The price of civilization: reawakening virtue and prosperity after the economic fall

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Jeffrey Sachs has published his take on the current crisis of neoliberal-capitalist societies, focusing on the case of the USA. His book The price of civilization is a good exemplar of a broader genre: pro-establishment economists explaining ‘the ills’ of current capitalism, the causes of the crisis and the requirements for resuming glorious capitalism (characterised – in Sachs' view – by prosperity, fairness, justice, happiness, equality and sustainability). The book interests us here not for the details of the data provided or the political-economic history of the United States that is laid out, but for the political, i.e. ideological, tenets of Sachs' account of crisis and crisis resolution, and therefore his representation of capitalism. A focus on this aspect provides some insights into the post-crash thinking, or modes of reasoning among liberal ‘progressives’ in Washington and beyond (hence, some illustrative quotes below). The book should tell us something about how the high priests of liberal reform have adjusted their narrative in response to the events since the late 2000s. An analytical and ideological response from the liberal camp was due, given that the market society project – pushed by the likes of Sachs for decades – is in trouble across the globe, especially in terms of ideology and legitimacy.

The book has two parts, titled ‘The great crash’ and ‘The path to prosperity’. The diagnosis offered is largely conventional (by now at least) and in line with the genre. The crash happened because of three things: selfish, greedy, dishonest and irresponsible elites that were not held to account; corporate capture of politics; and the overshooting of market society (i.e. markets permeating all facets of society; corporate media, propaganda, and public relations spin; the single-minded quest for personal wealth). The latter manipulated and weakened the forces of good and brought about a citizenry that was largely entangled in the trappings of ‘hyper-commercialism’ and did therefore not play its ascribed part: engaging in politics and constraining ill-behaving elites. This led to a series of extremes and imbalances, e.g. between politics, economics and society; markets and governments; market values and social values. These developments triggered a crisis with regard to individual subjectivities and societal relationships: a deepening of social divisions and inequality, a decline in trust and confidence at both interpersonal and institutional level, a rise in dishonesty and cynicism, psychological destabilisation, and elites abandoning a commitment to social responsibility while chasing personal wealth and power. The fundamental crisis, however, is a moral one:

At the root of America's economic crisis lies a moral crisis: the decline of civic virtue among America's political and economic elite. A society of markets, laws, and elections is not enough if the rich and powerful fail to behave with respect, honesty, and compassion toward the rest of society and toward the world. (3)

Further, Sachs pulls the ultimate joker card in explaining capitalist crisis: greed, i.e. individual freedom, self-interest and materialism gone too far.

When [free-market Right] libertarians deride the idea of social fairness as just one more nuisance, they unleash greed. The kind of unconstrained greed that is now loose in America is leading … to corporate criminality and deceit; … to politics dominated by special interests; … to income stagnation for much of the population and untold riches at the very top. (38)

Notably, neither Sachs nor many other writers who talk about greed as a causal factor in capitalism ever really define it or bother to actually develop the phrase into a full-scale concept, let alone examine it via interview-based case studies, measurements and the like. Characteristically as well, the book's index does not have entries for ‘power’, ‘class’, ‘imperialism’, or ‘criminality’ (but ‘corporate dishonesty and lies’). In the same vein, Sachs is short, vague and under-theorised when he discusses possible reasons for corporate dishonesty and fraud (23–25): ‘It's hard to know the ultimate cause of the breakdown in corporate truth telling and ethical business behavior in general. Dishonesty is a contagious social disease; once it gets started, it tends to spread’ (23).

Crucially, Sachs characterises American people as well-meaning overall: ‘The American people are generally broad-minded, moderate, and generous’ (5). This assumption allows a particular way to be modelled out of the impasse: re-energise the citizenry, foster virtuousness, ‘end the corporatocracy’ (244–246), put democracy back in the hands of the people, and thus unlock a captured and manipulated system and make capitalism and political governance effective again, i.e. ‘establish the right relationship of markets, politics, and civil society’ (161). Yet, how to restrain the power of corporates – and what to do when firms push for ever more power and resist changes demanded by people – is hardly discussed and again remains under-theorised (256).

In any case, for Sachs the solution lies with the current script and cast – except that all the actors involved need to play their part with a bit more moderation and compassion: ‘The actual solutions are within reach and require only moderate changes of course’ (257). He advocates a recalibration towards ‘the middle path’ (162), or ‘radical centrism’ (248) – characterised by a balance between individualism and social responsibility, for instance, and inspired by the writings of Aristotle, the Buddha, the Dalai Lama and happiness literature (‘The middle path of Buddha and Aristotle is currently challenged by the crude libertarianism of the free-market Right,’ 163). The capitalist firm as such – or the capitalist class, mode of production, power relationship and set of antagonisms – is not the problem. The main problem is people's emotions, attitudes, judgements, and behaviours; not the system's structures, properties and dynamics. The rich and powerful only have to take up their social responsibility: pay taxes, give to charity, help the poor, do philanthropy, offer business solutions to public problems. Wealth is good – the possibility of a structural link between the wealth of some and the poverty of others remains unarticulated. ‘Every American can play a role. No class war is needed or intended’ (162). Sachs' version of desirable politics is consequent then: ‘We need to return to a spirit of true deliberation at all levels of society, one that reconceives politics as honest group problem solving, grounded in mutual respect and shared values’ (179).

