Introduction
The parallel existence of strong economic expansion, prior to the recession, and gross human development failures in Nigeria has been described as ‘a paradox’ by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2010). Steady economic growth is coinciding with widening inequalities. The frequency of Nigeria’s 168 million people living in absolute poverty increased from 54.7% in 2004 to 60.9% in 2010. About 100 million Nigerians live on less than US$1 per day and two-thirds of the population are unable to afford the minimal standards of food, clothing, shelter and healthcare. In the 2010 survey measuring subjective or perceived poverty, 93.9% of Nigerians self-assessed as poor, a significant increase from the 75.5% who made similar assessment in 2004 (NBS 2010).
In spite of realising enormous revenue as the world’s 13th largest oil producer, with a daily output of 2.4 million barrels (EIA 2012), Nigeria has consistently ranked at the bottom in the yearly Human development report published by the United Nations. In the 2015 Human development report (see Table 1), Nigeria’s reported life expectancy of 52.8 years and Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.514 rank lowest among the top 15 oil producers (UNDP 2011; EIA 2014). Nigeria’s maternal mortality ratio of 560 per 100,000 live births is highest in this category, more than 10 times higher than Mexico, which records 49, and about 23 times higher than Iran, at 23 (UNDP 2015). Maternal mortality ratio is a key indicator for measuring the state of a country’s health system and its overall political, social and economic development (Nwagha et al. 2010).
| *Total production (thousand barrels per day) | Life expectancy at birth | Expected years of schooling | Means years of schooling | GNI per capita (2011 PPP$) | HDI value | HDI rank/188 countries | **Maternal mortality ratio | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 14,021 | 79.1 | 16.5 | 12.9 | 52,947 | 0.915 | 8 | 28 |
| Saudi Arabia | 11,624 | 74.3 | 16.3 | 8.7 | 52,821 | 0.837 | 39 | 16 |
| Russian Federation | 10,847 | 70.1 | 14.7 | 12.0 | 22,352 | .798 | 50 | 24 |
| China | 4598 | 75.8 | 13.1 | 7.5 | 12,547 | 0.727 | 90 | 32 |
| Canada | 4383 | 82.0 | 15.9 | 13.0 | 42,155 | 0.913 | 9 | 11 |
| U. A. Emirates | 3474 | 77.0 | 13.3 | 9.5 | 60,868 | 0.835 | 41 | 8 |
| Iran | 3377 | 75.4 | 15.1 | 8.2 | 15,440 | 0.766 | 69 | 23 |
| Iraq | 3364 | 69.4 | 10.1 | 6.4 | 14,003 | 0.654 | 121 | 67 |
| Brazil | 2966 | 74.5 | 15.2 | 7.7 | 15,175 | 0.755 | 75 | 69 |
| Mexico | 2812 | 76.8 | 13.1 | 8.5 | 16,056 | 0.756 | 74 | 49 |
| Kuwait | 2767 | 74.4 | 14.7 | 7.2 | 83,961 | 0.816 | 48 | 14 |
| Venezuela | 2685 | 74.2 | 14.2 | 8.9 | 16,159 | 0.762 | 71 | 110 |
| Nigeria | 2428 | 52.8 | 9.0 | 5.9 | 5341 | 0.514 | 152 | 560 |
| Qatar | 2055 | 78.2 | 13.8 | 9.1 | 123,124 | 0.850 | 32 | 6 |
| Norway | 1904 | 81.6 | 17.5 | 12.6 | 64,992 | 0.944 | 1 | 4 |
Sources: UNDP. Human Development Report 2011, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf.
*EIA. U.S. Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1.
**WHO (2011).
Compared with the 15 top oil-producing countries in Africa (see Table 2), Nigeria, the largest producer on the continent, performs poorly in many key human development indicators, including life expectancy (lower than Ghana, Tunisia, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, South Africa and Gabon) and expected years of schooling for children of school entrance age (lower than 11 countries, except for Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Chad). Nigeria also scores lower than many fellow African producers in the gross national income category (lower than Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Tunisia and South Africa). Among all top 15 African producers, Nigeria has the fifth highest maternal mortality ratio and one of the lowest HDI values. Such a grim human development picture can constitute a basis of deep-seated grievances and frequent violent conflicts in Nigeria. These human development challenges take on a more troubling dimension in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, where negative externalities from oil production further deepen an already depressing human development profile.
| *Total production (thousand barrels per day) | Life expectancy at birth | Expected years of schooling | Means years of schooling | GNI per capita (2011 PPP$) | HDI value | HDI rank/188 countries | **Maternal mortality ratio | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria | 2428 | 52.8 | 9.0 | 5.9 | 5341 | 0.514 | 152 | 560 |
| Angola | 1756 | 52.3 | 11.4 | 4.7 | 6822 | 0.532 | 149 | 460 |
| Algeria | 1721 | 74.8 | 14.0 | 7.6 | 13,054 | 0.736 | 83 | 89 |
| Egypt | 665 | 71.1 | 13.5 | 6.6 | 10,512 | 0.690 | 108 | 45 |
| Libya | 516 | 71.6 | 14.0 | 7.3 | 14,911 | 0.724 | 94 | 15 |
| South Sudan | 261 | 55.7 | 7.6 | 5.4 | 2332 | 0.467 | 169 | 730 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 269 | 57.6 | 9.0 | 5.5 | 21,056 | 0.587 | 138 | 290 |
| Congo (Brazzaville) | 259 | 62.3 | 11.1 | 6.1 | 6012 | 0.591 | 136 | 410 |
| Gabon | 240 | 64.4 | 12.5 | 7.8 | 16,367 | 0.684 | 110 | 240 |
| South Africa | 162 | 57.4 | 13.6 | 9.9 | 12,122 | 0.666 | 116 | 140 |
| Ghana | 106 | 61.4 | 11.5 | 7.0 | 3852 | 0.579 | 140 | 380 |
| Chad | 103 | 51.6 | 7.4 | 1.9 | 2085 | 0.392 | 185 | 980 |
| Cameroon | 81 | 55.5 | 10.4 | 6.0 | 2803 | 0.512 | 153 | 590 |
| Tunisia | 59 | 74.8 | 14.6 | 6.8 | 10,404 | 0.721 | 96 | 46 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 37 | 51.5 | 8.9 | 4.3 | 3171 | 0.462 | 172 | 720 |
Sources: UNDP (2015).
