Introduction
The African, Caribbean Pacific (ACP) bloc is in tatters. It is also clear that the European Union's (EU) ‘rationalisation’ of its development agenda over the course of the last two decades has been a direct influence on the increased marginalisation and subsequent disintegration of the ACP as a special grouping. The Lomé trading regime, which in 1975 established privileged and non-reciprocal access to EU markets for ACP exports, created a ‘unique bond’ between the two groups. However, by the 1990s it was obvious that, from an EU perspective, Lomé had run its course. The EU made it plain that the regime would not be extended past 2000. A new partnership agreement, signed in Cotonou in 2000, set out the blueprint for future EU–ACP relations. The Cotonou Agreement was a disappointment for many ACP countries because it appeared to signal the final collapse of collective ACP bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU. This article considers the implementation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement for the ACP grouping. It focuses on the EU's creation of a two-tier bloc by virtue of its Least Developed Country-specific ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative and its determination to replace the universal approach inherent in the Lomé arrangement with six regionally-negotiated, WTO-compliant, trading regimes.
This article expands on developments that have been of considerable interest to contributors of the Review of African Political Economy since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, namely increased evidence of neo-colonialism, EU ‘mercantilism’ and the concept of ‘partnership’. In particular, the article can be seen as an extension of some of the concerns and issues highlighted in ROAPE 112, ‘Trading Africa's Future’, which included relevant articles by Colin Stoneman and Carol Thompson (2007), Michael Barratt Brown (2007), Jan Orbie (2007), Paul Goodison (2007b, 2007c). The former, notably, has published a number of related articles in ROAPE on the subject of EU relations with Africa, EU development policy and the ongoing EU–ACP EPA negotiations (Goodison 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007a). The issues raised in these earlier editions remain pertinent. With the collapse of the Doha trade talks in July 2008, bilateral trade agreements are increasingly perceived as ‘the only game in town’, with the key players such as the EU and the US increasingly free to flex their economic muscle. Faced with strong-armed negotiating techniques and ever increasing fears of a global recession, many African countries have found avenues for coherent resistance to be limited.
Contextualising EU–ACP Cooperation
Cooperation between the EU and the countries that came to form the African, Caribbean Pacific (ACP) bloc in 1975 is almost as old as the EU itself. French influence in the early days of the EU ensured the development of a ‘special relationship’ between the newly formed European Economic Community and countries tied to Europe through colonialism. The special nature of this relationship came to be entrenched with the signing of the Georgetown Agreement in 1975, the formation of the ACP bloc and the negotiation of the Lomé Convention. The Lomé Convention and its later incarnations were to govern EU–ACP cooperation for 25 years and formed the heart of the EU's development agenda.
France had made it a condition of its accession to the Treaty of Rome that there be some accommodation made for its colonial and ex-colonial territories. Consequently, a regime of association was created in 1957 and in 1958 the first European Development Fund (EDF) was established with a budget of 58 million European Units of Account ($58 million).1 A significant proportion of this funding was distributed in the form of grants to French overseas territories. The relationship was formalised in 1963 by the signing of an association agreement in Yaoundé, Cameroon, between 18 newly independent francophone African states and the EEC. The Convention, which was subsequently renegotiated, was in operation between 1963 and 1969 (Yaoundé I) and between 1969 and 1975 (Yaoundé II), and established the basis for EU–ACP cooperation. In view of the proposals advanced by the Cotonou Agreement (see below), it is noteworthy that the Yaoundé regime stressed the need for reciprocity and non-discrimination in exchange for EDF grants. Furthermore, it actively encouraged the formation of regional partnerships in order to facilitate the creation of a Europe–Africa free trade zone (Lecomte 2001, p. 8). However, the Yaoundé goal of an EEC–Africa free trade zone went unrealised due to three key factors:
- 1.
The majority of newly independent African states chose to base their economies on import-substitution strategies, which entailed high levels of protectionism. There was thus little enthusiasm for reciprocal trade links with the EEC.
