Introduction
In the early 2000s, the Boko Haram sect began as an insurgency movement in response to poverty and corruption among northern Nigerian governors. The sect gradually spread from the heart of the Nigerian Borno region to the border areas of neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger, all within the Lake Chad Basin. Since 2009, the population of this region has been experiencing the atrocities and brutality of Boko Haram, particularly with its pledge of allegiance to terror groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State.1 Numerous studies argue that political marginalisation, social injustice, poverty, governance failure and institutional fragility lead to a sense of relative deprivation and then to insurgency (Hugon 2006; Aghedo and Osumah 2012; Vahabi 2012).
The failure of the states in the region to efficiently handle the youth population's growth, problems of unemployment and resulting vulnerabilities explain the spread of the social and geographic base of Boko Haram. The poverty pervading the region has proved to be a factor in mobilising the Boko Haram insurgency, making it easier for the group to recruit among the unemployed, illiterate and beggars.
The outbreak of the Boko Haram conflict and its expansion in the Lake Chad Basin is part of a strategy of positioning and capturing the wealth of the basin. From a geographical standpoint, the Lake Chad Basin lies at the borders of four distinct countries, along the pastoralist migration routes, thus facilitating sedentary predation and making inter-state control and coordination more difficult. Economically, the area is abundant in agricultural and pastoral resources whose value is easily captured (Gupta 1990; Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Natural resources become an essential source of wealth for Boko Haram by turning the lake area into an area for smuggling and trafficking.
The emergence of Boko Haram in the Diffa region (southeast of Niger) stems from the same logic. From a historical viewpoint, the Diffa region is a fragile region that experienced a rebellion by the Tubu communities and recently, a protest by youths regarding the oil industry. From 2014, thousands of youths, unemployed in many cases and susceptible to the heinous Boko Haram rhetoric against the authorities and governance system, joined the terrorist movement. In February 2015, Niger officially entered into war against the Boko Haram insurgency due to the possibility of seeing the Diffa region become a sanctuary for Boko Haram, whose actions weaken the populations’ means of livelihood, worsen food insecurity and poverty and reduce access to essential social services.
Based on experiences of Boko Haram's victims, and data from local non-governmental organisations and public bodies collected in the field, I analyse first the political economy of the Boko Haram insurgency, and then its impacts on communities’ activities in terms of production collapse, migration, poverty, aid dependency and precarious living conditions in the Lake Chad Basin.
Boko Haram's political economy
There is thought-provoking literature developed around the political economy of rebel organisations. However, most literature recognises a correlation between armed conflict and extreme poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Bannon and Collier 2003; Azam 2006; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Dim 2017). In the case of the Lake Chad region, the potential of agricultural, livestock and fishing activities attracted Boko Haram, making the lake a complex space of refuge, war, smuggling, rent-taking and trafficking. Control over these extra-legal economies is imperative for the survival of the movement (Iocchi 2018).
The Lake Chad Basin: an area of opportunities for Boko Haram
The Lake Chad region has a long history as a cosmopolitan space, revolving around the traditional political centre of the Kanem–Bornu Empire, a mercantile hub connected to West Africa and Central Africa. Divided among Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad, the Lake Chad region presents a mixed picture. Despite the agricultural and pastoral potential around the lake, the poverty rate is high and essential services generally remain also deficient in this region. The Lake Chad region is one of the poorest in the world with high population growth and vulnerability to climate change (Agbiboa 2013; Tull and Weber 2015; Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018).
Boko Haram draws its legitimacy from the failure of the socio-economic model of the ruling class in northern Nigeria and makes poverty and social exclusion one of its preferred breeding grounds. These socio-economic deprivations, particularly among young people, created the requisite environment for Boko Haram's violence. The inability of the formal system in integrating them has worsened the feeling of injustice developed by Boko Haram, sharpening its rhetoric on social justice, corruption and the opulence of the elites.
The economic opportunity view does not deny the significance of political and religious views of insurgency. According to some scholars, the religious ideology, classified as jihad, is a significant factor in fomenting the Boko Haram insurgency (Higazi and Brisset-Foucault 2013; Okwuchi Nwankpa 2015). Boko Haram's ideology is embedded in radical Islamism, which is not a new phenomenon in northern Nigeria, having started with the violent confrontations that took place between a sect of Muslim fanatics (the Maitatsine uprisings) and the Nigerian police force in the 1980s.