*EIA. U.S. Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1.
**WHO (2011).
The sources of conflict in Nigeria
The widening inequalities resulting from globalisation and the failure by the Nigerian state to meet the basic needs of its growing demographically diverse population have spawned simmering grievances, a survivalist culture and a politics of ethnic mobilisation (Udoh 2013a; Udoh and Ibok 2014). The fault lines created by competing definitions and dimensions of citizenship since colonial times continue to lead Nigeria along uncharted pathways. The British colonial policy of indirect rule functioned within a system of separation of administrative spheres; between the civic and native authority. The civic public, the platform for acquiring civic identity, was closed to Africans. Africans, as natives had to conduct their affairs through the native authority system; their ancestral ethnic or primordial domains provided the bases of citizenship (Ekeh 1975; Dibua 2005, 8).
The postcolonial codification of the Rousseaunian concept of citizenship as a social contract (Rousseau 2011) and the simultaneous utilisation of the colonial principles of indigeneity and ethnicity as the basis for allocating local and national appointments and making other political decisions have sustained two opposing categories of citizenship – constitutional and ethnic. The tension between the two categories is a critical foundation for understanding contemporary forms of conflict in Nigeria. Ethnicity has been the dominant platform of political action and expression of grievances against the state (Dibua 2005). Nowhere in Nigeria’s contemporary history has this been more evident than in the South-South zone, the source of Nigeria’s oil wealth, called the Niger Delta region. This article will examine theoretical and empirical explanations for the mobilisation by groups from the oil-producing communities to pursue armed struggle in engaging with the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies. The article theorises that the violent conflict that has defined Nigeria’s Niger Delta for more than a decade is caused by widening inequalities resulting from oil production in the region. The goal is to provide insights that may guide the development of peace strategies to address the roots of violent conflicts in Nigeria and other similarly unstable regions.
The challenge of armed violent conflict in the Niger Delta
The Niger Delta is a strategic region for a number of reasons. From the 15th through the 17th century, it was part of the international slave trade. From the 18th through the 19th century, it became known as Oil Rivers, supplying a great amount of palm oil and kernel (Alagoa 2004). With the discovery of petroleum oil, the region has been the economic backbone of the Nigerian state (Ibeanu 2002; Ighodaro 2005). More than 20 ethnic groups in 2007 comprised the population of the Niger Delta region. However, what constitutes the ethnic make-up of the region has become controversial over the years, because of the discovery of oil, the evolution of city states and post-colonial political restructuring (Ighodaro 2005). Such controversy has implications for political and economic development in this region. In the last decade of the 20th century and early 21st century, the region has become the epicentre of post-colonial resistance and struggle for democratic expression and justice in Nigeria. The controversy over control and management of natural resources and environmental issues surrounding the exploitation of the region’s oil has presented new opportunities for group mobilisation and collective action (Ukeje 2001).
Collier (2000) suggests that rebellion is driven by greed and the opportunities available for the rebels to benefit out of fighting a war, rather than by the existence of historical and social grievance. Cesarz, Morrison, and Cooke (2003) claim that rebellion in the Niger Delta is driven by criminal opportunism. However, Dibua (2005) has offered a counter-explanation that attributes the armed struggle in the Niger Delta to the perception by the people from the oil-producing communities that their citizenship rights have been suppressed by the state because they belong to ethnic minority groups.
Scholars have posited many theories to explain the motivations for violent conflicts; this article will examine four of these theories. The dynamics described in the four theories have been anecdotally discussed as key contributors to violent conflicts in the Niger Delta. However, there is a dearth of empirical evidence to support or dispute such suggestions. This article aims to use empirical processes to generate qualitative data that can fill this gap.
Resource scarcity
Resource scarcity is believed to result from ‘population growth, resource degradation, and the distribution of resources between individuals and groups’ – labelled by Homer-Dixon and Blitt (1998) respectively as ‘demand-induced, supply-induced, and structural’ scarcity. High population growth and density contribute to the depletion and ‘scarcity of renewable resources like arable land, fresh water, forest, and fisheries’ (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998, 205), thereby instigating armed conflict and struggle over access (Ehrlich 1968; Kahl 2006; Urdal 2011, 1). Resource scarcity can provide occasion for ‘resource capture’, where powerful groups seize control of dwindling resources at the expense of less powerful and marginalised groups (Urdal 2011). This theory has resonance when discussing Nigeria and the Niger Delta.
