Introduction
There is no doubt that global agriculture is facing a problem of generational succession (White 2015). The challenge is how to make land more accessible to young and energetic people given the resulting struggles between the older and younger generations over resource use and allocation, these tensions spanning intra- and inter-household levels (Bryceson 2002; White 2012, 13). Zimbabwe youth (those aged between 18 and 35 years) face the challenge of accessing land despite the fact that Zimbabwe implemented land reform recently, from the year 2000 to 2005.
Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in the year 2000 and evidence on the beneficiaries shows minimal allocation of land to young people and women (Moyo 2003; Scoones 2015a). The official pace of implementation slowed down around the year 2010 because most of the white-owned farms were already expropriated and allocated to the landless peasants. In recent times there is a surge in demand for land, particularly by the youth. The multifaceted and even contradictory youth struggles for land globally are well noted by White (2012).
The struggle for land by the youth is more entrenched in Africa because the youth population continues to grow. It is pointed out that for example from the year 2010 to 2020 the youth population will increase by 42.5 million (Proctor and Lucchesi 2012, 7). In Zimbabwe, the failing economy has resulted in massive urban unemployment making rural to urban migration less lucrative. The youth demand land from the government, particularly the ZANU–PF leadership. After the FTLRP ‘there is strong discontent from farmworkers, youth, the disabled and women who were all largely excluded’ from the land reform (Matondi 2012, 77). The land reform was highly polarised and was a struggle between various groups: for example, ruling party and opposition, youth and elders (Matondi 2012, 90). However, there was an alliance between youth and war veterans (Ibid., 91). Overall there is agreement that the youth had the smallest land allocation (Moyo 2003; Matondi 2012, 266). Scoones (cited in Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992) argues that the youth struggle not only for land but also over key ecological resources such as vlei (dambos, or shallow wetland areas).1 These land struggles are largely blamed on African states’ failure to handle their land and development paths and elitist post-independence reconciliation schemes (Moyo 2007; Simura and Mudimu 2019).
Background
In Zimbabwe the youth constitute the largest and key demographic group, at 60% of the population (ZimStat 2012). The youth’s failure to access and control land has propelled them into the ‘demographic domain of poverty’ (Njeru and Gichimu 2014, 2). At the same time, agriculture remains the key source of employment in the developing world (Proctor and Lucchesi 2012). In Zimbabwe, some studies indicate that a large number of youth accessed land, that the highest number of beneficiaries were between the ages of 25 and 40 (Chaumba cited in Boone and Kriger 2010). This, therefore, supports the fact that some of the youth currently struggling for land were not eligible for land ownership in 2000 as the FTLRP allocated land to persons aged 18 years and above. However, other studies indicate that youth did not receive much land because of limited social and political influence (Moyo 2004, 24). Nonetheless, today’s stark reality is that youth in post-land reform Zimbabwe are engaged in struggles for land access, ownership and control. The land alienation includes women, migrants and commoners (Lund 2011, 16). The alienation of youth from land in Zimbabwe is across the rural–urban divide. The government, in undermining women and youth access to land, puts across the narrative of land scarcity (Federici 2011). Interestingly, when other parties seek land this scarcity narrative is not employed: in July 2019, war veterans were provided with 15,000 hectares of land in Zimbabwe.
In Zimbabwe, land remains a contested issue because it is a source of wealth, employment, food security and speculative value in urban areas, and it provides access to credit, political and social capital for various groups including the state (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2001). It also provides access to other resources such as wildlife and water (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). The FTLRP was redistributive as the majority of the beneficiaries were ordinary people (James 2014). However, despite this, some people acquired oversized farms in districts such as Mazowe, about 10% of A2 farms fell into the hands of elites, there was discrimination on an ethno-regional basis, there were difficulties in ascertaining actual farm sizes for A2 models and there was multiple farm ownership (Moyo et al. 2009, 15; Moyo 2011; Matondi 2012, 77; Scoones 2015b). The occupation of multiple farms is falsely justified by allegations of poor soil quality on some allocated farms (Moyo 2011). It is against such a backdrop that the ‘youth’ land question arises and remains a contested issue in post-land reform Zimbabwe. The disenfranchisement of youth in Zimbabwe is shown by studies reporting that the 1980s land reform beneficiaries were aged between 22 and 55 years, while in the FTLRP some farms had the youngest farm beneficiary who was 34 years (Chiweshe 2011, 158; Zamchiya 2011). Despite these marginalisation tendencies ‘youth were a major force in the land occupations’ and had some farms specifically allocated to them (Chiweshe 2011, 148; Matondi 2012, 76).