Boko Haram's religious ideology relied on poor living conditions, educational backwardness and massive numbers of unemployed youths in the Lake Chad region. In general, religion serves as the unifying and mobilising identity and people with poor socio-economic conditions may draw guidance from this religious identity. Boko Haram took advantage of poor conditions to propose a religious project that appealed to thousands of youths who seek hope and livelihoods. Many people get engaged in the Boko Haram conflict because of their ambition to carve out a Caliphate state to attain the ideal society.
The evolution of Boko Haram around the Lake Chad area can be explained by the exploitation of the porous border area of Lake Chad. Boko Haram uses the lake to gain a substantial amount of financial income by exploiting non-regulated border market areas, and by posing as a revenue-generator for the local population (Alozieuwa 2016; Iocchi 2016). With no external funding, Boko Haram resorts to multiple lootings and hosting abductions. The populations living in the areas controlled by Boko Haram are obliged to pay taxes on the harvest of wheat, maize and red peppers. For example, Pérouse de Montclos (2015) mentions that in southeast Niger, Boko Haram requisitioned between one-third and a half of the production of red peppers, and took control of the trade in fish from Lake Chad.
The Diffa region, a socio-economic space favourable to Boko Haram
The Diffa region is bordered by the Komadugu River, which separates Niger and Nigeria, and the Lake Chad Basin, which Niger shares with Chad and Nigeria. Its economy is mainly tied to Nigeria, which buys its agricultural produce, including peppers and rice produced on the banks of the Komadugu, cattle from the inland pastoral areas, and fish and corn from the lake areas. In return, the region receives manufactured products and black-market fuel from Nigeria. For a while, the Diffa region had a reputation for being sympathetic to Boko Haram's ideology (Seignobos 2015), though the first Boko Haram attack on Niger's territory did not take place until 6 February 2015. From 2012, numerous events showed that Boko Haram was active in Niger where some suspects were arrested, and extortions of villages heads and dignitaries by Boko Haram elements were frequent.2
The geographical relocation of Boko Haram in the Niger section of the Lake Chad Basin indicates the group's interest in the Diffa region. At the beginning of the insurgency, the Diffa region was like a retreat area for Boko Haram. Boko Haram fighters would seek supplies in the Diffa region, not fearing reprisals by the local authorities. They would sell part of the products of their plunder, creating a network economy from which traders gained without necessarily being elements of Boko Haram (International Crisis Group 2017). The intrusion of Boko Haram in Niger's territory was also made possible by the indoctrination of the population. A set of intertwined factors explains this situation.
The first factor is ideological. The group succeeded in recruiting Nigerien followers based on religious and political arguments linked to feelings of injustice and social marginalisation. For example, fascinated by jihad-like rhetoric, thousands of young Nigeriens, mostly uneducated and escaping the control of wealthy families, joined the ranks of the terrorist group. The socio-cultural connections with the populations in the Borno State in Nigeria contributed significantly to the rapprochement between Boko Haram and the populations in the Diffa region, mainly the Kanuri communities. These communities have devoted themselves to Islamic education to the detriment of modern education, which is considered a form of alienation and is thought to contribute to loss of culture.
The second factor is financial. Some Nigerien Boko Haram recruits are attracted to financial incentives such as allowances that the group offers, and the war booty collected during attacks (cattle, food, weapons and vehicles, sexual slaves and others).3 The prosperity from looting and incentives to combatants returning from Nigeria attract recruits (Iyekekpolo 2016; International Crisis Group 2017). Moreover, some women, in quest of a better social position, are attracted to Boko Haram. The hope of finding a well-off husband contributes to their adherence to the jihadist group. Some girls, used by Boko Haram, join the movement in order to serve as informants or as housemaids. Thus, by extending its insurgency in Niger, Boko Haram has contributed significantly to the disruption of the local economy by forcing thousands of people to abandon their lands to settle in refugee camps where precarious living conditions and poverty become daily challenges.
