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      Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections

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      Oxford Review of Economic Policy
      Oxford University Press (OUP)

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          The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections

          Incomplete understanding of the connection between campaign spending and election outcomes has hindered evaluation of enacted and proposed congressional campaign finance reforms. Reanalysis of the 1972 and 1974 House and Senate campaign spending data using both OLS and 2SLS regression models shows that spending by challengers has a much greater impact on the outcome than does spending by incumbents. A similar analysis of the effects of spending on voters' recall of candidates in the 1972 and 1974 SRC surveys supports the explanation that campaign expenditures buy nonincumbents the necessary voter recognition already enjoyed by incumbents prior to the campaign. The 1974 survey questions on Senate candidates indicate that, although the inability to remember candidates' names does not preclude having opinions about them, voters recalling candidates are much more likely to offer evaluative comments, and these more frequently refer to candidates personally. Aware voters offer more negative as well as positive evaluations (though positive outnumber negative); familiarity is not automatically advantageous. And voters' evaluations of candidates strongly influence how they vote. The implications of these findings for congressional campaign finance policy are readily apparent.
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            Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables

            To examine the traditional view that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent spending, I reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate's ability to raise campaign funds, such as candidate wealth levels. When the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account, the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal. In contrast to previous research showing that, because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending, the incumbent's spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates, this article shows that in an average Senate election the incumbent's spending advantage yields a 6% increase in the incumbent's vote share. That incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform. My findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates, and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers.
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              Explaining Senate Election Outcomes

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Oxford Review of Economic Policy
                Oxford Review of Economic Policy
                Oxford University Press (OUP)
                0266-903X
                1460-2121
                July 03 2009
                July 03 2009
                : 25
                : 2
                : 292-305
                Article
                10.1093/oxrep/grp018
                2440e034-f24f-4670-a9fc-9a52d3318f40
                © 2009
                History

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