To gain a deeper understanding of the politics surrounding youth struggles for land, this article focuses on the political economic structure in which the youth, state and agrarian capital function (Moyo 2003), at the same time paying attention to the pace and direction of struggles for land (Borras and Franco 2005). To this end we examine the political-economic dynamics underpinning youth struggles for land and how the struggles unfolded; the role of the state in the youth land question; and the meaning of the current politico-economic conjuncture to the youth’s struggles for land. A study of these struggles is timely given that most previous studies focus on women and the whole population in general without paying specific attention to the youth (Moyo 2003, 2004, 2007, 2011; Moyo and Yeros 2007; Scoones et al. 2011, 2012, 2018; Marongwe 2011; Mutopo 2011; Matondi 2012; Bhatasara and Chiweshe 2017).
Setting the context: debating youth, land access and land politics
There seems to be no comprehensive definition of youth. However, theories of youth approach the study of young people in many interesting and useful ways: youth as action, youth as (sub)cultural practices, youth as identity, youth as generation (Jones 2009; cited in White 2012, 10).
Furthermore, youth is ‘constructed’ (White 2012, 9) and depends on the cultural, social, political and economic meanings society imagines. Although the youth are a key demographic group and a source of human capital, if not empowered with access and control of resources, they become a ‘double-edged sword’ (Munthali quoted in Chinsinga and Chasukwa 2012, 70). Evidence abounds how disempowered youths can revolt against governments; the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 stand as an example. In the Zimbabwean context, youth is viewed as troublesome, less progressive, wasteful and belonging to an undefined future. This view buttresses arguments that the traditional role of youth is helping out in the family farms and not functioning as farmers in their own right (Min-Harris 2009). The widely recognised definition of youth in Africa is people between the ages of 15 and 35 (African Union 2006). It is this demographic group on which this study focuses. We consider this group as a class, that is, as a relationship to another/other classes (Sargeson 2016). The youth, particularly the unemployed youth, played an active role in the FTLRP, albeit with some used by elites to carry out land occupations (Moyo et al. 2009, 44). Thus, not all of the youth exercised their agency to their benefit. The heterogeneity of youth is also pronounced, with some youth opining that the FTLRP destroyed the local economy (Chipenda 2018). Yet some youths are successful farmers in their own right (Matondi 2012, 241). Thus, youth’s varying positions with regards to land also shape their motivations for seeking land, as we shall see here.
There are various ways through which the youth can access land. De Janvry and Sadoulet (2001, 2) clearly capture some of the key ones as: land-transfers, community membership, direct appropriation, market transactions (formal and informal) and policy interventions (de-collectivisation and land reform). In communal lands, intra-family transfers inter vivo, for example son’s marriage and post-mortem, are more dominant. For women, in most cases they gain land rights through marriage (Cotula cited in Njeru and Gichimu 2014; Mutopo 2011). As for post-mortem transfers, they are slowly becoming unattractive to the youth as the latter become more impatient for an adult to die (Matondi 2012, 127). Furthermore, increases in life expectancy mean that youth have to wait for a longer period to access land (Cotula, cited in Njeru and Gichimu 2014). In addition, more demographic pressure has led to a reduction of the land size to be inherited (Njeru and Gichimu 2014). Moreover, the intergenerational land transfer is not so precise because often land is sold off, leading to intergenerational dispossession (White 2012).
As for the intra-family transfer methods, these are less reliable for they are affected by patriarchy and may lead to the exclusion of orphans and illegitimate children (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2001, 3). Customary and inheritance laws configure how youth work in family farms but with no control over the land (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Other studies have also shown that youth access land through sharecropping (Mungo’ngo’ cited in Bryceson 2002). In the case of accessing land through the market, some young people finance their land purchases from non-agriculture activities such as formal employment (Bryceson 2002). However, most youth in the rural areas might remain landless, as they are unable to access finance. A study in Ghana by Kidido, Bugri, and Kasanga (2017) revealed that both young women and men faced challenges in accessing land under rental and contractual agreements. At the same time, informal land access has become more prevalent (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). However, access through informal land markets discriminates against those such as the youth, who do not have the resources to pay for the land (Ibid.). The rise in informal occupations and informal land markets also signifies a surge in demand for land among various actors including the youth.
Some of the youth in Zimbabwe are unwilling to participate in farming as they view it as difficult (‘marwadzo’) and a symbol of backwardness (Rye 2006; Matondi 2012, 229). In some cases, youth landlessness is blamed both on their non-participation and on poor recognition of them in policy making (Smith et al. 2002). Paradoxically, land is a finite resource. In the countryside land is allocated to the youth via the village land allocation system (Greco 2016). This form of land access is usually through adult males (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006) and is hinged on patriarchy. In the post-land reform Zimbabwe women and youth have often accessed land through the use of social networks and political party affiliation (Mutopo 2011; Zamchiya 2011). On the other hand, it is also argued that the biggest challenge confronting youth access to land is capitalist agriculture that gives rise to more demand for flex crops that require huge land holdings (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2001, 1; White 2015; Borras et al. 2016).