Poverty, vulnerability and aid dependency with Boko Haram
In Niger, insurgency by Boko Haram has caused a significant displacement of the populations who are placed in makeshift sites and, at times, placed in homes with the host communities.4 The lack of access to essential services and means of livelihood has placed refugees and displaced people in poverty and vulnerable situations, thus creating an appalling humanitarian predicament and an increased dependence on emergency aid.
Basic life in refugee and displaced people's camps
In the Diffa region, many people had to run away from Boko Haram's activities on the banks of Komadugu and the Lake Chad Basin in order to seek refuge wherever possible along the N-1 national road. They abandoned their belongings in the areas they fled from, becoming very vulnerable. Women and children, who make up more than half of the displaced populations, are the most affected.
These forced displacements caused critical humanitarian needs in a region that already faces food insecurity, poverty and degradation of the environment. In refugee camps, people experience severe difficulties in obtaining essential services.5 Access to water, latrines, health care and schooling, and the lack of means of livelihood are particularly challenging for internally displaced people and refugees. These deprivations are worsened by insecurity, primarily when services are located outside the camps.
Health problems in the camps are also a severe concern. Humanitarian organisations have identified cases of diarrhoeal diseases, respiratory infections, malaria, meningitis and yellow fever outbreaks, which contribute to psychiatric and psychosocial problems. The poor quality of water, lack of hygiene facilities and overcrowding of camps are primarily responsible for this situation. Inadequate dietary conditions worsen the effect of this morbidity, while malnutrition and nutritional deficiencies are highly associated with infection risks and mortality. The population of refugee camps live generally in unhealthy shelters. For example, one study shows that 64% (56%) of households headed by women (men) live in shelters that are in bad to severe conditions (REACH 2016).6 This gender inequality is also observed in the same proportions in other areas, such as access to education and health. The displaced people (children included) are likely to use harmful adaptation mechanisms such as prostitution or forced labour to cope with the lack of access to basic services and means of livelihood.
The camps provide refugees with relatively precarious living conditions. Drinking water and food rations are sparingly distributed, and cleanliness and hygiene are often inadequate. Access to health and education facilities is even more difficult due to restrictions on mobility imposed by the public authorities and lack of personnel. This situation worsens the risk of diseases associated with malaria and infections, sometimes going beyond the emergency threshold. The public authorities seem overwhelmed by the extent of these precarious living conditions, thus increasing the population's dependence on humanitarian aid.
Dependence on humanitarian aid
Humanitarian actions take place when there is an exceptional and widespread threat to life, health or basic subsistence beyond the coping capacity of individuals and the community (Macrae and Harmer 2003). In the Diffa region, the Boko Haram insurgency contributes to the humanitarian crisis through the rise in human casualties, internally displaced people, food insecurity and the spread of various diseases.
In the Nigerien camps for refugees and displaced populations, the people have the same concern: shelter, security, access to water and quality food. They often have been robbed of their means of livelihood, which is access to agricultural lands and cattle. They rely entirely on humanitarian aid for their survival. In many cases, the assistance provided consists of the creation of shelters and latrines, the construction of health centres and schools, and the distribution of water, cookware, blankets, mosquito nets and food kits.
If humanitarian aid can be perceived as a normal response to the fragility of the refugees and displaced populations, it is feared that refugees will be trapped in aid due to Boko Haram. These camps, said to be temporary, can last as long as the insurgency, meaning years or even decades. However, the durability of emergency aid operations can cause adverse effects, including deviant behaviour, prostitution, laziness and moral depravation. The risk of seeing aid diverted, sometimes to the benefit of Boko Haram, is also real. Humanitarian organisations have difficulties in clearly identifying the beneficiaries. Aid distribution is often carried out in unstable conditions, and rumours of embezzlement are frequent.
The retention of refugees and internally displaced people in reception areas may cause a syndrome of dependency on humanitarian aid. This situation would maintain the needs of people who have become dependent on the exogenous resources of international organisations, and could increase tensions between displaced populations and unaided host populations. Consequently, land-use tensions would increase in the host zones, creating extensive needs that humanitarian aid would struggle to meet (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018).
Life with Boko Haram: economic deprivation and community tensions
Violence linked to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin has acute repercussions on food security, means of livelihood and the global functioning of the local economy. The displacement of populations caused by this violence exacerbates intercommunity tensions and exerts pressure on resources.