According to Nigeria's National Population Commission (Vanguard 2018), the country’s population is now estimated to be 196 million people. The population density in the Niger Delta region has also risen from 29 million in 2005, to 39 million in 2015, and is projected to be 46 million in 2020 within a land mass of 112,110 square kilometres (Niger Delta Development Commission 2016). As oil revenue becomes the main source of public finance in Nigeria, efforts to increase oil production have resulted in several negative impacts for the environment. These include erosion, flooding, deforestation, loss of soil fertility, depletion of biodiversity and acid rain formation, which are critical sources of rural poverty in the Niger Delta (Attah 2012; Udoh 2013b). The collapse of farming and fishing, traditional regional sources of income and livelihood, has caused resource scarcity, and the dependence on oil has fuelled the rural to urban migration trend that reflects the region’s deepening poverty and widening class-based inequality (Francis, Lapin, and Rossiasco 2004; Aborisade 2010). Competition for oil and gas resources has created a persisting narrative of regional struggle for access and control that often runs in opposition to the economic and political interests of other national and global stakeholders in the region’s oil resources.
Youth bulges
This explanation suggests that countries experiencing ‘age-structure transitions’ with large youth populations are more susceptible to political violence. Drawing on current population trends in developing countries, proponents of this school have warned that the world’s natural resources, including food resources, could soon be depleted by the teeming youth population (Urdal 2011). According to the United Nations Programme on Youth (UNPY 2011), youth (15–24 years) represent 18% of the world’s population; 67% of the world’s youth population live in Asia and 17% live in Africa. Youth comprise more than half of Nigeria’s population: the National Population Commission (UNDP Nigeria 2018) has identified the ‘growing youth bulge’ as both an opportunity and a liability for the country. Youth unemployment, which stands at 50%, has serious implications for security in the country (NBS 2016). The National Youth Policy (2015) has, thus, categorised youth as the most active, volatile and vulnerable segment of the population. This volatility and vulnerability are evident in the Niger Delta region, where youth, largely unemployed, unemployable and uneducated, have organised and waged a violent resistance against the government and multinational oil companies, kidnapping people for ransom, vandalising oil pipelines and pilfering oil for illegal sale (Udoh 2013b).
Horizontal inequalities
This school of thought links violent conflict to inequalities between groups ‘defined culturally in terms of ethnic, racial, or religious identity’ (Brown and Stewart 2006, 1). The proponents of horizontal inequalities reference economic, social and political horizontal inequalities that define the nexus of disadvantage, grievance, mobilisation and conflict (Ibid.). When an ethnic group feels socio-politically excluded and economically marginalised, the risk for violent conflict is increased (Urdal 2011). The experience of inequalities by residents of the Niger Delta region has been attributed to the domination of the region’s minority groups by the dominant ethnic groups who control the Nigerian state and the activities of multinational oil companies in the region (Obi 2009; Udoh and Ibok 2014). In the Niger Delta, evidence of neglect, discrimination, exclusion and over-exploitation by the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies has been documented by various studies and reports dating from the colonial period’s Willink Commission to the more recent Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNDP Nigeria 2006; UNEP 2011; Udoh 2013b).
Ethnic competition
According to this school, competition for resources, not economic deprivation, drives group mobilisation and conflict. As inequality among groups increases, so do competition for resources and the likelihood of conflict (Vermeersch 2011). Entrepreneurial political leaders seize the opportunity of group grievance to mobilise their ethic base. Ethno-political elites ‘produce ethnic groups, not the other way around’, and invoke it as they mobilise against ‘situations of marginalization and inequality’ (Ibid., 6–7). Yet, grievances and group identity must be strong in order for political entrepreneurs to mobilise successfully (Gurr 1993). Even then, their primary affiliation belongs to personal interests, not the specific group identity. Making a broad analysis of the origins of ethnic politics in Africa, Mamdani (2001) observes that colonial indirect rule codified a distinction between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. Races (at the top being people of European ancestry) were governed by civil law and ethnicities (mainly native Africans) were government by customary law. In Nigeria, Ekeh (1975) traces ethnic competition to the creation of two domains of allegiance by the British colonial system, the primordial and civic public. The primordial public was composed of ethnic unions, community associations and other primordial entities, created in parallel to the colonial system to fulfil the needs that the colonial administration could not meet (Ukiwo 2005). The civic public, including the military, the civil service and the police, was created as an apparatus of the colonial state that serviced the needs of the growing middle class and subsists as symbols and institutions of the post-colonial Nigerian state (Ekeh 1975; Ukiwo 2005). While political leaders retain fundamental allegiance to the primordial public, they view the civic public as an amoral arena where the end justifies the means, an arena on which they can fiercely compete over scarce resources, for a share of the national cake, which they are supposed to deliver home to the primordial public. This dynamic, characterised as ethnic and competitive communalism, has defined the perception of the oil resources in the Niger Delta by elites from the dominant ethnic groups of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa/Fulani, and their local Niger Delta facilitators. Using coercive state power at their disposal, they have created laws and other mechanisms that enable them to colonise the Niger Delta region, repress the residents and maintain control over the oil resources (Idemudia and Ite 2006).
Perspectives on ethnic mobilisation
Culturalists, as well as primordialists, have placed the incentive for ethnic groups to organise to address grievance on ‘cultural socialisation’ and common biological roots and ancestry (Vermeersch 2011). They argue that religion, language, social customs, community traditions and historical origins forge group identity and cohesion, and inspire collective action that may include violent conflict of non-rational quality (Gurr 1993; Vermeersch 2011). Collaboration, group identity and interest-driven common action need not be ethnicity specific. ‘International diffusion’ and ‘contagion’ allow groups based on common ancestry to develop and adapt beyond specific geo-cultural contexts, based on an international alignment of priorities and ideologies, methods and networking opportunities. An example of this is the network that sprang up in the Niger Delta, enabling the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, an ethnicity-based group, to form alliances with international groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and Amnesty International to pursue environmental justice in Ogoniland.