In the countryside village authorities have political and administrative functions (Greco 2016). Thus village heads play the gate-keeping role and village estate agent (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). Although, in the fast-track land reform areas the role of village estate agent is not legally recognised, for the land allocation mandate falls on the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands and Rural Resettlement (MALRR) and the Zimbabwe Land Commission (ZLC), the village heads still influence the land allocations, as illustrated through the ward case study discussed in this article. The influence of traditional leaders is also demonstrated by the fact they facilitate(d) land access for some land beneficiaries (Moyo, Rutherford, and Amanor-Wilks 2000). As for the political landscape, the post-land reform areas are a contested arena, with studies indicating that how and to whom the land is allocated has strong implications for electoral politics (Scoones 2015b). Thus, political allegiance to some extent determined land access; in some cases about 3% of youth who were regarded as the ‘vanguard of the party’ accessed land through patronage (Chiweshe 2011, 118). The youth and women are regarded as vital cogs in political mobilisation in electoral politics (Makunike 2014), hence there is a strong inclination by the ruling party to ‘influence land allocations’ in favour of these key political constituencies (Marongwe 2011). Consequently, people change political identities to suit the political situation and gain access to land (Mkodzongi 2012; James 2014).
Methodological reflections
To address the research questions we present three case studies. Data for the first, that is, the youth struggles for land at the ward level, were collected from in-depth interviews with landless youth, government officials from the MALRR and the ruling party ZANU–PF. Opposition parties that we approached told us they were not involved in the land reform and did not have any information with regards to the FTLRP. In addition, participant observations were also employed as the researchers joined the youth on the day the land allocations were done and conducted multiple visits to the selected ward. The second case study is the district-level study; data for this case were obtained through interviews with the youth that took part in the campaigns for land, key informant interviews and participant observations. The researchers managed to join the youth as they demonstrated for the land. Informal interviews were also conducted with war veterans, who are key actors in Zimbabwe’s land politics. The third case represents the national case. Data for this case were obtained through secondary sources such as various media reports, live videos from the national broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, and also through primary methods such as key informant interviews with officials from the MALRR, and we also attended some of the party rallies at which the youth amplified their demands for land. Additionally, in-depth interviews were also conducted with the youth who were part of the ZANU–PF youth league, as the demands for land in Zimbabwe were mainly channelled through ruling party structures. We gathered the data from December 2012 to September 2018.
Our use of three cases is aimed at greater illumination of how the youth struggle for land is variegated. The district- and ward-level data are based on the case of Marondera District; the district is one of the places where the landless and land-short peasants carried out the first land occupations in 1998. These land occupations triggered the FTLRP. Although the national case study is not geographically fixed as the youth engaged the authorities in different locations, the same actors were involved and they were using their positions as representatives of the youth at the national level, albeit within the ruling party.
The ward-level struggles: Riverside Farm, Ward 23 and Marondera East
Marondera is a farming district located 74 kilometres northeast of the capital, Harare. It is the provincial capital of Mashonaland East Province. Riverside Farm is located 20 kilometres from Marondera Metropolis. There is unequal land ownership and tensions in Marondera District as indicated by the Presidential Land Audit report (Utete 2003). The tensions emerge from some of the unresolved issues of the FTLRP. Some of these issues as highlighted in the report are first, that Marondera District Lands Committee members allocated themselves more than one plot. Second, politicians and war veterans got larger plots in the A1 and A2 models. Third, there were 35,000 people on the waiting list. Fourth, desk allocation resulted in unviable plot sizes. Fifth, the Committee was dominated by seven war veterans. Finally, former farmworkers were in conflict with A1 farmers amid allegations of theft and other criminal activities and property vandalism by the former farmworkers.
The majority of the youth in this area are landless and live with their parents. Some are waged farmworkers. Confronted with this situation, in March 2013 the youth in Ward 23 intensified their struggle for land. They wrote a letter to the governor through the village head. Under pressure to deliver something for the youth, the then provincial governor Aeneas Chigwedere, accompanied by members of the ZANU–PF youth league, military generals, officials from the ministries of lands, of agriculture and of youth visited Riverside Farm. The youth in this locality had become restless about their landlessness.