Sachs first and foremost calls for cultural and psychological (i.e. cognitive and emotional), rather than political-economic restructuring:

The starting point is that we must recognize the snares that the economy has set for our own psyches. We must begin by reclaiming our [psychological] balance as individuals, consumers, citizens, and members of society. (158)

Our challenge lies … in our ability to cooperate on an honest basis. … These are questions about our attitudes, emotions, and openness to collective actions more than about the death of productivity or the depletion of resources. (25)

Sachs puts his trust in the promotion of mindfulness, proper civic virtues and moral attitudes, and resulting pro-social practices (including ‘acts of moderation’, 169):

The mindful society is not a specific plan but rather an approach to life and the economy. It calls on each of us to strive to be virtuous, both in our personal behavior … and in our social behavior as citizens and members of powerful organizations. (182)

His formula: instead of greed, promote personal balance, self-awareness, thoughtfulness, attitude change (including towards income), virtue, prudency, moderation, compassion, mutual help, trust, happiness, honesty and unity in society. ‘Our mindfulness should then extend to a more considered understanding of our social relationship and responsibilities: as workers, citizens and members of the community’ (164–165). The book has several sentences like these:

Without restoring an ethos of social responsibility, there can be no meaningful and sustained economic recovery. (3)

We need to reconceive the idea of a good society … and to find a creative path toward it. Most important, we need to be ready to pay the price of civilization through multiple acts of good citizenship: bearing our fair share of taxes, educating ourselves deeply about society's needs, acting as vigilant stewards for future generations, and remembering that compassion is the glue that holds society together. (5)

Sachs insists on the possibility and necessity of a unified, harmonious, win–win capitalist society. Like others in the genre, he largely writes out of the equation of inter-class conflicts and value differences: ‘[The large problems] can be overcome if we face them as a unified society, acting on shared values of freedom, justice, and regard for the future’ (262). Sachs seems to see no crucial role for working class resistance, union activism, civil disobedience and the like. Instead, the mindfulness agenda cherishes the ability to cooperate across the class divide (263). Notably, he sees economic divisions to be a threat: ‘We are, in the end, stewards of the future at a time when our shared future is imperiled by economic divisions, shortsightedness, and a growing ecological crisis’ (263).

Notably, as in older versions of neoliberal ideology, it is principally the individual – and thus individual attitudes, choices and so on – that is the source of the problem and the basis of the solution:

The problems of America begin at home, with the choices we are making as individuals. Through clearer thinking, we can become more effective both as individuals and citizens, reclaiming power from the corporations. (161)

The propositions that I've laid out in this book are politically feasible. They start with the individual: to pull back from hyper-commercialism, unplug from the noisy media a bit, and learn more about and reflect on the current economic situation. A mindful economy calls on each of us with an above-average income to understand that if we are prudent, we can make do with a little less take-home pay. (254)

Note the agency focus, cognitivism, spiritualism, and voluntarism, as well as the politics of small steps and soft agreements that simmers through the lines: ‘[O]ur ability to master our baser emotions and channel them toward constructive and cooperative outcomes will provide the basis for our survival’ (260). Above all, it is the individual that, until old age, has to carry the responsibility and rise to the challenge to bring about change: ‘To resist the excesses of consumerism and the obsessive pursuit of wealth is hard work, a lifetime challenge’ (10).

Finally, on the main text's last page, a key figure of neoliberal ideology is presented in clean sheets yet again – sanitised of the dirt and dust or any other imprints of the economic crisis, absolved from causal implication in or responsibility for it: the successful, grand and benign investor, entrepreneur, captain of industry:

[A]s America's greatest businessmen, from Andrew Carnegie to Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and George Soros, have known, those with great business skills have great responsibilities as well … [T]here is a high civic responsibility to support public collective actions necessary and to augment those public actions with private philanthropy and leadership. The tens of billions of dollars given by Gates, Buffett, and Soros for global health, poverty reduction, good governance, and political freedom are proof of what can be accomplished by farsighted individuals who turn their unique business acumen to global problem solving as well as policy. (263)

In sum, then, Sachs suggests that virtue politics, compassion, voluntarism, a reawakened citizenry and benign elites, as well as cross-class cooperation and unity, are central for getting out of the crisis. In other words, because in Sachs' analytical world people are basically alright and the capitalist organisation and structure in which people (have to) operate is basically alright as well, we can essentially think, feel, restrain and cooperate ourselves out of societal divisions and crises. Is this another illusion, fairy tale, and magician's rabbit out of a hat? Will this script be sold to us as a stellar analytical and ideological template for renewed reforms in Africa and elsewhere?