This article sought to clarify the motivation that drives the people from Nigeria’s oil-producing communities to mobilise and engage in violent conflict with the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies that operate in their communities. To achieve this goal we framed five objectives that guided focus group discussions: (1) What are the sources of violent conflict in our communities? (2) What roles do individual behaviour, social networks, community structures and economic policies play in promoting conflict in the oil-producing communities? (3) What role do multinational oil companies play in promoting conflicts? (4) What can be done to address the sources of violent conflict at the individual, interpersonal, community and policy levels in the communities? (5) What can multinational oil companies do to help resolve conflicts in the communities?
Methods
The focus group method was used to explore the questions and issues raised in this study. Focus groups are ‘a form of group interview’ that enables a dynamic interaction to occur among respondents in a research project (Kitzinger 1995, 299; Morgan 1996). The goal of focus groups interaction is the generation of data. As a qualitative method, focus group is used for ‘describing and understanding perceptions, interpretations, beliefs, attitudes, practices, values, and meanings of a select population about an issue, from the perspectives of the participants’ (Bertrand, Brown, and Ward 1992; Liamputtong 2009, 65). It is particularly useful for examining participants’ knowledge, experiences, thought processes and motivations for action (Kitzinger 1995; Morgan 1996). Focus groups have been used to generate data among ethnic minorities (Kitzinger 1995); to facilitate the expression of criticism, and promote empowerment among repressed groups (Ibid.; Liamputtong 2009). It has been used to study sensitive issues such as violence, to explore and clarify the views, and form a consensus among those who feel anxious or uncomfortable about communicating (Lederman 1983; Pollack 2003), including marginalised people, the poor, women, minority groups, and those who otherwise may have little opportunity to be heard or express their opinions regarding their circumstances (Liamputtong 2009). This study was approved by DePaul University’s Institutional Review Board.
Sampling
Participants in this study (N = 85) were purposively recruited through an outreach initiative of a community-based organisation in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Using the radio and traditional community channels, invitations were extended to prospective participants in 15 oil-producing communities in the Ikwere community of Rivers State. Participants were drawn from youth, elders and women’s organisations, non-governmental organisations, audio-visual media organisations, local government, security agencies, former militant groups and workers in four multinational oil and gas companies. Participants came from the Ikwere ethnic background and also shared experience of living with the issues around oil exploration in the Niger Delta. This enabled them to talk openly with one other (Ibid., 72).
Procedures
Before being assigned to discussion groups, each participant read and signed an informed consent statement. Two rounds of 10 focus groups were convened simultaneously and each group had at least eight participants, a scribe and a facilitator. Scholars have noted that in general there should be six to ten participants in a focus group session.
During the first round of discussion each group was asked by its facilitator to brainstorm, identify and discuss the sources of violent conflict in their communities. After explaining the background rules and posing the initial questions, the facilitators faded into the background and enabled the participants to take control of the process to interact freely in a relaxed, comfortable atmosphere (Kitzinger 1995). Following the first focus group, participants took a break and ate lunch. Then they returned to their original groups to participate in the second focus groups, guided by the general question: ‘What can be done to address the sources of violent conflict in our communities?’ Although each focus group discussion was video- and audio-taped (with permission from participants), the scribe for each group took notes of the process and the discussions. These notes were used for the debriefing session at the end of the study and they were integral to the analysis and interpretation of the focus group data (Liamputtong 2009). Each participant was provided with a small stipend that covered transportation costs to the study venue.
Data analysis
The analysis of the focus group data was carried out by the scribes, facilitators and the researcher working together. The analysis was based on video and audio transcriptions, supported by the detailed notes taken by the scribes (Bertrand, Brown, and Ward 1992, 202). Using this approach ‘preserved all the essential points in the discussion’, as well as eliminated ‘false starts, irrelevant remarks, repetition’, and the nonessentials that characterise real-life discussions and complete transcripts (Ibid., 202). The researcher subsequently used NVivo 10 for Windows to code and develop an inventory of all the points discussed, highlighting recurring themes that ran through all the group discussions. The diverse perspectives that emerged were later synthesised by the researcher into meaningful conclusions (Ibid.).
Results
Sources of conflict
Focus group participants were given the same discussion guides: to brainstorm, identify and discuss the sources of conflict and solutions in their communities. Participants identified several factors that cause conflict. However, some factors were mentioned by more groups than others:
Divide-and-rule politics of oil companies
Nine out of ten focus groups identified this phenomenon as a cause of conflict in the Niger Delta. The participants suggested that oil companies deliberately ignore the legitimate channels of authority and leadership and engage in actions that destabilise the oil-producing communities. The conflict that ensues keeps the people busy fighting amongst themselves while the multinationals drill for oil in the midst of the confusion. A participant from Group 7 said:
When the oil companies bring any money, they divide it only to those who support them. When Shell wanted to drill, they paid community money to individuals, not to the community. They know the appropriate channels but ignore these channels. They look for persons they can control and give the money; back up these persons and fight the community while drilling – that causes problems.