- 2.
French business interests, which had enjoyed preferential access to these markets, were anxious to ensure that other European companies did not undermine their security.
- 3.
The United States was determined to prevent Europe claiming Africa as its sphere of influence and argued strongly against the concept.
When Great Britain was finally admitted to the EU in 1973, it was clear that a new, more effective agreement would need to be negotiated in order to accommodate Commonwealth interests. The EU decided to divide the Commonwealth countries into two groups, the ‘associables’ and the ‘non-associables’. The associables included the African, Caribbean and Pacific Commonwealth members and these countries were invited to negotiate association agreements with the EU. The non-associables, such as India, were deemed too developed to warrant inclusion in such an agreement and were thus restricted to negotiating standard trade agreements with the EU (Brown 2004, p. 45).
To the surprise of the EU, when talks began in July 1973, the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries decided to negotiate as a bloc rather than in regional groupings (Hall and Blake 1979, pp. 111–125). This show of unity led to the formation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group in June 1975, when 46 developing countries signed the Georgetown Agreement. The fact that these countries chose to negotiate an association agreement as a single group significantly bolstered their leverage during the talks. Consequently, the resulting convention, Lomé I, appeared to offer ACP countries a number of favourable concessions.
The demands for reciprocity and Free Trade Zones inherent in Yaoundé were dispensed with in favour of non-reciprocal tariff preferences for ACP countries. Furthermore, the EU introduced compensation mechanisms such as STABEX and SYSMIN2 in order to help offset commodity price instability. Following the 1973 oil crisis, the ACP countries were able to extract such concessions from the EU as a result of European anxieties as to the continuing availability of raw materials and as a result of Cold War geo-political considerations. Furthermore, the negotiations took place in the wake of the United Nations call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974, which demanded that developed countries make fair the terms of trade between North and South. The first Lomé Convention was duly signed in 1975 between the then nine member states of the EU and the 46 ACP states. Formalising the group as it did, the Georgetown Agreement created the structures necessary to facilitate the agreement, including a secretariat. The Convention was subsequently renegotiated at five-yearly intervals, in 1980 (Lomé II), 1985 (Lomé III), 1990 (Lomé IV) and finally in 1995 (Lomé IV–bis).
Lomé was thus very different from Yaoundé. The agreement was a clear breach of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principles inherent in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and consequently required a waiver. Article I of the GATT demands that any trade concessions offered by one signatory to another must, in turn, be offered to all other signatories. The GATT broadly allows for two exceptions to this rule if, one, the concessions are motivated by development concerns and two, the concessions relate to the functioning of free trade areas. However, the GATT rules stipulate that concessions cannot discriminate. For example, if the concessions were offered to developing countries, then they would have to be available to all developing countries. Lomé trade preferences, on offer only to ACP countries, were thus a breach of the GATT. Moreover, running counter to many of the free trade aspects of the Yaoundé regime, Lomé offered banana, beef and veal, rum and sugar protocols which, in essence, guaranteed producers prices well above global market levels. Moreover, ‘stabilisation’ measures such as STABEX and SYSMIN further sidelined market pressures within the EU–ACP relationship.
Of all the ensuing accords, Lomé I was the closest to an agreement between partners. There was little or no conditionality and ACP members were free to formulate their own economic policies without undue outside interference. However, each successive renegotiation of Lomé diminished the power of the ACP within the relationship. The debt crisis of the 1980s, the collapse of world commodity prices and the end of the Cold War eroded its bargaining power, with the result that the EU was able to incorporate conditionality into later versions of the Treaty. Poverty reduction, good governance, gender equality and sustainable development all became hallmarks of Lomé's later incarnations (Dearden 2002, pp. 4–6). Positive as these conditions arguably are, it is nonetheless possible to view the relationship between the EU and the ACP as having become increasingly one-sided. The concessions secured by the Bloc in the negotiations in the build-up to Lomé I were progressively ‘rolled-back’ by each successive renegotiation of the convention. Yet despite such increasing disparities, the majority of ACP countries were dismayed when it became apparent that the convention would not be renewed after the expiry of Lomé IV–bis in 2000.