Socio-economic restrictions with Boko Haram
With the intensification of Boko Haram attacks, Niger's government declared a state of emergency in the Diffa region on 10 February 2015 to stop the expansion of the group on Nigerien territory and protect the populations. However, this decision was followed by measures that forbid activities essential to the local economy (production of peppers, fishing and riding motorbikes) and impose limitations on mobility in many zones such as the islands on Lake Chad. These measures severely penalise the local economy and leave thousands of people with no income, thus making them reliant on humanitarian assistance.
The ban on the use of motorbikes (declared by the local authorities in mid June 2016), as well as other restrictive measures, caused a fall in the trade of spare parts and services provided by motorbike taxis (kabou-kabou).7 Thousands of youths working as motorbike taxi drivers, tyre repairmen and small street gasoline vendors lost their jobs. The closing of some markets, such as the Kintchandi market, took a toll on trade activities and rural-area jobs. The peasants who grow peppers or work as fishermen saw a considerable fall in their activities.
In this way, the humanitarian crisis in the Diffa region has direct impacts on the local economy and local people’s livelihoods. These people used to live mainly on rice farming, market gardening and livestock farming. Due to the many restrictions and high insecurity, they can no longer sell their products, contributing significantly to the reduction of cross-border trading activities (on the borders with Chad and Nigeria). The crisis has also contributed to the reconfiguration of regional economic environment and resulted in consequences such as the disappearance of seasonal economic migration and a rise in unemployment.
The conflict has caused the departure from the Diffa region of financial organisations like banks and mutual loan services. It has also contributed to reducing the mobility of the population that relies strongly on trans-border trade. The enforced curfew and ban on motorbike taxis have resulted in feelings of being misunderstood and rejected by the government.
Intercommunity tensions and access to resources
The Boko Haram insurgency created a climate of suspicion and fear that was instrumental in stirring ethnic antagonisms over land use. The arrival of refugees and displaced people in the Diffa region has stirred tensions between communities because of the increased competition to access the islands in the Lake Chad Basin and their resources. Military operations in the Niger section of the lake pushed some communities to relocate to refugee camps. This displacement of the populations notably changes the demographic and ethnic balance and exacerbates intercommunity tensions in a framework already marked by deprivation and pauperisation. Furthermore, the hardships in accessing resources often cause tensions in the refugee camps where differences in treatment are blatant.
The demographic disruptions caused by population displacement have stirred community tensions, mainly concerning access to resources. The concerns of some populations sometimes fuel these tensions to maintain their strategic interests. For instance, the recruitment of Buduma fishermen to the Boko Haram sect is motivated by their desire to seize the monopoly in the sales of fish held by Hausa traders. The intrusion of Boko Haram in Niger's section of the Lake Chad Basin has stirred tensions between communities over access to local resources, mainly cattle. Fulani and Mohamide Arabs accuse the populations living on islands, mainly the Budumas, of being Boko Haram allies and of taking part in cattle thefts and abduction of women. The Kanuri and Buduma communities accuse the Fulani chiefs of being in favour of the Nigerien military and of taking advantage of the resources of the lake by organising lucrative cattle traffic while evicting rival communities.
An amnesty programme and socio-economic rehabilitation promised by the authorities in January 2017 have brought positive elements to a particularly gloomy situation. However, the rehabilitation of Boko Haram ex-combatants should be part of a long-term development perspective. It should be followed by measures that aim at alleviating intercommunity tensions, particularly concerning access to the Lake Chad Basin resources and reinforcing the resilience of the communities affected by the conflict.
Conclusion
The Lake Chad Basin has long been marked by a notion of inequalities, marginalisation and underdevelopment, which has been a significant factor in the Boko Haram insurgency becoming embedded in the region. The conflict that resulted from the presence of Boko Haram has dismantled the local economy, displaced the populations, altered the harmony between communities and further deteriorated the relations between some local communities and the government.
Undoubtedly, the fight against Boko Haram cannot be won solely by using a military approach. It requires both an economic and a community approach, including appeasing measures, reconciliation between communities and boosting economic activities around Lake Chad. It requires finally breaking out of the cycle of underdevelopment by eradicating poverty and improving education and youth employment.