| Sources of conflict | Number of group mentions | Sources of conflict | Number of group mentions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divide and rule politics/policies/system of oil companies | 10 | Boundary determination | 1 |
| Illiteracy on part of leaders and people | 7 | Improper management of youth empowerment | 1 |
| Greed by contractors | 6 | ||
| Lack of employment | 6 | Erosion of norms and cultures of the communities | 1 |
| Cult activities | 5 | ||
| Selfishness of principal landlords | 5 | Buying over youth leaders and chiefs by oil companies | 1 |
| Misinformation or wrong information/ peddling of rumours | 5 | Lack of honesty and trust | 1 |
| Chieftaincy tussle | 5 | Lack of knowledge of oil company operations | 1 |
| Sharing formula (of contract proceeds by contractors, scholarships, skills acquisition opportunities) | 4 | Poor environmental protection | 1 |
| Marginalisation by government and oil companies and their agents | 4 | Idleness | 1 |
| Government inability to provide basic infrastructure | 3 | Community leadership politics | 1 |
| Rigging of youth elections | 3 | Imposition of wrong candidates to chieftaincy or political office | 1 |
| Poverty | 3 | Security agencies | 1 |
| Corruption and embezzlement by chiefs | 3 | ||
| Non-implementation of memoranda of understanding by oil companies | 3 | ||
| Imposition of wrong candidates to chieftaincy | 3 | ||
| Lack of good representation | 2 | ||
| Community projects not completed, done well, properly supervised or audited | 2 | ||
| Youth restiveness | 2 | ||
| Deprivation of the rights of landlords by oil companies | 1 | ||
| Inability of chiefs to deliver contracts and good judgements | 1 | ||
| Lack of memoranda of understanding | 1 | ||
| Unionisation of contractors | 1 | ||
| Expatriate quota | 1 | ||
| Underrating or disregard for youth | 1 | ||
| Community leadership politics | 1 | ||
| Intimidation by politicians – making the cartels powerful | 1 |
It is ‘cheaper to pay a few individuals than do the right thing for the community’, a participant from Group 6 commented.
Chieftaincy tussle
Five groups identified chieftaincy tussle as a source of conflict. The heads of villages and paramount rulers (who govern over a cluster of clans) are called traditional rulers or chieftains. They are influential institutions who preside over critical community decisions that can greatly impact oil exploration in the Niger Delta. In many Niger Delta communities, ascendancy to the traditional ruler’s throne is hereditary; in other communities, it is by appointment based on a system and a set of criteria commonly agreed upon by the community. Participants suggested that in recent years, oil companies and state governments have interfered in the process of choosing traditional rulers. Legitimate heirs to traditional thrones have been prevented from succeeding their forebears and candidates duly chosen by the people have been pushed aside in favour of individuals backed by oil companies and the government – candidates that would not challenge them or make decisions that interfere with oil production. A participant in Group 7 said:
Illiteracy
Seven focus groups suggested that illiteracy on the part of the leaders and the people is a source of conflict. Illiteracy pertains to a David and Goliath scenario, the simple rural villagers, inhabitants of oil-producing communities, pitched against sophisticated and powerful multinational oil companies. Participants suggested that oil companies and the government work in tandem to keep them illiterate and unaware of the activities of the companies that are exploiting their resources; otherwise they would build good schools in their communities, provide scholarships for them and keep them regularly educated about what the companies are doing in their communities and with their resources. A participant in Group 1 said: ‘the government and multinationals should provide proper enlightenment or awareness of the activities of multinationals towards their host communities’. From Group 3 another participant added, ‘Proper and reliable information should be given to avoid misinformation which could lead to crisis.’
Cult activities
Six groups mentioned cult activities as a source of conflict. Some members of the oil-producing communities form cult groups, gangs or secret societies that they use to terrorise fellow community members and hijack most of the benefits from oil production. A participant from Group 9 said:
Currently, two warring cult factions, Big Five and the Martyrists, are fighting themselves. Each would not allow the other to be at the helm of affairs. They see themselves as enemies; take oath of initiation – spiritual and religious. They would not allow non-members to hold any high position in the community. For example, cults determine what happens in Total Oil Company and they tell Total what to do.
VIPs in the society sponsor them for their own purposes. The sponsor becomes the leader of the community. The sponsor provides money, arms and bails them out of trouble with the law. In Total Oil Company, the cults negotiate on behalf of the community; write the Memoranda of Understanding to favor them (cultists). Total gives the community envelope (money) to the cults and the community would never know what was in the envelope. The political leaders and traditional leaders are oftentimes figureheads; it is the cultists who are the real leaders.
Selfishness of principal landlords
This factor was identified by five groups. The principal landlords are the individual owners of the land where oil wells (called Christmas trees by multinationals) and other installations are located. Generally, the landlords receive the lion’s share of attention from oil companies. They are routinely given small contracts, such as guarding the oil wells and other installations. Such preferential treatment, and the fact that the landlords are unlikely to share their small fortunes with the wider community, is a source of resentment and conflict.
Greed by contractors
Six groups identified this factor as a source of conflict. On occasion, oil companies give contracts to certain people from the oil-producing communities. Participants suggested that contractors are occupying privileged positions in their communities as they have cornered the contractual business for themselves. To limit this opportunity to a few and maximise the benefits that come with it, contractors have unionised. Only contractors operating within the union umbrella are given jobs or contracts, even if the job is to be done in your backyard. This causes deep resentment among many in the wider communities who feel that they are being unfairly denied access to income opportunities. To make it worse, even many unionised contractors refuse to share the proceeds as they should be shared. A participant from Group 7 said:
Contractors share with a few persons the proceeds that should go to the unions. Contractors share the money and leave other people out. Union workers are not paid for several months. When people talk, they want to use soldiers to keep them quiet and force them to forfeit the money they are being owed.