Prior to the FTLRP, Riverside Farm was part of Homepark Estate, which is owned by a large-scale commercial farmer (LSCF). The Estate was made up of seven farms that included Riverside, Waterhead, Springvalley and Homepark. During the FTLRP, Homepark Estate was downsized and Riverside, Springvale and Waterhead were allocated to landless indigenous people, and Homepark Farm was further downsized and shared between the LSCF and the peasants (it was reduced in size from 1200 hectares to 300 hectares). The LSCF was allocated 300 hectares and cultivates various cash crops (tobacco, peas, wheat, peaches). Riverside Farm is in Ward 23 and the land issue in this location is mired in racial tensions.2 On Riverside Farm, there is a piece of land of unknown ownership: sometimes it is recognised as state land but the LSCF cultivates tobacco and potatoes on this area and claims ownership. The disputed area involves counterclaims and demonstrates the importance of boundary politics in resettled areas (Lund 2011, 5).
The disputed area measures approximately 25 hectares of fertile red soil and is 50 metres from a dam. It is very flat, making it suitable for crops, and is 3.2 kilometres from the Harare–Mutare highway. In 2013, the village head indicated to the governor that the disputed land belonged to the peasants. Prior to this, the LSCF had continuously cultivated crops up to 2009 and then left this land fallow. The governor said that this land was to be allocated to the youth who were resident in Ward 23 and it was to be used strictly for irrigation projects and not for settlement. As such, it was to be given only to youths from the surrounding farms. The LSCF did not protest or attend but ‘released’3 some of its workers who fell within the youth demographic group.
As for local peasants, they invited some of their children who are resident in urban areas to join other youths who were making the land demands. In most resettled areas a majority of households straddle subsistence farming and informal urban jobs, indicating the precarity of livelihoods (Moyo 2003; Mkodzongi 2012). The actions of the older peasants of fighting for their youth offer an interesting dimension particularly if one considers arguments by White (2012) that intergenerational land transfer is problematic. In this case, the actions of the older land reform beneficiaries to strive to have their children acquire land in the first instance confirms White’s argument, yet at the same time it also demonstrates that in situations where older generations are not ready to release land to the youth, they are prepared to seek alternative forms of land access for the youth.
To ensure fairness and accountability the governor conducted a random draw. Numbers were put in a hat and the youths were supposed to randomly pick a number between 1 and 38. There were nearly 100 youths on this occasion and there were more male than female youths. About 38 blocks measuring an acre (i.e. 0.4 hectare) were to be allocated. The method the governor used is not how land should be allocated in A1 schemes but shows how much discretion government officials have in land allocations, and that in the process these discretion powers may be open to abuse (Cotula 2011, 18).
The provincial governor was forced to allocate land to the son of a war veteran despite the fact that he had missed out on the draw. The minister also removed the name of one youth who had won in the draw. To a broader extent, this indicates that war veterans still influence Zimbabwe’s rural politics and, by and large, national politics too. In rural Marondera and rural Zimbabwe in general, there is the dominance of war veterans, ZANU–PF officials and party youth in various societal structures such as village committees (Mujere 2011). This dominance is used by party youth to invoke a sense of ‘belonging’ to the land and to disenfranchise non-party members, labelled as outsiders and likely to return the land back to white farmers.
Historically, land provision in Zimbabwe has been associated with patronage. The ruling party ZANU–PF used land rights to prop up its hegemonic project in the early 1980s and during the FTLRP (Boone and Kriger 2010; Zamchiya 2011). The FTLRP beneficiaries had belonged to different parties (Matondi 2012, 78); however, after resettling on the allocated land, peasants in Riverside Farm all joined the ruling party to defend their land rights. This was a tactical move described as ‘performing ZANU–PF’ (Mkodzongi 2012), particularly given that in this locality the opposition also received electoral support.
Some of the youthful farmworkers from the LSCF who joined the gathering and the draw were eager to embark on independent horticulture on the contested piece of land and keen to co-exist with the land reform beneficiaries. Other farmworkers felt that they had missed out when the FTLRP was implemented, while at the same time resettled farmers treated them with animosity. One study notes that the ‘destitution of some ex-farmworkers remains a key concern’ (Moyo 2004, 37) for both the farmworkers and policy makers. The resolution to seek land was born out of the realisation that the ruling party wanted their vote and it was also an opportunity for them to correct their previous alienation. In the Riverside Farm context, Zimbabwe was having elections in July 2013 so the time was ripe for the youth to demand land from the leadership that badly wanted their vote.
There was animosity between the farmworkers and the youth from the resettled farms. The hatred and division between the farmworkers and the resettled peasants was shown by the way they sat in two different groups. According to local Shona culture this displays differences and animosity between community members. This animosity has origins before and during the FTLRP’s implementation in this area (Moyo, Rutherford, and Amanor-Wilks 2000) and feeds into the ‘occupier-landowner-farm worker-conflicts’ (Moyo 2004, 20; Utete 2003) The clashes between farmworkers and land reform beneficiaries typify the intra-poor political conflict (Borras, Franco, and Wang 2013) and provide opportunities for the political leadership to demobilise them. In this case the youth are differentiated between farmworkers and non-farmworkers, yet they are all landless youth.
