3
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: not found
      • Article: not found

      A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game

      Journal of Economic Theory
      Elsevier BV

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisher
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Related collections

          Most cited references21

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: not found
            • Article: not found

            Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control

              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: not found
              • Article: not found

              Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo

                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Journal of Economic Theory
                Journal of Economic Theory
                Elsevier BV
                00220531
                June 2004
                June 2004
                : 116
                : 2
                : 294-14
                Article
                10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00259-X
                26f0cbd5-43de-4146-a6ea-769b9cb8d324
                © 2004

                http://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/

                History

                Comments

                Comment on this article