The Erosion of a Special Relationship
Lomé I represented the ‘high water mark’, from an ACP perspective, in EU–ACP relations. A sense of partnership prevailed; the lack of conditionality allowed ACP countries to determine their own domestic economic policy together with systems of governance, cementing the ‘uniqueness’ of the relationship. However, the equilibrium of the partnership was rapidly undermined by changes in the global arena. The debt crisis of the 1980s, brought about by the oil crises of the 1970s and a collapse in global commodity prices, dramatically altered the balance of power between the two blocs. The debt crisis saw a shift away, on the part of major donors, from project finance to the funding of ‘policy reform’ and the implementation of neoliberal economic practices. This shift in focus was spearheaded by the IMF and World Bank, but rapidly adopted by other key actors such as the EU (Brown 2004, pp. 19–20). Chris Patten, UK Overseas Development Minister in 1988, succinctly articulated the view in Europe at the time, ‘it makes no sense to argue one course in Brussels and other in Washington’ (cited in Brown 2004, p. 22). The imposition of economic conditionality put the EU–ACP relationship under a degree of strain because it was incompatible with the partnership ethos that was supposedly at the heart of Lomé. However, the Commission maintained that the structural adjustment was unavoidable and duly incorporated neoliberal economic conditionality into the Lomé framework.
When it became clear, towards the late 1980s, that the structural adjustment policies advocated by the IMF and World Bank were having little effect in bolstering economic growth in developing countries, particularly those in Africa, the strategy was reconsidered. It was argued by advocates of adjustment that any failure in promoting development was as a result of poor implementation rather than any inherent policy deficiency. Consequently, the IMF and World Bank began to demand political as well as economic conditionality. It was believed that transparency and good governance would reduce corruption and would generate the necessary political will to force through reforms (Brown 2004, pp. 25–31). The EU rapidly followed suit, making good governance an important plank in its development strategy.
Once again, by the mid-1990s it was apparent that the majority of developing countries were under-performing economically, despite the introduction of economic and political conditionality. The international consensus shifted towards ‘pro-poor’ strategies aimed at promoting poverty alleviation. However, it was made clear from the outset that any poverty alleviation strategies devised would not be permitted to conflict with the neoliberal reforms also demanded by key donors such as the IMF and World Bank. Once again, the EU rapidly fell in line with the IMF/World Bank view of development. The language of poverty alleviation is plain to see in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, just as economic governance was explicitly entrenched in Lomé IV and good governance in Lomé IV–bis. By 2000, the approach adopted by the EU to its ACP partners was a long way removed from that negotiated in 1975. Furthermore, instead of being a partnership based purely on the needs of the participants, the relationship became increasingly normalised within a growing international development consensus.
It was not only the evolution of the Washington Consensus that was to affect the relationship between the EU and the ACP. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War were also to have a profound effect on the ‘special nature’ of the relationship. The end of the Cold War meant that, from a strategic perspective, African countries ceased to be as important, geopolitically, as they once had been. Furthermore, it meant that markets and trading partners in Eastern Europe, long cut off from the EU by the ‘iron curtain’, now became accessible. The EU's attention became increasingly focused on its near neighbours, to the detriment of its ACP partners. In 1970–74, out of the top 15 recipients of EU aid, 13 were ACP members; by 1996–97 this figure had fallen to just two, the remainder being made up of East European countries and countries bordering on the Mediterranean (Smith 2004, p. 62).