During the implementation of the FTLRP the LSCF had mobilised its farmworkers to repel the indigenous people when they occupied Homepark Estates and as the land occupations triumphed, land reform beneficiaries started to view farmworkers as agents of former white landowners and against indigenous autarky. As a result, to a larger extent up to now there is ill-treatment of former farmworkers (Chambati 2017). However, on this occasion the state was fair, giving all youth an equal chance despite calls that were made by local war veterans and resettled peasants to disenfranchise the farmworkers. Out of the 38 lucky draws, six picks were farmworkers. Overall, they were 12 female and 26 male lucky picks. The dominance of men in land allocation is a result of patriarchy and weak government enforcement of statutes that support equality between men and women with regards to all social, economic and political spheres (Moyo 2004; Government of Zimbabwe 2013). In addition, the random draw method of land allocation does not provide equal opportunity, particularly for disadvantaged groups such as women and the physically challenged.
After the draw, the youth and the farmworkers chanted ruling party slogans and the military generals that had attended re-emphasised that the youth were supposed to avoid losing the land by desisting from voting for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. A promise was made by the governor that the Ministry of Lands would, within four weeks, give the youth the permits providing usufruct rights to land reform beneficiaries. The harmonised elections were held on July 2013. ZANU–PF won but the governor, Mr Chigwedere, was not reappointed and no land permits were issued. Nonetheless, the A1 permits are issued not by the governor’s office but by the District Office of the MALRR. The permits were supposed to be issued before the elections because that was within the promised four weeks. The youth became disillusioned and did not occupy the land while waiting for the permits.
Our recent visits to this area, from March to September 2018, show that even after five years no youth was given the permit and no reason was offered. The youths who succeeded in the draw have been barred from occupying the fertile pieces of land by the government. No adequate reason is provided apart from the fact that the government is still considering its position. The fact that the government did not give official permits to the 38 youths just before the 2013 elections resembles how Cousins (2017) characterised the state’s action: as a spectrum of distract, deceive and divide. The intention of the state was to distract the youth from questioning the leadership over economic hardships that were faced by the democratically increasing youth. Second, the state deceived the youth that it was taking action by ‘appearing’4 to be providing land. Lastly, the state divided the youth between those who had the land and the landless. The state’s strategy divided and demobilised youth seeking land in Ward 23 by putting them on ‘eternal waiting’, which is what the state does when it comes to youth empowerment, proclaiming that ‘the future belongs to the youth’ (Interview, 2018).
Interestingly, there are three informal occupations on this piece of land; two are youth who are growing potatoes on an acre and have built makeshift houses made of plastics and cardboard. The other informal occupier, Mr X, is a land reform beneficiary from Riverside Farm, who built a permanent home. He moved from the place he was allocated during the FTLRP, stating that it was far away from a water source. The youth occupying the land are not part of the original 38 who had won the draw but are landless relatives of some resettled farmers who live nearby in Riverside Farm. Their crops are promising and suggest there are opportunities for poor households to accumulate capital, thus fuelling youth land struggles. The fact that the youth are no longer scared of occupying land shows how deep the demand for land is and also demonstrates the youth’s agency and their preparedness to participate in ‘grand wars’ for livelihood (Borras 1998).
The authorities were aware of the informal land occupation and gave the youth notice to vacate after harvesting their crops. The notice was given through the Riverside village head. The youth consented to this position so that their crops are not destroyed but they have been doing this for the past two years. The informal land occupation by the youth was overt and tolerated by the village head and the community because there is kinship in this community. Informal land occupation is historically noted as a result of unequal land ownership patterns and intensified struggles for land (Moyo 1995; Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). However, in the 1990s and at the start of the FTLRP, informal land occupations were met with the use of the anti-riot police (Sakata 2016). In the post-land reform, the authorities rarely resort to violence but opt for dialogue with the informal occupiers. Prior to the FTLRP, there was pressure by capitalist farmers to implement the private property regime that was prevalent at the time (Moyo 1995).
District struggles: Marondera District
In Marondera District the rural community is known for its revolutionary nature: the Svosve people were among the first groups, in 1998, to carry out land invasions (Sakata 2016). The agency of the youth in this district is very visible as shown by the fact that in 1997, they raised concerns about the problem of overpopulation and inadequate farming space (Ibid.). In 2013, from January to July, the government through the provincial governor’s office allocated some land to 400 youth in Marondera District who had put immense pressure on the government to give them land. Our interviews with the MALRR district offices in Marondera indicate that there about 40,000 land seekers on the official waiting list (Interview, June 2018 and July 2019). The list is not disaggregated in terms of age and gender. However, the government is in the process of creating a database that can capture these demographic details.