Sharing formula
Four groups identified this factor as a source of conflict. This covers the sharing of contract proceeds by contractors (discussed previously), scholarships and skills acquisition opportunities. Some multinationals (i.e. Total E&P) channel the benefits that are due to the landlords through the traditional rulers. Invoking their power, traditional rulers often hijack such benefits for themselves and refuse to give them to the land-owning families. If they decide to share with the landlords, traditional rulers may only select land-owning families that they consider to be loyal to receive some of the benefits. If they decide to give to all the landlords, only 50% of the benefit would go to the landlords. A participant from Group 6 said:
50% is given to the landlord family executives to share equally among the landlord families; 30% for the community. The 30% given to the community is shared only to the paramount ruler, the members of the Community Development Committee, youth leader, and women’s leader; 10% goes to the chief’s palace and the remaining 10% is shared among the cabal – all the chiefs around the paramount ruler.
Other sources of conflict
Participants also identified other factors that they considered to be sources of conflict in the Niger Delta. These include lack of employment – emphasis on unemployment among youth and the rigging of youth elections. They suggested that traditional rulers, the government and oil companies routinely interfere in youth elections, seeking to impose youth who are unlikely to challenge them. In these circumstances, conflict erupts because youth perceive the interference as a violation of their right to freely choose their own leaders. Unemployment, marginalisation and outside meddling in youth affairs naturally result in youth restiveness (another factor identified by participants).
Participants from Group 7 mentioned corruption as a cause of violent conflict. Although most of the discussion hinged around a system they frequently called ‘a web of corruption’, a participant from this group gave an example of ‘corruption’, standing and raising his voice:
Imagine the corruption! If job is awarded in my community, the contractor settles the chiefs and youth; the chief also wants to take the portion given to the youth, almost taking it all. When Shell paid to the community, the chiefs took it all. The community liaison officer is the middle man, but sided with the chiefs, not the youth.
How the community can solve violent conflict
Focus group participants suggested a number of measures that can be adopted at the community level to ease violent conflict in the Niger Delta (see Table 4). The vast majority of the groups suggested that putting in place credible and freely elected or appointed leaders would help resolve violent conflict in their communities. Three groups mentioned that allowing the people the freedom to select their traditional chiefs would ease violent conflict in the communities. Besides ensuring credible leadership, participants also suggested the enactment and enforcement of good laws, as well as instituting a just distribution formula.
| What the community can do to tackle the sources of conflict | Number of group mentions |
|---|---|
| Ensure good (credible) leadership is put in place (elected or appointed) | 8 |
| Chieftaincy matters should be addressed transparently by bringing in the people’s choices | 3 |
| Introduce and enforce proper, reliable and transparent laws | 3 |
| Institute proper sharing formula (equitable distribution), observing orderliness and due process | 3 |
| Provide education opportunities to all | 2 |
| Leaders should disseminate the right kind of information | 2 |
| Speak with one voice | 1 |
| Seek the face of God | 1 |
| Make policies that create enabling environment for growth and development | 1 |
| Leaders should work together to achieved desirable goals | 1 |
| Organise seminars that bring together operating oil companies | 1 |
| Appoint a committee to checkmate appointed leaders | 1 |
| Remain steadfast to common agreements to counter oil companies’ divide and rule policies | 1 |
| Community leaders and youth should stop embezzling community funds | 1 |
| Community leaders should respect the law | 1 |
| Be educated and informed | 1 |
| Engage in community development services | 1 |
| Address every conflict situation without fear or favour | 1 |
| Promote merit in place of mediocrity | 1 |
| Dialogue when crisis arises | 1 |
Community leaders need to lead by example, by respecting the law. Among other measures suggested are creating education opportunities for the people, as well as requesting regular information sessions about the activities of oil companies in their communities. They urged the use of dialogue in crisis situations and a common determination to resist the divide-and-rule strategies used by oil companies to destabilise their communities.
How the government can resolve violent conflict
Overwhelmingly, the participants suggested that government should create jobs (for youth) in order to help resolve violent conflict in the Niger Delta (Table 5). The expectation of government to provide education opportunities for all and for women in particular received the same number of group mentions (4) as empowering youth and respecting people’s choices during elections.
| What the government can do to tackle the sources of conflict | Number of group mentions |
|---|---|
| Create jobs | 7 |
| Provide education opportunities to all, especially women | 4 |
| Empower youth | 4 |
| Respect people’s choices during elections or in selecting traditional rulers – stop imposing leaders or rigging elections | 4 |
| Protect the oil communities from the heavy hands of the multinationals | 2 |
| Avoid sentiments when dealing with the communities | 2 |
| Make the oil companies implement the memoranda of understanding, using relevant government agencies | 2 |
| Ensure that life and property are secured | 2 |
| Be accountable to the people – listen to the yearnings of the grassroots | 2 |
| Make the security agencies do their jobs without bias or intimidation | 1 |
| Create an enabling environment for the host communities | 1 |
| Refrain from dabbling in choice of community leaders | 1 |
| Create programmes that raise the standard of living of the communities | 1 |
| Check the activities of unionised contractors | 1 |
| Should not leave development projects to oil companies alone – should also contribute their quota | 1 |
| Provide adequate social amenities to encourage development | 1 |
| Stop seizing job opportunities | 1 |
| Use dialogue in settling community disputes instead of violence | 1 |
| Checkmate the activities of oil companies and their agents | 1 |
| Make companies respect environmental rights and protect the environment | 1 |
| Work with host communities to address pressing problems that would raise conflict | 1 |
The participants felt that it was the responsibility of the government to protect their communities from the ‘heavy hands of multinationals’. They suggested, among many measures, that one way the government can protect them is to hold the companies to the terms of the memoranda of understanding that they sign with the communities. The government can also secure life and property, listen to the yearnings of the grassroots and refrain from being sentimental when dealing with the communities.