The EU's commitment to its near neighbours was confirmed in 2004 when ten mainly former communist bloc countries acceded, swelling its membership to 25 and again, in 2007, with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, the end of the Cold War also served to open up other regions to European interests. Latin American countries, during the Cold War lying strictly within the American sphere of interest, have entered into a variety of arrangements with the EU including an association agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) in 1996 and a EU–Mexico free trade agreement in 1999. Negotiations for a MERCOSUR–EU free trade agreement are underway. The EU has also been attempting to extend its influence in Asia, based on a cooperation agreement signed with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1980. In short, the EU has become a global actor since 1989 and the ACP countries are no longer its only or even main trade concerns. Given this change in circumstances, it is possible to argue that Cotonou represents the ‘rationalisation’ of EU development policy where the ACP is concerned. The ACP bloc is now simply one amongst many, no longer ‘special’ (Smith 2004, p. 62). By the time Lomé expired, the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) regime that governed EU relations with non-ACP developing countries had been extended and enhanced to such a degree that the tariff differences between the two arrangements had fallen to just 2 per cent of each other in most areas (Dickson 2004, p. 42).
However, the simplest explanation for Lomé's demise was its incompatibility with the international trading regime enshrined in the GATT and later the WTO. The Lomé regime found itself under sustained pressure from 1994 onwards when a GATT Panel ruled that the non-reciprocal elements contained within the convention, as well as its discriminatory nature, meant that it was incompatible with the multilateral trading system. Consequently Lomé IV–bis (1995–2000) required a WTO waiver before it could be implemented. Largely as a result of the GATT Panel's findings, the EU decided that any future EU–ACP agreement would have to be consistent with WTO rules.
It can be argued that it was becoming increasingly apparent to EU policy makers that certain ‘sacred cows’, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), were also coming under sustained pressure to be reformed. The ACP regime had been relatively cheap to run and involved little in the way of actual costs to the EU. However, with the CAP under threat from outside interests such as the USA and WTO, it seems likely that the EU viewed an additional battle over preferences to third countries as being too ‘costly’ (Dickson 2004, p. 56). In addition, the slow pace of multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO, combined with an increasingly vociferous lobby, drove the EU to consider alternatives.
What has become clear is that that while EU ambitions have been frequently stalled or thwarted within the confines of the WTO, its bilateral negotiations have largely secured what its negotiators have failed to attain through the WTO (see Stoneman and Thompson 2007). The result has been that the EU has attempted to reshape much of the developing world to suit its own purposes. In order to do so, relics from the past, such as Lomé and ACP needed to be sacrificed in order to facilitate more EU agreements with South America and South East Asia.
This change in attitude was apparent from the mid-1990s, epitomised by the EU's dealings with the newly democratised South Africa. The FTA negotiations between South Africa and the EU in the latter part of the 1990s provided observers with an indication of the Europe's vision of a post-Lomé agreement. From the outset it was made plain to the South African Government that any agreement would have to conform to WTO guidelines, with the result that the South African delegation was confined to negotiating within very narrow parameters (Gibb 2002, p. 120). It took two years of often acrimonious talks before an agreement was reached.
Yet, despite the shift away from non-reciprocal exchange, the EU has been most anxious to ‘talk up’ the Cotonou Agreement in an effort to portray itself as the guardian of the poor and the marginalised. Poul Nielson (2000), the then European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, stated that the partnership would:
give a new momentum to the relationship between the ACP States and the European Union. It represents an important component of international efforts aimed at promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty … It has been achieved thanks to a shared political willingness to give an ambitious response to these problems, building on the acquis of twenty-five years of cooperation under the Lomé Conventions.
The Post-Lomé Partnership
As stated, and in line with the general development consensus, there has been a noticeable shift in the language and framing of EU development policy over the past 20 years, the emphasis being placed squarely upon ‘people-orientated’, ‘pro-poor’ policies rather than economic goals and targets. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in 1992, forms the basis for the current approach to development issues, with Article 130u stating that members ‘shall foster the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them’. Based on Article 130u, the European Commission (2000, p. 5) has highlighted four key objectives where its development policy is concerned: reducing poverty; supporting economic growth by virtue of enhancing competitiveness in the rural sector; promoting good governance, democracy and human rights; improving environmental and institutional sustainability.
