second mechanism by which power over the wildlife economy shifted. It resulted in local communities losing the rights to negotiate with investors of their choice, forcing them to accept whichever investor the Botswana Tourism Organisation chose for them (Interview, member of Khwai Trust Executive, 21 May 2018). This organisation opened avenues for land accumulation by billionaires and multinational companies that already dominate the country’s tourism industry. In March 2018, media reports claimed that the environmental ministry had a desire to allocate a prime concession area in the Okavango Delta to British billionaire Sir Richard Branson, just a month after his courtesy visit to President Khama (Botswana Gazette 2018).
Lastly, the hunting ban shifted power over the wildlife economy by converting hunting zones (mostly utilised by local communities) into photographic areas, thereby empowering multinational photographic companies in the wildlife tourism sector. Mbaiwa and Hambira (2020) note that some of these multinational companies were given long-term leases spanning between 30 and 50 years, despite the land management regulations that recommend companies be given shorter leases of 15 years. This long-term lease arrangement makes it difficult for citizen companies and CBOs to operate in prime tourism areas. Due to the dominance of foreign investors in the industry, it is estimated that Botswana loses approximately 71% of revenues through tourism leakages as money is transferred back to countries where these companies originate (Ibid.).
Critics see the ban on hunting as Khama’s strategy to safeguard his interests in the non-consumptive tourism business to which he is highly connected (LaRocco 2016; Interview, trophy hunting safari operator, 11 May 2018). Local media reports claim that Ian Khama made the decision to ban hunting at the instigation of Wilderness Safaris and National Geographic film-maker Dereck Joubert, with whom he shares business interests (Sunday Standard 2017). Ian Khama is a shareholder in Wilderness Safaris, Botswana’s leading ecotourism operator, and a very close acquaintance of Dereck Joubert.3 President Khama awarded both Wilderness Safaris and Dereck Joubert the Presidential Order of Meritorious Service in 2015 for their role in wildlife conservation in Botswana, and he maintained a tight control over the environmental ministry by appointing his younger brother, Tshekedi Khama, as the minister. A trophy hunting safari operator (Interview, 11 May 2018) commented that they had privileged access to political power and that they were able to influence him, but we could not verify this. The tourism industry is controlled by a small, white and foreign elite, but alliances are growing between this group and the Tswana elite.
The presidency of Mokgweetsi Masisi (2018–): early indications
The pact between Khama and the photographic companies forged through the ban on hunting was short-lived. Khama’s successor, President Mokgweetsi Masisi, used the constitutionally sanctioned concentration of power in the presidency to disarm the Anti-Poaching Unit in May 2018 and to lift the ban on hunting in 2019. Under Masisi, parliament passed the motion in June 2018 to consider the lifting of the ban on hunting and shooting of elephants in wildlife management areas. Subsequently, a cabinet subcommittee established in April 2019 recommended the lifting of the ban, giving primacy to human–wildlife conflict. This apparently pro-poor stance of Masisi was harshly criticised by the photographic industry and the conservation lobby who threatened to call for a boycott of the country’s tourism. In his Facebook and Twitter accounts, Joubert considered the lifting of the ban to be ‘Botswana’s blood law’, meaning that it would result in high levels of wildlife poaching. While President Masisi’s role in the greening of Botswana is still to be assessed, his few months in office at the time of this research and analysis reveal that he aims to position his wildlife policy in opposition to some of the directions that Khama had taken. Given the significant contribution of tourism to Botswana’s economy, it is very unlikely that Masisi would fundamentally reverse the greening of the country. Shortly after lifting the ban, Masisi assured his country and the world that hunting would be done in an extremely limited and tightly controlled fashion.
Conclusion
In this paper, we traced the evolution of environmental policy in Botswana from the presidency of Seretse Khama through to his son Ian Khama to advance three related arguments. First, Botswana might not fit perfectly into the category of green state espoused by ecological modernisation theorists, but the country’s efforts towards the conservation of wildlife translate into the greening of the state. The normative view that informs much discussion on the green state limits the space for exploring many and varied environmental actions carried out by states like Botswana and many others in the global South. This paper has shown that the greening of the state was enabled by the collaboration between authorities in Botswana and international agencies and actors who financed environment-related programmes and also facilitated the development of green institutions. Moreover, this collaboration shaped the environmental agenda of the country.
Second, we argue that political leaders play a crucial role in the greening of the state. The tactics of each leader influence the pace of greening. In Botswana, the four presidencies paid attention to environmental protection and variously contributed to the development of environmental policies and strategies. The presidency of Ian Khama stands out as the peak of the greening of Botswana between 1966 and 2018 because it realigned the wildlife economy with political power.
Third, the greening process is characterised by and also results in power imbalances that skew the wildlife economy in favour of foreign multinational companies and the Tswana elite. Institutional restructuring required to facilitate the greening of Botswana and shifts in wildlife policy have weakened the participation of local citizen companies and CBOs in prime tourism areas. This has in turn entrenched the domination of the wildlife economy by foreign-owned companies with the backing of the state and local elites.