What oil companies can do to help resolve violent conflict
Nine out of ten focus groups urged the oil companies to faithfully implement the memoranda of understanding that they sign with the communities (Table 6); eight groups urged them to create employment opportunities (for youth). Participants discussed jobs with such fervour that it indicates that this was a major source of conflict. In addition to providing jobs, participants expected the companies to provide social amenities (ensuring that social projects started by them are completed, well done and audited), scholarships and skills acquisition opportunities. They urged the oil companies to be transparent, and educate and communicate with the people about their activities in their communities; oil companies must stop interfering in host community politics to avoid conflict and violence.
| What the oil companies can do to tackle the sources of conflict | Number of group mentions |
|---|---|
| Faithfully implement agreed memoranda of understanding with the host communities | 9 |
| Create jobs | 8 |
| Provide social amenities to the communities | 5 |
| Avoid divide-and-rule policies | 4 |
| Provide scholarships and skills acquisition opportunities | 3 |
| Ensure that community projects carried out by them are well supervised for completion and audited | 3 |
| Regularly educate host communities about their activities | 3 |
| Stop interfering in community politics | 2 |
| Award contracts to the host communities | 2 |
| 100% implementation of corporate social responsibilities directly to beneficiaries | 2 |
| Engage ICT centres to train youth to be self-employed | 2 |
| Make the communities shareholders in the companies | 1 |
| Accept responsibility when they are at fault | 1 |
| Be sincere | 1 |
What individual citizens can do to help resolve violent conflict
Participants were asked to identify and discuss any roles that individual members can play to reduce or eliminate violent conflict in their communities. This part of the discussion appeared to be difficult for participants and it appeared that they were taken unawares and asked to do something that they were not accustomed to doing. They lamented that they were too marginalised and disenfranchised to be able to do anything to change the situations in their communities. After the facilitators encouraged them to reflect, find their own strengths and values, and discuss how they could bring these to bear on peace and development, many of them found their voices. Four groups (Table 7) said they would like to start awareness campaigns to educate people in their communities about their rights and responsibilities and the need to protect the environment. More groups identified ignorance and insufficient information as the reasons why they are always suspicious of the government and oil companies. They said if they gained personal development, then they would be able to respond to measures adopted by the companies to short-change them in their communities. If they had more education, perhaps the government and oil companies would take them seriously. Many groups said that individuals in their communities need to reduce personal greed, be honest and sincere with one another and adopt peaceful strategies for resolving conflict. These participants acknowledged that each of them had a personal responsibility to be creative, entrepreneurial, constructive, law-abiding and God-fearing.
| What the individual citizen can do to tackle the sources of conflict | Number of group mentions |
|---|---|
| Initiate peace and enlightenment (awareness) campaign | 4 |
| Engage in self-development and education (to meet the challenges of the time) | 4 |
| Reduce personal greed | 3 |
| Be honest (sincere) to ourselves | 3 |
| Say no to all ills by peaceful protest | 2 |
| Embrace peace | 2 |
| Render selfless love to one another | 2 |
| Be God-fearing | 2 |
| Use constructive criticism | 1 |
| Be a good citizen | 1 |
| Be your brother’s keeper (Have the cause of the people at heart) | 1 |
| Ensure the security of companies’ property | 1 |
| Never betray my community or individuals | 1 |
| Avoid bad groups | 1 |
| Sensitise others positively | 1 |
| Resist fraudulent attempts by leaders | 1 |
| Enlightenment against cultism | 1 |
| Adhere strictly to the rules governing the community | 1 |
| Be law abiding | 1 |
| Be creative | 1 |
| Be entrepreneurial | 1 |
| Be a role model | 1 |
| Should think of what to do for the community, not what the community should do for me |
Discussion
The purpose of conducting the focus groups was to understand, from the perspectives of members of the oil-producing communities, the sources as well as ideas for resolving violent conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Participants in this study comprised men and women, ages 19–62 years. Participants were focused, frank and sincere in expressing their opinions of the sources of violent conflict in their communities. Overall, the focus group findings support and challenge many of the assumptions of ethnic mobilisation theorists on the etiology of violent conflict. They confirm much of existing analysis of the macro-level sources of conflict in this region.
Most previous studies on the Niger Delta have focused on macro-level sources of violent conflicts in the Niger Delta. A critical new finding of this study is the important role of micro-level factors related to individual and interpersonal behavioural interactions as sources of violent conflict in this region. In offering solutions to violent conflict in their communities, focus group participants suggest that residents should offer ‘constructive criticism’, and use ‘peaceful’ means of protest, practise honesty, reduce personal ignorance by engaging in ‘self-development and education’, be ‘creative’ and entrepreneurial’, ‘be law abiding’, ‘reduce personal greed’, and put the needs and interests of the community over their individual needs. These findings suggest that interventions to reduce violent conflicts in this region need to explore ecological models and strategies for individual and group empowerment, rather than solely target reforms at the macro-levels of government and industry.
