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      War and Default

      1 , 2
      Journal of Conflict Resolution
      SAGE Publications

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          Abstract

          Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war’s economic disruptions, strains states’ ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war. In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war. After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finance and war onset.

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          Most cited references70

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          Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error

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            Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference

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              Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Journal of Conflict Resolution
                Journal of Conflict Resolution
                SAGE Publications
                0022-0027
                1552-8766
                October 2018
                June 01 2017
                October 2018
                : 62
                : 9
                : 1876-1904
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Department of Political Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA
                [2 ]Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
                Article
                10.1177/0022002717707239
                0fbbb00a-adba-477a-8a3c-89294b875151
                © 2018

                http://journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license

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