A further dimension has been added to EU policies through the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, unveiled in September 2000, which sets out targets for reducing poverty, gender inequality and environmental degradation. These objectives, together with other previously agreed upon International Development Goals, were subsequently amalgamated by the United Nations General Assembly in order to articulate eight ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs). These targets now dictate the direction of EU development funding and it is against these MDGs that the success of EU policies must be judged (Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2000, Preamble). The Treaty of Nice (2003, Articles 177, 178, 180) demonstrates how the core elements have been incorporated into the EU agenda. Sustainable development and poverty eradication are thus firmly entrenched in the Treaties that constitute the legal basis for the EU. The objectives set out in the MDGs are most specific, and, if EU development policy is to be effective in aiding the realisation of these targets, then funding to developing countries must be carefully targeted so as to produce optimal returns.
While WTO rules do not allow for non-reciprocal agreements, they do allow for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): agreements between economic blocs. It is for this reason that the EU chose to build the post-Lomé strategy on regionalism. Article 35 of the Cotonou Agreement stresses that ‘economic and trade cooperation shall be built on regional integration initiatives of ACP states, bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world economy’. The proponents of increased cooperation maintain that, in addition to attracting additional investment, regional integration will provide the ACP countries with economies of scale and increased competitiveness. Furthermore, regional integration is seen as an aid to overcoming the problems associated with being a small or landlocked state.
However, the Cotonou strategy represents a major departure from the Lomé regime and many ACP states felt, and continue to feel, that the timetable for ending non-reciprocal trade links was rushed and would damage their economies. Consequently, at the outset of negotiations, the ACP countries campaigned vigorously for an extension to the WTO waiver relating to Lomé preferences. This extension was eventually secured, facilitating the gradual implementation of the Cotonou Agreement over a period of eight years, expiring on 31 December 2007. This waiver was secured in order to allow ACP countries a certain degree of ‘breathing room’ in order to prepare their economies for the loss of tariff revenues and other duties brought about by their accession to the new agreement.
There were, and remain, certain difficulties associated with the regional strategy put forward by the EU. Whilst, historically, there has been no shortage of regional groupings involving ACP members, by 2000 very few were in any sense ‘advanced’. When the history of regionalism amongst the ACP states is assessed, the problems inherent in a regionally-based development strategy become immediately apparent. Of the 53 countries in Africa, only six are members of just one regional organisation. Of the remainder, 26 states are members of two groupings, 20 simultaneously belong to three, whilst the Democratic Republic of Congo is a member of four. Regional integration in the groupings mentioned was, and remains, limited.
Despite this limited progress in regional integration initiatives, the timetable set demanded that negotiations for the creation of EU–ACP EPAs, begun in 2002, be completed by 1 January 2008, when the Doha-sanctioned waiver for the Lomé preferences expired. An additional complication for the ACP countries during this negotiation period was that the ongoing WTO Doha Round negotiations were running parallel to the EPA talks. These parallel negotiations were problematic since, if the new EU–ACP EPAs are to be WTO-compliant, talks should arguably have been suspended until the new WTO rules were clarified. The Doha Round, originally timetabled for completion by January 2005, is well behind schedule. The failure of the Geneva Summit in July 2008 means that an agreement remains as elusive as ever. This may have ramifications for any EU–ACP FTAs, given that paragraphs 28–29 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, which relate to regional trading blocs, are points that still require clarification.