The urban and rural youth organised themselves into a collective movement and approached the Mashonaland East governor, Dr Chigwedere. The group of youth resembled the ‘reserve army’ that is a result of disarticulated accumulation that spurs jobless growth in the global South (Marx 1976; Delgado Wise and Veltmeyer 2016). There was a significant number of male youth compared to female. The youth constituted of unemployed National Youth Service graduates, ruling party members and other youth whose identity could not be established. But what united this class was the need to secure land as the source of livelihood. This finding of the youth’s struggle for land as a productive resource is counter to some situations recorded in other parts of the country where youth viewed the life on the land as ‘marwadzo’ (Matondi 2012, 229). The youth assembled for several days at the governor’s office, sang revolutionary songs from 10 am till lunch hour (1 pm). They were tolerated; no force was used to disperse them. Faced with this predicament the state decided to downsize nearby farms, Bemba and Hozek and other surrounding farms. The land was divided into several plots for the youth ranging from 1 hectare to 3 hectares depending on the topography.
The collective action by the youth or society, in general, is well summed up by Tarrow (2011) in his famous work, Power in movement, where he argues that ordinary people organise each other and confront elites and authorities in power, especially when political opportunities arise. In Zimbabwe, the political opportunities had arisen in the sense that Zimbabwe was having elections in the same year (2013) and the elites badly wanted the youth vote; as such, the chances of the youth having their demands met were high. Land rights are used to reward and intimidate voters (Boone and Kriger 2010).
In addition, the government had just started to implement the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Government of Zimbabwe 2008), which was aimed at the inclusion of the local people in the productive sector, and agriculture was classified as a sector reserved for indigenous citizens. The demands by the youth were raised alongside the need for projects; the word ‘project’ became a catchphrase that was associated with the empowerment drive, symbolising a way of generating income usually through self-employment. The youths demanded land that is close to rivers, more fertile and ‘shovel-ready’.5 The mixture of their demands with the empowerment mantra symbolised some form of rightful resistance (O’Brien 1996). According to O’Brien, rightful resistance is a political situation where there are efforts by the poor to upset plans of the elites. Rightful resistance is characterised by popular contention, near the boundary of an authorised channel, and employs rhetoric and commitment of the powerful to curb the abuse of political and economic power. This form of resistance exploits divisions among the powerful (Ibid.). In the year 2013, the state was at full throttle with the implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. This act was premised on the idea of indigenous people having at least 51% shareholding in extractive industries owned by foreign firms. In Marondera District the youth attempts to indigenise Davis Granite, which is located 17 kilometres from the Central Business District, were futile, as the company is involved in quarry mining extraction on a seemingly small area, albeit with massive extraction.6 After the failure to indigenise Davis Granite, the youth turned their focus to the land; they employed indigenisation rhetoric and admonished the government for not fulfilling its empowerment promises. Furthermore, what made the land an easier target for ‘empowerment’ is the fact that in Marondera District there was no mining company to indigenise, unlike other districts that had several mining companies. Through the use of the tactic of rightful resistance, the youth were able to make the state act on their demands. In terms of class alliances, the war veterans, who are a key actor in Zimbabwe’s land politics, supported the political actions of the youth and their land struggles and understood this as a way to ‘wean’ the youth and more broadly provide some opportunity for accumulation by the youth who were jobless (Interview, 2014). Our follow-up visit in 2018 confirmed that the youth had started to utilise the land as shown by the fact that they had constructed wells for water and planted maize.
National struggle
The allocation and distribution of agricultural land must be fair, equitable, and must have regard to gender balance and diverse community interests (Government of Zimbabwe 2013). Therefore, the state is legally bound to provide youth access to land on an equitable basis. However, in reality, the state has failed to adequately meet this constitutional requirement. During the FTLRP women gained access to 18% of redistributed land (Moyo et al. 2009). As for youth, as highlighted by other studies in the previous sections, they had limited access to land. Our interviews with the MALRR officials at the national office in Harare, conducted in June and July 2019, indicate that the waiting list for the citizenry seeking land is around 530,000 nationally; however, the data are only obtained from six provinces, with four other provinces having missing data. In addition, the data were not categorised. Thus, it was difficult to precisely obtain the number of youth struggling for land at the national level. However, more importantly the government confirmed that the youth indeed lacked land and that they had put some measures in place to ensure that more youth are involved in agriculture. More specifically, the government set up a Youth Desk in 2018 that aims to provide mentorship and entrepreneurship and to make agriculture attractive to the youth. Interestingly none of the goals of the Youth Desk mention improving the youth’s access to land, which forms the bedrock of the progressive inclusion of youth in the agriculture sector. In addition, some youth interviewees remarked that they were not aware of where and how to seek or register for land.
