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      A strange state of mournful contentment : The role of compassion in moral betterment

      Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions
      The European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions

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          Abstract

          In this paper, I will consider a unique case where changing one’s character is part of a process of moral betterment when facing oppression. By engaging with the Dutch-Jewish intellectual and Holocaust victim Etty Hillesum, I will highlight the situated dimension of moral betterment as a practice that is driven by the pressure of concurrent events. I will claim that moral betterment does not just come out of an internal will to change for the better. Instead, I will argue that “bearing real suffering” (Hillesum 1996: 220) is what makes compassion a potential source of moral betterment. This is possible because in compassion, one experiences emotional friction between weakness and strength in facing the suffering caused by oppression.

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          A circumplex model of affect.

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            The Body in the Mind

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              Moral Enhancement

              Opponents of biomedical enhancement often claim that, even if such enhancement would benefit the enhanced, it would harm others. But this objection looks unpersuasive when the enhancement in question is a moral enhancement — an enhancement that will expectably leave the enhanced person with morally better motives than she had previously. In this article I (1) describe one type of psychological alteration that would plausibly qualify as a moral enhancement, (2) argue that we will, in the medium-term future, probably be able to induce such alterations via biomedical intervention, and (3) defend future engagement in such moral enhancements against possible objections. My aim is to present this kind of moral enhancement as a counter-example to the view that biomedical enhancement is always morally impermissible.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions
                Passion
                The European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions
                2773-1715
                June 18 2024
                June 18 2024
                : 1
                : 2
                : 139-153
                Article
                10.59123/passion.v1i2.13769
                04d669e3-3d16-438f-8330-44fe3a804c28
                © 2024

                https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

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