There are also problems relating to funding. For the sake of comparison, it is useful to note the costs involved in the incorporation by the EU of the 12 2004 accession states. The cost of integrating these new members will be an estimated €40 billion ($52 billion) (Gunessee 2002, p. 11). While the EU has contributed significant funds to the ACP countries for regional initiatives in the past, this funding is far less than the money on offer to the new EU members. Similarly, EU compensatory adjustment costs for its 21 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) proportionately far outstrips that earmarked for the ACP bloc. Although little acknowledged by the EU, the adjustment costs associated with the proposed EPAs are significant (Goodison 2007b, p. 257). They relate to the loss of tariff revenues, restructuring of domestic sectors, the development of the institutional capacity with which to deal with Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the harmonisation of policies with neighbours, to highlight but a few. The Commonwealth Secretariat has estimated that adjustment costs will represent a minimum €9 billion ($11.7 billion) cost to the ACP as a whole (Bilal and Rampa, 2006). To put this figure into context, during the period 2001–04 the EU offered the ACP countries €300 million ($390 million) in trade-related assistance (Bilal et al. 2006). The ACP countries have requested that the EU establish an adjustment fund in order to facilitate the transition to the new regime. However, the EU has stated that any adjustment costs will be covered by the 10th EDF which came into effect in 2008 and has a commitment of €22.7 billion ($29.51 billion) (European Commission 2006). There is little ‘new money’ in this aid budget and the fear is that, as a result, these adjustment costs will have to be met at the expense of other sectors such as health or education, a point acknowledged by the European Parliament (2008, pp. 14–15). In a report by the Parliament's Committee on Development, it is argued that ‘trade-related assistance will not cover any loss in customs duties or additional support for economic adjustment, which should come from other sources’.
ACP Unity and the ‘Problem’ of LDCs
Worryingly for the ACP bloc, unlike the situation in 1975 with the signing of the Georgetown Agreement, obstacles to unity now abound. The Cotonou Agreement makes special concessions for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), thereby creating a two-tiered ACP group. Classification is important as, under the new agreement, LDCs are entitled to continued, non-reciprocal privileged access to EU markets – an arrangement sanctioned by the WTO and not necessitating a waiver. Article 85 of the Agreement states that:
To facilitate this development, ACP LDCs are currently party to the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative, which allows for tariff-free access to EU markets for practically all LDC goods. As a result of EBA, the EU will eliminate 919 tariff lines on LDC goods by 2009, with only 25 lines relating to the arms trade remaining. Tariff lines on sugar, rice and bananas were targeted to be removed gradually in order to stagger the flow of these commodities into the EU. However, EBA creates certain problems for regional groups, with LDCs, under the terms of the Cotonou Agreement, having no real incentive to join the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements. The EBA initiative allows LDCs tariff-free access to EU markets without the need for reciprocity. By joining a regional group and negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, LDCs stand to lose any tariff-derived income, with little chance of offsetting these losses. Concern was raised that if LDCs prove reluctant to join regional EPAs, it could undermine the viability of a number of regional bodies, especially in Africa, which has, in turn, proved to be the case (discussed below). That being said, EBA is not enshrined in treaty form and could, theoretically, be withdrawn by the EU at any time.The SA–EU FTA: Bullying Tactics
The negotiations that led to the South Africa–EU free trade area raised a number of issues for the ACP countries. As mentioned above, these negotiations were prolonged and often acrimonious. The result was a lingering suspicion that the EU was not above bullying weaker countries into accepting its policies. Negotiations between South Africa and the EU for a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) were initiated in June 1995 and concluded in March 1999. The TDCA, which sets out the creation of a FTA and also outlines future EU financial assistance to South Africa in the form of the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), was only concluded after 24 rounds of formal talks as well as numerous informal sessions.
