Ranked-Choice Voting and the Potential for Improved Electoral Performance of Third-Party Candidates in America

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Abstract

Proponents of ranked-choice voting highlight a number of arguments for why such an approach to elections should be adopted. One major argument is that ranked-choice voting will encourage voters to support more third-party or independent candidates and break the electoral stranglehold of the two main parties in America. Considering approximately two-thirds of Americans want a third major party this argument may prove appealing to American voters, but there is currently no empirical evidence to support such claims. In this project, we explore a theory of why ranked-choice voting may increase voter support for third-party or independent candidates and test the argument that ranked-choice voting (RCV) will improve the fortunes of third-party candidates using a survey experiment. We find significant support for the claim that ranked-choice voting increases support for third-party candidates.

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Scholars have consistently demonstrated that no link exists between declining political trust and declining turnout, but they have paid less attention to the effect of trust on vote choice. In an era characterized by declining trust, the incumbent party has lost, and third parties have strongly contested, four of the last eight presidential elections. Such outcomes are historically anomalous. This study demonstrates that declining political trust affects vote choice, but the electoral beneficiary differs according to electoral context. In two-candidate races, politically distrustful voters support candidates from the nonincumbent major party. In races with three viable candidates, third-party alternatives benefit from declining political trust at the expense of both major parties.

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R. Alvarez, Jonathan Nagler (1995)

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Author and article information

Contributors

Alan James Simmons: (View ORCID Profile)

Journal

Title: American Politics Research

Abbreviated Title: American Politics Research

Publisher: SAGE Publications

ISSN (Print): 1532-673X

ISSN (Electronic): 1552-3373

Publication date Created: May 2022

Publication date (Electronic): February 25 2022

Publication date (Print): May 2022

Volume: 50

Issue: 3

Pages: 366-378

Affiliations

[1 ]University of Illinois at Springfield, Springfield, IL, USA

[2 ]Institute for Legal, Legislative, and Policy Studies, University of Illinois at Springfield, One University Plaza, MS PAC 451, Springfield, IL 62703-5407, USA.

Article

DOI: 10.1177/1532673X211072388

SO-VID: ea8c5ee6-9a4d-4248-acfb-80da5156b18b

License:

https://journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license

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