Political influence is embedded in state programmes (Chinsinga 2010). The youth’s demands for land at the ‘national level’ were mostly articulated overtly via the ruling party ZANU–PF. At the national level, the youth demanded peri-urban land. Similarly, the land was also made available to the youth through party structures rather than the mandated government agencies. The fact that the authorities paid attention to the youth’s demand for land via party organs and not via the MALRR waiting list shows how much politics takes precedence over economic, social and technical considerations (Ibid.). The youth nationally demanded land for a number of reasons, key among them being to appease them for keeping President Robert Mugabe in power. The youth recognised that the party survived on patronage so they demanded that the president give them something in exchange for their vote. This campaign was led by a vocal youth leader, Kudzai Chipanga. They demanded peri-urban land so that they could build houses. These demands were made at various party platforms, mostly at national gatherings, where they would remind President Mugabe how much they wanted some land so that they could improve their lives. Second, the demands for urban land were based on the fact that urban land was an easy source of income through sales. The land was an economic empowerment option in an economic crisis that was characterised by high unemployment (around 80%, although this was denied in the official reports, Moyo 2003, 5; Matondi 2012, 239). Some of the youths in the urban areas found rural land not attractive, as there were limited opportunities to sell it. One key informant remarked that economic hardships had propelled the youth to seek land and additionally the general feeling was that some youth felt ‘left behind’ because they did not get land during the FTLRP. However, it is important to note that not all of the youth had attained the legal age to access land when the FTLRP was implemented in the early 2000s and some were used by elites to occupy farms in exchange for monetary payment (see Chiweshe 2011).
The youth struggles for land, as one key informant remarked, were fuelled by the factional fights that were occurring in ZANU–PF, and so the youth realised that there was much antagonism within the party, Mugabe’s time could be limited and the youth considered him as the only person who could meet their demands: ‘mudhara akabva tinobata pasi’ (if the old man retires we will be left with nothing). In July 2016 1300 hectares of peri-urban land for residential purposes was allocated to the youth via Mr Chipanga: of this, 1000 hectares was in Harare, the capital, and 300 hectares in Bulawayo, the second largest city (Mahove 2016). The land that was allocated to the youth was public land and in peri-urban locations. The Harare City Council had also earmarked the same place for urban residential expansion, and other competing forces such as urban land developers (known as land barons) eyed the same portions of land for their capitalist speculative activities. The origins of these land barons are also traced to the ruling elite.
After allocating the peri-urban land to the youth, President Mugabe said, ‘youths should not be seen to be in the fore, attacking ZANU–PF’ (Sunday Mail 2016). In this way, Mr Mugabe clearly demonstrated that land reform was an instrument to consolidate political gain (Borras 2007, 42). He was using the land to mute the youth’s criticism of the ruling party’s failures. The process of allocating land to the youth was aimed at consolidating his party’s unfettered hold on power. During the land allocation process Mr Chipanga, the youth leader, announced that land was only to be allocated to youth within the ruling party structures. Neither the authorities nor President Mugabe opposed this position. This shows how youth’s quest for land has been reduced to a party, not a national, issue: in the process this has led to the alienation of youth who do not belong to the party and also dampens the prospects for progressive youth to access land, due to the fact that they will always be forced to view accessing land as a party favour rather than a constitutional right that they claim. President Mugabe was removed from power before water and sewer pipes were installed, the youth up to now have not occupied the land7 and there are no discussions around this issue. ZANU–PF internal politics has undergone many changes, some of which have a bearing on the youth’s struggle for land as discussed below.
Interestingly, there are also allegations that elite capture affected the youth who were allocated peri-urban land. In a famous case, the former president chastised the then minister of local government Kasukuwere, who was in charge of urban land allocation, for taking land meant for youth and selling it to the PHD Church (Dewa 2016). The PHD Church is a wealthy church run by an enterprising pastor who is known for land development, mining and other capitalist ventures.
Current conjectures
More recently a number of political dynamics have taken place in Zimbabwe. Mugabe was forced out of power in November 2017, which resulted in tectonic shifts on how the youth land question in general and the youth land struggles are dealt with. We argue that youth struggles for land in Zimbabwe have been muted as the new administration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa is saying it is time for economics and not politics. This in short means that youth’s demands, which are political by every account (Moore 2001), have taken a back seat. Interestingly, while muted at the moment the issue is a time-bomb because the youth group demographically is constantly being renewed and is eager to shed the tag of being a ‘demographic domain of poverty’ (Njeru and Gichimu 2014).