The final agreement was a far cry from that which the post-apartheid South African government had originally envisaged, centred as this had been on South Africa becoming a member of the ACP bloc and acceding to the Lomé Convention. The EU denied this request on the grounds that it viewed South Africa as a developed country and that such a step would not be WTO-compatible. Furthermore, it soon became evident that the EU wished to use any agreement with South Africa as the basis for future agreements with other ACP countries (Lee 2002, p. 86). It was argued that, as a developed country, for South Africa to have improved access to EU markets would necessitate the creation of a free trade area (FTA). Concerned about the prospect of a FTA, the South African government rejected the EU's proposals. As a result, negotiations broke down and were only resumed in January 1997. In April 1997, as a concession, South Africa was allowed to accede to Lomé, although not as a full member. This step paved the way for further negotiations and consequently, by October 1999, the TDCA had been signed by both parties. Yet a number of problems remained unresolved. Wine and spirits became the focal point of sometimes bitter talks. A number of EU member states objected to South Africa making use of the terms ‘port’ and ‘sherry’, claiming that this practice would undermine European producers. Further objections were raised against the use of ‘ruby’, ‘ouzo’, ‘grappa’ and ‘grand cru’. After a tele-conference in June 2000, it was believed that an agreement had been reached. However, on perusal of the proffered EU text, South African negotiators argued that the EU had attempted to ‘slip’ new clauses into the agreement and on this basis refused to sign it. Commissioner Franz Fischler urged South Africa to sign the agreement and to negotiate changes once the agreement had come into force. A statement by the South African Department of Trade and Industry highlighted the growing tensions:
The changes made by the EU after the 9th June are not acceptable to us as they are matters of substance and cannot be resolved technically at a later stage. Once again the EU seeks to reduce South Africa's multilateral rights and extend the names it wishes to protect … This is unfortunate and it is sad that we repeat again the pressure negotiating tactics [sic]. (Cited in Action for Southern Africa 2002 )
To many developing countries, these negotiations fostered the perception that the EU was not prepared to provide poorer countries with meaningful concessions. This sense was further underlined by EU demands that European fishing interests be allowed access to South African waters – a demand largely viewed by the South African delegation as unreasonable. The often adversarial nature of the EU–South African negotiations has been interpreted by many ACP countries as being an indication of the EU's unwillingness to be flexible when considering development policy. The negative perception engendered by the EU–SA negotiations has prevailed and has, to an extent, poisoned the atmosphere surrounding the talks (Griffith and Powell 2007). The overall result was a marked lack of enthusiasm for Cotonou amongst the ACP countries, with a Ghanaian trade official declaring somewhat morosely that ‘we will not survive in this game’ (EPA2007.org).
Furthermore, the EU's decision to treat South Africa as a ‘special case’ has had ramifications felt far beyond its borders. Southern African regionalism has suffered more than most as a result of the EU's determination to forge a post-Lomé settlement. While regional development in the region was by no means coherent or straightforward, certain groupings such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), operated efficiently and to the benefit of all its members prior to the signing of the TDCA in 1999. This is not to argue that there existed a strong sense of regional identity – as stated, southern Africa, prior to the EPA negotiations, was home to regional groupings other than SACU. However, by forcing a bilateral free trade agreement on South Africa, the EU effectively undermined the foundations of SACU, making the BLNS3 states de facto partners in the new agreement without consultation, compensation or their consent. Similarly, by in effect removing South Africa from the regional equation, the EU has left southern Africa bereft of an economic growth pole to drive forward integration. The result has been that, with SADC in particular, regional integration in the sub-continent has floundered. The ongoing EPA talks have only served to exacerbate this trend, a point acknowledged by the European Parliament (2008, p. 13): ‘the Commission's switch from a regional to a double approach, to both regional and national negotiations, was not helpful to stimulate regional integration’.
Between Cotonou and EPA
The 31 December 2007 deadline for the signing of EPAs came and went with relatively little comment in the media despite the seismic shift it represented in terms of EU–ACP relations.4 The EU steadfastly refused to bow to pressure from its ACP partners to extend the deadline for negotiations or to consider alternative scenarios to EPAs, essentially presenting the majority of ACP states with a ‘take it or leave it’ ultimatum. Then EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, stressed that ‘the deadline is not a bluff or some negotiating tactic invented in Brussels’ (2007a) and that the EU intended to meet the 2008 deadline. Speaking in November 2007, he stated that part of the reticence on the part of certain ACP states was that they ‘had been misled by the claims of some that politically easier alternatives – extensions to Cotonou, seeking another waiver, the availability of GSP+ – are achievable’ and that they believed that ‘the EU was holding something back, and if only they held out long enough against change, some way to preserve the status quo would be found’ (Mandelson 2007c). Yet the ACP countries were promised alternative scenarios. The Cotonu Agreement makes clear, in Articles 37.5 and 37.6, that EPAs will only be negotiated with ACP countries which ‘consider themselves in a position to do so’ and that the EU would commit itself to examine ‘all alternative possibilities’. ACP countries thus had every right, in the build-up to the 31 December 2007 deadline, to complain that the EU was acting in bad faith.