The findings from this study support the argument that leadership and multinational oil companies instigate or exacerbate violent conflict by creating an unfavourable environment for peace and development in the Niger Delta. Participants in this study also suggest that oil companies, government and traditional leaders sometimes collude to deny landlords and other community members their just compensations. Previous studies have found that oil companies often collude with government and local leaders to intimidate and marginalise the people in order to keep the oil flowing (Frynas 2000; Akpan 2005; Obi 2009). In addition, the crisis in the Niger Delta has been widely framed as a failure of leadership (Ibeanu 2000, 2002; Hargreaves 2002), as well as a result of manipulative and divisive strategies used by multinational oil companies (Frynas 2000; Akpan 2005; Udoh and Ibok 2014).
The focus group discussions also support findings from previous studies that attributed violent conflict in the Niger Delta to destabilising and destructive business practices and policies of oil companies in the Niger Delta, including lack of transparency (Akpan 2005; Peel 2005), unjust compensation schemes (Akpan 2005) and environmental damage (Higgins 2009). Badamus (2010, 340) references ‘government’s divisive tactics’ as the cause of violence and adds that ‘state violence against the Ogoni people and its divide and rule policy also saw the upsurge in violent conflict between the Ogoni and their neighbours.’ Shell acknowledged that some of its social policies contributed to corruption, poverty and violent conflict in the Niger Delta (BBC 2004; Akpan 2005).
According to the resource scarcity school of thought, high population growth and density results in the depletion and ‘scarcity of renewable resources like arable land, fresh water, forest, and fisheries’ (Kahl 2006, 117), thereby instigating armed conflict and struggle over access to such resources (Ehrlich 1968; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Urdal 2011, 1). This explanation for violent conflict is vigorously criticised by the ‘traditions of neoclassical economics and political ecology’ or so-called ‘resource optimists’ (Urdal 2011, 4). They reject the notion that renewable resources are scarce at the global level or even at the local level. It is resource abundance, not scarcity, that causes conflict – violence is used as an instrument for capturing rich resources, which are in turn used to finance conflict or work indirectly to enable corruption and ‘Dutch disease’ syndrome, thus weakening states through consumerism, dependency and patronage. Political ecologists also reject the resource scarcity explanation for conflict, arguing that ‘scarcity’ may sometimes be artificially engineered in local contexts with abundance of resources. They state that focusing too narrowly on resource scarcity ignores critical causes of resource degradation such as mineral exploration and mining processes (Peluso and Watts 2001, 26; Urdal 2011). In order words, it is not the poor, but multinational companies and the governments that protect them, that are the cause of scarcity or violence (Urdal 2011, 5). Agreeing with previous studies (Frynas 2000; Akpan 2005), focus group participants state that it is the oil companies that instigate instability in the oil communities through sponsorship of violence, use of divisive strategies and interference in community politics, and corruption in the form of bribery that ultimately creates waste, scarcity, competition, grievance and violent conflict.
The proponents of youth bulges maintain that countries experiencing ‘age-structure transitions’, with large youth populations, are more susceptible to political violence. This explanation is accused by some of taking a conveniently narrow view of the growth in youth population as primarily a demographic problem. Critics point out that this approach fails to recognise the failure of governments and multinational oil companies to provide opportunities and rights of citizenship that could enable youth to make constructive contributions towards the development of their societies (Udoh and Ibok 2014). Large youth populations ‘can be a blessing rather than a curse’, and ‘a vehicle for economic development’ (Kelly and Schmidt 2001; Urdal 2011, 2). Participants in the focus groups suggest that youth could help further the development and transformation of the Niger Delta, if they are provided with skills development opportunities, scholarships, employment or support to express entrepreneurial abilities.
The finding that marginalisation, poverty and illiteracy contribute to conflict in the Niger Delta echoes the theory of horizontal inequalities that links violent conflict to inequalities between groups (Brown and Stewart 2006). Previous research has found a link between oil production and poverty in the Niger Delta (Udoh, Stammen, and Mantell 2008; Higgins 2009; Udoh and Ibok 2014). According to Obi (2009, 111), ‘the horizontal inequality approach is a useful conceptual frame for examining the root causes and adopting policies that target the fundamental causes of violent conflict.’ A limitation of this study is that participants were drawn from only the Ikwere ethnic group. A future study would need to sample the opinions of other ethnicities in the Niger Delta such as Ijaw, Itsekiri or Ogoni.
Conclusion
Multiple inquiries and programmes have been initiated by the government to identify and recommend lasting solutions to the underlying determinants of conflict in the Niger Delta. However, almost all intervention programmes have targeted macro-level factors and ignored key micro-level determinants of violent conflict. These programmes have failed primarily because they were not participatory but imposed by the federal government on the people. The Niger Delta people have come to view such interventions as white-washed half-hearted schemes developed by the major ethnic groups who occupy the key positions in the federal government.
The theories discussed in this article provide conceptual and intellectual grounding for the sources of conflict identified by participants in this study. The participants also confirm factors that multiple analyses have identified as sources of grievance and violence in the Niger Delta. To address the recurring challenge of instability in this region, the Nigerian government and multinational companies need to recognise the teeming population of youth in the region as potential partners in the production of wealth and promotion of development that benefits, uplifts and empowers the impoverished population of the region. The government, oil companies and other stakeholders must make a deliberate effort to reduce tensions in the region by fostering transparency, accountability, trust, participation, inclusion and responsible oil production practices that do not violate the integrity of the region’s ecology.