Furthermore, current economic efforts by the government show few signs of producing broader economic benefits for the youth. For instance, the new administration amended the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Law so that foreigners can participate in many sectors of the economy, including agriculture. These amendments are a blow to the youth who used the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Law as a rallying point in waging their struggle to access resources. The government’s stance of ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’ is opening the whole agrarian sector to foreign capital and there is a greater propensity for the promotion of large-scale agriculture (Mazwi et al. 2018). Large-scale agriculture is preferred on the false basis that it will create jobs for the youth (Mafeje 2003; van der Ploeg 2008; Bernstein 2010; Moyo 2011). Additionally, the older Togarepi replaced the younger and more militant Chipanga8 as leader of the ZANU–PF youth wing, so in essence the youth have been divided, and the land question in the ruling party youth wing has been replaced by the need for factory urban-located jobs. The youth’s demand for land is seen as indicating a shortage of jobs (Matondi 2012, 237).
On the other hand the ZLC Act (Government of Zimbabwe 2018) was passed into law in early 2018 and there is a push for a land audit (Mazwi et al. 2018). This places land allocation into the hands of the Commission and the streamlining of land allocation to be conducted by the state and not the party. The ZLC is carrying out a national audit to determine the extent of multiple farm ownership and underutilised land. This offers the youth an opportunity to benefit should more land be found from multiple farm owners and underutilised land. Freeing of underutilised land is critical given the finite nature of land. In addition, a fully functional and independent ZLC offers an opportunity for the elimination of land allocation on patronage grounds. At the same time, this calls for the youth to realign their strategy from being party focused to targeting the appropriate authorities when it comes to land access.
The period of the FTLR saw Zimbabwe being put under economic sanctions for violating property rights (Moyo and Yeros 2007). At the height of the isolation, the state became radicalised as it tried to navigate the international isolation. In recent days the state is in the process of deradicalising as it tries to be readmitted into the international community (cf. Moyo and Yeros 2007; Mazwi et al. 2018). In its deradicalising efforts the state is denouncing some events of the FTLRP. Hence, the prospects for broadly based land reform processes that may disrupt capitalism and disturb neoliberalism are eroded and it is through such processes that the youth could gain access to land, given that the market mechanism is beyond their reach.
Moyo clearly foretold the current conjuncture:
the formal demand for radical or merely extensive land reform tended to be constrained, especially in recent struggles for democratization, by the proceduralist thrust of civil society activism, much of which is ensconced within a neoliberal economic framework. (Moyo 2004, 11)
The land question in Zimbabwe is a racial question (Moyo 1995). With this knowledge the youth in Marondera claimed land to correct the racial injustices. However, in recent times, there is the ‘de-racialisation’ of the land question by the state. The authorities recently remarked that a ‘farmer is a farmer whether black or white’, which suggests that the youth’s repertoires of racial injustice are not very relevant at the moment. They have to come up with a different repertoire to match the new situation (Tarrow 2011). A progressive struggle for land reform requires shared interests among actors, the creation of alliances and creation of symbiotic interaction with pro-reformers from above (Borras 1998). This symbiotic interaction is not a feature of Zimbabwe’s land politics at the moment. In light of this, the youth have to create a new alliance that spans the political divide and advances their struggle for land as a class struggle for the landless rather than that of political party members. There is the need for the youth to reclaim the ‘pro-poor’ land reform dialogue. More importantly, the acuteness of the struggle for land by the youth, the growing list of other poor land seekers and the finite nature of land as a resource all point to the urgent need to free up more land through a reduction if not total elimination of multiple farm ownership and downsizing of oversized farms.
Conclusion
This article discussed the politics of youth struggle for land in post-fast-track land reform Zimbabwe. The struggle stems from a number of factors. First, economic malfunctioning, demonstrated in the failure to create jobs. Second, as a result, this leaves the youth with the option of having land as the only source of livelihood. Third, the continuous use of land as a political patronage tool leading to further disenfranchisement of more youth. Through the use of three case studies, the article demonstrated that youth exercise their agency to varying degrees as they struggle to access land. These struggles are mostly waged along the political party lines. The state and ruling party have on numerous occasions tried to address the youth’s demands for land but the efforts have not been enough, as they are characterised by empty promises and further youth disenfranchisement. In the process of waging their struggle for land, the youth were also divided along party political lines. The elites have taken advantage of this fault line, thus weakening the youth’s narrative and their struggles as they are unable to keep up with the ruling party dynamics that resulted in a fallout of some of the pro-land reformers from above in the ruling party that had aided the youth in their struggle.
The study also demonstrated the rise of informal land occupations that have been a constant feature of Zimbabwean struggles for land since colonial times. However tolerable these informal land occupations are, they point to a simmering struggle for land among the youth. The current conjuncture of a state embracing neoliberalism has led to a mutation of the youth’s struggle for land, and calls for the youth to regroup, reconfigure their repertoires of action and more importantly move away from party parochialism to form a class alliance that can articulate their need for land in a space that is increasingly closing up for a redistributive land reform.