Ultimately, only the Caribbean Region signed a full EPA with the EU. A further 20 countries agreed to ‘interim’ EPAs whilst 43 countries decided, for a variety of reasons, not to sign up to any agreement at all. However, the consequences of not signing up to an EPA did not affect all ACP countries equally; for LDCs there was little threat of sanction as their access to EU markets was already secured through the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative. The result was that the majority of LDCs, especially in Africa, chose not to sign. For non-LDCs, the decision not to sign means that they become subject to the basic Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) regime applicable to all third countries.
Now that the dust has settled somewhat, it remains to assess the probable ramifications of the 31 December 2007 deadline. Proponents of the Cotonou agreement stressed the positive aspects of its regional focus. Yet there is precious little evidence to suggest that regional unity has been advanced by the process. With the exception of the Caribbean configuration, the EPA negotiations have arguably set back attempts at regionalism amongst the ACP countries, particularly in Africa where existing structures have been seriously undermined. In the Pacific, Papua New Guinea and Fiji have signed interim EPAs; the remaining PACP members have not. The Eastern and Southern African (ESA) configuration has splintered into two groups, while in West and Central Africa no agreement could be reached. However, individual countries such as Cameroon, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire opted to sign interim EPAs with the EU, abandoning their regional partners. Nigeria, Gabon and the Republic of Congo have, for the moment, opted out of the process altogether. In southern Africa, the SADC EPA group has been reduced to just five countries (out of a membership of 14 states). More importantly for the future of the SADC EPA, South Africa, the regional hegemony, has elected not to sign the interim agreement (ECDPM 2008, pp. 3–4).
The result is that the ACP bloc has disintegrated and, moreover, there is little to suggest any remnants of a ‘special relationship’. Despite arguments by Development Commissioner Louis Michel (interview in Trade Negotiation Insights 2008) to the contrary, many ACP countries felt bullied by the Commission in the build-up to December 2007. A declaration by the ACP Council of Ministers (2007) emphasised that members deplored ‘the enormous pressure that has been brought to bear on the ACP States by the European Commission, contrary to the spirit of the ACP-EU partnership’. In the declaration, ministers ‘underlined the importance of regional markets and stressed that any arrangements that undermine ongoing ACP regional integration processes must be avoided. In this regard, [ministers] emphasised the need to prioritise regional integration processes within the ACP, over the free trade with the European Union’. Similarly, African Trade Ministers, meeting in Addis Ababa, urged the Commission to note ‘that the level of preparedness to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements is inadequate’ and requested that ‘in the spirit of partnership’ the EU ‘show flexibility’ (African Trade Ministers 2007). That such ‘flexibility’ was not forthcoming was a source of considerable disquiet in countries such as Senegal.
Conclusion
The final months of 2007 witnessed the unravelling of the ACP as a bloc and the near-collapse of a ‘unique relationship’ stretching back to the early days of the European Union. The ‘special relationship’ between the EU and the ACP, although still trumpeted by the EU, has slowly eroded over the past three decades. In its initial incarnation, Lomé offered developing countries unprecedented access to developed country markets. However, this special relationship has been curtailed for a number of reasons: the rise of neoliberalism, the end of the Cold War, the evolution of the international trading regime and the rise of the EU as a genuinely international actor. The consequence of these factors for the ACP countries is that EU relations with the bloc have become ‘normalised’. There is an increasing sense that the ACP countries are no longer ‘special’, but are now simply one trading bloc amongst many. In an arena where the ‘voice’ of poorer countries is becoming increasingly diffused, the crumbling of ACP solidarity can only exacerbate the ongoing drift of many developing countries to the margins of the global economy.