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      Sustained representation of perspectival shape

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          Abstract

          Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain an elliptical appearance even when we know it’s circular? This question has generated heated debate from Locke and Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely primarily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to elliptical objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw search arrays of three-dimensional “coins,” and simply had to locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose with static and dynamic cues, couldn’t be explained by strategic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape classes, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world objects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their objective shape “out there,” and their perspectival shape “from here.”

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          A cortical mechanism for triggering top-down facilitation in visual object recognition.

          Moshe Bar (2003)
          The majority of the research related to visual recognition has so far focused on bottom-up analysis, where the input is processed in a cascade of cortical regions that analyze increasingly complex information. Gradually more studies emphasize the role of top-down facilitation in cortical analysis, but it remains something of a mystery how such processing would be initiated. After all, top-down facilitation implies that high-level information is activated earlier than some relevant lower-level information. Building on previous studies, I propose a specific mechanism for the activation of top-down facilitation during visual object recognition. The gist of this hypothesis is that a partially analyzed version of the input image (i.e., a blurred image) is projected rapidly from early visual areas directly to the prefrontal cortex (PFC). This coarse representation activates in the PFC expectations about the most likely interpretations of the input image, which are then back-projected as an "initial guess" to the temporal cortex to be integrated with the bottom-up analysis. The top-down process facilitates recognition by substantially limiting the number of object representations that need to be considered. Furthermore, such a rapid mechanism may provide critical information when a quick response is necessary.
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            Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for 'top-down' effects.

            What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional "modular" understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: none of these hundreds of studies - either individually or collectively - provide compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or "cognitive penetrability". In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: in each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.
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              Representation and Recognition of the Spatial Organization of Three-Dimensional Shapes

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
                Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
                Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
                0027-8424
                1091-6490
                June 12 2020
                : 202000715
                Article
                10.1073/pnas.2000715117
                7334526
                32532920
                a312b3fd-2dcb-4a7e-aa2e-574b56a83349
                © 2020

                Free to read

                https://www.pnas.org/site/aboutpnas/licenses.xhtml

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